Dispatch Japan

Failure to fill key Asia policy posts hinders Obama administration

Mark Lippert, the assistant secretary of defense for Asia and one of President Barack Obama’s closest friends, was close by Chuck Hagel today when the US defense secretary met in Washington with his Japanese counterpart, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera.

In a few days, Lippert will still be at Hagel’s side, but no longer as head of the Pentagon’s Asia shop. Hagel announced 10-days ago that he had asked Lippert to be his chief of staff, a move widely-seen in Washington as beneficial to the Administration because it should ensure smooth communication between the White House and the Pentagon. The move takes effect on May 1.

Lippert is not only close to Obama, but came to know Hagel well when Obama and Hagel formed a strong bond while serving together in the US Senate.

But what of the Administration’s much-ballyhooed “rebalancing” of US strategic posture toward Asia? Who is running that show?

Lippert’s move to the Pentagon’s front office leaves two of the Administration’s top three Asia policy positions empty. Earlier this year, the influential Kurt Campbell departed after four years as assistant secretary of State for East Asia, and he has yet to be replaced.

At the National Security Council, the senior director for Asia, Danny Russel, is on loan from the State Department, and is reportedly in the running to be Campbell’s replacement. That would seemingly solve one problem but create another: a vacancy at the NSC, which is arguably the most influential of the three Asia-related posts in an administration that tends to centralize decision-making in the White House.

Some analysts argue that these vacancies are not all that important because the core of the Administration’s Asia policy – the “rebalancing” – is set in stone, and run from the very top by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and President Obama himself. Both the Pentagon and State Department have highly-competent staffs in the respective Asia shops, fully capable of managing day-to-day affairs. And,  largely because of heightened tensions with North Korea, high-ranking Administration officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey, recently have spent considerable time in region.

Others warn that the effectiveness of policy in Asia is tied to the credibility with which senior American officials named to top Asia policy posts are viewed by governments in the region. From this standpoint, the Obama administration is falling woefully short by leaving key positions unfilled.

Take the recent alarming deterioration in relations between two key US allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea. Critics, of which there are many, argue that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has unnecessarily exacerbated the tensions by encouraging visits by Japanese law-makers to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and with his accompanying nationalist rhetoric.

The State Department was sufficiently disturbed that it recently summonsed a diplomat from Japan’s Embassy in Washington to informally register the Administration’s concern.

Still, it remains unclear if Abe is fully aware of the unhappiness in Washington, which has led to a lot of discussion among Asia specialists that the Administration would be wise to use quiet but firm diplomatic means to ensure that the message gets directly to Abe and his inner circle. That, in turn, raises the question of who in the Obama Administration would have the “political juice” to effectively deliver the message.

One former government official who remains in close contact with Asia Hands in the administration says: “Strong communication through private channels is really needed, but I can’t think of who a credible interlocutor would be for Tokyo, especially since Lippert is moving up and out of the Asia business. The Administration has clearly not invested in relationships in Tokyo that put them inside the political decision-making loop.”

When relations with Tokyo are running smoothly, there is usually a senior official at the NSC, the State Department, or the Pentagon who is in daily contact with the Chief Cabinet Secretary, or a deputy chief cabinet secretary, in Tokyo, ensuring that messages at the highest level travel back-and-forth unhindered. That is not the case right now.

At the Pentagon, it’s widely believed that the acting assistant secretary for Asia, Peter Lavoy, will be nominated as Lippert’s permanent successor. Lavoy, who is a South Asia specialist, is highly-respected for his professionalism and expertise. But he is not considered a heavyweight in policy-making circles.

At State, the nomination of Russel as Campbell’s permanent replacement is now considered a foregone conclusion, though Secretary of State Kerry is reportedly resisting White House pressure, hoping instead to name his own person. Russel, who has been with the Obama NSC from the beginning, has been senior director for Asia since 2011, and is favored by President Obama’s inner circle.

A move by Russel to State would not be problem-free. While highly-respected for his expertise, especially in Japan and Korean affairs, Russel is said by numerous Foreign Service colleagues to be very political, with a knack for forming tight bonds with political appointees. His presence as chief of the East Asia bureau could create an awkward working situation with the bureau’s top career specialist, Jim Zumwalt. Also a Japan and Korea expert, Zumwalt is technically senior to Russel within the Foreign Service.

Moreover, with Caroline Kennedy reportedly in line to be the next US Ambassador to Japan, the US Embassy in Tokyo would need a strong deputy chief of mission. Reports are already circulating at State that Zumwalt could be asked, for the “benefit of the Service,” to return to Tokyo as DCM.

(After the initial publication of this report, Mr. Zumwalt forwarded the  following comment: "We have an extremely competent DCM in Tokyo: Kurt Tong.  He is doing a great job, and we have every confidence that he will help the new Ambassador to Japan get off to a strong start.  I have no plans to leave my present job in Washington.")

Meanwhile, a Russel move to the State Department would open up the top Asia spot at the NSC. National Security advisor Tom Donilon presumably would want to name a strong, trusted person to that key post. Within the tight fraternity of Asia specialists in Washington, it is anyone’s guess who that might be.

 

 

Manning: Pyongyang fearful of internal situation

Robert Manning is a senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as a senior counselor from 2001 to 2004 and as a member of the US Department of State Policy Planning Staff from 2004 to 2008. The interview was conducted via email for both Dispatch Japan and Weekly Toyo Keizai.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is motivating North Korea right now? Are these the tactics of a new regime trying to consolidate power? Or are these the tactics of a more shrewd leadership, engaging in yet another round of provocations designed to extract concessions?

 MANNING: The conventional wisdom to explain North Korea’s actions is that this is primarily about a new twenty-nine-year-old trying to consolidate his position by demonstrating how tough and courageous he is to the North Korean military and political elite.

That may be part of the answer. But let me offer an explanation that has been noticeably absent in the sea of commentary on North Korea in recent weeks.

It’s possible that a major reason North Korea’s new leaders decided they needed to whip up a sense of crisis — of a nation under siege and facing impending attack from outside enemies —is because they are insecure and fear a fragile internal situation that is increasingly difficult to control.

Since the end of the Cold War (and Soviet aid) North Korea’s economic system has steadily broken down. Since the great famine in 1995, there have been continual food shortages facing by some estimates up to one-third of North Korea’s twenty-three million people.

The breakdown of Pyongyang’s food-distribution system led the government to allow private markets and some private plots. There has been a bottom-up second economy taking shape. In recent years, markets have sprung up all over North Korea with a growing array of goods indulged by the regime as a coping mechanism. A fledgling merchant stratum has sprung up; it is occasionally harassed, but tolerated, and exists largely outside the government.

At the same time, despite efforts to keep the nation isolated, several factors — including economic trade and refugee flows to China, CDs and broadcasts from South Korea, and now some five million cell phones — have made its borders more porous and information flows more accessible.

This is a regime that are control freaks, and are deeply uncomfortable with things they can not control. That is a key reason they have rejected economic reforms such as those China and Vietnam have pursued.  To the degree that North Koreans get a dose of reality about the outside world, the myths of a “socialist paradise” by which the regime misgoverns start to unravel. If the twenty-three million North Koreans realize the massive lies fed to them to sustain the world’s only hereditary Stalinist dictatorship, it could gradually undo the regime.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the regime unstable?

MANNING: I am not arguing that the masses are poised to revolt. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Pyongyang still runs a terror state with some two hundred thousand in labor camps, and those caught trying to flee the country are frequently executed. But the current situation may be viewed by the regime as discomforting and fragile, with its efforts to seal off the country from reality increasingly more than fraying at the edges.

At the onset of a new leader’s tenure, how better to reassert tight control over its beleaguered citizens and whip up support for the regime than to instill fear and claim that the U.S. imperialists are on the verge of starting a nuclear war. This involved going to great lengths, including telling foreign embassies to evacuate Pyongyang and warning foreigners in South Korea to leave before the war starts. It’s great political theater, and Pyongyang seems oblivious to how ridiculous it is.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So Pyongyang is not looking for a large-scale confrontation?

MANNING: I don’t think so. Actually, I think the notion of a “crisis” – as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis – is nonsense. The world is not on the brink of an imminent nuclear confrontation. North Korean troops and artillery are not about to pour across the Demilitarized Zone. This is all nothing more than political theater. Unfortunately, a lot of media has gone along for the show, from the hysterical TV portrayals of goose-stepping North Korean troops, and breathless news reports of North Korean warnings of war, to maps depicting the range of imminent missile launches, complete with retired U.S. generals explaining the targets.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Still, the bellicosity has been pretty strident.

MANNING: This time around, it is louder and more melodramatic. But we have seen time and again North Korea throwing a political tantrum in response to annual U.S.-ROK military exercises or the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in response to Pyongyang testing a nuclear device or launching a missile.

Kim may be dangerous, but he is not crazy: North Korea is not suicidal. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests are not really “provocations.” They are part of a systematic military program that North Korea has been working on for more than forty years to obtain nuclear and missile capabilities. Diplomatic concessions in the past have affected the timing and perhaps the amount of missile and nuclear tests. But they have gone and will continue to go forward because the North Koreans want to gain such weapons. While I think deterrence still prevails, there is cause for more concern as the North Koreans develop new capabilities like the Musudan, with a 4000km range, and a mobile ICBM.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How can Pyongyang wind this down and “save face” without some kind of skirmish?

MANNING: I think they can simply claim victory, with a narrative that says US and its puppets in the South were about to attack us, but the heroic stance of Kim Jong Un forced them to back down. That may be why they held festivals and a marathon in the midst of this on April 15, Kim Il Sung's birthday. And why they did not test a missile --at least not in the midst of the pseudo-crisis as many expected.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent is Kim Jong-un actually calling the shots in Pyongyang?

MANNING: That is unclear. We know his uncle -- his father's brother-in-law, Jang Sang Taek, has been providing much adult supervision, and if you recall for about roughly a year after Kim Jong Il had a stroke in 2008, Jang was running day-to-day affairs. I suspect he is still playing a large role. But Kim is what passes for political legitimacy in North Korea.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why did the North shut down the Kaesong industrial area?

MANNING: They had suspended operations before. But given that Kaesong produces about $100 million a year in free money for the regime, it suggests domestic factors. 53,000 North Korean workers have been exposed to South Korean managers every day in Kaesong.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Has China really changed its attitude toward a greater willingness to apply substantial pressure on Pyongyang? Are there still limits to how much pressure China will apply? Would China risk bringing down the regime?

MANNING: This is a somewhat humiliating situation for Beijing, with the tail wagging the dog. Their problem is that they give stability a higher priority than denuclearization, and provide enough food, fuel and spare parts to keep N. Korea going, but have little real leverage. It is not like a rheostat that they can dial up or down a little; it is either on or off. And they are afraid of the consequences of turning it off and the possibility of a collapse where they would lose their buffer, and face a unified Korea aligned with the US.

But there is a growing debate within China among the political and intellectual elite over whether N.Korea may be a liability not an asset. China is willing to apply some pressure, endorsing sanctions. We will see how far they go in enforcing sanctions. Their ultimate problem is that like the Soviet Union, at some point N.Korea may collapse of its own weight, and China may not be able to do much about. In the meantime, rather than coordinating with the US, ROK on Japan, they have been reluctant to discuss "what if" – regime collapse -- questions.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:The US seems prepared to impose a price on North Korea for any conflict, while working carefully to avoid unnecessary escalation. Is that your assessment of the Administration’s approach, and do you agree with it?

MANNING: I think Obama has handled it about right. They show of force, the B-2s, was a clear statement that we are serious, and if they launch any aggression, it will be the end of N.Korea.

Yet the US cancelled an ICBM test to avoid appearing to escalate things, and have made it clear the US is willing to negotiate. The door is open -- anytime, so long as Pyongyang is willing to put its Weapons of Mass Destruction on the table, based on the 2005 agreement that the North walked away from, as they did with the Feb.29 2011 agreement.

In the past, North Korean actions have been designed to create tensions in order to extract concessions. But the Obama administration and that of the new ROK President Park Geun-hye have made it clear that they have both seen that movie before and are not buying it.

The administration has handled this tempest in a teapot well, with its military show of force sending a clear signal to the twenty-nine-year-old Kim that this is not a video game, and that Pyongyang should think twice before confronting the United States and its allies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent is the strenuous US reaction designed to reassure the region of US reliability, vs. the obvious desire to deter North Korea?

MANNING: I think for the US, credible deterrence and reassurance to our allies are inseparable. The US offshore balancer role in the Asia-Pacific remains an essential pillar of stability, and the US does not want to risk diminishing the credibility of that role. I think it is important to make clear to Pyongyang that they will not be accepted as a nuclear state. They would probably like an India-type agreement with the US, but Washington and Seoul are not going to give it to them.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there any chance for a diplomatic solution, and what would that look like?

MANNING: So long as the North Korean regime wants to possess nuclear weapons, there is little room for problem-solving diplomacy. There are deep levels of distrust on both sides and the North Korea regime is anachronistic, trapped in its own myths. That leaves little to seriously talk about.  Pyongyang should recall that the Soviet Union had thirty thousand nuclear warheads, yet that didn’t save it from collapsing from its own contradictions.

Americans tend to think all problems have solutions, but sometimes they can only be managed. We can plan for post-Kim regime scenarios, but we have to live with the present.

 

 

 

 

 

US-Japan agreement on Okinawa: Far less than advertised

US and Japanese officials are promoting the April 5th agreement on returning some land in Okinawa now used by the US military as a breakthrough in long-stalled plans for an overall restructuring of the US presence in Japan’s southern-most prefecture.  Amy Searight, the Pentagon’s principal director for East Asia policy, told reporters that the agreement “is a milestone in our progress towards realigning our forces in Okinawa.”

But even a cursory look shows that there is far less in this agreement than meets the eye. Indeed, in some ways it represents backtracking from an agreement announced in April 2012.

Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s office, while striving to not appear obstinate, pointed out that much of the agreement rests on the assumption that the controversial Marine Corps Air Station Futenma will be relocated to a new facility in the Henoko Bay area of the prefecture – a facility that Nakaima “has consistently believed and repeatedly warned is politically unfeasible.” The Okinawa Times, among other criticisms, echoed Nakaima by pointing out that “it has been nearly 17 years since agreement was reached to return the Futenma Air Station. The plan has made little progress because it was premised on the base’s relocation to the Henoko district.”

Consider these features of the agreement:

 

• The area to be returned totals about 2,590 acres, which is a mere 4.5 percent of the total amount of land now utilized by American forces based on Okinawa;

• Of these 2,540 acres to be returned, only 6.2 percent would be returned relatively soon, without significant conditions. That is a mere 161 acres. Moreover, numerous Okinawan commentators have pointed out that many of those 161 acres are of little use economically;

• On other hand, 80.2 percent of the planned land returns (2,076 acres) are contingent on construction of replacement facilities in Okinawa. This includes the Futenma Replacement Facility envisioned for Henoko – the one that Governor Nakaima continues to call politically unfeasible. The anticipated completion dates for these replacement facilities are all quite vague, specifically 2022-28 “or later.” The Okinawa Times referred to this “or later” caveat as “a love letter in the sand.”

• Finally, 13.6 percent of the planned land returns (353 acres) will coincide with the redeployment of 9,000 Marines out of Okinawa, including a to-be-determined number to Guam. However, construction on Guam of the necessary new facilities to support the inflow of Marines is bogged down by cost under-estimates, doubts about the plan in Congress, and now the US budget sequestration.

The argument from many Okinawans that the April 5^th agreement is a significant step backward is compelling. In April 2012, the two countries agreed to delink the return of 5 key facilities south of the huge Kadena Air Base from the Futenma-Henoko issue, which represented significant progress from a 2006 bilateral statement that had reaffirmed that link. The idea was to accelerate the return of the five facilities, which include Camp Zukeran, the Makiminato Service Area, and the Army port at Naha. The April 5^th agreement in essence abrogates the 2012 statement, and returns the entire issue to the status of 2006, making virtually all returns into a package, with the core element being the completion of the Futunma Replacement Facility in Henoko.

The Abe administration is hoping that identifying specific dates for the return of each facility will weaken opposition in Okinawa to the Henoko plan. But it remains very unclear whether local officials in Okinawa will accept that argument from Washington and Tokyo that the moveable and flexible timelines for the return of key facilities actually represents a concrete schedule.

High-level Ministry of Defense officials are optimistic that Governor Nakaima, a member of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, will eventually show flexibility and lower his opposition to the Henoko plan.

The Governor’s office is now reviewing an application from Tokyo to engage in landfill operations in Henoko Bay that are necessary for construction of the new facility. That review will take somewhere between 8-10 months, coming close to a scheduled January 2014 race for mayor of Nago, of which Henoko is a district. The current mayor, Susumu Inamine, is opposed to the Henoko project.

The MOD and the prime minister’s office (Kantei) seem to think they can out-maneuver Mayor Inamine by somehow winning the support of a majority of Nago assembly members.

Senior staff members in the Office of Prefectural Governor (Nakaima’s staff) argue that the MOD and Kantei are wildly optimistic, but say it will take about a month to gauge the overall reaction to the April 5^th agreement and other efforts  by Tokyo (including economic aid packages) to sway opinion among local officials throughout the prefecture.

All of this obscures the worrisome fact that, under the most optimistic scenario, the dangerous Futenma facility (located smack in the middle of Ginowan City) will remain open for another nine years, even though there are clear alternatives available. The alternatives, which US and Japanese officials have informally discussed, include a new facility on Shimojishima island (part of Okinawa prefecture), consolidation of the Futenma operations onto the huge Kadena air base, or construction of a new heliport inside Camp Schwab or Camp Hansen, combined with US access to a new runway to be built in Naha. The last option would include the US hosting of a regiment of Ground Self Defense Forces at Hansen or Schwab, which the GSDF is  anxious to do.

Discussion of these alternative options has never officially been acknowledged by either Washington or Tokyo, for fear of killing the Henoko plan without an alternative firmly in place.

As things stand now, the two sides are committed to the Henoko plan, but continued opposition on Okinawa in the face of the April 5^th agreement could finally force Washington and Tokyo to seriously pursue one of the alternative options.

 

 

For Abe, talks with Obama came down to ‘take what you can get’

From the standpoint of his political image back home, the February 22 summit meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama was a big success for the Japanese leader. Abe was able to bolster his standing with the Japanese public and within his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as someone who can effectively manage the all-important US-Japan alliance. He projected the image of a strong leader by forcefully proclaiming that Japan “is back,” and that he has restored trust in the US-Japan relationship by reversing three years of supposed alliance disorder engendered by the Democratic Party of Japan.

The big headline in Japan was that Abe had successfully secured from Obama a statement clarifying that Tokyo would not have to make any unilateral concessions on tariff reductions as a precondition for joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

But the heavy focus on the joint statement on trade distorted the overall picture of the summit.

Indeed, walking down the TPP avenue so quickly was not Abe’s preference. It was the path he had to take if he were to demonstrate that the US-Japan alliance “is back,” since the White House made TPP its priority.

All along, Abe wanted to demonstrate alliance revival by pushing collective self-defense (his "gift" was to be a public statement of Japan's willingness to use its missile defense to try to shoot down any North Korean ballistic missile aimed at US territory), and to get a strong US statement specifically criticizing China, by name, for its East China Sea maritime provocations.

The White House would have none of it, and pushed for the public agenda to focus on North Korea, cooperation on other aspects of global security, and economic policy, especially trade.

Abe had to adjust. The word in political circles in Tokyo is that Japanese negotiators secured the final wording of the joint statement on TPP roughly ten days ago, which emboldened Abe to begin pushing in the days leading up to the summit for the LDP to accept Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations. Roughly half of the LDP’s Diet members oppose TPP, fearful of a backlash from the country’s powerful agriculture lobby.

Because Obama wanted to focus on TPP and economics so heavily, Abe had to allow TPP into the forefront if he hoped to demonstrate back home his ability to manage the alliance. Obama mentioned that the “highest priority” between the two countries is to restore healthy economic growth. The White House wants Japan, which still has the world’s third-largest economy, to join TPP, though not at the cost of watering down the low-tariff philosophy behind the prospective agreement.

Abe would have preferred to avoid tackling the complicated domestic politics of TPP until after critical Upper House elections to be held by next July. But he found he couldn’t do that and also successfully stage-manage his appearance in DC. It looks now as if Abe will announce fairly soon a decision to enter the TPP talks. It remains to see just how hard  Abe will push for genuine tariff reform, especially on agricultural products like rice, once the blowback from inside the LDP and from agricultural interests begins.

     ARM’S DISTANCE: The TPP joint statement notwithstanding, it was hard to miss that Obama kept Abe at arm's distance during the summit.

     One: There was no joint press conference. Last year, on April 30, while he was readying for an ultra-secret midnight departure for Afghanistan that night, President Obama took the time for a 30-minute joint press conference with then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Obama praised the alliance, joked easily with Noda, and promoted the "joint vision" that had been announced just days before by the "2+2" meeting between the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries.

This time, with Abe, Obama did not take the time for a press conference.

     Two: Oval Office theater. In a brief Oval Office appearance with Abe, Obama mentioned North Korea, cooperation on Afghanistan, and the high priority of promoting economic growth. He spoke not one word about the Senkakus, China, Okinawa, or even a "joint vision" of the sort announced with Noda. Abe tried his best to criticize China, very indirectly, but adhered to US desires to not rile-up Beijing. Obama took one question from a small press “pool,” which was on the looming US budget sequestration. He answered at length, but said nothing about Abe, Japan, or Asia. Obama directed the second and final question toward Abe.

     Three: Neither Obama nor Secretary of State John Kerry took the seemingly easy step of reiterating the January 18 statement by then-Secretary of State Clinton outlining American opposition to any effort at unilateral change of Japan's administrative control of the Senkakus. This was a far-cry from Abe's initial desire for a strong statement from Obama specifically mentioning China.

     Four: The White House surely gave Abe a carefully worded statement that the prime minister can use at home to push for TPP entry. But this was a case of Abe adapting to the US agenda. Abe did not want to be in a position of promoting TPP before the Upper House elections, but that's where he finds himself.

Obama embraced the US-Japan alliance, but did not embrace Abe.

 

Obama to embrace Japan, not Abe

With North Korea having recently tested a third nuclear device and China acting provocatively in the East China Sea, there will be plenty for Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama to talk about when they meet at the White House later today.

The summit will provide an opportunity for the US and Japan to reaffirm their bilateral security alliance and the need for regional peace, stability, and security.

However, below the surface, there is a great deal of unease about Prime Minister Abe in the White House, and at the State Department and the Pentagon. Concern is running high that Abe’s views on history, and his nationalist feelings toward Korea and China, could complicate relations in Northeast Asia as Japan pursues what are otherwise modest and logical expansions of security responsibilities and capabilities in the region.

Some Asia specialists from the Bush administration who know Abe, and worked with him while he was chief cabinet secretary and later briefly prime minister in 2006-2007, are fairly confident that Abe will act pragmatically, and not let his ideology cause problems for Japanese diplomacy.

But few people in the Obama administration know Abe, and top officials are somewhat skeptical that Abe (and those around him, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and education minister Hakubun Shimomura) will be able to restrain their nationalist impulses and act with a clear strategic vision for stability in the region. As Michael Cucek pointed out recently, Abe himself declared in his “new” book (a virtual reprint of an earlier tome) that his return to power is not simply a replacement of the discredited Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), but “is a fight to return the country called Japan to the hands of the citizens of Japan from out of the grip of postwar history.” Abe’s long-standing “history denier” perspective has not changed.

For this reason, the Obama administration, while squarely reaffirming the alliance, wants to avoid any statements or symbolic gestures during Abe’s brief visit that could appear provocative toward Beijing, or be seen as an endorsement of Abe’s personal political agenda.

     DIFFICULT PREPARATIONS: To begin with, the White House was never terribly enthusiastic about a visit from Abe. Tokyo pushed very hard for a January summit, but the White House said the president’s schedule would not permit that.  The White House attitude amounted to: Abe virtually invited himself, so we could hardly say ‘no.’

Part of the problem is that expectations in Washington are quite low of anything substantial emerging soon from Tokyo on hot-button issues like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks or basing arrangements for US forces on Okinawa. Many had assumed that this was a problem of the poor governance and weakness of the DPJ, but it is clear now that it is a broader political problem in Japan. Abe is not able or willing to push for progress on key issues at least until after next summer’s Upper House elections.

Abe had assumed, mistakenly, that his return to office, and that of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), would be met with cheers in Washington, that an “anything but the DPJ” attitude prevailed. While greater political stability is certainly welcomed by Obama administration officials, many in Washington were pretty happy with the foreign and security policies of the DPJ’s Yoshihiko Noda, who is clearly more moderate than Abe.

All of this made it difficult for senior officials to work out details for the summit. This became apparent two weeks ago, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Zumwalt and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey met in Washington with Takeo Akiba of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ro Manabe of the Ministry of Defense. When the talks ended, the Japanese officials were unusually brusque in declining to talk with gathered reporters, indicating the continued lack of clarity made it difficult to brief the press.

As late as last Friday, after the prime minister’s office had announced that Abe would visit Washington on February 21-23 and meet with Obama on the 22^nd, the White House would not provide quick confirmation. That afternoon, the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent a ‘heads-up’ note to the Japanese press corps saying that “if the situation allows it to happen,” Abe would visit on February 21-23. Only later did the White House issue a statement announcing the visit. Coordination was less than smooth.

     WHITE HOUSE NIXES ABE PLANS: For Abe, the visit with President Obama is important as an opportunity to demonstrate to his domestic audience that he can manage the all-important alliance with the US. However, it may turn out that the only concrete news Abe is able to bring to Washington is that the Diet will likely sign the Hague Convention provisions concerning custody arrangements of children of failed international marriages. The repeated hearing of tragic stories spurred former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to champion the cause. The DPJ had agreed to adopt legislation, and Abe has followed. But even on this issue Abe still faces hurdles, as conservatives object to “outside intervention” into family disputes, and liberals (especially the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito, have raised concerns about Japanese women victims of domestic violence.

Abe had initially hoped to trumpet his plans to lift Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and make clear publicly that Japan would use its missile defenses to assist the United States in the event North Korea launched a ballistic missile aimed at US territory.  Abe assumed the new policy would be welcomed in Washington.

That was not the case. The Pentagon, of course, would welcome the defense planning and operational flexibility that would come from Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. But US officials were concerned that a demonstration of support for such an initiative by Abe could be misinterpreted as endorsement of the prime minister’s broader domestic agenda, including revision of the Constitution, which could unnecessarily anger Beijing. Instead, US officials pressed to keep discussions during the summit to specific means to enhance deterrence and regional stability, including better US-Japan combined intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training of Japanese Self-Defense Force marine capabilities.

In the same vein, Washington was not eager to back Abe’s desire for specific criticism of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea, particularly with regard to the Senkaku islands. The Obama administration is trying to walk a very fine line between clearly warning China against efforts to unilaterally challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus, and not giving China any reason to feel threatened.

The White House is perfectly willing to reaffirm the statement made on January 18^th by then-Secretary of State Clinton in a joint appearance with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida. Without mentioning China by name, Clinton warned against “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus. But in the same sentence, she went on to say that “we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means.”

This is a warning to China, but it is also an effort to stay engaged with China, to let Beijing know that the US would not favor provocative actions by Japan, and to let Abe know that the US wants his government to stay cool and calm.

In the White House view, a specific reference to China might boost Abe’s domestic agenda, but would not be helpful for the alliance or for regional stability and security.

Within the Obama administration, the departure of Hillary Clinton and her influential assistant for Asian affairs Kurt Campbell has led to a subtle but important shift in the balance of power in managing Japan-related issues. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is a strong supporter of the strategy of “rebalancing” US force posture and diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Donilon is also extremely concerned about the strategic dilemma posed by China. How can the US simultaneously engage China and deter China from exercising undue heavy-handedness in the region? How best to persuade a rising China to participate in a rules-based regional and global architecture, and not create a self-fulfilling prophecy of China as an enemy?

It’s in this context that Donilon and other administration officials are wary of Abe’s hard line nationalist proclivities.

     TPP AND OKINAWA:  Meanwhile, the White House is frustrated that Abe will not provide an affirmative answer about Japan’s participation in the TPP trade talks, but officials there and at the State Department know that until next summer, Abe’s priority will likely be the Upper House elections. Abe does not want to anger the LDP’s rural voter base. Close to half of the LDP’s Diet delegation is opposed to TPP participation. For his part, Abe has been hinting at the possibility of making a decision on TPP prior to the elections. But the betting in Washington is that Abe is angling to garner from Obama some language hinting at flexibility in the demand that Japan put rice and other sensitive economic sectors on the negotiating table as a precondition to joining the talks. Washington is very reluctant to carve out exceptions for Japan prior to a decision by Tokyo to participate.

Many in Washington believe Abe wants Japan to eventually join TPP, if only out of the strategic recognition that TPP could be an important component of a rules-based regional security and economic architecture to which China would have to adapt. (Economic reform, which TPP could help spur, has never been in the forefront of Abe’s thinking.) But it’s unclear if and when Abe will be willing to spend the political capital required to move the issue forward.

Obama will be anxious to hear from Abe his intentions concerning TPP, but it remains unclear how the two sides will be able to meet each other’s stated political needs.

Concerning Okinawa, particularly plans to construct in the Henoko area a facility to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, expectations in Washington are very low.

The White House, State Department, and Pentagon were all quite upset that the Abe administration did not provide them with advance notice that Abe would not, prior to his Washington visit, send a request to Okinawa Governor Nakaima for permission to begin landfill work for the Henoko project.

Administration officials were not upset about Abe’s decision itself; that was expected. But the timing of his announcement, with no advance warning to Washington, upset US officials.

As for the Henoko project itself, the Obama administration increasingly recognizes the political reality that in all likelihood it will not be built, and has already begun serious consideration of possible alternatives. Indeed, this was discussed directly with the prime minister’s office and the foreign and defense ministries, prior to Prime Minister Noda leaving office. But the feeling in Washington and Tokyo is that Henoko cannot be publicly abandoned until an alternative is prepared, because Okinawans might conclude that the US will be staying at Futenma forever, and this perception would cause terrible problems. For now, both sides will continue to publicly support Henoko, even though both sides agree an alternative must be found.

 

 

 

Smith: ‘Japan needs a strategic accommodation with South Korea’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fourth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Sheila Smith is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

SMITH: Given events in the region, I think this will be a crisis management summit to reaffirm the alliance. The transition in Japan makes this a good opportunity to discuss some outstanding bilateral issues, including TPP and Okinawa. But the real challenge for both sides will be to conduct the alliance reaffirmation in a way that has real meaning.

In Northeast Asia, we are facing a moment where our bilateral alliance cooperation really matters. We see Japan in a standoff with China over the Senkakus. There is no agreement on maritime boundaries. We’ve got a rising China with a trajectory of military growth.

All of the pieces are there for this to be a pretty serious heads-up for the alliance. The deterrence message is very important, and the Obama administration has done a good job in this area. But the risk-reduction message is also vital. Frameworks – bilateral, trilateral, regional – somehow have to be constructed with Beijing. I suspect there is a significant amount of interest blossoming at some level in China, because this standoff, or worse, is clearly not helpful to China’s longer-term interests.

Meanwhile, this is the beginning of the second Obama administration, and the White House is committed to a rebalancing of American force structure and overall strategic focus toward Asia. This is a moment for the Obama administration to begin defining and refining the rebalancing strategy.

Finally, the economic component of the US-Japan relationship needs enhancement. TPP is one piece of that, but there is much to be gained from a pretty frank discussion by the two leaders about growth strategies, including the yen and longer term economic goals, and how the alliance might work to support those strategies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

SMITH: There has been a lot in the media about superficial things, such as the timing of the summit, or the Kyodo report that the Obama administration gave a firm “no” to collective self defense. Some reports seem almost determined to find problems. I don’t think that this is the tone or tenor of the upcoming meeting.

But there are challenging issues, including TPP and the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.

The Diet has made progress toward ratification of the Hague convention.

The real question is: what will the alliance accomplish? They will have to talk about the longer-term forward deployment of US forces. It wouldn’t be a bad idea to create some kind of strategic consultative process, not just one confined to the Senkaku problem, but one that envisions the shape and roles of the alliance over the next decade or two.

I suspect Abe will want to talk about TPP, even if he is not ready or able to say that Japan will join the talks. The president will want to hear Abe’s views on this. We all know it poses a domestic political hurdle, but the president would like to have a clear sense of how the prime minister plans to proceed.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

SMITH: The administration is anxious to know how much “traction” the alliance can get. There is a tendency to dub recent problems as a “DPJ problem.” I don’t agree with that. Japanese politics are going through a structural transition. There will be governments, like the current Abe cabinet, that say “we have to wait until after the next election” before we can tackle this or that issue. This is not just a problem for one party. It is a structural problem that is as troubling for the conservatives as it was for the liberals, and it poses a big problem for the Japanese government.

The Obama administration wants to embrace the alliance. But there is much more realism in Washington now about how much can be accomplished, and how quickly. The realism first set in while the DPJ was in office, but it has not gone away with the LDP having come back.

There are signals, including the rising stock market and high ratings for the cabinet, that are positive, and people in Washington are aware of this, but the relatively low expectations remain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

SMITH: There are people in Washington from the Bush administration who have worked with Abe, but the Obama administration needs time to get to know him. It’s best to treat him not as a former prime minister who has come back, but rather as head of a new cabinet that just came to office. That will enable the White House to get a feel for Abe’s perspectives, on the ‘history’ issue, on collective self defense, and other issues.

There definitely are questions in Washington about exactly what Abe means by ‘collective self-defense.’ People would like to get beyond the campaign slogans of “constitutional revision” and “reinterpreting collective self-defense,” so as to get down to the actual details of what that would mean for force posture, for interoperability between US and Japanese forces, and for roles and missions.

The administration would like to know in more concrete ways what his policies are aiming at. For example, when Defense Minister Onodera said he planned to throw out the existing National Defense Program Guidelines, most of us in Washington collectively groaned: “Why? What’s wrong with the ‘dynamic deterrence’ policies outlined in the current NDPG?”

The feeling in the administration is a desire for less of the political coloring of these issues, and more of the concrete details.

Then there is the broader issue of ‘history,’ especially ‘comfort women.’ What does Mr. Abe plan to do? Does he want to issue a new statement, while not replacing the Murayama statement? There are still big questions about the prime minister’s intentions, particularly with regard to Japan’s relations with South Korea. These are not really questions of history of Japan’s wartime activities. The issue really is the viability of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the ROK.

People are watching closely Mr. Abe’s efforts to reach out to South Korea, not simply on a strategic level, but really the broader process of reconciliation and accommodation. This is where Abe’s personal views, and those of some of his cabinet members, will be very important.

We are all looking to see how Mr. Abe will treat the upcoming Takeshima Day, how Minister Shimomura will handle textbook revision, and other issues that could have an impact on Japan-ROK relations.

It is well-known that the prime minister and some of his cabinet members have very explicit personal views. But people are willing to wait and see how they proceed as a government, and make judgments once specific policies emerge.

Given the strategic environment in East Asia, particularly after the recent North Korean nuclear test, Japan and South Korea cannot afford to not move in the direction of a broad accommodation. It is very much in Japan’s strategic interests, equally important perhaps as it is to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

SMITH: The DPJ and the LDP face the same problem: what is going to happen with Japanese agriculture? How much is any Japanese prime minister willing to risk politically to mobilize for agriculture reform? How much is the prime minister willing to use TPP as a tool for promotion of economic competitiveness?

We need Japan to join because that would greatly strengthen TPP. But Japan needs to do so pretty quickly so as to fully participate. Right now, the talks are proceeding without any voice from Japan. It really boils down to whether Japan wants to be pro-active about open markets and competitiveness, or wants to stay in the old mode of incrementalism.

In reality, Abe will probably have to win a huge Upper House election victory to make this possible. And he would still have to convince an awful lot of his own LDP Diet delegation to go along. The consensus-building won’t start until after the Upper House election. No LDP member will want to go into that election campaigning on a pro-TPP platform.

Unfortunately, with the TPP talks supposed to wrap up by the end of this year, that would mean Japan would not be able to catch up and influence the final outcome.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

SMITH: This is certainly not the first government in Tokyo to lack enthusiasm about tackling Okinawa basing issues. Ryutaro Hashimoto was the most pro-active. Junichiro Koizumi was very pro-alliance, but he was not visibly pro-active about Okinawa the way Hashimoto was. Most politicians see only trouble, and no rewards, in becoming heavily involved in Okinawa base issues.

The politics are also more complicated on Okinawa since the days of Hashimoto as prime minister. People often say: wait and see what happens in the next election. In Okinawa, there is always a “next election,” often within six months – governor, prefectural assembly, Nago mayor. There is always something.

But the trend lines have shifted considerably against the Henoko project. Local LDP leaders in Okinawa are openly against the Futenma Replacement facility plan for Henoko. For example, Naha Mayor Onaga led the recent protests that went to Hibiya Park in Tokyo.

We used to think of this as a progressive-left vs. conservative-right issue, and if the conservatives would just come back all would be fine. But it is much more complicated than that.

There is a new reality in the balance among and within Japan’s political parties. You don’t have the same people representing Tokyo and Okinawa. Trust was never very deep between Tokyo and Okinawa, but now there is even less than in the past. Tokyo is going to have to work very hard to win back the conservatives recently elected to the Okinawa prefectural assembly. They openly campaigned against the Henoko project.

I have thought for quite some time that the Henoko project is the least realistic of our options. Now, that is even more the case, with both liberals and conservatives on Okinawa lined up against it.

Can Abe-san shift that? We’ll have to see. Japan hasn’t had a conservative prime minister in quite some time. In any case, it will take time.

Unlike other issues, such as abductees or revision of the Constitution, Okinawa basing is not an issue on which Mr. Abe has been outspoken. We don’t know what he really thinks. But given everything else he has to deal with before the Upper House election, I cannot imagine that this is high on his priority list.

 

Hornung: Obama to urge Abe to avoid ‘overtly antagonistic’ policies toward neighbors

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the third in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Jeffrey Hornung is an associate professor with the Hawaii-based Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

 HORNUNG: No, I don’t. They will have lots to talk about: China, Senkaku, revised defense guidelines, Futenma Replacement Facility, North Korea, and energy. Given Abe’s recent public statements on the TPP and the desire to make a decision on Japan’s participation, it is likely this will also be a focus of discussion. That said, I don’t expect any specific achievements beyond a frank conversation, a reiteration of the importance of the alliance, and a photo opportunity.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

HORNUNG: I think Abe’s goal for the summit is limited to having a face-to-face meeting with Obama and talk about the aforementioned issues. The summit is highly valuable to Abe because it provides him an opportunity to explain his thoughts on the issues, what he intends to do, and to demonstrate that he is both a good steward of the alliance and welcomed by the US. It doesn’t appear Abe will ask Obama for anything specific regarding any of the issues. 

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

 HORNUNG: Initially, I think the US agreed to the meeting because the Japanese side strongly requested it. Now that the meeting is taking place, I sense the US will use the meeting to talk about priorities for the alliance under Abe, express a strong desire for progress on Japan’s participation in the TPP and emphasize the need for Japan to have good relations with its neighbors and therefore tone down any statements or policies that may be seen as overtly antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think Abe will bring any gifts to Washington. He is not in a position to do so on issues that are relevant to the alliance. There is no consensus in Okinawa on the FRF, members of the LDP are not yet convinced about joining the TPP, and Abe just re-engaged his expert panel from his first administration to restart discussions on collective self-defense. There have been no decisions reached on any of these issues, so he is in no position to offer any new policies. If anything can be considered a “gift,” Abe may play up his decision to exempt F-35 fighter jet parts manufactured by Japanese firms from Japan’s prohibition on exporting arms. Or he may emphasize his willingness to submit legislation to enable Japan to join the Hague Convention.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

 HORNUNG: It is not a case of Washington being comfortable or not with Abe and any personal views he may hold. Instead, it is more about US strategic thinking, and officials in Washington trying to maintain calm relations throughout Asia at a time the President has expressed an interest in rebalancing to the region. If you look at Abe’s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, he too was rather conservative when it came to security matters, very similar to Abe. And yet, under Noda, relations with the US returned to normalcy after a brief hiatus under Noda’s two predecessors.

 The difference between Noda and Abe is Noda didn’t try to overtly antagonize China or South Korea. Yes, Noda purchased three of the Senkaku Islands, but he did it only because he was trying to prevent a worse scenario. On the other hand, Abe’s speeches and comments during the LDP presidential election and general election were at times antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors, particularly China. From the US perspective, such comments are a distraction because it disrupts Japan’s relations with its neighbors, which influences US ability to effectively engage all countries in the region on more substantial issues. Likewise, although Abe said he will not revise the Kono Statement or the Murayama Statement, he will issue his own statement. If his statement flares up anti-Japanese sentiments in China or South Korea, or hurts relations with those countries with which Japan is slowly working to strengthen security relations (i.e. Southeast Asian countries, Australia, India), the energy devoted to calming the tensions is a distraction to US engagement on other issues.

 The US can work with conservative Japanese premiers, but I think the problem (if there is one) arises when those premiers pursue policies or statements that hurt Japan’s relations with its neighbors. The US wants Japan to have good relations with its neighbors, including China. I get the sense that Abe understands all this, and in order to show he is a good steward of the alliance, we can probably expect him to tone down his rhetoric on things like history.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 HORNUNG: It is difficult to say without asking Abe himself, but I can appreciate the difficult decision he faces. In Abe’s party there are members who strongly oppose Japan’s participation because they are concerned the LDP will lose votes from the agriculture sector if Abe announces his decision to join TPP talks. This matters because Upper House elections are scheduled for July, and he wants to secure a majority so as to provide him legislative power to pursue other items on his agenda. Joining the TPP talks would jeopardize this because it would upset those voters that have traditionally voted for the LDP. At the same time, he has pledged his determination to tackle Japan’s economic problems and a desire to build closer relations with the US. Joining TPP talks would assist both of these goals.  While I don’t expect any movement on this issue prior to the summit, it can be expected that they will discuss Abe’s position.

Still, there is a limited timeframe within which we can expect Abe to reach a final decision. This is because the US requires 90 days of Congressional deliberations for approval when it holds international trade negotiations. Because it is expected that TPP member countries will conclude their talks at the October APEC meeting, Abe will have to reach a decision sometime after the summit and prior to July’s elections. Given that Abe consistently reiterates his interest in joining the talks premised on the ability to gain exceptions to abolishing all tariffs, he appears interested in joining the talks, while looking for some sort of political leverage to gain his party’s acceptance. It is a political balancing act that I’m not sure he can win. It is unclear whether other TPP-interested countries are keen to allow exceptions and, if they did, whether Abe’s LDP would accept these exceptions as sufficient to justify them approving Japan’s participation.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think the plan is dead, nor is it a case of which person in Tokyo can move forward with the project. It is more a case of who in Okinawa can move the project forward. Or more correctly, who wants to move the project forward. Although Abe has announced he will not move forward with the project for now, he will focus on efforts to make a positive political environment in Okinawa, nurturing relations with local politicians in Nago and Naha in an effort to build some semblance of trust. In order for the project to proceed, not only the governor, but the Nago mayor and council have to approve. Currently, all oppose. Abe’s task is to nurture a better political environment to get some to say yes before their next election OR to help get candidates elected that support the plan. There are elections next year in Nago and Naha. Some in Tokyo believe that Gov. Nakaima may step down (due to health reasons) before the next election but, before doing so, announce his support of the plan in order to settle the contentious issue once and for all. Under this thinking, Abe’s task is to create for Nakaima an environment for a ‘hanamichi’ (path for a graceful exit) in the interlude.

  

 

Cossa: Abe and Obama to ‘get acquainted’ at meeting

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the second in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Ralph Cossa is president of Pacific Forum-CSIS, a leading think-tank focusing on Asia and the Pacific.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

COSSA: It sounds like this is turning into a “get acquainted” meeting rather than a summit with key deliverables. I’m sure the administration was hoping for more – Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF, Henoko), TPP – but it seems clear he is coming empty-handed.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

COSSA: Abe wants Obama’s blessing, and wants to enhance his image prior to Upper House elections, which seem to be the only thing really on Abe’s mind.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

COSSA: The Obama administration will likely try to impress upon Abe that deliverables are needed now on FRF and eventually on TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

COSSA: Washington is likely less comfortable or enthused about Abe than he apparently thinks Washington is or should be. I have not talked with him directly but others have told me that he believes Washington is (or at least should be) relieved with his victory, and that he has an “anything but DPJ” mentality that will not sell very well in DC. When Noda was in office, Washington was actually pretty comfortable with the DPJ. Abe’s election has raised both expectations and anxieties, given some of his election posturing, although most believe the “real Abe” is not as bad as his campaign rhetoric implies or as bad as his critics advertise.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

COSSA: Probably. If I were making US policy, I would not be pushing Japan to join now, since, with respect to market openness, it would lower the lowest denominator. If I were Japan, I would want to join now, when pressure to open up would probably be relatively low because the US is so anxious for Japan to join. So neither side’s current position makes sense to me.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

COSSA: Part of the raised expectations in Washington is on Abe delivering on FRF. Asking for more time does not cut it. If Abe can’t deliver and move the Henoko project forward after the Upper House election, it will cause some strains between the two governments. But last month, we published an essay by Kerry Gershaneck of Hawaii Pacific University on a possible alternative FRF facility, one that Kerry wrote would be “more strategically useful, politically viable, and environmentally friendly” than Henoko.

 

 

Nelson: Obama to urge ‘calm management’ of China ties in talk with Abe

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the first in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Chris Nelson is the founder and editor of The Nelson Report, one of the most influential voices in Washington on US policy toward East Asia.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

NELSON: Probably not much specific beyond important reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance, and a clear restatement of concerns about North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear explosives.

Obama will likely want to be careful in his wording on the Senkakus, insisting on no use of force to change the status quo of Japanese administrative control, while not taking sides in the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to sovereignty. A lot will depend on the ongoing debate over Japan’s intelligence evaluation that China recently aimed a “lock-on” radar system at a Japanese naval vessel. That kind of radar system is used to guide weapons in an attack. Did that really happen, and has China backed away from that provocation since then?  Pyongyang’s testing of another nuclear device has heightened regional tensions and added a degree of urgency to the meeting..

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

 NELSON: Abe would like a public demonstration from the US of solidarity and support on regional security, and he would like to avoid any public statements on politically ‘difficult’ issues that could complicate Upper House politics for the LDP.

Privately, Abe, like the rest of non-Chinese Asia, is very worried about the budget crisis (‘sequestration’) in Washington, and whether Congress and the White House will be able to keep the security commitments  that Asia, especially Japan, is relying on for regional stability.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal? 

NELSON: The White House wants to present a dual public message: solidarity with Japan, along with calm management of regional security problems.

Privately, the White House wants to reinforce concerns already expressed about alliance management, especially Japan’s relations with South Korea, which is an important US ally and very important to regional security. The White House also wants to reinforce maintaining a calm approach to China and the Senkakus problem. Finally, the White House would like some clarification on Abe’s intent concerning TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

NELSON: Beef may be the only topic on which Abe will be able to publicly bring some good news for the US. With an Upper House election to take place by next summer, Abe feels limited in what he can do. This assumes that without the political complications associated with the election, Abe would actually be in favor of TPP or the building of a new US Marine facility on Okinawa, but we really don’t know that, which is why the White House wants clarification on Abe’s actual views.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

NELSON: Many in the US foreign policy elite, including in the Obama administration, have made clear that they are uncomfortable with the ‘revisionist history’ views held by some Japanese leaders. These views complicate alliance management, especially with South Korea, and make managing relations with China much more difficult. I doubt that this will be expressed in public. It will be interesting to see if any senior US officials who give background briefings about the summit bring up these sensitive topics.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 NELSON: ‘Eventually’ is a long time! There is no question that major business, finance, and foreign policy officials see the importance, both strategically and policy-wise. A lengthy delay by Japan runs the risk that too many chapters in a prospective TPP agreement will be set, and therefore non-negotiable, without a chance for Japan to influence the details.

Abe’s agricultural minister is seen in Washington as surprisingly progressive overall, so perhaps later this year Abe will be willing to engage in a major domestic political dispute in favor of TPP. My guess is that if the TPP talks make real progress, Tokyo will feel the external pressure to join.

Concerning US-Japan bilateral trade, negotiations concerning beef have basically ended in a positive way. Negotiators have made a lot of progress on insurance, and some other difficult topics.

Much like the case of the Korea-US free trade agreement, the auto sector could prove to be most difficult for the US and Japan to resolve.

When Abe and Obama meet, I would like to see them stress areas of agreement, such as intellectual property rights and services, and not just harp on the areas of disagreement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 NELSON: I think the Henoko project is dead. The planned facility at Henoko will never be built.

Nye: Beware of ‘populist nationalism’

Japan will hold parliamentary elections on December 16 that will bring a new prime minister to office, while China remains in the midst of a critical transition in national leadership. In both countries, foreign and security policies are points of contention. Tension between Japan and China is running high, largely focused on the small Senkaku islands in Okinawa, which both countries claim as sovereign territory but which Japan has had administrative control of for many years. China’s growing assertiveness throughout the East and South China seas raises the danger of instability and miscalculation in the region.

The  Obama Administration was sufficiently concerned about these trends  that last month the State Department authorized a semi-official delegation of former top US foreign policy officials to visit Beijing and Tokyo for talks with leaders in China and Japan. The delegation included Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who was chairman of the US National Intelligence Council and a top Pentagon official in the Clinton Administration; Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state in the first George W. Bush administration; Jim Steinberg, deputy secretary of state for Barack Obama; and Stephen Hadley, national security advisor to President George. W. Bush.

The initiative seems to have come from Kurt Campbell, the influential assistant secretary of state for East Asia, who is close to both Nye and Armitage. Nye knew Campbell from Harvard, and brought him into the Pentagon in 1994 to oversee efforts to upgrade the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era. Armitage, though out of government at the time, was already well-known as a staunch advocate of stronger US-Japan security ties, and became something of a mentor to Campbell. Nye and Campbell later developed a close bipartisan working relationship centered on deepening US-Japan relations.

Nye and Armitage were logical choices to deliver a message to Japan and China. But the Obama administration wanted a slightly larger, while still bipartisan group, so Republican Hadley and Democrat Steinberg were brought in. The trip was authorized by Hillary Clinton, presumably with White House approval. The State Department picked up the expenses, except those portions already paid for by Japan’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun, which had earlier invited Nye and Armitage to participate in a symposium on regional security.

The delegation delivered a written report to Secretary of State Clinton in mid-November, and later met with her in Washington.

Comments from several members of the delegation have made it apparent that the main goal was to clarify to Chinese leaders the firm stance in Washington that the Senkakus fall within the parameters of the US-Japan Security Treaty. And, in a somewhat more nuanced fashion, the delegation emphasized to Prime Minister Yoshiko Noda and other Japanese leaders  that neither side in the Senkaku  territorial dispute should escalate, but rather manage events in a way that  precludes the question of US involvement from ever being broached.

We asked Professor Nye to further discuss the conclusions he drew from the trip. He emphasized that he would be speaking only for himself, and not other members of the delegation. The interview was originally conducted for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and appears in the magazine’s November 24 issue. (PE)

 DISPATCH JAPAN: How dangerous is the current conflict between Japan and China over the Senkakus?

NYE: I don’t think it is dangerous in the sense that someone is sitting around planning an attack. But it is a danger in the sense that events on the ground or close to the islands could escalate in a climate of populist nationalism in both countries, and may take governments beyond where they want to be. It is worth remembering that the 2010 incident seems to have occurred when a drunken Chinese trawler captain rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a broader strategy underlying China’s approach to the Senkakus, or is a Japan-China dynamic primarily at work?

NYE: Chinese regard Japan as having changed the status quo by having the central government purchase the islands from the private owner. China has not accepted Prime Minister Noda’s public explanation that he took that step to prevent Governor Ishihara from having the Tokyo municipality purchase the islands, which could have caused mischief.

The Chinese think there is a large plan by Japan to erode what they call “the outcome” of World War II. I don’t know how much of that is pure rhetoric, or represents the real thinking in China. But that is what senior Chinese say.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is your assessment? Is it rhetoric, or real thinking?

NYE: I think a lot of Chinese really believe that Japan is trying to erode the status quo. I think others are using that line in an effort to create a wedge between the US and Japan.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Some analysts argue that until the incoming Chinese leadership consolidates power, it may feel compelled to maintain a hard line toward Japan.

NYE: If your concern is a populist-nationalism, then a period of political transition is probably one of the most difficult times to exercise restraint, because nobody wants to be seen as less willing to defend the motherland than their political rivals.

If you look at China’s blogosphere, you see that there is considerable nationalism in the country. Some of it is manipulated by the top Chinese leaders. But a lot of it is indigenous, without manipulation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do Japan and China get out of this stalemate? Are there practical steps that could show progress, or is this likely to be a long-term problem?

NYE: I suspect the problem will be around for some time. Look back at 1972, when then-prime ministers Kakuei Tanaka and Zhou Enlai basically agreed to kick the can down the road. Tanaka had raised the issue, and Zhou Enlai said the two countries were not going to resolve the issue at that time, and the issue should not disrupt the process or normalizing ties.

That became the status quo, with both sides retaining their claims to sovereignty, but with Japan retaining administrative control after the United States returned the islands as part of Okinawa reversion.

That status quo basically persisted until Governor Ishihara tried to purchase the islands for Tokyo. That, in turn, led the Chinese to conclude that the long-standing status quo was gone, and could not return.

So, what can be done? The best we can hope is to get the issue off the front burner of the stove so that it does not boil over and spoil the other dishes.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You’ve mentioned possibly reviving the framework for joint development of oil and gas reserves in the area.

NYE: If you can get to a situation where the issue is treated with a low posture, where it is not playing a role in China’s political transition or in the upcoming Japanese elections, then several things might be possible. There is the idea put forward by the London Economist to take the six square kilometers of what is basically rock, and create a marine sanctuary with no human habitation but devoted to fish and birds, to the benefit of the ecology of the region.

That would not resolve the sovereignty issue. The Senkakus would still be regarded by Japan as its sovereign territory. But devoting the territory to the broader good of the region might help diffuse the issue.

In addition, it would be beneficial to revive agreements for joint exploration of some of the undersea resources, including oil and gas, in the East China Sea. There are some fields that straddle the line between Japan and China. The idea is to create an atmosphere in which the Senkaku issue could be more easily managed.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the onus on Japan to make these proposals? Where will the impetus come from?

NYE: Japan has administrative control. Japan could say that, while maintaining its sovereign rights, we are hereby dedicating these six square kilometers to marine ecology. I don’t think this would satisfy the Chinese, but it might take the issue off the front burner, and reduce the dangers of landing of troops, habitation or other actions that would serve as a red flag to the Chinese. The Chinese would protest that they still maintain their claims to sovereignty, but you wouldn’t have provocative actions of the sort that Governor Ishihara might suggest.

DISPATCH JAPAN: There are some questions in Japan about what exactly the United States would do in the event of a deeply provocative action by China with respect to the Senkakus. The US is a war-weary country. Is it realistic to expect US Marines to be involved?

NYE: I don’t think so. We can try to solve this, or at least manage this problem, well-short of that. Both Secretary of State Clinton and Defense Secretary Panetta have made clear that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty covers the Senkaku islands because they are part of the territory returned to Japan in 1972. But we have also made clear that each side should manage the problem in a way that ensures it never reaches that point.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Japan now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having territorial disputes simultaneously with Russia, China, and Korea. Does this reflect poor strategic thinking in Japan?

NYE: Japan has to think through its relations with both China and Korea. It does Japan no good to have things harken back to the 1930s. Japan today is so much different. But occasionally there are politicians in Japan who take actions that instead of looking to the future look to the past.

That is something that Japanese strategists have to grapple with.

But thinking strategically, and thinking politically in the context of an impending election, are often very different things.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Are you concerned that a populist-nationalism in Japan could disrupt the country’s diplomacy?

NYE: Japanese with whom I speak during my visits really are thinking of moderate positions. But I did not speak with Governor Ishihara or Mayor Hashimoto. The question is whether they will refrain from stirring up populist-nationalism in the context of a competition for political power. Otherwise, among the people I know and speak with, everyone from students, to businessmen, to Diet members, I do not see any signs of a dangerous nationalism at this point. But there are some people who would like to stir up dangerous nationalism.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Would it be wise for Japan to consider some kind of quick resolution of the Takeshima dispute with Korea, so as to better focus on managing relations with a rising China?

NYE: If one thinks strategically, Japan should be asking itself how to improve relations with Korea. Takeshima/Dokdo is part of that.

I am also concerned about talk of revising the Kono Statement from the 1990s regarding Korean ‘comfort women.’ Japan should not shoot itself in the foot. Japan does not need this. It makes no sense to appeal to history in an unfavorable way, when the country should be thinking about the future and improving relations with Korea.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any significant movement in Japan toward development of nuclear weapons?

NYE: No, I do not. Japan obviously could develop nuclear weapons. This came up at a recent conference on security issues in Japan organized by Nikkei, and again in front of a large audience of students at Waseda University that Rich Armitage and I addressed.

There was a polling device available at both events allowing audience members to express their views. There was not any indication of a strong desire for development in Japan of nuclear weapons. There are always some voices in favor, but it remains a very small minority view.

There is a desire to have a stronger Japan capable of participating in collective self defense. But that is not necessarily a desire for a nuclear arsenal.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why has the talk in Japan about phasing out all use of civilian nuclear energy caused so much concern in Washington?

NYE: Last summer, Rich Armitage and I expressed concern in our report that Japan would not be able to give up nuclear energy entirely and still be able to sustain the kind of economic growth we all would like to see in Japan. Our major concern was the effect that eliminating nuclear energy would have on the Japanese economy.

We also said that having Japan as a participant in the global civil nuclear energy regime puts another ‘good guy’ at the table. Japan is concerned about safety, and safeguards. And one of Japan’s most distinguished diplomats, Yukiya Amano, is head of the IAEA. So we came out in favor of Japan maintaining civilian nuclear energy, though we understand that there is considerable controversy in the wake of the Tohoku tragedy.