Dispatch Japan

US-Japan base roadmap: ‘dead plan walking’

The lengthy joint security statement set to be issued by the US and Japan today marks the demise of the 2006 bilateral “roadmap” for restructuring US forces in Japan, particularly the plan to construct a facility in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa to replace to US Marine Air Station Futenma.

No one will say this officially, of course. The two governments will continue to say that they have only postponed the 2014 deadline for completion of the new facility, and the related redeployment of 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

But the plan is dead.

Key members of Congress have moved to block it, insisting that more viable, cost-effective, and innovative ways be found to base and deploy US forces in the strategically critical Asia-Pacific region. In Japan, neither the money nor the political will is present to move forward with construction of a new facility that Okinawans – who generally are supportive of the US-Japan alliance – deeply resent. And on Guam, the building of infrastructure and related facilities needed to host a larger number of servicemen and military equipment is far behind schedule and plagued by cost overruns, which has further angered an increasingly debt-weary Congress.

For now, the most likely outcome of the roadmap’s death is a tacit acceptance of the status quo: 17,000 Marines from the division-size III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – the only MEF based abroad – will remain based on Okinawa, and the 1,200-acre Futenma base, which is dangerously located in the center of Ginowan City (pop. 91,000), will remain open.

Few Japanese political leaders are prepared at this point to raise the idea of alternative basing options, for fear of provoking the wrath of a Washington that has been surprisingly inflexible on the issue for over a decade. There is virtually no chance that the initiative to start talks on alternative arrangements will come from Tokyo.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is in the midst of a transition from the historic tenure of retiring Defense Secretary Robert Gates – truly a momentous era for the Defense Department – to the incoming team of Leon Panetta, who is moving over from the CIA.

Today’s “2+2” meeting of the defense and foreign ministers of Japan and the US takes place with Gates still in office, making it unrealistic to have expected any change in the official US stance on base realignment in Japan to be apparent in the joint statement. Even if Panetta ultimately chooses to initiate a policy change, it will take time for him to put in place his own team to bring that about, not to mention have the opportunity to give the issue the attention it deserves. Not surprisingly, Panetta is extraordinarily focused Afghanistan and Pakistan, as his trip to Pakistan just 10 days ago for talks with top Army and intelligence officials made clear.

But it is also reasonable to assume that Panetta, as part of his deliberations with Congress about overall defense spending, will want to engage the three influential senators – Carl Levin, Jim Webb, and John McCain – who have taken the lead in insisting on changes in US basing plans for the Asia-Pacific region, including the realignment roadmap for US forces in Japan.

As US forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and cutbacks in defense spending proceed, another US global force posture review is likely, in which context the US and Japan could engage in discussions about alliance roles, missions, and force structure, and update a 2006 realignment roadmap that has already been overtaken by events.

     ALLIANCE POSITIVES: Problems surrounding Okinawa and US basing notwithstanding, today’s bilateral Security Consultative Committee talks (as the ‘2+2’ is formally known) will highlight the enduring, enormous value of the US-Japan alliance – a genuine coming together based on friendship and shared interests that was on display for the world to see in the wake of the ‘triple disaster’ that hit Japan on March 11. The joint statement to be issued today speaks at length about common security challenges in North Korea, Afghanistan, Iran, and other areas, and shared interests in disaster relief, nuclear safety, energy security, climate change, and regional and global economic prosperity.

     UNSTABLE STATUS QUO: Still, the collapse of the 2006 roadmap for base realignment can’t simply be papered over by political leaders and government officials from Washington and Tokyo. Almost 16 years after the horrendous assault and rape of a young Okinawan girl by three US servicemen sparked intense protests and led to base realignment plans, the US and Japan have virtually nothing to show for a decade-and-a-half of intense negotiations. Clearly this is no way to run an alliance, especially one of such immense regional and global importance.

The stalemate reveals deep-seated, uncomfortable realities about the structure and management of the bilateral US-Japan alliance, including discrimination by main-island Japanese (and, implicitly the US) against Okinawa, which bears a hugely-disproportionate share of the burden of US military installations in Japan; a continuing (though much-lessened) tendency of Japanese leaders and citizens alike to bear less-than-full responsibility for security matters; and, a lingering, occasional tendency on the part of American military and civilian leaders to adopt the haughty tone of superiority typical of managers dealing with a client-state.

The original purpose of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), formed by the two countries in November 1995 in the wake of the schoolgirl rape, was to reduce the heavy “footprint” of US military installations on Okinawa. The centerpiece of the SACO agreement, reached in December 1996, was the promised return to Okinawa of the US Marine Air Station Futenma. Virtually everyone agrees Futenma is a disaster just waiting to happen, given its location in a heavily populated area. One helicopter crash in downtown Ginowan City could throw this vital security alliance into crisis.

     INTERIM OPTIONS: Futenma is home to Marine tanker aircraft, and Marine helicopters. Original plans called for moving the tanker aircraft to bases in Kyushu; those plans remain intact. The initial plans envisioned movement of the Marine helicopters to some other existing facility on Okinawa. The first option was the giant US Air Force Kadena base, north of Futenma. But intense rivalries between the US Air Force and the US Marines bureaucratically rendered that “unworkable,” with both services making the dubious argument that it would be dangerous having fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operating in close proximity. A second option was to construct a relatively small heliport inside the Camp Schwab Marine base.

Over time, however, the Kadena and Schwab options gave way to the vision of a brand new runway – either offshore, or with landfill – being built in the Henoko Bay area.

Once the runway vision emerged, the search for a replacement for Futenma was no longer about helicopters; it morphed into the new need for a dedicated Marine runway for fixed-wing aircraft.

And over time, US negotiators began to firmly link the closure of Futenma with the construction of the new runway.

The purpose of this runway? The Marines have never provided a consistent, credible explanation. Ministry of Defense officials in Tokyo who have worked  intensively on the  Futenma replacement issue say they have never been informed about the Marine intentions for the envisioned runway (actually, runways, as plans envision a V-shaped structure). There had been talk by Marine officials of possible use by jet fighters, but Japanese officials counseled against voicing any such intentions for fear of inciting opposition on Okinawa. Since then, US officials have spoken about Gulfstream-style executive jets. Some officials have also mentioned the need for runways in the event that  MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft need to conduct emergency landings in fixed-wing (instead of helicopter) mode. The Marines are scheduled to deploy 24 Osprey to Okinawa starting in October 2012, which has infuriated many on Okinawa, including moderate Governor Hirokazu Nakaima.

Once the need for a runway is either eliminated or put aside, the Futenma air station closure could proceed even if the overall base realignment plan is postponed. The Marine tankers at Futenma could move to  Kyushu, as planned, and the helicopters (even MV-22 Osprey) could be moved to either Kadena (as envisioned by Senators Levin and Webb), or to a heliport inside of Camp Schwab, which engineers say could be constructed quickly.

Closing Futenma, as both the US and Japanese governments have promised would be done, would go a long way toward easing tensions on Okinawa about the heavy presence of US bases. It would also deeply impress Okinawans if the US were to finally deliver on promises to reduce the noise associated with continuous flights in and out of the huge Kadena air base. Up to now, the US has agreed to modify some flight schedules, only to rotate in other aircraft, with the result of no net noise decrease.

On the other hand, tensions will linger as long as Futenma remains open, especially because the US unilaterally decided to link the Futenma closure to the broader realignment, which the SACO agreement of 15 years ago never envisioned. If Futenma remains open, the 24 Osprey set for deployment to Okinawa next year will likely wind up there.

Okinawans are also worried about political retaliation from Tokyo, in the form of reduced economic aid. An existing large development assistance program is scheduled to expire next year, and renewal talks have barely begun.

     FROM INTERIM TO LONG-TERM BASING: There would be relatively few political or technical obstacles to closing the Futenma air station as an interim measure, while postponing the final decisions about overall US basing in Japan and the region until a later date. To the contrary, closing Futenma, and integrating its current assets and operations into existing facilities, would create the kind of political goodwill that would facilitate broader US-Japan strategic dialogue.

Alas, both interim and long-term solutions to the Futenma problem will have to wait until Leon Panetta and his team are up and running inside the Pentagon. And even then it will likely take time for the issue to make it to Panetta’s desk.

Until then, the unstable status quo – Futenma’s continued operation – will likely remain, causing the US-Japan alliance to work with less-than-optimal efficiency and friendly willingness.

 

 

 

Pressure builds for US shift on Okinawa

Pressure is growing on the Obama Administration to significantly alter plans for US Marine basing arrangements on Okinawa, but chances seem slim for a policy shift at least until Defense Secretary Robert Gates departs office late next month.

Several factors have converged to give the issue new urgency. Opposition remains strong on Okinawa to construction of a new facility in the Henoko Bay area, to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been slated for closure since 1995. There is simply no momentum in Japan to move forward with the project, a situation made more stark by the Great Eastern Earthquake of March 11. Tokyo is intensely focused on reconstruction efforts; neither the financial nor political capital is available to push the Henoko project through.

Meanwhile, construction delays and cost overruns continue to bedevil a critical, related portion of the plan: the relocation of over 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members from Okinawa to Guam.

And in Washington, an increasingly debt-weary Congress is asking whether it is worth the cost of building the new Henoko facility and the new Marine housing and related facilities on Guam, when cheaper force configurations more conducive to strategic needs in Asia might be found.

Diplomats are under stress to find some answers because of plans for a “2+2” meeting of defense and foreign ministers from the two countries, to be followed by a summit meeting between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Naoto Kan. With leaders in Japan tied down with reconstruction efforts, no schedule has yet been set for either meeting, though staging both by the end of June has been discussed.

When those meetings do occur, it won’t be possible to simply ignore Futenma and related Okinawa issues. It is very possible Washington and Tokyo will agree to state the obvious: the 2014 deadline to complete the Okinawa and Guam force structure realignment will have to be pushed back. It is also possible the administration will accept a very low-key statement of continued support for the Henoko plan, rather than a high-profile emphasis, so as to avoid the issue returning as a major irritant at the top of the bilateral agenda.

There remain pockets of hope within the Obama administration that White House will force the Pentagon to accept a review of the whole base realignment plan for Okinawa prior to the Obama-Kan summit, but that seems very unlikely.

     PENTAGON BOTTLENECK: Secretary Gates remains adamantly opposed, and there does not yet exist within the administration the necessary correlation of political forces willing to force Gates to accept a new approach. The Pentagon’s rigid stance is worsened by the lack of a replacement yet for General Chip Gregson, who retired recently as assistant secretary of defense for Asian affairs.

Senior Pentagon officials continue to say the administration is committed to the Henoko plan. But with the Pentagon leadership in transition, with CIA director Leon Panetta set to take over once Gates departs, the senior officials are exceedingly reluctant to veer from established policy, even if they want to. Officials at this level are in a bind: aware of the opposition in Japan, aware of the enormous investment the US Marines, and US diplomacy, have in the existing policy, but not politically strong enough to even push for, much less win, a policy change.

     AWAITING LIPPERT: The White House has tapped Obama confidante Mark Lippert to replace Gregson, but Lippert has been bruised a bit as he works his way through the administration’s internal political gauntlet. Some Pentagon officials have quietly raised concerns that Lippert might have the kind of strained relations with senior military officers that could hinder his effectiveness.

Lippert, who has served in Iraq as a Navy intelligence officer, is “pro-military,” and is known to have functioned as a bit of a window into the US armed forces for then-Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama. But Lippert is not “pro-Pentagon.” Lippert is an international relations major from Stanford University who has served in the military with pride, but is committed to the military as a tool of policy, not out of institutional loyalty. His loyalty is to Obama.

For much of Obama’s first year in office, Lippert served as chief of staff for the National Security Council (NSC). He clashed with General Douglas Lute, a holdover from the Bush administration as “war czar” for Iraq and Afghanistan. He also had tense relations with his nominal boss, then-National Security Advisor General Jim Jones. Critics say Lippert flaunted his close relationship with Obama. But the close tie with Obama is real, and strong, and Obama personally would like to see Lippert overseeing Asia policy for the Pentagon. That is still likely to happen, though those harboring reservations could trip him up.

     ASIA POLICY SHIFT: Evidence continues to grow that President Obama and his top aides would like to see a major US strategic shift toward greater emphasis on Asia, which should be particularly evident when the President hosts the APEC summit in Hawaii next November.

It’s notable that in a recent New Yorker analysis of Obama’s foreign policy, NSC director Tom Donilon, deputy director Ben Rhodes (Obama’s long-time chief foreign policy speechwriter), and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell were all quoted outlining just such a strategic “rebalancing” of American foreign policy. The Pentagon’s top policy chief, Michelle Flournoy, outlined a similar policy in a recent talk at Johns Hopkins.

The administration is looking to energize America’s role in East Asia by fomenting a system of open and transparent economic and security cooperation in the region, defining the terms of engagement to which China has to respond. The economic component, for now, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade initiative. And the security component involves building on America’s traditional bilateral security alliances in the region to include a network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships from India, through Vietnam and Indonesia, to Australia, and up to Korea and Japan.

Japan is already cultivating security ties with India and Vietnam, and deepening ties with South Korea, including discussion of formal military agreements involving information sharing and the exchange of military goods and services. China and South Korea both provided relief assistance to Japan after March 11, opening the door to expansion of the existing “Plus Three” dialogue between Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing.

Washington is supportive of these steps by Japan, as they indirectly extend the influence of the US-Japan alliance, while providing Tokyo a far greater degree of self-determination than possible through the exclusively bilateral US-Japan security alliance.

     THE FUTENMA DILEMMA: The problem Washington faces is that continued focus on the Futenma dispute threatens to distract the US and Japan from this broader strategic goal, allowing a relatively minor base dispute to disrupt the whole alliance. Excess focus on Futenma also detracts from the absolutely critical role played by the naval facility at Yokosuka, where the US home ports the USS George Washington carrier group, and the role of the huge Kadena Air Force base on Okinawa. Together, Kadena and Yokosuka allow the US to project enormous power throughout East Asia, and are the principle means to deter North Korean aggression, and to balance China’s rising military role in the region.

Tokyo continues to insist Japan fully backs the plan for a new facility at Henoko, fearful that admitting the plan is dead will cause tension with Washington. And Washington continues to back the Henoko plan, because no political decision has been made to abandon the bureaucratic status quo.

With no decision yet made to abandon the Henoko project, none of the necessary talks about a new plan can proceed. That leaves the US-Japan alliance dangerously vulnerable to a crisis in the event of a helicopter crash at the Futenma facility, which is surrounded by civilian communities.

     CONGRESSIONAL INTRIGUE: Into this bureaucratic quagmire have stepped three senior and very influential US senators: Carl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John McCain, the Ranking Republican on Armed Services; and, Jim Webb, chairman of the Asia subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations. On May 13, the three senators issued a joint statement calling for the Defense Department to “re-examine plans to restructure U.S. military forces in East Asia.” The senators said the US “strongly supports a continuous and vigorous US presence in the region,” but emphasized that they “believe the current DoD realignment plans are unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.”

While the statement was “joint,” Senator Levin seemed to emphasize the need for restraint, and cost-effectiveness, in defense spending, especially in the construction of new overseas facilities. Senator McCain tended to emphasize strategy, saying: “The Asia-Pacific region’s growing role in the global distribution of power requires us to consistently view and update plans for the U.S. military’s role in the region.” And Webb forcefully challenged the Marine Corps claims that construction of a new facility in Henoko Bay to replace the Futenma air station is indispensable to the Marine presence in, and thus the stability of, East Asia.

Webb brings to the issue years of experience as a Naval Academy graduate, a highly-decorated Marine officer, a military planner, a former Secretary of the Navy, and now almost a full term as a US senator.

With Webb taking the lead, the three senators proposed a dramatic overhaul of the US Marine presence in East Asia. The key elements would include: a) “abandonment” of the Henoko project at Camp Schwab as a replacement for the Futenma facility; b) integration of the Marine Corps assets at Futenma into Kadena Air Force base, while dispersing some Air Force assets now at Kadena to other areas of the Pacific; c)  home-basing in Hawaii or at Camp Pendleton the 8,000 Marines now scheduled to redeploy to Guam, and deploy those Marines on a rotating basis throughout the Pacific.

     THE JONES ROLE:  Most intriguing is that retired Marine Corps General Jim Jones, who was President Obama’s national security advisor until last October, played an important role in helping Webb craft these proposals. It will be difficult for the current Marine Corps leadership to argue to legendary Marine veterans Jones and Webb that their proposals would be harmful to the Marine Corps, and are otherwise operationally unrealistic.

Jones first publicly revealed his apparently evolving views on Okinawa in a meeting last week with a group of Japanese parliamentarians, including former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki (LDP) and Mikio Shimoji, policy research chief for the People’s New Party (PNP). According to Shiozaki and Shimoji, who met with reporters after their meeting with Jones and displayed their written notes, Jones said that he had always thought the best approach on Okinawa was to merge into the Kadena air base the Marine aircraft operations now based at Futenma. The Henoko project was not needed.

It remains unclear what, if anything, Jones did to try to change American policy toward Futenma while he was national security advisor.

     THE SKEPTICAL VIEW: Some sources very close to the situation are skeptical that the Obama administration will shift Okinawa policy any time soon. According to this view, it makes sense that the administration would seek to kick the Futenma-Henoko issue down the road a while longer. Pushing back the 2014 deadline would amount to acknowledging the obvious, and acknowledging the difficulties to proceed so soon after the March 11 natural disasters would also buy more time to find a permanent solution.

But Senator Webb is proposing a wholesale rethinking of American strategy and force structure in the Western Pacific, and only the Secretary of Defense and/or the President himself can make those kinds of decisions. Without that heavy push from the White House, according to this view, it would not be possible to shake the bureaucracy out of its policy rut.

From a strategy standpoint, opponents of a shift in Okinawa policy will argue that it would signal a US retreat from Asia, and reduce the American deterrence of China.

     WORKING WITH CONGRESS: But the White House continues to send signals that it is serious about a shift in strategy toward Asia. A restructured US force posture would not be seen as retreat, but rather an effective region-wide “hedge” in the event China tries to throw its growing weight around in the region. And sources close to Kurt Campbell say that he is convinced that continued US and Japanese wrangling over Futenma will threaten the whole “shift” strategy, because it can’t work without a vibrant US-Japan alliance.

Campbell is prepared to work with Webb and others in Congress on a new basing arrangement for the Marines in the Pacific. Once Panetta takes over as defense secretary, and assuming Lippert becomes his top deputy for Asia, the White House would have in place an administration-wide team to pursue an expanded role in the region.

White House to tap Obama friend as Pentagon’s Asia chief

The White House will soon nominate Mark Lippert, a close friend and trusted advisor to President Barack Obama, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, according to sources close to the situation. Lippert will replace General Wallace “Chip” Gregson, who will depart April 1. Barring any unexpected glitches in the laborious background check that is now standard for high-level appointments, the Lippert nomination should be made public shortly. With his Capitol Hill experience as an aide to Senator Patrick Leahy and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, and his presidential ties, Lippert should have little trouble winning Senate confirmation.

The tapping of Lippert, who was then-Senator Barack Obama’s first foreign policy advisor starting in 2005 and became an overall friend and confidante, comes at a critical time in Obama’s effort to craft his own doctrine for America’s role in the world. It’s a clear sign of the importance the president places on US ties with East Asia.

    STRATEGIC REBALANCING: Even before taking office, Obama was influenced by a gnawing sense in much of the US foreign policy community that the US global posture was dangerously out of balance: a debilitating commitment of national power and prestige to two questionable land wars in Southwest Asia, alongside a mysterious lack of strategic investment of time, energy, and resources to an Asia-Pacific region that is anxiously witnessing the truly historic economic and military rise of China.

The first order of business was to extricate the huge US national security apparatus (planning, intelligence, troops, equipment, money, diplomacy) from Iraq and Afghanistan, which the Administration has been doggedly trying to do, but in both cases is proving easier said than done. (The White House really did not want to lose focus by getting sucked into Libya…)

Simultaneously, the Administration has been trying to reassert, and reconfigure, America’s role in East Asia. Some initial fanciful notions of a ‘strategic partnership’ with China have given way to the reality that Beijing is still somewhat clumsily seeking to define its role as an emerging regional and global power. Tensions have run high with China since the leadership in Beijing has resisted reining in its errant North Korean ally, and has haughtily asserted claims on territories controlled by Japan and some Southeast Asian nations.

Instead, the Administration is trying to foment a system of open and transparent economic and security cooperation in the region, defining the terms of engagement to which China has to respond. The economic component is the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade initiative. And the security component involves building on America’s traditional bilateral security alliances in the region to include a network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships from India, through Vietnam and Indonesia, to Australia, and up to Korea and Japan.

    THE LIPPERT ROLE: One way or another, the President wanted Mark Lippert to play a role in this emerging strategic plan to rebalance America’s global position. Several months ago the White House was looking at Lippert to go to the Pentagon as a deputy assistant secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict (SOLIC). These are the counter-terrorism operations that will become increasingly important as the US steadily withdraws ground forces from Afghanistan.

But the White House eventually settled on Lippert for the more senior post of assistant secretary for East Asia, which will require both a bold strategic vision and a deft ability to challenge some entrenched elements of the US military-security bureaucracy.

Lippert has no background in Asia. But there is no question that he will be speaking for the President.

A graduate of Stanford, with a degree in International Relations, Lippert quickly found work on the Hill with Senator Leahy, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. He joined up with Obama in 2005.

Along the way, Lippert decided to pursue his lifelong interest in the military, and utilized a little-known but important Navy program that allows skilled foreign policy specialists to commission as Naval officers and work part time in Naval Intelligence or as a staff aide to senior officers. (Interestingly, Lippert’s soon-to-be counterpart at the State Department, Assistant Secretary for East Asia Kurt Campbell, served as an aide to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the same program.)

Before the Obama presidential campaign entered full swing, Lippert served a tour in Iraq as an intelligence officer assigned to a Navy SEAL special operations unit. Upon his return, he resumed his position right next to Obama, alongside Obama’s other foreign policy alter ego, Denis McDonough, now the President’s Deputy National Security advisor. Even as the Obama campaign’s team of foreign policy advisors grew to over 300, including some establishment heavyweights, it was Lippert and McDonough who were rarely out of eye contact with Obama.

After the election, Lippert served as chief of staff for the NSC, nominally led by retired Marine General Jim Jones. The relationship was uneasy however because Lippert had much closer ties to the President. Lippert eventually left the NSC to serve another Navy tour, and returned to Washington a few months ago to once again work for Obama. General Jones has left the NSC, replaced by Tom Donilon, who shares the “rebalance toward Asia” perspective.

    THE POLICY VISION: Once he takes office, Lippert won’t have to define policy as much as implement policy. With the strong backing of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Administration’s emerging policy toward Asia has mostly been shaped by Kurt Campbell. The policy starts with the principle that the US-Japan alliance is the foundation of the US strategic position in the region. The US Kadena air force base on Okinawa, and the US naval base at Yokosuka are the keys to the ability of the US to project power and maintain stability. And, partly in response to the rise of China, Japan and other nations in the region are becoming increasingly comfortable with military-to-military cooperation. The beginnings of a broad security architecture are taking shape, not to contain China, but as a framework for the peaceful integration of China, and as a hedge in the event Beijing settles, even temporarily, on a more troubling posture in the region.

    THE FUTENMA PROBLEM: Lippert’s most difficult, and important, task may turn out to be resolving the vexing problem of the US Marine Corps presence on Okinawa. Technically, the US and Japan have an agreement for roughly half of the 17,000 Marines now stationed on Okinawa with the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to relocate to Guam by 2014. As part of the deal, the US Marine Station Futenma, on Okinawa, would close, and its key operations (mostly involving helicopters) would relocate to a new facility to be built in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa, close the Marine Camp Schwab. The key component would be a new runway built to accommodate the controversial V-22 Osprey, a tilt rotator vehicle that can land and takeoff either as a chopper or fix-wing aircraft.

Public opinion on Okinawa is firmly against the new facility. Tokyo signed the deal with Washington, but has been unable for 15 years to bring Okinawans on board. Washington insists the deal should proceed, and expects Tokyo to deliver its side of the bargain.

The issue is deadlocked. The Henoko project is essentially dead, though no official death notice has been issued.

Instead, the issue has continued to be a dangerous irritant that can easily be inflamed (as occurred recently when word emerged that then-State Department Japan desk chief Kevin Maher had made inappropriate comments about Okinawans; an otherwise unimportant incident took on outsized importance because of the backdrop of tension over Futenma.)

For a while, the Futenma issue threatened to disrupt the whole US-Japan alliance, overshadowing the critical roles of Kadena and Yokosuka, and the growing willingness of Japan to take on more regional and even global security responsibilities.

    WISHING IT AWAY: Today, Washington and Tokyo have seen the wisdom of temporarily posting a resolution, confining Futenma discussions to working level meetings. The issue is in a state of unsteady equilibrium. Tokyo continues to voice unequivocal support for the project, so as to not rile American opinion in a way that would bring the issue back to the top of the bilateral agenda. In reality, virtually no political leader in Tokyo wants to touch the issue. In the wake of the recent tragic earthquake, that will be the case even more. And Washington continues to insist the plan must go forward, but does so in a more low-key style so as to not have it return to the top of the agenda.

This approach has two problems: Futenma remains open, and just one US aircraft accident among the heavily concentrated population surrounding the base could provoke such a backlash as to threaten all US bases in Japan, including the vital Kadena and Yokosuka installations. And as long as the two sides pretend the existing Henoko plan can still move ahead, there is no possibility to discuss alternative basing arrangements.

The Marines want to stay on Okinawa. It is convenient. Japan picks up much of the bill. And it is not clear where the money would come from to fund a transfer and permanent basing somewhere else, such as Guam or Hawaii.

With the White House focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, including continued heavy deployments by US Marines in Afghanistan, the President’s advisors have fiercely resisted having the Futenma issue reach his desk. The White House does not want to have any tension with the Marines over Okinawa, and does not want to have to go to Congress for the funds to finance an alternative basing plan.

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has shared that reluctance. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, careful to maintain her successful alliance with Gates on broader issues, has gone along.

But the stalemate can’t last forever, especially because it will continue to prove disruptive to the broader strategic vision of rebalancing the US global posture toward Asia, in cooperation with Japan.

    NEW MARINE BASING ARRANGEMENT: The best solution would be for the US to scrap the 2006 “roadmap” with Japan that seemed to finalize the Marine realignment on Okinawa and Guam.

There is no compelling strategic reason for the Marines to be on Okinawa. They are a global force that can be based anywhere. They certainly are not critical to the US deterrent capability in Asia. During the tense moments with China last summer, it was the USS George Washington aircraft carrier out of Yokosuka, together with fleet air units and larger air capabilities out of Kadena that provided the US show of force in the region.

It makes no sense for the heavy Marine presence on Okinawa to cause the kinds of irritants that could ultimately threaten the vital continued US presence at Kadena and Yokosuka.

A workable solution could involve a phasing out of the III MEF from Okinawa, to be replaced by Japanese Marine units, trained by the United States, who would be responsible for the defense of Japan’s southern islands. To dispel any notions of a slip in US commitment to Japan or the region, the US could permanently base an Ohio-class submarine out of Yokosuka, and permanently base a unit of F-22 aircraft at Misawa or some other facility in Japan.

The Marines could be permanently based elsewhere, with preparations in place for the use of Japanese facilities in the event of a crisis, and visiting basing rights to be negotiated throughout the region.

A solution to the Okinawa problem becomes feasible in the context of the broader repositioning of the United States strategically in the region.

Lippert has just the kind of political clout that would be required to bring the Marines along. Nothing short of intervention by a strong defense secretary, or a person with clear White House backing, can break the current deadlock over Futenma.

Will Lippert adopt that role? If he does, he and Campbell could make a formidable team capable of reshaping the US presence in East Asia for years to come.

The danger is that he will choose to stick with the existing framework, hoping to avoid confronting the bureaucratic inertia in the military and on Capitol Hill. That would amount to presidential endorsement of the existing deadlocked plan, which would greatly inhibit the US-Japan alliance from evolving into a much more vibrant force for stability in the region anytime soon.

 

 

 

 

NSC shakeup could impact US-Japan relations

The much-anticipated announcement by President Obama October 8 that Tom Donilon will be his new national security advisor might not be the greatest of news for US-Japan relations.

Donilon has been a prominent supporter of the blinkered view that “tough love” succeeded with Japan over the past year, moving a dangerously-naïve Yukio Hatoyama out of power, and opening the door for more pragmatic leaders of the DPJ to steer US-Japan relations back on track.

With the strong backing of Defense Secretary Bob Gates, Donilon’s perspective has until  recently prevented a more flexible approach to the intractable Futenma problem from emerging within the Obama administration, sending the US-Japan alliance into one of its most contentious periods in many years.

The White House has placed a virtual moratorium on high-level celebrations of the 50^th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty, partly out of anger, and partly out of a determination to not give any sign of pulling back from insistence that the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma move forward.

Donilon’s view has long but cautiously been opposed by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who has argued that the focus from Washington should be on the entirety of the US-Japan alliance. Campbell has worked closely on this view with the Pentagon’s Asia chief Chip Gregson. Assisting Campbell has been retired US ambassador Rust Deming, who informally speaks for the “Japan Hand” community throughout the United States opposed to the Administration’s heavy focus on Futenma.

Until recently, Campbell and Gregson have been unable to convince their respective bosses, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates, that the Henoko project as currently crafted would not work, and that the Marines would have to come up with more flexible options for basing on Okinawa. Gates is not particularly fond of Japan, stemming from his days in the intelligence community, when he distrusted the ability of Japan to prevent intelligence and technology security breaches. Moreover, with wars ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Administration engaged in intense struggles over the proper troops levels for Afghanistan, Gates was adamantly opposed to pressuring the Marines to revisit Okinawa basing options.

Hillary Clinton has backed Gates because of a broader Pentagon-State alliance the two formed in favor of boosting the State Department’s funding and staffing levels for promotion of “soft power” and development diplomacy. Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, often known as a friend of Japan, has tended to back Donilon more than his friend Campbell on the Okinawa issue.

Walking carefully

Campbell and Gregson have both had to walk a fine political line inside the Administration’s corridors of power. Campbell fought, and lost, with the Marines over a decade ago, when the idea of closing Futenma and relocating its operations to a new facility first arose. Campbell favored merging the Marines into the huge US Air Force Kadena base on Okinawa, and failed in an effort to kill funding for the futuristic Marine helicopter, the Osprey, which is now scheduled to be deployed to Okinawa in the coming years. Campbell does not relish the thought of more battles with the Marines.

Nor does Gregson, a retired Marine Corps general who worked closely with Campbell on Futenma issues over a decade ago. Gregson is known for his affinity for Okinawan people and culture, and is vulnerable to accusations that he is overly-sympathetic to Okinawans on issues relating to Futenma.

None of these disagreements reflect personal animosities. In the frenetic pace of policy making in Washington, the disagreements often reflect different perspectives developed for institutional and bureaucratic reasons. Donilon, for example, is reluctant to have the Futenma issue reach President Obama’s desk at a time when the President is managing a sometimes tense relationship with the Joint Chiefs over prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.

This view was reflected in the abrupt, even rude treatment accorded Prime Minister Hatoyama by Washington leading up to his resignation.

The somewhat dismissive attitude toward Japan worked in parallel with efforts by the Administration to develop a ‘strategic partnership’ with China, on everything from currency and other global economic matters, to climate change and North Korea.

The Administration has grudgingly come to accept that such a partnership is unlikely to develop any time soon. To the contrary, China has been decidedly uncooperative on currency and climate change issues, and has shown great reluctance to pressure North Korea. Moreover, the country’s huge, unexplained military buildup has relentlessly continued, and China has shown disturbing tendencies to try to bully neighboring East Asian neighbors, especially over disputed territories.

The result has been an Obama administration effort to reenergize alliance relationships in East Asia, and to cultivate broader political and security relationships with nonaligned nations, all carefully calibrated to dissuade Beijing from trying to throw its growing weight around the region.

Hillary Clinton delivered her now-famous address to the Asian Regional Forum meeting on July 23 in Hanoi, indirectly warning China to settle any territorial disputes in the region in a peaceful manner.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen had earlier voiced his growing concerns about the rapid, unexplained pace of China’s military buildup.

More recently, the Administration dispatched White House economic advisor Larry Summers, along with Donilon, to Beijing, for some tough talks on a range of issues. Donilon’s presence was a clear message that the Administration is increasingly (though far from totally) looking at China through a traditional security lens, rather than through the lens of a prospective broad partnership on global issues.

In that context, the recent disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea opened the door for Campbell and others to argue that the Administration had mistakenly taken Japan for granted, and that an effective US strategy in Asia had to be conducted in close cooperation with Japan.

Vice President Joe Biden actually started this campaign earlier.

President Obama and Secretary Clinton acted on the Biden-Campbell theme when they held cordial meetings with Prime Minister Kan and Foreign Minister Maehara during the UN General Assembly meetings in New York in late September.

They were backed up by unequivocal statements of support for Japan during the dispute with China made by Secretary Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mullen.

For now, the Administration’s attitude toward Japan has dramatically changed, which Donilon is going along with. But Donilon is doing so primarily, overwhelmingly, with China on his mind, viewing Japan as a necessary piece in a broader US move to balance China in the region. Campbell, Gregson, and others see a close relationship with Japan as having great value in its own right, for bilateral, regional, and global reasons.

At this point, the two camps are united in a decision to temporarily shelve the Futenma issue, and concentrate on deepening the US-Japan alliance.

But the Futenma issue is not dead. Donilon remains determined to push it through, while Campbell favors more flexibility on the part of the Marines.

The two sides will eventually have to reconcile this big difference, and that might not happen until another round of intense stalemate over Futenma threatens to once again bog down the alliance.

But that kind of showdown won’t occur, if ever, for at least a few more months, during which time Washington and Tokyo will have a chance for a broader strategic dialogue. Who knows? Tom Donilon might even participate.

 

 

 

Japan blinked? Look again.

 

A lot of analysts may have ‘rushed to judgment’ concerning the recent East China Sea conflict between Tokyo and Beijing.

 

The conventional wisdom seems to be that Japan “blinked” under Chinese pressure by releasing unconditionally the captain of a fishing vessel at the center of the dispute. But there is little evidence to back up that contention.

 

At an early stage, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku took charge of the issue in Tokyo for the government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan. No snub of newly-named Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara or the Foreign Ministry was intended. Sengoku and Kan just wanted to make clear that the Japanese government at the highest levels was running the show.

 

In fact, Maehara, a supposed hawk on China issues, was on board with the policy to release the ship's captain. He apparently gave Secretary of State Hillary Clinton a hint of things to come during their meeting in New York on September 23.

 

The government had several objectives. First was to reinforce long-standing policy that Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands is nonnegotiable. The Chinese fishing boat in question had rammed a Japanese Coast Guard cutter, causing considerable damage, while illegally located inside Japanese territorial waters. The matter, as far as Tokyo was concerned, was for local law enforcement authorities to handle; emphasis on local law enforcement highlighted Japanese territorial sovereignty.

 

Early release of the ship’s crew was routine.

 

As China escalated tensions, Sengoku’s next objective was to secure clear backing from the United States that the Senkaku Islands fall under the jurisdiction of the US-Japan Security Treaty. US policy since the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1972 has been that ultimate determination of sovereignty over the Senkakus is a matter for Japan and China to work out peacefully, but for now the islands are under the administrative control of Japan, and therefore come under the jurisdiction of the bilateral security treaty.

 

The Obama administration never hesitated. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in her September 23 meeting with Maehara in New York, forcefully said “of course they do,” when the issue of the Senkakus falling within the realm of the security treaty arose. Defense Secretary Bob Gates was equally blunt that day, telling reporters inquiring about the dispute that “we would fulfill our alliance obligations.”

 

Sengoku’s next objective was that Japan be seen as acting in a calm and measured manner, in contrast to the image of China as a unreasonable antagonist that quickly emerged. He told reporters that he wanted to avoid “extreme nationalism” in either Beijing or Tokyo from exploiting the issue.

 

Since last July, the Kan government had been an enthusiastic supporter of Secretary of State Clinton’s initiative, launched at an ASEAN meeting in Hanoi, to ensure that territorial disputes in the South China Sea be settled peacefully. That principle was reinforced when President Obama met with ASEAN leaders in New York on September 24. The message from the meeting was implicitly critical of China, which recently has haughtily been claiming sovereignty over virtually all disputed territories in the South China Sea.

 

As many analysts have noted, China’s demeanor toward Japan in the recent East China Sea dispute has made a shambles of its ‘charm offensive’ in the region that earlier had seemed to bear some diplomatic fruit for Beijing.

 

Sengoku also wanted to make sure Beijing had a face-saving way to deescalate the dispute. Sengoku is not convinced that the Chinese leadership planned the ramming of the Japanese Coast Guard vessel as a deliberate provocation.

 

Finally, Japanese officials have quietly pointed out that Japan remains in firm administrative control of the Senkakus. China has made no overt moves to challenge that physical status quo, even if annoying, regular violations of Japanese territory by Chinese fishing vessels, and a few disturbing ‘shoulder-bumping’ incidents recently between military units in the area, might be forerunners of future escalations.

 

Should such an escalation take place, Japan has in place the local forces (a very formidable Coast Guard that is borderline military in capabilities) to deal with relatively minor skirmishes, followed by the Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces. In the background is the US-Japan alliance, and regional diplomatic support.

 

In this context, Japan had nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by releasing the detained fishing boat captain. Tokyo never had any intention of putting the vessel captain on trial. His release was inevitable. Having met all of his objectives, Sengoku saw no need to draw out the detention.

 

The Cabinet has made a considered judgment to couch the captain’s release as a decision made by local authorities, free of political considerations. That’s a diplomatic fig-leaf, of course, which reinforces the principle of Japan’s legal system having jurisdiction in the area, while providing Tokyo with political and diplomatic flexibility.

 

Tokyo came up short somewhat in coordination with the local authorities, a fact that highlighted the DPJ’s relative lack of diplomatic experience. But that seems to be a minor wrinkle in what otherwise was an effective and responsible performance by the DPJ.

 

DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada, who gained considerable respect for his recently-concluded stint as foreign minister, forcefully defended the Cabinet’s actions during a television appearance in Tokyo on Sunday with his counterparts from opposition parties. Naturally, the LDP’s Ishihara and the YP’s Eda lambasted the DPJ’s handling of the incident. But they provided little in the way of specific alternatives that would have improved the outcome for Japan.

 

 

Seiji Maehara and unrealistic expectations in Washington

Japan’s new foreign minister, Seiji Maehara, is a nice guy, unfailingly polite, and overall a pleasure to work with. He’s also very smart, well-informed about strategy and foreign policy, and deeply committed to enhancing the US-Japan relationship.

So it comes as no surprise that his appointment as Japan’s chief diplomat was welcomed in Washington.

But there’s a problem. Many in Washington assume that Maehara will carry with him a magic solution to the lingering problem of whether and how to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, on Okinawa. The Futenma issue is holding the US-Japan bilateral alliance as virtual hostage.

Maehara has no magic solution; there is none. Indeed, political momentum is decidedly against current plans to construct a Futenma replacement facility in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa, north of the Futenma base, which has long been scheduled to close. On September 12, residents of Nago City, in which the Henoko area is located, elected a municipal assembly with a large majority opposed to the Futenma replacement project. Nago City’s mayor, elected earlier this year, is a firm opponent.

Many in Tokyo were reportedly stunned by the vote, but that simply reinforced the impression that an enormous gulf exists between Tokyo and Okinawans. There was never any serious doubt which way the assembly elections would go.

And there is no realistic reason to doubt the outcome of the gubernatorial election for Okinawa Prefecture, scheduled for November 28. The challenger, Yoichi Iha, is a fierce opponent of the Henoko project. The incumbent, Hirokazu Nakaima, is growing exceedingly weary of straddling a ”maybe” position, and won’t even have the leeway to approve the project should he win reelection and still harbor any inclination to do so.

Seiji Maehara knows this. For the past year, he has doubled as State Minister for Okinawa, along with his main cabinet role as transportation minister. Maehara quietly spent a lot of time trying to influence the outcome of the Nago elections in favor of pro-base candidates, and came up woefully short.

The only way the Henoko project could proceed is for Prime Minister Kan to order police forces to dislodge the many protesters almost sure to line the perimeter should efforts be made to shun local opinion and forcibly begin construction. Kan, a former civic organizer, is not about to do that. Any attempt to do so would hold dire political consequences for his government, and could conceivably spark ugly demonstrations against the US military presence in Okinawa, and perhaps across Japan.

It is hard to believe that the US-Japan security alliance, which is absolutely critical to peace and stability in East Asia and beyond, is threatened with disruption over what many analysts agree is a base of minor importance. (Former US ambassador to Japan, Mike Armacost, has called the current US policy “stupid.”) But that is exactly the situation.

The top two US negotiators, Assistant Secretary of  State Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of Defense Chip Gregson, know that the current US plan to build a replacement base in Henoko is unworkable. But they have been unable to convince Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, or the upper echelons of the National Security Council staff to change course. None of them want to go through the laborious, politically-arduous task of convincing the Marines to develop new basing options, and to coordinate new plans with Congress and Guam, which is scheduled to eventually be home to 8,600 Marines now based on Okinawa.

Unfortunately, a severe attitude of impatience bordering on derision toward Japan has taken hold in parts of the Obama Administration. This year marks the 50^th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty, but the White House has blocked the holding of any significant events to celebrate the occasion. The ministers of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries routinely gather each year in New York at the time of the UN General Assembly, for a bilateral security dialogue known as the 2+2. Not this year, because the Futenma issue remains unresolved. (There is talk now in Tokyo of trying to convene a 2+2 meeting in December, but that is based on hope in Tokyo that Washington will finally accept the Kan government’s inability to move forward on Henoko.)

All of this comes in the midst of close cooperation between the US and Japan on a range of critical security issues that belies the notion of a relationship in disarray. Japan has naval forces in the Arabian Sea, for example, working with US and other naval forces against piracy. Japanese ground forces were dispatched to Pakistan recently to assist relief efforts in the wake of devastating floods. Japan worked closely with the US and South Korea in the wake of North Korea’s apparent sinking of a South Korean naval vessel earlier this year. The major naval exercises held by the United States in the vicinity of China recently, held as a not-so-subtle message to China to act with restraint in the region, took place with Japanese military observers on board. The USS George Washington aircraft carrier embarked for the exercises from recently-upgraded facilities at its home port in Yokosuka, Japan. The George Washington’s air wing is now operating from a new $2 billion runway built with Japanese assistance at the US Marine Air Station Iwakuni.

In short, the US-Japan alliance is functioning well, and could be functioning better, if not for the insistence from Washington that the Futenma replacement project is some kind of litmus test of Japan’s commitment.

Maehara will not be able to solve that problem. Only a policy change in Washington will do, and there are still precious few signs that the White House yet understands that diplomatic temper tantrums or political stiff arms won’t alter this entrenched reality of domestic Japanese affairs.

 

Washington and Tokyo stalled on setting "2+2" ministerial summit

Neither side is quite ready to admit it, but Washington and Tokyo seemed stalled on setting a date for the next meeting of foreign and defense ministers from the two countries.

 

The apparent inability to set a date for the Security Consultative Committee meeting, also known as the “2+2,” reflects continuing and widening disagreement over plans for a new facility to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, on Okinawa.

 

A date may yet be set, but the delay is troubling.

 

The two sides issued on August 31 a report on the planned new facility prepared by a panel of experts. They were unable to meet a May 28 pledge by the two governments to resolve all outstanding issues regarding precise location, design, and construction methods for the new facility.

 

Opposition to the new facility is intense on Okinawa, and a gubernatorial election set for the prefecture on November 28 is likely to harden that stance.

 

Tokyo is reluctant to take any action, including a 2+2 meeting, that could put a spotlight on plans for the facility. Instead, Japanese government officials have been trying to wrangle from the US concessions on technical issues such as design of the facility’s runway, as a way to demonstrate to Okinawans that sincere efforts are being made to reduce the burden of the heavy US base presence in the area. Meanwhile, Japan is also offering to increase its already substantial financial underwriting of the planned move of 8,600 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The plan is plagued by delays and cost overruns.

 

Further complications are likely to arise during the next two weeks, when Prime Minister Naoto Kan battles a challenge for his office from Ichiro Ozawa. The presidential election for the Democratic Party (DPJ) is scheduled for September 14. Kan is a reluctant supporter of the Futenma replacement plan, a position he adopted only after intense US pressure undermined his predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama. Ozawa is a firm opponent of the new facility, set for the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa.

 

Kan’s plan since taking office last June has been to ardently support the move to Henoko in public, while planning to tell Washington in the wake of the gubernatorial election that opposition on Okinawa was inalterably tying his hands. If forced, under pressure from Ozawa, to show any enthusiasm for the Henoko plan during the DPJ election campaign, Kan could lose some critical votes in what could be a close outcome. He might wind up softening his support.

 

US negotiators are aware of the dilemma facing Japanese political leaders, but they have been unable to convince the White House, Defense Secretary Bob Gates, or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to back off.

 

The political reality is that no plan for a Futenma replacement facility can move forward in the face of Okinawan opposition. For years, the Liberal Democratic Party tried to use the power of the central government budget to siphon off opposition. That failed, and the DPJ has not had any more success with that approach.

 

The best the two sides can hope for now is that the incumbent Okinawa governor, Hirokazu Nakaima, will win reelection in November, and show some flexibility. That, combined with extensive romancing of local elected officials in the Henoko area, might prove sufficient to allow the project to proceed. Few are hopeful that approach will work.

 

In the meantime, the governments in Washington and Tokyo find themselves in the remarkable situation of being unable to celebrate the enormous success of the bilateral alliance, in this the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty. They apparently can't even schedule a summit meeting of their respective foreign and defense ministers, in what otherwise would be the latest in a long line of annual events.

 

The bitter irony is that the alliance has otherwise been functioning well, with extensive cooperation at the working level on critical issues like China, North Korea, Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations. Moreover, the replacement facility for Futenma is not even of great strategic importance, especially in comparison to the huge US naval presence in Yokosuka and the enormous US Air Force base at Kadena. But bureaucratic inertia in Washington has locked the US into a policy that is undermining the broader US-Japan alliance. An unfortunate cynicism in Washington about ongoing political turmoil in Japan has only made it more difficult for a US compromise position to emerge.

 

 

Gates and Japan

Defense writer Fred Kaplan’s tour de force profile of Pentagon chief Robert Gates rightly garnered lots of attention on August 16, detailing as it does the bold initiatives and actions that have made Gates one of the most influential defense secretaries since the post was established in 1947. (The “news” that Gates will likely leave the Pentagon in 2011 generated the most headlines, even though his expected departure has been conventional wisdom for months. The parlor game of predicting Gates’s successor began quite some time ago.)

 

Because of its importance, the Kaplan profile of Gates has tended to overshadow a critical speech Gates delivered in San Francisco last week that could one day mark a signature project of his tenure.

 

While undoubtedly unintentional, the initiative announced by Gates could indirectly have a positive impact on US-Japan relations, potentially reversing a frosty period in bilateral ties to which an uncharacteristically impolite Gates contributed.

 

Gates announced he has ordered a “thorough Force Structure Review” of the Marine Corps., “to determine what an ‘expeditionary-force-in-readiness’ should look like in the 21^st century.” The incoming commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, will have the overall job of “defining the future mission” of the Corps.

 

Gates is responding, he said, to “anxiety in some circles over the future role and character of the Marine Corps.” Over the past decade, the principal combat activities of the Marine Corps have involved extensive deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the result that the Marines have “functioned for years as a so-called second land army.”

 

In the process, Gates said, a perception has taken hold that the Marines “have become too heavy, too removed from their expeditionary, amphibious roots and the unique skill sets those missions require.”

 

Gates said he did not want to preempt the work of the “smart people” who will be “trying to define the unique mission of the Marines going forward.” But he offered what he called a few “observations.”

 

First: Though the Marines have often engaged in extensive land campaigns, “fundamentally, the Marines do not want to be, nor does America need, another land army.”

 

Second: The Marines have “a unique ability to project combat forces from the sea under uncertain circumstances,” an ability that was particularly evident in the first Gulf War, when a flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City forced the Iraqi army to keep one eye on the Saudi border and one eye on the coast.

 

Third: Having said that, Gates said, “I do think it is proper to ask whether large-scale amphibious assault landings along the lines of Inchon are feasible.”

 

Earlier in the day, Gates indicated during a question-and-answer session with sailors, that he foresees a smaller Marine Corps in the coming years. The Corps now stands at 202,000 up from 175,000 a few years ago.

 

In the end, Gates told his San Francisco audience, he envisions a Marine Corps “at the ‘tip of the spear’ in the future, when the US military is likely to confront a range of irregular and hybrid conflicts.”

 

 

The Japan angle

What does this have to do with Japan? Potentially, a lot.

 

Okinawa is home to the III Marine Expeditionary Force of the US Marine Corps, one of three Marine MEFs, and the only one based outside the United States.

 

For the last year, US-Japan relations have been rocked by a dispute over a replacement facility for the Marine Air Station Futenma, which is located in a heavily populated area of Okinawa and is scheduled to close. Futenma is home to a portion of the 1^st Marine Air Wing, the aviation component of the III MEF. The portion at Futenma, the Marine Aircraft Group 36, consists of helicopter units and KC130 refueling tankers.

 

Opposition to building a replacement facility, now planned for Henoko Bay, off the coast of Marine Camp Schwab, is intense on Okinawa. The Democratic Party of Japan, which became the ruling party last September, promised to locate the Futenma replacement facility outside of Okinawa, but backed away from that pledge under unrelenting pressure from Washington.

 

The opposition on Okinawa has not gone away, however, and the two sides are likely to face another rough period in November, when final details for the Henoko facility are supposed to be wrapped up. A gubernatorial election on Okinawa scheduled for November will likely confirm once again the intense local opposition, and Tokyo will be very reluctant to ride rough shod over Okinawan popular will.

 

Unless Washington agrees to alter its plan, or at least postpone implementation while the two sides can review the situation, the two sides are headed for another nasty showdown.

 

A confrontation serves neither side’s interests, especially because the new facility is not critical to the US strategic position in East Asia. Bureaucratic inertia in Washington, including an unwillingness up to now to reconsider Marine deployment options in the region, have led Washington to bludgeon Tokyo, despite the adverse impact that approach is causing on the crucial US-Japan alliance.

 

The closure of Futenma is part of a broader “roadmap” to realign US forces in Japan, agreed to in 2006, and reaffirmed by the new Obama Administration in February 2009 without so much as a cursory review.

 

A key part of the realignment, scheduled for completion by 2014, is the movement of some 8,500 Marines, and 9,000 dependents, from Okinawa to Guam. But construction delays, and subsequent funding cuts by an angry Congress, have made it virtually impossible to meet the 2014 deadline.

 

Now Secretary Gates has ordered a top-to-bottom review of the roles, missions, and forces structure of the Marine Corps, presumably including the III MEF on Okinawa.

 

Why should Washington push for the Henoko facility, and why should Tokyo go along, when the Marine Force Structure review could very well conclude that the Henoko facility is not needed after all?

 

 

Kadena, Yokosuka key

The US Marine Corps is a critical part of the American global strategic posture. But basing the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan, at least at the size and structure envisioned by the 2006 roadmap, is not critical to the US strategic deterrent in East Asia. By contrast, the Yokosuka naval base and the Kadena air base are strategically vital. Yokosuka is home to the USS George Washington, the only aircraft carrier group the US home ports abroad. And Kadena, one of the largest air force bases in the world, is the hub of US airpower in the Pacific, and home to the 18^th Wing, the largest combat wing in the US Air Force.

 

All things being equal, Okinawa is a great place to locate the III MEF. But all things are not equal, considering that 20% of the land mass of Okinawa Prefecture’s main island is occupied by US military facilities. Okinawa hosts a hugely disproportionate share of US military facilities compared with Japan’s four main islands.

 

It seems ill-advised to single-mindedly press ahead for the unnecessary Henoko project at the risk of potentially igniting public ill-will toward Kadena and Yokosuka.

 

The Marines are not on Okinawa to defend Japan. The chances of a land invasion of Japan are less than remote. Even a Chinese move on the Senkaku islands could effectively be met by Japan’s Coast Guard and the Maritime Self Defense and Air Self Defense forces (not to mention the Ground Self Defense Forces).

 

Similarly, the Marines are not on Okinawa to defend South Korea. The Republic of Korea’s ground forces are larger in number than the entire US Army and US Marine Corps combined worldwide, and they are capable of defeating North Korea, with backup of course from the combined air and naval forces of the US and the ROK itself.

 

The Marines do have specialized assignments in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, including securing ports to facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief, and trying to locate and secure nuclear materials. But Marine forces with access to bases in Japan and pre-positioned supplies and equipment in Japan would not necessarily have to be permanently based on Okinawa to fulfill those roles.

 

At a minimum, that would be a legitimate component of the upcoming review of the Marine Corps’s roles and force structure.

 

It might very well prove optimal for the US and Japan to find a way for the specialized 31^st Marine Expeditionary Unit, a 2,000 person force that is the lightning-quick element of the III MEF, to remain on Okinawa. The 31^st MEU, which is one of seven Marine MEU’s in the world but the only one based outside the US, is transported by the versatile USS Essex, which now operates from upgraded facilities at the Sasebo naval base in Kyushu.

 

Take time to reconsider

Having said that, the Marine operational concept is the “air-ground task force,” with a sea-based transport component, so it is not easy to split up a task force for basing purposes without undermining operational efficiency.

 

These are the types of issues the US and Japan should be talking about, rather than being diverted by the misguided emphasis placed on finding a replacement for Futenma. Japan has a vital interest in working with the US to find suitable, sustainable basing arrangements for the Marines in the Western Pacific, since Japan directly and indirectly benefits from the security blanket the mere presence of the Marines provides in the region.

 

It would seem that with the November Okinawa gubernatorial election likely to confirm opposition to the Henoko project, with the Marine Corps about to undergo a thorough review of its missions and force structure, and with construction behind on the new facilities for Guam, the perfect opportunity has arisen for Washington and Tokyo to postpone consideration of a Futenma replacement facility, and instead concentrate on boosting what is otherwise a very healthy strategic alliance.

 

 

 

Simmering Okinawa problem could boil over

It’s now about as “unofficially official” as it can get that the August and November deadlines concerning a Futenma replacement facility on Okinawa will not be met. Indeed, the political underpinnings of the 2006 bilateral “roadmap” for realignment of US forces in Japan, of which the relocation of some 8,500 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the construction of a Futenma replacement facility are cornerstones, are coming undone in both countries.

 

The confluence of three events on July 27 made this abundantly clear – as if additional clarity were needed. (See earlier accounts over at Observing Japan and Sigma One.)

 

On Tuesday, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell testified on US-Japan security ties before the House Armed Services Committee, and hinted at a schedule slip by failing to mention in his prepared remarks the August deadline for reaching agreement on the exact location, design, and construction method for the Futenma replacement facility. An August agreement would supposedly then set the stage for a final political decision in the Fall.

 

Also yesterday, the US government’s Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) released its much-anticipated Final Environmental Impact Statement concerning the on-going military buildup on Guam, and officials made clear that vital infrastructure and other critical preparations will not be anywhere near complete by the 2014 deadline for moving the 8,500 US Marines and their 9,000 dependents to Guam. Publicly, the JGPO says 2014 is still the goal, but with huge cost overruns already apparent, and a skeptical Congress slowing funding, the Marine redeployment faces significant delays.

 

Meanwhile in Tokyo, Prime Minister Naoto Kan gathered for the first time since taking office the four members of his Cabinet deeply enmeshed in the Futenma issue. Present were Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku, who will function as the Cabinet’s Futenma coordinator; Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, who is the principal liaison to the US; Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa; and, State Minister for Okinawa Seiji Maehara.  The participants let it be known not-so-privately that they will defer decisions until after the Okinawa gubernatorial election, scheduled for late November. This continued a pattern of leaks with the same message, as outlined at Twisting Flowers.

 

The Okinawa election is likely to institutionalize widespread opposition to construction of the Futenma replacement facility. Prime Minister Kan has already said he will not forcibly begin construction. To do so could easily spark broader opposition to US bases in Japan, which neither Washington nor Tokyo wants to see happen. So the stage is increasingly set for Tokyo, while ceaselessly voicing support for the replacement facility, to shrug its post-election shoulders and say it needs more (undefined) time to bring Okinawan opinion along.

 

September test

The big question now is how the Obama administration will respond to a situation over which it is rapidly losing even the pretense of control. An early test could come in September. Japanese officials make no secret of the fact that Prime Minister Kan would like to visit the US for a meeting with President Obama. The sense inside the Administration is that Obama, assuming Kan is reelected DPJ president and remains prime minister, would like to hit the “reset” button with the DPJ, and would welcome a meeting with Kan, probably around the time of the UN General Assembly in late September.

 

An important sign will be whether the Administration puts aside lingering bad feelings about the Futenma issue and genuinely celebrates the US-Japan alliance in this, the 50^th anniversary of the signing of the bilateral Security Treaty.

 

The Administration has apparently given the go-ahead for Ambassador John Roos to participate in the peace memorial ceremony in Hiroshima on August 6^th. He would be the first US official to do so.

 

Obama is also scheduled to visit Japan in mid-November for the APEC summit.

 

Internal Disconnect

One way or another, the United States eventually will have to show flexibility on the Futenma issue. What’s not clear is whether the Obama administration will accept this reality smoothly, or if another, perhaps more serious episode of bilateral tension will be needed to force cabinet officials to focus on the issue.

 

A major problem inside the administration is a “disconnect” between the assistant secretary level of senior officials – Kurt Campbell at State, and Chip Gregson at the Pentagon – and the Cabinet secretaries they report to. Sources intimately familiar with the thinking of Campbell and Gregson report that the two know that the current plan for Marine basing on Okinawa will not work, but they have been unable to get their respective bosses – Hillary Clinton at State and Robert Gates at Defense – to face that fact.

 

Campbell and Gregson have scrupulously stuck to the “tough love” stance in public, and in talks with Japanese officials. Campbell, for example, has suggested to Japanese officials that Tokyo could adopt a “special measures” law to override Okinawan opposition to construction of a new facility on Okinawa to replace Futenma. And Gregson, in his House testimony yesterday, said he fully expects details of the Futenma replacement facility to be settled by the end of August, and full political agreement to be reached by the Fall.

 

But they both can see the political writing on the Okinawan wall. While they may continue to press Tokyo to abide by the existing accord, both accept the domestic political constraints at work in Japan.

 

By contrast, Gates and Clinton have shown little interest in Japan’s domestic problems, considering them rather minor in comparison to the difficulties they face in dealing with Iraq, Afghanistan, China, and North Korea. Gates and Clinton believe they have delegated the issue to Campbell and Gregson, and want it resolved without requiring cabinet attention.

 

As a result, Gregson and Campbell have not really leveled with Gates and Clinton, failing to inform them in no uncertain terms that the Futenma replacement plan will not work. They know Gates and Clinton do not want to hear that message, and they have chosen for the time being to try to manage an unmanageable situation.

 

Message to Beijing

Another factor influencing the continuing hard line from Gates and Clinton on Okinawa issues is a desire to send a strong message to both China and North Korea. Beijing is testing Washington (and Tokyo) in the South China Sea and other parts of the region, while the regime in Pyongyang, as usual, turns to aggressive means to fight for survival on its own brutal terms. The Gates-Clinton visit recently to the Korean DMZ, and the joint military exercises conducted with South Korea, were designed to make clear to one and all that the US intends to remain as a source of balance and stability in East Asia. The concern of both Gates and Clinton is that any sign of discord between the US and Japan over Okinawa could weaken that message.

 

The irony is that Japan has been fully cooperating with the US in those efforts. Senior officers from Japan’s Self Defense Forces were on hand to observe the US-ROK exercises. As I wrote recently, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, the key to the US force projection capability in East Asia, is operating from newly-modernized facilities at the Yokosuka naval base. The 5^th Air Wing attached to the George Washington is operating from a just-opened $2 billion facility at the US Marine Air Station Iwakuni, financed in large part by Japan.

 

The unnecessary flap over Futenma has overshadowed this very significant boosting in US-Japan military cooperation, and a flare-up will only hinder future collaboration.

 

Flexibility not easy

Unfortunately, a shift in US policy on Okinawa can only happen through intervention at the Cabinet level. There are simply too many powerful moving parts for a policy shift to be engineered by sub-cabinet officials.

 

As things stand now, the national security interagency process is heavily weighed down by Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention Iran, China, North Korea, and a host of transnational issues. Forcing Okinawa, and proper deployment of the III Marine Expeditionary Force back on the policy agenda would require both Gates and Clinton doing some very “heavy lifting” politically.

 

Rivalries between the US Marines and the Air Force would have to be tamed. It will be very difficult for the Marines to streamline their presence on Okinawa without significant Air Force cooperation.

 

Meanwhile, a Congress increasingly anxious to trim Pentagon budgets would be an unpredictable factor in any effort to reopen the Marine-Okinawa issue. Congress has already strongly signaled intent to slow down funding for the Guam buildup, not so much because of political jockeying in Japan but because of anger over faulty DOD estimates of infrastructure needs on Guam. Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee with considerable say on military construction issues, made some waves in Washington earlier this month when she suggested that money earmarked for the buildup on Guam would be better spent in the continental US.

 

To make matters worse, the administration doesn’t relish the prospect of reopening the Okinawa issue after having spent the better part of a year falsely castigating the DPJ as somehow “pro-China” and “lacking a serious commitment” to security.

 

At this point, the best option might be for the two countries to simply postpone consideration of Okinawa issues for at least a year, providing time for a serious, in-depth dialogue on roles, missions, and basing arrangements to develop.

 

In that context, the prospect of significant construction delays on Guam could provide both countries with a face-saving opportunity to begin that process.