Dispatch Japan

Manning: Pyongyang fearful of internal situation

Robert Manning is a senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as a senior counselor from 2001 to 2004 and as a member of the US Department of State Policy Planning Staff from 2004 to 2008. The interview was conducted via email for both Dispatch Japan and Weekly Toyo Keizai.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is motivating North Korea right now? Are these the tactics of a new regime trying to consolidate power? Or are these the tactics of a more shrewd leadership, engaging in yet another round of provocations designed to extract concessions?

 MANNING: The conventional wisdom to explain North Korea’s actions is that this is primarily about a new twenty-nine-year-old trying to consolidate his position by demonstrating how tough and courageous he is to the North Korean military and political elite.

That may be part of the answer. But let me offer an explanation that has been noticeably absent in the sea of commentary on North Korea in recent weeks.

It’s possible that a major reason North Korea’s new leaders decided they needed to whip up a sense of crisis — of a nation under siege and facing impending attack from outside enemies —is because they are insecure and fear a fragile internal situation that is increasingly difficult to control.

Since the end of the Cold War (and Soviet aid) North Korea’s economic system has steadily broken down. Since the great famine in 1995, there have been continual food shortages facing by some estimates up to one-third of North Korea’s twenty-three million people.

The breakdown of Pyongyang’s food-distribution system led the government to allow private markets and some private plots. There has been a bottom-up second economy taking shape. In recent years, markets have sprung up all over North Korea with a growing array of goods indulged by the regime as a coping mechanism. A fledgling merchant stratum has sprung up; it is occasionally harassed, but tolerated, and exists largely outside the government.

At the same time, despite efforts to keep the nation isolated, several factors — including economic trade and refugee flows to China, CDs and broadcasts from South Korea, and now some five million cell phones — have made its borders more porous and information flows more accessible.

This is a regime that are control freaks, and are deeply uncomfortable with things they can not control. That is a key reason they have rejected economic reforms such as those China and Vietnam have pursued.  To the degree that North Koreans get a dose of reality about the outside world, the myths of a “socialist paradise” by which the regime misgoverns start to unravel. If the twenty-three million North Koreans realize the massive lies fed to them to sustain the world’s only hereditary Stalinist dictatorship, it could gradually undo the regime.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the regime unstable?

MANNING: I am not arguing that the masses are poised to revolt. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Pyongyang still runs a terror state with some two hundred thousand in labor camps, and those caught trying to flee the country are frequently executed. But the current situation may be viewed by the regime as discomforting and fragile, with its efforts to seal off the country from reality increasingly more than fraying at the edges.

At the onset of a new leader’s tenure, how better to reassert tight control over its beleaguered citizens and whip up support for the regime than to instill fear and claim that the U.S. imperialists are on the verge of starting a nuclear war. This involved going to great lengths, including telling foreign embassies to evacuate Pyongyang and warning foreigners in South Korea to leave before the war starts. It’s great political theater, and Pyongyang seems oblivious to how ridiculous it is.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So Pyongyang is not looking for a large-scale confrontation?

MANNING: I don’t think so. Actually, I think the notion of a “crisis” – as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis – is nonsense. The world is not on the brink of an imminent nuclear confrontation. North Korean troops and artillery are not about to pour across the Demilitarized Zone. This is all nothing more than political theater. Unfortunately, a lot of media has gone along for the show, from the hysterical TV portrayals of goose-stepping North Korean troops, and breathless news reports of North Korean warnings of war, to maps depicting the range of imminent missile launches, complete with retired U.S. generals explaining the targets.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Still, the bellicosity has been pretty strident.

MANNING: This time around, it is louder and more melodramatic. But we have seen time and again North Korea throwing a political tantrum in response to annual U.S.-ROK military exercises or the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in response to Pyongyang testing a nuclear device or launching a missile.

Kim may be dangerous, but he is not crazy: North Korea is not suicidal. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests are not really “provocations.” They are part of a systematic military program that North Korea has been working on for more than forty years to obtain nuclear and missile capabilities. Diplomatic concessions in the past have affected the timing and perhaps the amount of missile and nuclear tests. But they have gone and will continue to go forward because the North Koreans want to gain such weapons. While I think deterrence still prevails, there is cause for more concern as the North Koreans develop new capabilities like the Musudan, with a 4000km range, and a mobile ICBM.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How can Pyongyang wind this down and “save face” without some kind of skirmish?

MANNING: I think they can simply claim victory, with a narrative that says US and its puppets in the South were about to attack us, but the heroic stance of Kim Jong Un forced them to back down. That may be why they held festivals and a marathon in the midst of this on April 15, Kim Il Sung's birthday. And why they did not test a missile --at least not in the midst of the pseudo-crisis as many expected.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent is Kim Jong-un actually calling the shots in Pyongyang?

MANNING: That is unclear. We know his uncle -- his father's brother-in-law, Jang Sang Taek, has been providing much adult supervision, and if you recall for about roughly a year after Kim Jong Il had a stroke in 2008, Jang was running day-to-day affairs. I suspect he is still playing a large role. But Kim is what passes for political legitimacy in North Korea.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why did the North shut down the Kaesong industrial area?

MANNING: They had suspended operations before. But given that Kaesong produces about $100 million a year in free money for the regime, it suggests domestic factors. 53,000 North Korean workers have been exposed to South Korean managers every day in Kaesong.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Has China really changed its attitude toward a greater willingness to apply substantial pressure on Pyongyang? Are there still limits to how much pressure China will apply? Would China risk bringing down the regime?

MANNING: This is a somewhat humiliating situation for Beijing, with the tail wagging the dog. Their problem is that they give stability a higher priority than denuclearization, and provide enough food, fuel and spare parts to keep N. Korea going, but have little real leverage. It is not like a rheostat that they can dial up or down a little; it is either on or off. And they are afraid of the consequences of turning it off and the possibility of a collapse where they would lose their buffer, and face a unified Korea aligned with the US.

But there is a growing debate within China among the political and intellectual elite over whether N.Korea may be a liability not an asset. China is willing to apply some pressure, endorsing sanctions. We will see how far they go in enforcing sanctions. Their ultimate problem is that like the Soviet Union, at some point N.Korea may collapse of its own weight, and China may not be able to do much about. In the meantime, rather than coordinating with the US, ROK on Japan, they have been reluctant to discuss "what if" – regime collapse -- questions.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:The US seems prepared to impose a price on North Korea for any conflict, while working carefully to avoid unnecessary escalation. Is that your assessment of the Administration’s approach, and do you agree with it?

MANNING: I think Obama has handled it about right. They show of force, the B-2s, was a clear statement that we are serious, and if they launch any aggression, it will be the end of N.Korea.

Yet the US cancelled an ICBM test to avoid appearing to escalate things, and have made it clear the US is willing to negotiate. The door is open -- anytime, so long as Pyongyang is willing to put its Weapons of Mass Destruction on the table, based on the 2005 agreement that the North walked away from, as they did with the Feb.29 2011 agreement.

In the past, North Korean actions have been designed to create tensions in order to extract concessions. But the Obama administration and that of the new ROK President Park Geun-hye have made it clear that they have both seen that movie before and are not buying it.

The administration has handled this tempest in a teapot well, with its military show of force sending a clear signal to the twenty-nine-year-old Kim that this is not a video game, and that Pyongyang should think twice before confronting the United States and its allies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent is the strenuous US reaction designed to reassure the region of US reliability, vs. the obvious desire to deter North Korea?

MANNING: I think for the US, credible deterrence and reassurance to our allies are inseparable. The US offshore balancer role in the Asia-Pacific remains an essential pillar of stability, and the US does not want to risk diminishing the credibility of that role. I think it is important to make clear to Pyongyang that they will not be accepted as a nuclear state. They would probably like an India-type agreement with the US, but Washington and Seoul are not going to give it to them.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there any chance for a diplomatic solution, and what would that look like?

MANNING: So long as the North Korean regime wants to possess nuclear weapons, there is little room for problem-solving diplomacy. There are deep levels of distrust on both sides and the North Korea regime is anachronistic, trapped in its own myths. That leaves little to seriously talk about.  Pyongyang should recall that the Soviet Union had thirty thousand nuclear warheads, yet that didn’t save it from collapsing from its own contradictions.

Americans tend to think all problems have solutions, but sometimes they can only be managed. We can plan for post-Kim regime scenarios, but we have to live with the present.

 

 

 

 

 

For Abe, talks with Obama came down to ‘take what you can get’

From the standpoint of his political image back home, the February 22 summit meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama was a big success for the Japanese leader. Abe was able to bolster his standing with the Japanese public and within his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as someone who can effectively manage the all-important US-Japan alliance. He projected the image of a strong leader by forcefully proclaiming that Japan “is back,” and that he has restored trust in the US-Japan relationship by reversing three years of supposed alliance disorder engendered by the Democratic Party of Japan.

The big headline in Japan was that Abe had successfully secured from Obama a statement clarifying that Tokyo would not have to make any unilateral concessions on tariff reductions as a precondition for joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

But the heavy focus on the joint statement on trade distorted the overall picture of the summit.

Indeed, walking down the TPP avenue so quickly was not Abe’s preference. It was the path he had to take if he were to demonstrate that the US-Japan alliance “is back,” since the White House made TPP its priority.

All along, Abe wanted to demonstrate alliance revival by pushing collective self-defense (his "gift" was to be a public statement of Japan's willingness to use its missile defense to try to shoot down any North Korean ballistic missile aimed at US territory), and to get a strong US statement specifically criticizing China, by name, for its East China Sea maritime provocations.

The White House would have none of it, and pushed for the public agenda to focus on North Korea, cooperation on other aspects of global security, and economic policy, especially trade.

Abe had to adjust. The word in political circles in Tokyo is that Japanese negotiators secured the final wording of the joint statement on TPP roughly ten days ago, which emboldened Abe to begin pushing in the days leading up to the summit for the LDP to accept Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations. Roughly half of the LDP’s Diet members oppose TPP, fearful of a backlash from the country’s powerful agriculture lobby.

Because Obama wanted to focus on TPP and economics so heavily, Abe had to allow TPP into the forefront if he hoped to demonstrate back home his ability to manage the alliance. Obama mentioned that the “highest priority” between the two countries is to restore healthy economic growth. The White House wants Japan, which still has the world’s third-largest economy, to join TPP, though not at the cost of watering down the low-tariff philosophy behind the prospective agreement.

Abe would have preferred to avoid tackling the complicated domestic politics of TPP until after critical Upper House elections to be held by next July. But he found he couldn’t do that and also successfully stage-manage his appearance in DC. It looks now as if Abe will announce fairly soon a decision to enter the TPP talks. It remains to see just how hard  Abe will push for genuine tariff reform, especially on agricultural products like rice, once the blowback from inside the LDP and from agricultural interests begins.

     ARM’S DISTANCE: The TPP joint statement notwithstanding, it was hard to miss that Obama kept Abe at arm's distance during the summit.

     One: There was no joint press conference. Last year, on April 30, while he was readying for an ultra-secret midnight departure for Afghanistan that night, President Obama took the time for a 30-minute joint press conference with then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Obama praised the alliance, joked easily with Noda, and promoted the "joint vision" that had been announced just days before by the "2+2" meeting between the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries.

This time, with Abe, Obama did not take the time for a press conference.

     Two: Oval Office theater. In a brief Oval Office appearance with Abe, Obama mentioned North Korea, cooperation on Afghanistan, and the high priority of promoting economic growth. He spoke not one word about the Senkakus, China, Okinawa, or even a "joint vision" of the sort announced with Noda. Abe tried his best to criticize China, very indirectly, but adhered to US desires to not rile-up Beijing. Obama took one question from a small press “pool,” which was on the looming US budget sequestration. He answered at length, but said nothing about Abe, Japan, or Asia. Obama directed the second and final question toward Abe.

     Three: Neither Obama nor Secretary of State John Kerry took the seemingly easy step of reiterating the January 18 statement by then-Secretary of State Clinton outlining American opposition to any effort at unilateral change of Japan's administrative control of the Senkakus. This was a far-cry from Abe's initial desire for a strong statement from Obama specifically mentioning China.

     Four: The White House surely gave Abe a carefully worded statement that the prime minister can use at home to push for TPP entry. But this was a case of Abe adapting to the US agenda. Abe did not want to be in a position of promoting TPP before the Upper House elections, but that's where he finds himself.

Obama embraced the US-Japan alliance, but did not embrace Abe.

 

Deming: US, Japan need ‘new imagination and energy’ on Okinawa basing issues

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fifth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Friday meeting with President Obama. Rust Deming, a veteran Japan specialist, is an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

DEMING: I don’t expect many specific results. This is really a summit to set the agenda for the two governments. First is for the two leaders to get to know each other. The prime minister has made clear that the US-Japan alliance is at the top of his list of priorities, at the center of Japanese foreign policy. The two leaders will try to put together a list of issues that need to be worked on over the next year or so.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

DEMING: Abe is not in a political position to bring very much to Washington. Nor does the Obama administration expect him to bring much. Abe wants to establish a personal relationship with the president, and wants to send a message that the US-Japan alliance is headed in a good direction now that he is back in office. He wants to demonstrate that he and the LDP have returned, and that whatever shakiness occurred over the last three years is a thing of the past.

In fact, while the first year of the DPJ in power, under Hatoyama, proved to be a difficult time for the alliance, Kan and Noda did try to bring the alliance back to the center of Japan’s foreign policy, and we made a lot of progress. If you look at the “2+2” statements from 2011 and 2012, you’ll see that the DPJ really accepted the fundamental strategic objectives of the alliance, and Japan’s roles and missions, which the LDP had agreed on earlier. There really was no gap between the two countries, which was a very good accomplishment, and very beneficial to the long-term stability of the alliance. The DPJ period was not without its benefits for the alliance.

But the LDP is back, and Abe wants to signal that he is personally putting the alliance back in the center of Japanese foreign policy.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

DEMING: The White House would like to emphasize that Japan is critical to America’s broad policy in Asia, and at the center of the “rebalancing” of US global strategy toward Asia. The administration would like to see Japan become a more active player in regional and global affairs on a wide range of issues, particularly on TPP, and more open markets.

There is also recognition that, prior to the Upper House election, Prime Minister Abe is not in a position to do very much, or even say very much, on TPP and other issues. But I expect the president to emphasize the importance the US attaches to moving forward on TPP and other issues that are important for the alliance.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

DEMING: We have been trying to get away from that in recent years, particularly in early meetings such as the upcoming visit. Abe has been in office only two months. The real opportunity provided by this summit is to set an agenda for the alliance.  Down the road, when the two leaders meet again later in the year at the G8 summit or the East Asian summit, for example, there perhaps will be more concrete results. But this is not the time to expect very much.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

DEMING: It’s clear that some people are a little uneasy with the narrative that Abe seems to share with many conservative Japanese about responsibility for and the nature of developments in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of us in Washington believe that history is a complicating factor for relations among countries in the region, and therefore not very useful to bring up. It complicates Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly the ROK and China.

But in his last tenure as prime minister, in 2006, Mr. Abe reached out to China and Korea. He did not visit Yasukuni Shrine. He is a sophisticated statesman. A lot of people hope that, whatever his personal views and impulses, Abe will operate in a way that does not complicate Japan’s relations with China and Korea, or even with the US. Remember, there are some issues related to history, such as “comfort women,” that resonate in Washington. Most people with whom I speak are fairly hopeful that Abe will behave in a way similar to his first tenure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you expect the collective self-defense issue to come up explicitly?

DEMING: That is really an issue for the Japanese to decide. Many people in Washington would like to see Japan move forward on this issue in due course. The timing of what Japan does, and how it does it, does have importance for relations in the region. But this has been a long-term issue for Japan in which the US does have great interest. You’ll recall the Yanai Commission established by Abe himself in his first term, which studied the issue. The Yanai report relates to Japan’s ability to play a more active role in the alliance and in peacekeeping operations. Many of the ideas in the report represent a natural evolution in Japan’s defense posture, and not something that signals a major departure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?DEMING: I hope so. This really is not primarily a US-Japan bilateral issue. Japan needs to take these steps to restructure its own economy, for its own good. Abe is clearly focused on the economy. He has taken some short-term steps to stimulate the economy. But long-term, there has to be a fundamental opening up of the economy. TPP is a useful device to help make that happen. I hope that, after the Upper House election, Japan will move in this direction, because it is in the interest of Japan’s long-term economic health, which is very important for the US-Japan relationship.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

DEMING: I have not been to Okinawa in about one year, but I don’t think the political dynamic there concerning Futenma and the planned replacement at Henoko has changed very much. The Henoko plan is still very problematic. We are going ahead with improvements at Futenma. The MV-22s (Osprey) have arrived there. Things seem to be operating smoothly. But I have always been extremely nervous about the possibility of an accident at Futenma, which would really, seriously complicate our overall alliance.

I hope that the new government in Tokyo might be stable and be able to make some long-term plans. And, with the Obama administration beginning its second term, there will be new people coming into office. The two sides might be in a better position to put the Futenma issue back at the top of the agenda and actually do something about the issue. I would hate to see the issue just lie fallow for another 17-18 years; we started discussing this in 1995.

I don’t have any magic solution. But I believe we need new imagination and new energy on the issue.

 

Hornung: Obama to urge Abe to avoid ‘overtly antagonistic’ policies toward neighbors

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the third in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Jeffrey Hornung is an associate professor with the Hawaii-based Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

 HORNUNG: No, I don’t. They will have lots to talk about: China, Senkaku, revised defense guidelines, Futenma Replacement Facility, North Korea, and energy. Given Abe’s recent public statements on the TPP and the desire to make a decision on Japan’s participation, it is likely this will also be a focus of discussion. That said, I don’t expect any specific achievements beyond a frank conversation, a reiteration of the importance of the alliance, and a photo opportunity.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

HORNUNG: I think Abe’s goal for the summit is limited to having a face-to-face meeting with Obama and talk about the aforementioned issues. The summit is highly valuable to Abe because it provides him an opportunity to explain his thoughts on the issues, what he intends to do, and to demonstrate that he is both a good steward of the alliance and welcomed by the US. It doesn’t appear Abe will ask Obama for anything specific regarding any of the issues. 

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

 HORNUNG: Initially, I think the US agreed to the meeting because the Japanese side strongly requested it. Now that the meeting is taking place, I sense the US will use the meeting to talk about priorities for the alliance under Abe, express a strong desire for progress on Japan’s participation in the TPP and emphasize the need for Japan to have good relations with its neighbors and therefore tone down any statements or policies that may be seen as overtly antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think Abe will bring any gifts to Washington. He is not in a position to do so on issues that are relevant to the alliance. There is no consensus in Okinawa on the FRF, members of the LDP are not yet convinced about joining the TPP, and Abe just re-engaged his expert panel from his first administration to restart discussions on collective self-defense. There have been no decisions reached on any of these issues, so he is in no position to offer any new policies. If anything can be considered a “gift,” Abe may play up his decision to exempt F-35 fighter jet parts manufactured by Japanese firms from Japan’s prohibition on exporting arms. Or he may emphasize his willingness to submit legislation to enable Japan to join the Hague Convention.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

 HORNUNG: It is not a case of Washington being comfortable or not with Abe and any personal views he may hold. Instead, it is more about US strategic thinking, and officials in Washington trying to maintain calm relations throughout Asia at a time the President has expressed an interest in rebalancing to the region. If you look at Abe’s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, he too was rather conservative when it came to security matters, very similar to Abe. And yet, under Noda, relations with the US returned to normalcy after a brief hiatus under Noda’s two predecessors.

 The difference between Noda and Abe is Noda didn’t try to overtly antagonize China or South Korea. Yes, Noda purchased three of the Senkaku Islands, but he did it only because he was trying to prevent a worse scenario. On the other hand, Abe’s speeches and comments during the LDP presidential election and general election were at times antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors, particularly China. From the US perspective, such comments are a distraction because it disrupts Japan’s relations with its neighbors, which influences US ability to effectively engage all countries in the region on more substantial issues. Likewise, although Abe said he will not revise the Kono Statement or the Murayama Statement, he will issue his own statement. If his statement flares up anti-Japanese sentiments in China or South Korea, or hurts relations with those countries with which Japan is slowly working to strengthen security relations (i.e. Southeast Asian countries, Australia, India), the energy devoted to calming the tensions is a distraction to US engagement on other issues.

 The US can work with conservative Japanese premiers, but I think the problem (if there is one) arises when those premiers pursue policies or statements that hurt Japan’s relations with its neighbors. The US wants Japan to have good relations with its neighbors, including China. I get the sense that Abe understands all this, and in order to show he is a good steward of the alliance, we can probably expect him to tone down his rhetoric on things like history.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 HORNUNG: It is difficult to say without asking Abe himself, but I can appreciate the difficult decision he faces. In Abe’s party there are members who strongly oppose Japan’s participation because they are concerned the LDP will lose votes from the agriculture sector if Abe announces his decision to join TPP talks. This matters because Upper House elections are scheduled for July, and he wants to secure a majority so as to provide him legislative power to pursue other items on his agenda. Joining the TPP talks would jeopardize this because it would upset those voters that have traditionally voted for the LDP. At the same time, he has pledged his determination to tackle Japan’s economic problems and a desire to build closer relations with the US. Joining TPP talks would assist both of these goals.  While I don’t expect any movement on this issue prior to the summit, it can be expected that they will discuss Abe’s position.

Still, there is a limited timeframe within which we can expect Abe to reach a final decision. This is because the US requires 90 days of Congressional deliberations for approval when it holds international trade negotiations. Because it is expected that TPP member countries will conclude their talks at the October APEC meeting, Abe will have to reach a decision sometime after the summit and prior to July’s elections. Given that Abe consistently reiterates his interest in joining the talks premised on the ability to gain exceptions to abolishing all tariffs, he appears interested in joining the talks, while looking for some sort of political leverage to gain his party’s acceptance. It is a political balancing act that I’m not sure he can win. It is unclear whether other TPP-interested countries are keen to allow exceptions and, if they did, whether Abe’s LDP would accept these exceptions as sufficient to justify them approving Japan’s participation.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think the plan is dead, nor is it a case of which person in Tokyo can move forward with the project. It is more a case of who in Okinawa can move the project forward. Or more correctly, who wants to move the project forward. Although Abe has announced he will not move forward with the project for now, he will focus on efforts to make a positive political environment in Okinawa, nurturing relations with local politicians in Nago and Naha in an effort to build some semblance of trust. In order for the project to proceed, not only the governor, but the Nago mayor and council have to approve. Currently, all oppose. Abe’s task is to nurture a better political environment to get some to say yes before their next election OR to help get candidates elected that support the plan. There are elections next year in Nago and Naha. Some in Tokyo believe that Gov. Nakaima may step down (due to health reasons) before the next election but, before doing so, announce his support of the plan in order to settle the contentious issue once and for all. Under this thinking, Abe’s task is to create for Nakaima an environment for a ‘hanamichi’ (path for a graceful exit) in the interlude.

  

 

Nelson: Obama to urge ‘calm management’ of China ties in talk with Abe

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the first in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Chris Nelson is the founder and editor of The Nelson Report, one of the most influential voices in Washington on US policy toward East Asia.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

NELSON: Probably not much specific beyond important reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance, and a clear restatement of concerns about North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear explosives.

Obama will likely want to be careful in his wording on the Senkakus, insisting on no use of force to change the status quo of Japanese administrative control, while not taking sides in the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to sovereignty. A lot will depend on the ongoing debate over Japan’s intelligence evaluation that China recently aimed a “lock-on” radar system at a Japanese naval vessel. That kind of radar system is used to guide weapons in an attack. Did that really happen, and has China backed away from that provocation since then?  Pyongyang’s testing of another nuclear device has heightened regional tensions and added a degree of urgency to the meeting..

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

 NELSON: Abe would like a public demonstration from the US of solidarity and support on regional security, and he would like to avoid any public statements on politically ‘difficult’ issues that could complicate Upper House politics for the LDP.

Privately, Abe, like the rest of non-Chinese Asia, is very worried about the budget crisis (‘sequestration’) in Washington, and whether Congress and the White House will be able to keep the security commitments  that Asia, especially Japan, is relying on for regional stability.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal? 

NELSON: The White House wants to present a dual public message: solidarity with Japan, along with calm management of regional security problems.

Privately, the White House wants to reinforce concerns already expressed about alliance management, especially Japan’s relations with South Korea, which is an important US ally and very important to regional security. The White House also wants to reinforce maintaining a calm approach to China and the Senkakus problem. Finally, the White House would like some clarification on Abe’s intent concerning TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

NELSON: Beef may be the only topic on which Abe will be able to publicly bring some good news for the US. With an Upper House election to take place by next summer, Abe feels limited in what he can do. This assumes that without the political complications associated with the election, Abe would actually be in favor of TPP or the building of a new US Marine facility on Okinawa, but we really don’t know that, which is why the White House wants clarification on Abe’s actual views.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

NELSON: Many in the US foreign policy elite, including in the Obama administration, have made clear that they are uncomfortable with the ‘revisionist history’ views held by some Japanese leaders. These views complicate alliance management, especially with South Korea, and make managing relations with China much more difficult. I doubt that this will be expressed in public. It will be interesting to see if any senior US officials who give background briefings about the summit bring up these sensitive topics.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 NELSON: ‘Eventually’ is a long time! There is no question that major business, finance, and foreign policy officials see the importance, both strategically and policy-wise. A lengthy delay by Japan runs the risk that too many chapters in a prospective TPP agreement will be set, and therefore non-negotiable, without a chance for Japan to influence the details.

Abe’s agricultural minister is seen in Washington as surprisingly progressive overall, so perhaps later this year Abe will be willing to engage in a major domestic political dispute in favor of TPP. My guess is that if the TPP talks make real progress, Tokyo will feel the external pressure to join.

Concerning US-Japan bilateral trade, negotiations concerning beef have basically ended in a positive way. Negotiators have made a lot of progress on insurance, and some other difficult topics.

Much like the case of the Korea-US free trade agreement, the auto sector could prove to be most difficult for the US and Japan to resolve.

When Abe and Obama meet, I would like to see them stress areas of agreement, such as intellectual property rights and services, and not just harp on the areas of disagreement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 NELSON: I think the Henoko project is dead. The planned facility at Henoko will never be built.

Nye: Beware of ‘populist nationalism’

Japan will hold parliamentary elections on December 16 that will bring a new prime minister to office, while China remains in the midst of a critical transition in national leadership. In both countries, foreign and security policies are points of contention. Tension between Japan and China is running high, largely focused on the small Senkaku islands in Okinawa, which both countries claim as sovereign territory but which Japan has had administrative control of for many years. China’s growing assertiveness throughout the East and South China seas raises the danger of instability and miscalculation in the region.

The  Obama Administration was sufficiently concerned about these trends  that last month the State Department authorized a semi-official delegation of former top US foreign policy officials to visit Beijing and Tokyo for talks with leaders in China and Japan. The delegation included Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who was chairman of the US National Intelligence Council and a top Pentagon official in the Clinton Administration; Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state in the first George W. Bush administration; Jim Steinberg, deputy secretary of state for Barack Obama; and Stephen Hadley, national security advisor to President George. W. Bush.

The initiative seems to have come from Kurt Campbell, the influential assistant secretary of state for East Asia, who is close to both Nye and Armitage. Nye knew Campbell from Harvard, and brought him into the Pentagon in 1994 to oversee efforts to upgrade the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era. Armitage, though out of government at the time, was already well-known as a staunch advocate of stronger US-Japan security ties, and became something of a mentor to Campbell. Nye and Campbell later developed a close bipartisan working relationship centered on deepening US-Japan relations.

Nye and Armitage were logical choices to deliver a message to Japan and China. But the Obama administration wanted a slightly larger, while still bipartisan group, so Republican Hadley and Democrat Steinberg were brought in. The trip was authorized by Hillary Clinton, presumably with White House approval. The State Department picked up the expenses, except those portions already paid for by Japan’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun, which had earlier invited Nye and Armitage to participate in a symposium on regional security.

The delegation delivered a written report to Secretary of State Clinton in mid-November, and later met with her in Washington.

Comments from several members of the delegation have made it apparent that the main goal was to clarify to Chinese leaders the firm stance in Washington that the Senkakus fall within the parameters of the US-Japan Security Treaty. And, in a somewhat more nuanced fashion, the delegation emphasized to Prime Minister Yoshiko Noda and other Japanese leaders  that neither side in the Senkaku  territorial dispute should escalate, but rather manage events in a way that  precludes the question of US involvement from ever being broached.

We asked Professor Nye to further discuss the conclusions he drew from the trip. He emphasized that he would be speaking only for himself, and not other members of the delegation. The interview was originally conducted for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and appears in the magazine’s November 24 issue. (PE)

 DISPATCH JAPAN: How dangerous is the current conflict between Japan and China over the Senkakus?

NYE: I don’t think it is dangerous in the sense that someone is sitting around planning an attack. But it is a danger in the sense that events on the ground or close to the islands could escalate in a climate of populist nationalism in both countries, and may take governments beyond where they want to be. It is worth remembering that the 2010 incident seems to have occurred when a drunken Chinese trawler captain rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a broader strategy underlying China’s approach to the Senkakus, or is a Japan-China dynamic primarily at work?

NYE: Chinese regard Japan as having changed the status quo by having the central government purchase the islands from the private owner. China has not accepted Prime Minister Noda’s public explanation that he took that step to prevent Governor Ishihara from having the Tokyo municipality purchase the islands, which could have caused mischief.

The Chinese think there is a large plan by Japan to erode what they call “the outcome” of World War II. I don’t know how much of that is pure rhetoric, or represents the real thinking in China. But that is what senior Chinese say.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is your assessment? Is it rhetoric, or real thinking?

NYE: I think a lot of Chinese really believe that Japan is trying to erode the status quo. I think others are using that line in an effort to create a wedge between the US and Japan.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Some analysts argue that until the incoming Chinese leadership consolidates power, it may feel compelled to maintain a hard line toward Japan.

NYE: If your concern is a populist-nationalism, then a period of political transition is probably one of the most difficult times to exercise restraint, because nobody wants to be seen as less willing to defend the motherland than their political rivals.

If you look at China’s blogosphere, you see that there is considerable nationalism in the country. Some of it is manipulated by the top Chinese leaders. But a lot of it is indigenous, without manipulation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do Japan and China get out of this stalemate? Are there practical steps that could show progress, or is this likely to be a long-term problem?

NYE: I suspect the problem will be around for some time. Look back at 1972, when then-prime ministers Kakuei Tanaka and Zhou Enlai basically agreed to kick the can down the road. Tanaka had raised the issue, and Zhou Enlai said the two countries were not going to resolve the issue at that time, and the issue should not disrupt the process or normalizing ties.

That became the status quo, with both sides retaining their claims to sovereignty, but with Japan retaining administrative control after the United States returned the islands as part of Okinawa reversion.

That status quo basically persisted until Governor Ishihara tried to purchase the islands for Tokyo. That, in turn, led the Chinese to conclude that the long-standing status quo was gone, and could not return.

So, what can be done? The best we can hope is to get the issue off the front burner of the stove so that it does not boil over and spoil the other dishes.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You’ve mentioned possibly reviving the framework for joint development of oil and gas reserves in the area.

NYE: If you can get to a situation where the issue is treated with a low posture, where it is not playing a role in China’s political transition or in the upcoming Japanese elections, then several things might be possible. There is the idea put forward by the London Economist to take the six square kilometers of what is basically rock, and create a marine sanctuary with no human habitation but devoted to fish and birds, to the benefit of the ecology of the region.

That would not resolve the sovereignty issue. The Senkakus would still be regarded by Japan as its sovereign territory. But devoting the territory to the broader good of the region might help diffuse the issue.

In addition, it would be beneficial to revive agreements for joint exploration of some of the undersea resources, including oil and gas, in the East China Sea. There are some fields that straddle the line between Japan and China. The idea is to create an atmosphere in which the Senkaku issue could be more easily managed.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the onus on Japan to make these proposals? Where will the impetus come from?

NYE: Japan has administrative control. Japan could say that, while maintaining its sovereign rights, we are hereby dedicating these six square kilometers to marine ecology. I don’t think this would satisfy the Chinese, but it might take the issue off the front burner, and reduce the dangers of landing of troops, habitation or other actions that would serve as a red flag to the Chinese. The Chinese would protest that they still maintain their claims to sovereignty, but you wouldn’t have provocative actions of the sort that Governor Ishihara might suggest.

DISPATCH JAPAN: There are some questions in Japan about what exactly the United States would do in the event of a deeply provocative action by China with respect to the Senkakus. The US is a war-weary country. Is it realistic to expect US Marines to be involved?

NYE: I don’t think so. We can try to solve this, or at least manage this problem, well-short of that. Both Secretary of State Clinton and Defense Secretary Panetta have made clear that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty covers the Senkaku islands because they are part of the territory returned to Japan in 1972. But we have also made clear that each side should manage the problem in a way that ensures it never reaches that point.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Japan now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having territorial disputes simultaneously with Russia, China, and Korea. Does this reflect poor strategic thinking in Japan?

NYE: Japan has to think through its relations with both China and Korea. It does Japan no good to have things harken back to the 1930s. Japan today is so much different. But occasionally there are politicians in Japan who take actions that instead of looking to the future look to the past.

That is something that Japanese strategists have to grapple with.

But thinking strategically, and thinking politically in the context of an impending election, are often very different things.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Are you concerned that a populist-nationalism in Japan could disrupt the country’s diplomacy?

NYE: Japanese with whom I speak during my visits really are thinking of moderate positions. But I did not speak with Governor Ishihara or Mayor Hashimoto. The question is whether they will refrain from stirring up populist-nationalism in the context of a competition for political power. Otherwise, among the people I know and speak with, everyone from students, to businessmen, to Diet members, I do not see any signs of a dangerous nationalism at this point. But there are some people who would like to stir up dangerous nationalism.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Would it be wise for Japan to consider some kind of quick resolution of the Takeshima dispute with Korea, so as to better focus on managing relations with a rising China?

NYE: If one thinks strategically, Japan should be asking itself how to improve relations with Korea. Takeshima/Dokdo is part of that.

I am also concerned about talk of revising the Kono Statement from the 1990s regarding Korean ‘comfort women.’ Japan should not shoot itself in the foot. Japan does not need this. It makes no sense to appeal to history in an unfavorable way, when the country should be thinking about the future and improving relations with Korea.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any significant movement in Japan toward development of nuclear weapons?

NYE: No, I do not. Japan obviously could develop nuclear weapons. This came up at a recent conference on security issues in Japan organized by Nikkei, and again in front of a large audience of students at Waseda University that Rich Armitage and I addressed.

There was a polling device available at both events allowing audience members to express their views. There was not any indication of a strong desire for development in Japan of nuclear weapons. There are always some voices in favor, but it remains a very small minority view.

There is a desire to have a stronger Japan capable of participating in collective self defense. But that is not necessarily a desire for a nuclear arsenal.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why has the talk in Japan about phasing out all use of civilian nuclear energy caused so much concern in Washington?

NYE: Last summer, Rich Armitage and I expressed concern in our report that Japan would not be able to give up nuclear energy entirely and still be able to sustain the kind of economic growth we all would like to see in Japan. Our major concern was the effect that eliminating nuclear energy would have on the Japanese economy.

We also said that having Japan as a participant in the global civil nuclear energy regime puts another ‘good guy’ at the table. Japan is concerned about safety, and safeguards. And one of Japan’s most distinguished diplomats, Yukiya Amano, is head of the IAEA. So we came out in favor of Japan maintaining civilian nuclear energy, though we understand that there is considerable controversy in the wake of the Tohoku tragedy.

 

 

 

 

No short-term letup likely in Japan-ROK tensions

Chances are diminishing that tension between Japan and South Korea over a vexing territorial dispute will ease anytime soon. At issue is sovereignty over a group of desolate islets, which Japan calls Takeshima and Korea calls Dokdo, that lie midway between the two countries. Korea now has administrative control.

Adding to the friction is a flare-up in a highly-charged conflict over “comfort women,” the Korean and other women from the region forcibly confined to brothels organized by the Japanese Imperial Army to service soldiers. This week marks the 1^st anniversary of a ruling by South Korea’s Constitutional Court that the central government in Seoul should do more to win compensation for the women, truly sincere apologies from Tokyo, and more teaching of the issue in Japanese textbooks.

Lurking just below the diplomatic radar screen is the May 24, 2012 Court ruling that Koreans forcibly shipped to Japan to work in war-time factories for  virtually no compensation can sue for restitution. Japanese courts have repeatedly rejected similar suits, a legal ruling that Korean jurists say rests in part on the dubious assumption that Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea was legal, and made the Korean laborers Japanese ‘nationals’ who  were essentially engaged in  wartime conscription under the terms of the National Mobilization Law  adopted by the  Diet  in 1938.

Technically, these are separate legal and political issues, but they are, of course, inextricably linked to Japan’s era of colonial expansionism and wartime aggression.

Recently it has seemed as if a day barely goes by without some unproductive tit-for-tat being launched, making it difficult for even moderate on either side to resist a rising sea of nationalism.

The two sides have reached an emotional stalemate.

The likelihood of an actual military conflict is quite remote, though that did not stop the sensationalist magazine Asahi Geino from publishing lengthy scenarios of Japanese air force  and naval units ‘liberating’ Takeshima from the current  ROK administrative control. Officials in both Tokyo and Seoul insist they would not allow events to spin so out of control,  though the mere raising of the issue is sufficient  reason for concern.

The bigger problem, at this point, is lost opportunities for productive strategic and military cooperation between  Japan and the  ROK, on everything from nuclear power  safety  and North Korea policy, to the rapid rise of China as a regional and global power. A planned bilateral pact on intelligence sharing between the two governments, set to be signed last June has already been put on hold indefinitely, and a set of economic cooperation agreements could also fall by the wayside.

US officials are particularly disturbed by this turn of events. The much-publicized US plan to rebalance its global force posture toward East Asia is based in large part on promoting expanded bilateral and military cooperation among allies in the region as a kind of ‘force multiplier’ for American influence vis-and-vis a  rising China.

     WHY NOW? Why all of this turmoil now between Tokyo and  Seoul? In some sense, this reflects tensions that have been present since the end of World War II. An August 14 column by Asahi Shimbun’s progressive editor Yoshibumi Wakamiya, while not absolving ROK president Lee Myung-bak for escalating tensions, tries to put Lee’s recently-assertive stance in some perspective.

Wakamiya argues that for South Korea, ‘Dokdo’ “has almost religious connotations.” Japanese authorities integrated Dokdo/Takeshima under Japanese jurisdiction in 1905, which many South Koreans view as a precursor of Japan’s total annexation of the Korean Peninsula five years later. Morever, Wakamiya says, many South Koreans are haunted by a gnawing  feeling that the  country failed to mount  an  effective  opposition to Japanese colonialism, and were  liberated only after the  US  defeated Japan in World War II.  In 1952, South Korean strongman Syngman Rhee ordered the seizure of Dokdo, providing South  Koreans with a sense of satisfaction that there was at least one place they liberated on their own.

In 1965, under a diplomatic normalization treaty, the two countries basically agreed to table the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute, and individual claims for compensation against Japan by individual Korean citizens were supposedly subsumed by a large-scale bilateral economic aid package provided by Japan.

But as military rule has given way to democracy in South Korea, both the territorial dispute and “comfort women” issues have resurfaced. Many liberals in Japan believe that South Koreans were short-sighted in their vociferous rejection of the 1995 Asian Women’s Fund, established at the initiative of then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to provide some measure of compensation, and official apologies, to women brutally coerced into Japanese-run brothels. The fund followed an official investigation, and subsequent statement by the cabinet of  then-prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa (the 1993 ‘Kono statement’ issued by then-chief cabinet secretary Yohei Kono), apologizing for Japan’s actions, and going so far as to acknowledge Japan’s military played a role in the organizing  and  running of the “comfort women” system.

While the Murayama efforts were far from perfect, they provided a good beginning. Instead, arch-nationalists and history-deniers in Japan launched a campaign to disavow Japan’s apologies, insisting there was no evidence that the Japanese military played any role in coercing Korean or other Asian women. Those efforts failed to win withdrawal of Japan’s apology, but greatly undercut Japan’s credibility and standing in East Asia. The situation  was made  worse by then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to the  controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and the especially hard-line stance of his  successor, Shintaro Abe, that Japan did anything particularly wrong in Korea (or China) during World War II. Today, Abe is attempting a political comeback, in collaboration with Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto, with denial of the “comfort women” wrong-doing as a central component of his program.

     THE DPJ AND HISTORY: When the Democratic Party of Japan knocked the long-entrenched Liberal Democrats (LDP) from power in 2009, dealing with history issues was not heavily emphasized, but it  was certainly an implied part of the DPJ’s much-publicized desire to improve ties with Asian neighbors.

For decades during the Cold War, Washington had largely turned a blind-eye toward much of the neo-nationalism that often reared its ugly head inside the LDP. The LDP was anti-communist, especially anti-Soviet, and later wary of the rise of China. The LDP’s tolerance of neo-nationalism undercut Japan’s position in East Asia, but that was a relatively small problem compared with the benefit of  having Japan in the  US’s Cold War camp.

By contrast, the DPJ did a poor job of explaining its desire to enhance ties with East Asian nations, and was easily (sometimes willingly) miscast by officials in Washington as somehow anti-American.

In fact, it was largely the work of former DPJ prime minister Naoto Kan, and his chief cabinet secretary Yoshito Sengoku, who helped facilitate the greatly-improved ties between Tokyo and Seoul, including the prospect for serious strategic, intelligence, and military logistics cooperation, that was so evident until the recent tensions erupted.

In 2010, Kan visited Korea to commemorate the 100 anniversary of Japan’s annexation of Korea, and strongly reiterated Tokyo’s previous apologies. While Tokyo avoided some sensitive issues that Seoul wanted to address, particularly the question of whether Japan’s 1910 annexation was “legal,” real progress was made. The two sides agreed to series of three summits.

The subsequent collapse of Kan’s cabinet, the coming to office of Yoshihiko Noda (who is not a knee-jerk nationalist but is less emotionally committed to historical reconciliation), and the August 2011 Constitutional Court ruling on comfort women set the stage for a less-than-smooth discussion when Lee visited Noda in Kyoto in December 2011.

Lee was compelled by the Court ruling and related domestic political pressure to push Noda on the comfort women issue. Noda, who was bogged down by domestic issues, proved insufficiently sympathetic to Lee’s dilemma, and somewhat rigidly repeated Japan’s official positions.

Lost in all of the subsequent emotion was Lee’s hint that the comfort women issue could be dealt with as a “humanitarian” issue, apparently outside of the 1965 bilateral treaty that Tokyo considers a closed matter. Noda agreed that the issue is “humanitarian,” but has not shown much inclination to forge a new framework for progress on the issue.

     US MEDIATION? Though the possibility has been discussed inside the Obama administration, US officials are mostly reluctant  to be pulled into any kind of mediating role between Tokyo and Seoul. The result could easily backfire by raising anger inside one or the other of  the  two key US allies in the  Pacific.

Complicating any potential US role is that the US has shifted positions over the years, which both Tokyo and Seoul try to use to their respective advantage. In the early years after World War II, Washington backed Korea’s claim to sovereignty. But when the Cold War broke out in earnest, and some degree of rearmament began in Japan, Washington backed Japan’s claim. Today, the US takes no stance on sovereignty, but mediation might provide quite tricky given the historical record of a shift in US positions.

     DISPUTE WITH CHINA DIFFERENT: Meanwhile, Japan’s territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku islands (known as Diaoyu in China) is of a very different geopolitical nature. China’s increasingly assertive stance is not simply bilateral vis-à-vis Japan, but part of a much broader campaign to assert power in East Asia.

Japan is wary of China’s rise, and has no desire for confrontation. But Japan has the upper hand on two front: Tokyo has administrative control, and any more by Beijing to break that status quo militarily would be widely disparaged. Moreover, the US is obligated to assist Japan in the event of Chinese aggression, and US officials certainly see it in the US national interest to prevent China from exercising inappropriate power in the region by trying to settle territorial disputes by force.

     TWO BIG MYTHS: As the disputes with Korean and China (and to a lesser extent with Russia) have flared, much of the Japanese media, together with the LDP, has promoted a narrative that weakness on the part of the DPJ is at the root of the problem. The argument goes that the DPJ was so intent on demonstrating “diplomacy of consideration” (ie, excess apologies) toward Korea and China that the government wound up conveying weakness, which Seoul and Beijing have capitalized upon.

The second part of the myth, especially with regards to China, is that the DPJ so woefully mismanaged the US-Japan alliance (especially over Okinawa), that an infuriated Washington may not aid Japan in a conflict with China. Beijing, the argument goes, is highly-attuned to this dynamic, and is concluding it can act assertively toward Japan with impunity.

The myths fit with a growing, palpable sense in Japan that economic woes and political bungling have set the country on a course of decline, destined to be overshadowed by rising neighbors.

Much of the media – especially Yomiuri – and many within the LDP, have concluded that Tokyo must quickly move to mend ties with the US, especially by finally acquiescing to existing plans for construction of a new US Marine Corps facility on Okinawa. Ironically, this would probably have the opposite result, as opposition to that plan is so strong on Okinawa that few leaders of any stripe in Tokyo are actually willing to spend political capital to try to push the plan through. More promises to Washington that can’t be fulfilled is a recipe for truly harming the bilateral alliance.

 

Mike Green: ‘The Asia pivot is both political, and good policy’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan. Michael Green is professor of Political Science at Georgetown University, and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. During the George W. Bush administration, Prof. Green served as senior director for the National Security Council, responsible for coordination of policy toward the Asia-Pacific.

TBL: Do you consider the ‘Asia pivot’ a new strategic initiative?

GREEN: It is a strategic recognition that Asia deserves more attention with respect to resources, and senior administration time. Secretary Clinton set that tone, very early on in the Obama administration’s first days. It makes sense because the center of international political and economic dynamism is shifting to Asia; power is diffusing, and it is shifting to Asia, especially with the rise of China and India. It makes sense for the US to play the leading role in this process. The public recognizes this. Both the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs polling over the past two years documented a sense among the US public that Asia is more important than Europe and other regions.

 TBL: How does that translate into actual policy?

GREEN: It is useful to discipline the State Department and the Pentagon to send a clear signal that Asia is going to get priority. For example: In my understanding, the Pacific Command will not be cut; no matter how the Defense Department budget cuts proceed, the cuts will come out of Europe; possibly two infantry brigades, and other force structures. But it won’t come out of Asia.

That is a very important signal for the Army to hear; It is important for the State Department to hear, because USAID will have to adjust. It imposes a certain discipline on the bureaucracy.

It also sends an important message to the Asia-Pacific region, which is always worried about American withdrawal. The message: Despite the financial crisis, this administration is not going to make cuts in our Asia policy.

And, very importantly, Republicans are not challenging this. That is the good news.

 TBL: Is it a new grand strategy?

GREEN: I am a little more doubtful. It is much more political than strategic. The focus on Asia is exactly right. The term “pivot” is where I have trouble.

Superpowers don’t pivot. Global superpowers do not, even under the kind of economic pressure we are under now, enhance security by looking like they shift radically from one region to another. It violates Teddy Roosevelt’s notion of speaking softly and carrying a big stick. It oversells the whole thing.

 TBL: Doesn’t ‘superpower’ mean you can do that?

Green: Not effectively. China is overreacting. I have been in favor of maintaining a balance of power in our China relationship, but the “pivot” label came so suddenly, and so jarringly, that it created problems with China that we did not need.

 TBL: It seemed quite a different approach from the initial Obama policy.

Green: That’s right. The Obama administration started off, in 2009-2010, emphasizing more of a concert of power with China.

That’s the problem with the “pivot.” It seems to come out of nowhere, and it comes after the 2009 statement with Hu Jintao saying that we respect each other’s core interests, and after statements about strategic reassurance. We sent signals that the US would go the extra mile to cooperate with China on climate change, strategic reassurance, due respect of core interests. All of a sudden there was a jarring new agenda which makes it implicitly all about China.

 TBL: What about Europe, and NATO?

That is an important point. Europe matters enormously. In fact, Europe is incredibly important to our China policy. We need a global approach to China, and the transatlantic relationship has been critical for that.

Finally, while it looks as if the US Pacific Command is not going to be cut in the upcoming budget battles, the commander in the Pacific does not own those forces. The air and naval assets in the Pacific, if something goes hot in Southwest Asia, are shifted.

 TBL: So we need to maintain a global, rather than Pacific policy.

GREEN: Exactly. We really can’t have a hermetically-sealed region if we  are to be a global superpower. In the context of the defense cuts that President Obama is promising -- $500 billion, and maybe more – there is a lingering danger that the US Pacific force structure could be hollowed out if events get hot in the Middle East.

And we have not solved the problems in the Middle East. It is not as if we can simply turn our attention to Asia, and look away from other critical areas.

 TBL: So you are not impressed with the “pivot”?

GREEN: I think a lot of it is political. It is cover for the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a message of robust and assertive policy toward China, which I think has a political dimension because it is allowing the administration to show that it is not ‘cutting and running’ from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Overall, I think the strategy is basically right, though it is not adequately resourced, and the speed with which it took place created some unnecessary problems. The rhetoric of the pivot probably hurt the strategy in some ways.

 

TBL: Would this have occurred if China had been cooperative on the Cheonan sinking, on climate change, and on currency matters?

GREEN: The Chinese brought this on to themselves to some extent because of their position on the Cheonan, on the South China Sea, the Senkakus. All of these incidents brought out animosity in Asia, a desire in the region for the US  to counterbalance China. The Chinese created the conditions where the administration, to its credit, really enhanced relationships, particularly in Southeast Asia, but with all of our allies.

I don’t think a lot of countries in the region necessarily appreciate the pivot label, because they don’t want to be implicated with us in putting a stick in China’s face. The foreign minister of Indonesia has questioned the pivot.

But there’s no doubt the Chinese made this possible.

 

TBL: You mentioned before that you think a lot of the pivot is political.

GREEEN: If you read Bob Woodward’s book, Obama’s Wars, you get the strong impression that the people who wanted to get out of Afghanistan were using China and this pivot logic, without knowing a whole lot about China or Asia. So the ‘pivot to Asia’ narrative was present from the beginning of the Obama administration, but a lot of it had to do with the debate over Afghanistan.

 

TBL: But it’s not all political, is it?

GRENN: No. I think Kurt Campbell and Hillary Clinton began putting the pillars of the policy in place from the very beginning.

Let’s put it this way: China’s actions helped make the policy pivot more effective; the political desire to leave Afghanistan played a role. And some of the pillars of the pivot were being put in place from the very beginning.

TBL: If we start at India, and move down to Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and then up to Japan and Korea, there seems to be a pretty interesting network, even if informal, of new security ties. And it’s not all US-led: It’s Japan-India, or Japan-Vietnam, or even Japan-Korea.

GREEN: This is not new. This was basically the Bush Administration’s Asia strategy. The pillars were the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which we negotiated; the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative, which we began; the transformation of the strategic relationship with India; and the Armitage-Nye focus on upgrading the strategic relationship with Japan.

But I give the Obama administration a lot of credit for adding energy and substance to this process, in Southeast Asia in particular.

TBL: What about ties with India?

GREEN: The Obama administration has largely dropped the ball on India. Senior Obama officials have told Indian officials that Washington does not engage in ‘balance of power’ politics the way Bush did.

And the Obama administration had no trade agenda for the first year or two.

So the building blocks of a true regional policy are finally getting into place, but it has taken the Obama administration a long time to get this done, to get back to some of the building blocks – especially with respect to India and trade – that the Bush administration had earlier put in place.

TBL: What about Southeast Asia?

GREEN: I think Secretary Clinton in particular saw a vacuum in our Southeast Asia policy. Condi Rice had skipped two of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings. Clinton filled that vacuum very quickly. and effectively, and was very welcomed, in part because of China’s much more aggressive stance in the South China Sea in 2010.

So, some of this “pivot” is new; some of it is old, but it took the Administration a while to act on existing policy.

Overall, I would say that this now amounts to a fairly solid bipartisan approach to Asia policy. This means: We should be building up our trade alliances; building up our maritime alliances.

TBL: What about China policy?

GREEN: Based on the President’s recent Asia trip, I don’t see a coherent China policy. We cannot have a policy toward China that is based only on ‘balance of power.’ We have to engage China. The agenda for cooperation was clear and robust – some people thought too robust – when Obama took office in 2009.

Now, I don’t see any engagement policy. In fact, the rhetoric toward China is a good deal more hard-line now from the Obama administration than it was under Bush, or Bill Clinton.

Chinese violations of intellectual property rights, trade restrictions, human rights violations, and cyberspace abuses are egregious, but I am not sure where the White House sees US-China relations going right now.

TBL: How will expanded maritime ties in the region affect US force structure?

GREEN: We will have more access, and be more welcomed, around the region. It is not very well-known, but we now do more naval exercises with India than we do with any other country. We do more exercises with India than India does with all other countries in the world combined.

There will be more intelligence sharing. Although India did not choose a US contender for its next jet fighter, we are actually selling India a lot of defense articles.

In India, it will not be bases; it will be deeper defense relations.

TBL: What about the rest of the region?

GREEN: In Australia, we will obviously have more access. The new facility is for all intents and purposes a base, and it will take some stress off of Okinawa. It will not replace Futenma. It will allow the Marines to send a Maritime Expeditionary Unit (MEU)), which are broadly part of the US special operations community, for very real exercises and training.

Korea, under Lee Myung-bak, is keen to maintain a hefty US presence, and he is even looking at having more regular rotations of Marines, in particular because of the Cheonan and West Sea challenges. This is not a replacement for Futenma, but there may be more rotations of Marines and naval units into Korea than before.

We will have more operations with Vietnam, and more regular visitations with the Philippines.

TBL: Are we pushing too hard, too fast?

GREEN: I wouldn’t put it that way. But we have to be careful to not overplay our hand. These relationships could change based on changes in the national leaderships of these nations. In 2004, for example, we pressed the South Korean government to give us “strategic flexibility” --  in other words, the right to use our troops based in South Korea in contingencies outside of South Korea . That was a big mistake. The South Koreans were reluctant to agree because of obvious implications for China relations. The South Koreans actually publicly said ‘no’, and the Chinese took huge comfort from that as a sign the US-ROK alliance was becoming weaker.

The lesson is that if we push too hard – if we are not sensitive to the local political conditions – we create a dynamic where we are asked to not come. We could end up with a situation in which governments are voted out of office, with new governments coming in on an explicit platform of denying or limiting US access.

TBL: Doesn’t that logic apply to Futenma?

GREEN: In a sense, yes. But the problem in Okinawa is a local government problem, not a national government problem. At the national level, Japan’s two leading parties support the US-Japan plan for Okinawa. The problem is that at the local level the opposition is becoming insurmountable.

 

Sneider: ‘I don’t see strong evidence of a serious pivot toward Asia’

 Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan . Dan Sneider is associate director of research at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly headed the Tokyo and Moscow bureaus of the Christian Science Monitor, and was both national editor and foreign policy columnist at the San Jose Mercury News.

TBL: Do you accept the notion that the Obama administration will shift greater focus, attention, and overall resources to the Asia-Pacific region, as the US winds down the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

SNEIDER: I was one of many people who criticized the Bush administration repeatedly for focusing too much on the Middle East and South West Asia, while neglecting East Asia. Even from a narrow security point of view that criticism was important to make, especially for those of us watching the situation in North Korea. We argued that the North Korean nuclear program was more clear and present danger than anything Iraq posed.

But not all blame should be placed on the Bush Administration. The Clinton administration, for example, did not give East Asia the importance it deserved, at least from an economic point of view.

TBL: You don’t seem very impressed with the stated new Obama policy.

SNEIDER: Northeast Asia has always been one of the primary focuses of American security policy, along with the Middle East and Europe. The rise of China doesn’t really alter that reality. We have security alliances with Japan and South Korea for a reason, and they have been there for more than half a century. I don’t see any change in that regard.

TBL: I hear a “however” coming…

SNEIDER: Yes. The Obama Administration is certainly investing not only rhetoric, but the time and energy of senior leaders on East Asia on a scale much greater than previous administrations. The President’s extensive commitment to host the APEC summit and to attend the East Asia summit all point to this trend. The administration is genuinely working to come up with a coherent policy toward the whole region, which is a major change.

However, I continue to believe that if one could draw a pie chart measuring the collective brain of the US national security establishment, you’d see that far greater amounts of time are still devoted to the Middle East and Europe, and, relatively speaking, East Asia is still not a priority.

TBL: How would you measure that?

SNEIDER: The number of people who deal with East Asia is actually pretty small, particularly those who have real depth of knowledge and experience in the region, including language skills.

I don’t yet see strong evidence that we are really going to strategically pivot away from the Middle East to East Asia. Policy makers spend a lot more time thinking about Iran than they do about North Korea. We have a stability policy in East Asia; we want to prevent conflict by maintaining a basic balance of power. But that is different from a genuine, proactive, positive policy toward the region.

I also don’t see attempts to freshly rethink how we approach the Asia-Pacific region. We pretty much have a set of policy prescriptions that we have been following for a long time. In fairness, that may be in part because those policies worked pretty well. This has meant a series of bilateral security alliances – the well-known hu-and-spokes policy, where there is no regional security architecture; the US has been the balancing power. More recently, we’ve shown a slightly greater commitment to regional security arrangements.

Toward China, we have had a hedging-engagement policy for a long time; sometimes we hedge more, and sometimes we engage more.

TBL: So you don’t see a big change?

SNEIDER: I don’t get the sense that anyone in the Administration has sat down and said: “It is really important that we rethink this region as a whole, where it is headed, and what our role is going to be.”

TBL: How does economic policy fit in this picture?

SNEIDER: I think our approach to the region, for a long time, has tended to be weighted much too much toward security in the traditional, narrow sense, and not weighted toward economic policy. The Obama Administration has undertaken some semblance of a trade policy, and that is a good thing. But, for the most part, we have assigned ourselves the role of guarantor of military balance of power as our primary function.

TBL: You see to think that our friends in East Asia want more.

SNEIDER: Yes. The fact is that many countries in the region have much more concern about the direction of US economic policy. If we don’t recover economically, and find new sources of growth for the US economy, it is not going to matter how many Marines are sitting in Darwin, Australia, or how many aircraft carriers are moving around in the Western Pacific.

The real source of the sense in the region of American decline does not come from policy makers in the region counting US ships and planes. It’s the perception that the US is unable to deal with its own economic problems, and is drifting into stagnation.

TBL: Did the Chinese and American leaderships misread each other when Obama took office?

SNEIDER: Every US administration goes through a learning curve with China. The ‘W’ Bush Administration came into office in 2001 talking about China as a threat. People tend to forget the extent of the tough talk in place when Bush came in. We had the forced downing of the American surveillance aircraft, for example. Officials pretty quickly learn that the kind of rhetoric you bring from the campaign trail into the White House doesn’t work very well when you are trying to govern.

The Obama Administration might have shown the reverse. There was some China-bashing during the campaign. But for the most part, the Administration came into office looking to engage China in a whole range of global partnership initiatives, including climate change and currency management. The view was that China was the central relationship to manage in East Asia.

The first trip the President took to China was very upbeat, and the Administration tried to push difficult issues to the side, for which he was criticized. But the efforts ran into the normal difficulties that are there: Who the Chinese are, what they want, the inevitable, relatively speaking, limits of American power in a world in which other countries are becoming stronger, and the fact that there are issues on which we cooperate with China, and issues on which we clearly disagree.

TBL: So, we misread each other?

SNEIDER: The Obama administration settled into wariness. After the 2008 financial crisis the Chinese became overbearing and arrogant, and had a sense of triumph of their system over that of the US. But in the end, both countries understand that they somehow have to manage this relationship because there is no strategy of confrontation, or even containment that works. China is far too embedded into the world economic system, and the US is too deeply engaged with China economically as well. Rhetoric that echoes the Cold War, sliding China into the role the old Soviet Union played – should not be taken seriously. It can’t be done.

TBL: Has the Obama administration learned this lesson?

The Administration has definitely gone through a learning curve with China. But I don’t think former National Security Council director for Asia, Jeff Bader, who has dealt with China for a long time, had huge illusions that we were going to enter into an alliance relationship with China and throw off our relationship with Japan.

Did the Obama administration see China as being central? Yes, because China is central. That is not an ideological statement; it is reality. The goal is to use alliance relationships to help manage China, and pull China into structures where they are forced to adhere to existing rules. That’s what the administration seems to be is trying to do.

I see this more as a natural learning curve than a dramatic shift in US policy.

TBL: What about future US force structure in East Asia?

SNEIDER: I don’t see any evidence that someone in the government sat down and said: “OK, 20 years from now, what kind of force structure do we want to have in the Asia-Pacific region? How do we want to think about that structure from the point of view of potential adversaries, crisis situations, and other possible scenarios?” I would love to see evidence that this kind of thinking is actually going on.

TBL: What about Okinawa:

I certainly don’t see any serious rethinking about the role of the US Marines on Okinawa. Until that issue is resolved, we will continue to have unnecessary tensions with Japan, our most important ally in the region.

 

Kurt Campbell: ‘We have been over-invested in Iraq and Afghanistan’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan . Kurt Campbell is assistant secretary of state for East Asian and and Pacific Affairs. He was previously co-founder of the influential think tank  Center for a New American Security, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific. Much like Mark Lippert, Obama’s nominee to run the Pentagon’s Asia Division, Campbell served as a Naval Officer through a special program that allows accomplished academics to work as senior advisors to career Naval officers. Campbell worked as a liaison to the Russiian military leadership for then-US Joint Chief of Staff Admiral William Crowe. This interview is one of four that we conducted to evaluate President Obama’s purported “pivot” toward East Asia in foreign policy.

 

TBL: What’s the best way to describe the ‘pivot’ toward Asia the Administration has undertaken? It is a return to normalcy, or is it a fundamental shift in US strategy?

CAMPBELL: There is a profound recognition that over the past 10 years, we have been primarily occupied – many would say preoccupied -- with extraordinarily important and consequential developments in the Middle East.

 This involves the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently the extraordinary developments associated with the Arab Spring. There are many reasons for us to remain consequentially involved in the Middle East and South Asia. However, by almost every measure, we have probably been over-invested in Iraq and South West Asia. And in Washington there is a profound bipartisan recognition that the lion’s share of the history of the 21^st century will be written in the Asia-Pacific, and that the United States needs to be part of that story line.

            So, what we’ve seen over the past few years is an integrated effort to first redefine and advance our bilateral security and political relationships, to work closely with emerging new partners, such as India’s “look East” strategy, Indonesia, Vietnam, New Zealand, and others. There is a clear recognition that US-China relations are essential. But most countries in the region want to see the two great nations of the region working together, even with underlying tensions and occasional challenges. It is in the interests of every country in the region to see in their own situations an improvement in relations with China. At the same time, they want the US in that picture because they believe it aids in that effort.

            As part of our overall effort, we are also committed to multilateral institutions, formally joining the East Asia summit, working to establish a formal secretariat at ASEAN, launching the US-ASEAN summit, the steps that were taken at APEC, and then the ASEAN Regional Forum all signifying a strong commitment to institution-building.

            Lastly, our ticket to the big game in the Asia-Pacific region has always been our military. Not only do we have to reposition our capabilities more to the Asia-Pacific; we also have to recognize that over the past 10 years we have invested much more heavily in land-based capabilities and on-going operations than we have expeditionary and ‘blue water’ naval capabilities, which are essentially what are necessary in the Asia-Pacific region. So we will be making those complex steps. 

Also, and Peter you this better than anyone, we need to maintain a very strong set of capabilities in North East Asia, while doing a good deal more in South East Asia. And in Australia we’ve headed down that path.

TBL: At the start of the Obama Administration, how much did the Chinese and American leaders misread each other: China thinking the US was in decline as signified by the 2008 financial crisis, and the US by thinking they could pull China into the role of a more responsible global stakeholder?     

CAMPBELL: I’m not sure there is ever a definable “beginning” in this relationship. There is a constant ebb-and-flow. The United States has to recognize, deeply and profoundly, that the US-China relationship will be the most complex bilateral relationship that we will ever experience. This requires an enormous amountof hard work, and many consultations on every conceivable matter. Even with these dialogues, the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation are very real.   

We thought it was important to send a signal that, yes, we have experienced some economic and financial difficulties in recent years, but that but that the fundamentals of our system and of our economy are very strong, and that the United States will be playing a primary role in the Asia-Pacific region for decades to come. But at the same time that our position is strong, we are prepared, willing, and able to sit down with China and other countries to figure how best to live together in peace and freedom, and maintain and advance the commerce that has sustained us all.

TBL: Is TPP a trade policy, or more the trade element of a much broader geo-strategic architecture to which you are urging a peaceful China to adhere?

CAMPBELL: It is fundamentally a trade initiative that ironically just a few months ago people questioned whether would even be possible. We were very gratified on the US side that the Korea-US trade agreement passed.  That has allowed forward momentum in a number of sectors. So we were able to announce a general framework in Hawaii.            Thus far, many of the countries that have signed on with the TPP initiative are smaller. We believe this is a high-quality agreement that has the potential to define a new way to get back to complex negotiations overall.

Since the announcement of the TPP Framework agreement at the APEC meeting in Hawaii in November, there have been a number of countries, including Mexico, Canada, Korea, and even Japan that have expressed much more interest in exploring the dynamics of the agreement, and what’s possible.

We support this. We believe it has the potential to be a standard-setting agreement, on environmental issues, labor standards issues, and other key issues that involve trade.. The idea is absolutely clear about what is expected with respect to local content, and other difficult subjects.

And by the way, the desire for high-quality or standard-setting agreements is not something that is being imposed by the United States. Many of the countries involved, including Singapore and New Zealand, are pressing for this approach.

Finally, as to your question of whether TPP is geo-strategic in nature: Although it is primarily designed for commercial purposes, as with all things this complex and important, TPP does of course entail geostrategic ramifications.

TBL: I ask about the geopolitics because a minority view in Japan tends to view TPP as some kind of American plan to gain a dominant position in important parts of Japan’s economy. Others see it as a critical way for Japan to help set the regional architecture, without which, China’s influence would only grow.

CAMPBELL: We have made clear that TPP is not something you are invited to. It is something a nation would want to aspire to. If you meet the conditions, if you are prepared to participate, then there can be a process of dialogue with the key partner. So we are not excluding anyone.

At the same time, there is a lot strategic misinformation floating around about TPP in countries where some reforms might be controversial. We think the TPP process could create the kind of connectivity among key participants that will create strong relations across the Pacific, which does nothing to “contain” any nations, but does everything to tie the United States is a much stronger way to the Asia-Pacific than ever before.

TBL: How do you expect our force structure to change in the Asia-Pacific region?

 CAMPBELL: The mantra the Pentagon uses is that we are politically sustainable, sensible, that we  are dispersed rationally, and that we work with a range of partners. I think it is undeniable that we have strong and important commitments in Northeast Asia, but that we need to work more with fiends and partners in Southeast Asia, and take the necessary steps to follow through on the commitments the President made in Australia.

So, we will see a level of American military commitment that is continuous, even in a period military downsizing, and in some places may see more naval and other capability. We think sending that message right now in the Asia-Pacific region is of central importance.

TBL: So the structure may change, but the presence overall will remain.

CAMPBELL: There will be no question that the US is determined to play a thoroughgoing, critical military role in all aspects of the challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific.

And when I say challenges, recognize I am referring to some of biggest ever, including the response to Ache, Operation Tomodachi, and ongoing efforts to respond to huge flooding in Thailand. It is the United States  first and foremost that has been deeply engaged in these efforts. One thing we are trying to do in the context of the East Asia Summit is to put in place capabilities in advance that allow other countries working with us to the inevitable natural disasters that will strike at his region.

TBL: When do you expect Prime Minister Noda to visit Washington?

CAMPBELL: The White House is responsible for specific invitations and timing, We were very happy that Secretary Clinton hosted Foreign Minister Genba here in December for an extensive meeting that helped lead to a extensive joint security declaration. We have many important things planned for 2012, including the visit of the Prime Minister, but also the celebration of the 100^th  anniversary of the cherry blossoms and they wonderful gift of the Japanese people to the United States. We’ve got several things that we would like to highlight over the course of the next several months that will send a very strong message of support from the United States of support for Japan.

TBL: Okinawa seems to be a continuing source of difficulty between the two governments, or between Okinawa and the two governments. What do you see as the best way forward?

CAMPBELL: Both governments have made an agreement to move ahead on this project. And we have worked closely with Japanese counterparts on a range of the next steps, including the landfill permit. We recognize how important it is for the Japanese and American governments to together send a message of solidarity, and of a strong security joint capability between the two sides. I think the next few months are likely to be critical, and we look forward to working with our Japanese colleagues on every dimension of the FRF issues.