Dispatch Japan

Okinawa Vice Governor Takara: ‘No go on Henoko’

 

Three weeks have passed since the United States and Japan announced with great fanfare an agreement on consolidating US military bases on Okinawa. The core of the agreement is the eventual, long-anticipated closure of the US Marine Air Station Futenma, perilously located in the crowded center of Ginowan City. The closure of Futenma, which would occur in 2022 at the earliest, is contingent on the construction of a replacement facility further north in the Henoko district of Okinawa. The decision to close Futenma was first reached in 1996, and the initial target date was 2014. Heated opposition on Okinawa has blocked the  project.

Both governments hailed the agreement as a “breakthrough” on an issue they have intensively discussed for almost 18 years, with little to show for the efforts.

Most major US media outlets, whose correspondents in Tokyo were apparently not fully aware of the ins-and-outs of the nearly two decades of negotiations, proved to be easy prey for the optimistic cloak in which American and Japanese officials draped the April 5 deal.

In the weeks leading up to the announcement, and in the weeks that have followed, Ministry of Defense officials in Tokyo, and leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, have expressed optimism that Okinawa leaders can be convinced to alter their opposition. They point out that Okinawa Prefecture Governor Hirokazu Nakaima is a member of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s LDP, and argue that he will eventually “come around.”

Nakaima has a big voice in the matter because he must give approval before landfill work that is necessary for construction of the envisioned Henoko facility can proceed. Nakaima has repeatedly expressed his view that it is simply unrealistic to think that local opposition to the Henoko plan can be overcome. He calls for a replacement facility to be built outside of Okinawa, which, despite being far smaller than Japan’s four main islands, now hosts roughly 75% of the US military presence in Japan (as measured in total Japanese land leased by the United States military for bases).

Indeed, the ink had barely dried on the April 5 agreement when, the next day, Nakaima met with Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, and afterwards told reporters that he still opposes the Henoko plan, and still expects the US and Japan to reach agreement to transfer the Marine functions conducted at Futenma to a spot outside of Okinawa. “I have no intention of changing my stance,” he said.

Optimism rose among supporters of the Henoko replacement facility plan when Kurayoshi Takara, a 65 year-old professor  who is considered Japan’s top historian on the Ryukyu Islands and Okinawa itself, took office as Vice Governor of Okinawa. Analysts sometimes pigeon-hole Takara as a “conservative,” but he is actually somewhat of an iconoclast whose views, while very respected, are hard to label. There was even talk of Nakaima retiring later this year, rather than running for reelection in late 2014, and leaving it to Takara to champion the Henoko plan.

Takara is having none of that. Eyebrows rose among those who follow Okinawa issues closely when Takara forcefully presented his opposition to the Henoko plan in an interview published by Asahi Shimbun on April 26.

The interview was accompanied by an “Interviewer’s Note,” written by Asahi correspondent Norio Yatsu.

Below are both the Yatsu note and the text of his interview with Takara.

 

* * * * *

 

Interviewer’s note:  

Kurayoshi Takara, 65, a former professor at the University of the Ryukyus, once faced fierce criticism from the Okinawan people for drafting a recommendation saying that Okinawa should make up its mind to overcome history issues and fulfill its responsibility. He became the vice governor of Okinawa this spring. He is critical of the “victim mentality” and accepts the role played by the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Is the arrival on the scene of this conservative opinion leader in the Okinawa Prefectural Government an indication of the possibility of accepting the relocation of the Futenma Air Station within Okinawa?

When the local papers in Okinawa carried on their front page the scoop that Takara was going to be named vice governor, I suspected this was a foreboding of things to come. Takara is an expert on Ryukyu history who was involved with historical research for the restoration of the Shuri Castle, as well as one of the leading conservative opinion leaders in Okinawa. I interviewed Takara in late March, just before he became vice governor. With the caveat that it’s his personal opinion, he said that Henoko relocation will not be feasible and expressed concern about the present situation in which Okinawa has no choice but to revert to its “finger-pointing” mode. He has kept quiet after assuming the vice governorship. Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga is also opposed to Henoko relocation. [Henoko is a district of the city of Nago.] If Onaga is a person who appeals to “feelings,” Takara appeals to “reason.” We mainlanders must take very seriously the fact that the two top conservative brains in Okinawa have arrived at the same conclusion.

 

ASAHI: Your recommendation “Okinawa Initiative” in 2000 was astounding. Is your assumption of the vice governorship a step toward accepting the relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Henoko?

Takara: Several people in Tokyo told me that the bureaucrats think so and are happy. They say that with my becoming vice governor, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima will give approval for landfill in Henoko, resign, and Takara will take over. I thought they have a shallow understanding of Okinawa. That’s their wishful thinking.

What I urged in that recommendation was for Okinawa to make up its mind to be a part of the nation of Japan. Modern Japan has merely treated Okinawa as a marginal prefecture and as a result, Okinawa became has adopted an unwavering victim mentality. Its ability to see the big picture has weakened. For sure, the situation in Okinawa does justify complaints about discrimination. I was saying that we should not focus only on that aspect and should improve our way of thinking. It is a big mistake to think that Takara believes that Okinawa issues can be forgotten and anything that’s good for Japan can go ahead. If I have to choose, I will definitely choose Okinawa’s interest.

 

ASAHI: Is it too optimistic to think that the governor will approve the landfill?

Takara: Personally, I think this will be very difficult. The government will probably do all it can to create an environment conducive for the approval, but I don’t think the situation will change with such methods.

As a result of the controversy stirred up by former Democratic Party of Japan Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s statement that [the Futenma base] would “at least be relocated out of Okinawa,” the hurdle for relocation within the prefecture has become higher. At the same time, Okinawans have begun to share the common perception that the hurdle is indeed higher. In both senses, there is no going back to the previous state of affairs.

The government will have various options, such as to criticize the governor’s inaction on the landfill application or take him to court, like in the case of former Governor Masahide Ota’s refusal to sign lease contracts on behalf of military land owners. Yet is it really worth going that far for Henoko relocation? This will only aggravate the Okinawan people’s antipathy toward the bases.

 

ASAHI: The governor has not completely ruled out relocation within Okinawa, and there are people who accept the relocation. The government may be thinking that Henoko relocation is still possible depending on the political situation in Okinawa.

Takara: For sure, the governor is not saying that he is opposed to relocation within Okinawa. However, he has been saying all along that Henoko relocation is near impossible. Why is Tokyo not accurate in its analysis of the reality in Okinawa? What is the government’s basis for saying there are actually many people who accept the relocation?

 

ASAHI: Perhaps it’s the notion that if forced to choose between Henoko relocation and the permanent presence of the Futenma base by the end of this year, Henoko would be accepted with reluctance.

Takara: However, it’s the Japanese government that is providing military bases, and these are operated by the U.S. forces. It will be utterly irresponsible for the authorities in charge of security to say: We tried to remove the danger posed by the Futenma base but Okinawa would not listen, so the base is staying where it is. If an accident occurs, it would be Okinawa’s fault.

 

ASAHI: What you are saying now is completely different from the Mr. Takara who served as adviser to the conservative Inamine and Nakaima administrations who asserted that “solutions are more important than interpretations.”

Takara: Okinawa plays two roles. One is to denounce, criticize, and point to the issues relating to the military bases concentrated in Okinawa. The other is to come up with concrete proposals for arriving at solutions to these issues to be included in the agenda of Japan as a whole, telling Japan: “Therefore, Okinawa would like to propose the following ideas, and it is willing to compromise to a certain extent for these proposals.”

However, Okinawa is still unable to extricate itself from the first role more than 10 years after the prefectural government changed hands from the reformists to the conservatives. The base issues are that much confined within Okinawa. The repeated crimes and accidents caused by U.S. service members and the forcible deployment of the Osprey simply serve to make the contradictions in Okinawa sink in. In reality, Okinawa has no choice but to continue to protest.

 

ASAHI: The governor advocates relocation out of Okinawa.

Takara: Governor Nakaima pledged to relocate the Futenma base out of Okinawa during the election campaign for his second term, thus plunging into the debate. His rival called for relocation out of Japan.

Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga, I, and others purposely chose to use the expression “relocation out of Okinawa” because relocation to some other place in Japan is better for thinking about Japan’s security. If we simply forget about other options in the country and go straight to relocation to Guam, the Japanese people will not appreciate the weight of the base-hosting burden on Okinawa or understand why security is important.

I slightly revised the governor’s speech to the National Governors’ Association after his reelection to read: “We are grateful for your sympathy and understanding for Okinawa, but the situation will not improve with just that. Please think of this as a problem for the Japanese people as a whole.” However, the reaction was cold.

 

ASAHI: That’s the perception gap between Okinawa and the mainland.

Takara: Forty years after Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese administration, the perception gap on the historical experience of the brutal Battle of Okinawa and long-term military occupation by the U.S. forces, which resulted in the excessive base-hosting burden, is beginning to emerge in a tangible manner. Many Okinawans are now saying that the way the Japanese government treats Okinawa amounts to discrimination.

 

ASAHI: However, you seem to disapprove of using the expression “discrimination.”

Takara: I can understand the sentiment, but once you talk like that, discussion and dialogue will stop. Those accused of discrimination will shut up and there will be an emotional gap. I have come to think that it is more important to come up with an alternative expression.

 

ASAHI: When Okinawa talks about discrimination, some mainlanders and Internet users accuse it of being a “traitor.” Don’t you think there has been little change in the paradigm of “finger- pointing Okinawa versus dejected mainland” that you abhor?

Takara: Tolerance has withered amid the social stagnation. While politicians say they take Okinawa’s voice seriously, they do not substantially translate this into policy decisions. With the generational change, it is no longer possible to talk heart-to-heart like in the olden days.

The ceremony to mark the restoration of Japan’s sovereignty on Apr. 28 is a case in point. I thought the Prime Minister really came up with a symbolic issue. Okinawa’s reversion only came after the barbaric American occupation that followed Apr. 28 ended. Unfortunately, I don’t think the Prime Minister had a strong sense that Okinawa, Amami, and Ogasawara were deserted at that time when he talked about the restoration of sovereignty.

 

ASAHI: You grew up on Minamidaito Island.

Takara: This is an island that people from Hachijo Island in Tokyo opened up in 1900. That is why Okinawa is not something that I take for granted without even thinking, which is why I am able to take a relative point of view and look at Okinawa from a certain distance.

 

ASAHI: Is a solution still difficult even after the Liberal Democratic Party returned to power?

Takara: I think so. This country is facing too many tough issues. Futenma relocation is just one of the political issues. I believe I have no choice but to do my job with this understanding.

The Japanese government is too occupied to even review the Japan-U.S. agreement and is only able to move forward on the basis of the existing policy. While in Okinawa, the hurdle is now raised for relocation within the prefecture. There is also very little leeway to mediate and narrow the gap.

 

ASAHI: Aren’t you the one who is going to close that gap?

Takara: Oh, no. It is not appropriate for the Okinawa Prefectural Government to say we have this and that idea based on the Japan-U.S. agreement or we will be able to accept this and that military base. It will be difficult for Okinawa to give up its posture of “finger-pointing” unless the government is able to come up with burden-reduction measures not premised on Henoko relocation, in addition to returning the facilities south of Kadena Air Base. However, I must not lose sight of the role I must play in proposing solutions to the problem. Otherwise, we will only be able to find solutions within the context of the contradictions plaguing us. I would like to prevent that from happening.

 

 

Mochizuki: ‘US-Japan agreement on Okinawa is not a breakthrough’

Professor Mike Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. He co-directs the "Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific" research and policy project of the Sigur Center. Previously, he was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was also Co-Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at RAND and has taught at the University of Southern California and Yale University. This interview was conducted jointly for Toyo Keizai On-Line and Dispatch Japan.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the significance of the recently-announced agreement between Washington and Tokyo concerning the return of some territory in Okinawa?

MOCHIZUKI: This is a last-ditch effort by the US and Japanese governments to alter base politics in Okinawa so that the Futenma Replacement Facility can be constructed at Henoko Bay.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this a genuine breakthrough on the issue?

MOCHIZUKI: If by “genuine breakthrough,” you mean that the agreement will succeed in fundamentally altering current political dynamics in Okinawa, I would say it is not a breakthrough. Moreover, the agreement does not entail a significant acceleration in the timetable for returning U.S. facilities south of Kadena Air Force Base, which has been sought by Okinawans.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: It seems that Tokyo is trying to “buy off” Okinawa. Can that tactic work anymore?

MOCHIZUKI: Okinawa of course welcomes the financial aid from the central government in order to promote development. But this aid does not necessarily translate into local willingness to accept a new Marine Air Station within the prefecture.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So much of the new agreement depends on construction of replacement facilities, which has been one reason for the impasse of many years. So where is the “breakthrough?”

MOCHIZUKI: There is no substantive breakthrough. But I think that by recommitting themselves to the return of Futenma as well as the return of facilities south of Kadena, the U.S. and Japanese governments hope to turn around public opinion in Okinawa. After the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama, the political executives of every city, town, and village of Okinawa –whether conservative or progressive-- have declared their opposition to the Henoko FRF plan. So what the Abe government would like to do is at least win the support of conservatives in Okinawa for the current Futenma relocation plan. But when Okinawans read the fine print of the agreement and consider the conditions and the probable schedule for the return of U.S. military facilities, there is not much to cheer about.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any change in the attitude of Governor Nakaima? There are top-level MOD officials who believe that since the governor is an LDP member, he will eventually alter his opposition to the Henoko plan.

MOCHIZUKI: I think Governor Nakaima wants to maintain a good rapport with the Abe government, and he is wisely refraining from rejecting central government initiatives out of hand. But I don’t think this means that he is now prepared to accept the Henoko plan. He is being cautious, and he has stated that he needs to find out how local communities that will be affected by the latest agreement feel.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: The MOD and the Kantei seem to think they can out-maneuver Mayor Inamine by somehow winning the support of a majority of assembly members. Do you see that as feasible?

MOCHIZUKI: Winning over the majority of the Nago City Assembly is an ambitious goal for the MOD and Kantei. But what is key is whether or not Mayor Inamine, who has vehemently opposed the Henoko plan, wins re-election in 2014.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a different attitude toward the Henoko project between the local Henoko residents vs. the other sections of the prefecture? The OPG staff seems to think that the Henoko community favors the project, but all other sections of Okinawa remain opposed.

MOCHIZUKI: Because there has been so much money flowing into the communities closest to Henoko Bay, it is not surprising that these communities tend to favor the FRF project. But those sections of Nago City away from Henoko Bay tend to be opposed. And public opposition to the Henoko plan remains pretty robust in the rest of Okinawa Prefecture.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How would you characterize the Abe government’s approach toward Okinawa? Tokyo seems intent on using the period of review of the landfill application to win over a significant portion of Okinawa sentiment that, up to now, has been opposed.

MOCHIZUKI: Through both financial aid and the promise of future closures of U.S. military facilities in attractive areas for development, the Abe government hopes to win over the hearts and minds of conservative Okinawans who are pro-development and more supportive of the security alliance with the United States. Unfortunately, the latest agreement tends to take a piecemeal approach so the effect on these Okinawans is unlikely to be dramatic.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Has the tension with North Korea had any significant impact on how the long-standing stalemate for FRF? (Putting pressure on Okinawa to agree to Henoko…)

MOCHIZUKI: Tensions with North Korea as well as tensions with China over the Senkakus may have increased support for the US-Japan alliance among some Okinawans. But this does not necessarily mean that they will now embrace the Henoko plan. Rather many Okinawans are probably asking that if US military forces are so important for Japanese security, why don’t other prefectures offer to host those forces?

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: According to the new agreement, Futenma would remain open for at least another 9 years (2022). Is it wise to keep such a controversial facility open for such a long time?

MOCHIZUKI: The target date of 2022 is probably frustrating and depressing for Okinawans. Remember that under the original 1996 agreement, the goal was to have Futenma returned between 2001 and 2003. 2022 would be at least 19 years after the target date. That’s a whole generation. Moreover, the April 2013 agreement does not declare Futenma will be returned in 2022 at the latest. The document instead states “2022 or later.” So there is a strong possibility that the 2022 target year will not be met.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: The plan to relocate a large number of US Marines to Guam seems to be in question, as construction of new facilities on Guam is caught up in cost-overruns, underestimation of costs, questions in Congress, and now the sequestration. How can the overall base realignment move forward if the US can’t deliver on the Guam side of the deal?

MOCHIZUKI: That’s a good question. Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings and I, however, have an answer to that. We propose relocating these Marines back to bases on the continental United States. If we pre-positioned equipment in Japan and elsewhere in the region, we can easily and rapidly fly Marines back into the region during a contingency. Moreover, Marines can maintain a regular regional presence through rotational deployments.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the US Marine presence on Okinawa really of strategic importance, or is the real motivation more mundane bureaucratic considerations?

MOCHIZUKI: If Okinawa were willing to host 20,000 Marines permanently, I would acknowledge that there may be strategic benefits of such a presence. But that is not the case. Therefore, we have to recognize the political strain that such a Marine presence poses on the alliance. Moreover, having Futenma Marine Air Station located in a crowded urban area increases the probability of a tragic accident.If such a tragedy were to occur, this would have a devastating effect on the alliance. It is strategically important to maintain support in Okinawa for hosting more vital facilities like Kadena Air Force base. I am not arguing that all the Marines should leave Okinawa. But I believe that we can dramatically reduce the Marine presence on Okinawa without undermining the US security role in the Asia-Pacific.

US-Japan agreement on Okinawa: Far less than advertised

US and Japanese officials are promoting the April 5th agreement on returning some land in Okinawa now used by the US military as a breakthrough in long-stalled plans for an overall restructuring of the US presence in Japan’s southern-most prefecture.  Amy Searight, the Pentagon’s principal director for East Asia policy, told reporters that the agreement “is a milestone in our progress towards realigning our forces in Okinawa.”

But even a cursory look shows that there is far less in this agreement than meets the eye. Indeed, in some ways it represents backtracking from an agreement announced in April 2012.

Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s office, while striving to not appear obstinate, pointed out that much of the agreement rests on the assumption that the controversial Marine Corps Air Station Futenma will be relocated to a new facility in the Henoko Bay area of the prefecture – a facility that Nakaima “has consistently believed and repeatedly warned is politically unfeasible.” The Okinawa Times, among other criticisms, echoed Nakaima by pointing out that “it has been nearly 17 years since agreement was reached to return the Futenma Air Station. The plan has made little progress because it was premised on the base’s relocation to the Henoko district.”

Consider these features of the agreement:

 

• The area to be returned totals about 2,590 acres, which is a mere 4.5 percent of the total amount of land now utilized by American forces based on Okinawa;

• Of these 2,540 acres to be returned, only 6.2 percent would be returned relatively soon, without significant conditions. That is a mere 161 acres. Moreover, numerous Okinawan commentators have pointed out that many of those 161 acres are of little use economically;

• On other hand, 80.2 percent of the planned land returns (2,076 acres) are contingent on construction of replacement facilities in Okinawa. This includes the Futenma Replacement Facility envisioned for Henoko – the one that Governor Nakaima continues to call politically unfeasible. The anticipated completion dates for these replacement facilities are all quite vague, specifically 2022-28 “or later.” The Okinawa Times referred to this “or later” caveat as “a love letter in the sand.”

• Finally, 13.6 percent of the planned land returns (353 acres) will coincide with the redeployment of 9,000 Marines out of Okinawa, including a to-be-determined number to Guam. However, construction on Guam of the necessary new facilities to support the inflow of Marines is bogged down by cost under-estimates, doubts about the plan in Congress, and now the US budget sequestration.

The argument from many Okinawans that the April 5^th agreement is a significant step backward is compelling. In April 2012, the two countries agreed to delink the return of 5 key facilities south of the huge Kadena Air Base from the Futenma-Henoko issue, which represented significant progress from a 2006 bilateral statement that had reaffirmed that link. The idea was to accelerate the return of the five facilities, which include Camp Zukeran, the Makiminato Service Area, and the Army port at Naha. The April 5^th agreement in essence abrogates the 2012 statement, and returns the entire issue to the status of 2006, making virtually all returns into a package, with the core element being the completion of the Futunma Replacement Facility in Henoko.

The Abe administration is hoping that identifying specific dates for the return of each facility will weaken opposition in Okinawa to the Henoko plan. But it remains very unclear whether local officials in Okinawa will accept that argument from Washington and Tokyo that the moveable and flexible timelines for the return of key facilities actually represents a concrete schedule.

High-level Ministry of Defense officials are optimistic that Governor Nakaima, a member of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, will eventually show flexibility and lower his opposition to the Henoko plan.

The Governor’s office is now reviewing an application from Tokyo to engage in landfill operations in Henoko Bay that are necessary for construction of the new facility. That review will take somewhere between 8-10 months, coming close to a scheduled January 2014 race for mayor of Nago, of which Henoko is a district. The current mayor, Susumu Inamine, is opposed to the Henoko project.

The MOD and the prime minister’s office (Kantei) seem to think they can out-maneuver Mayor Inamine by somehow winning the support of a majority of Nago assembly members.

Senior staff members in the Office of Prefectural Governor (Nakaima’s staff) argue that the MOD and Kantei are wildly optimistic, but say it will take about a month to gauge the overall reaction to the April 5^th agreement and other efforts  by Tokyo (including economic aid packages) to sway opinion among local officials throughout the prefecture.

All of this obscures the worrisome fact that, under the most optimistic scenario, the dangerous Futenma facility (located smack in the middle of Ginowan City) will remain open for another nine years, even though there are clear alternatives available. The alternatives, which US and Japanese officials have informally discussed, include a new facility on Shimojishima island (part of Okinawa prefecture), consolidation of the Futenma operations onto the huge Kadena air base, or construction of a new heliport inside Camp Schwab or Camp Hansen, combined with US access to a new runway to be built in Naha. The last option would include the US hosting of a regiment of Ground Self Defense Forces at Hansen or Schwab, which the GSDF is  anxious to do.

Discussion of these alternative options has never officially been acknowledged by either Washington or Tokyo, for fear of killing the Henoko plan without an alternative firmly in place.

As things stand now, the two sides are committed to the Henoko plan, but continued opposition on Okinawa in the face of the April 5^th agreement could finally force Washington and Tokyo to seriously pursue one of the alternative options.

 

 

Obama to embrace Japan, not Abe

With North Korea having recently tested a third nuclear device and China acting provocatively in the East China Sea, there will be plenty for Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama to talk about when they meet at the White House later today.

The summit will provide an opportunity for the US and Japan to reaffirm their bilateral security alliance and the need for regional peace, stability, and security.

However, below the surface, there is a great deal of unease about Prime Minister Abe in the White House, and at the State Department and the Pentagon. Concern is running high that Abe’s views on history, and his nationalist feelings toward Korea and China, could complicate relations in Northeast Asia as Japan pursues what are otherwise modest and logical expansions of security responsibilities and capabilities in the region.

Some Asia specialists from the Bush administration who know Abe, and worked with him while he was chief cabinet secretary and later briefly prime minister in 2006-2007, are fairly confident that Abe will act pragmatically, and not let his ideology cause problems for Japanese diplomacy.

But few people in the Obama administration know Abe, and top officials are somewhat skeptical that Abe (and those around him, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and education minister Hakubun Shimomura) will be able to restrain their nationalist impulses and act with a clear strategic vision for stability in the region. As Michael Cucek pointed out recently, Abe himself declared in his “new” book (a virtual reprint of an earlier tome) that his return to power is not simply a replacement of the discredited Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), but “is a fight to return the country called Japan to the hands of the citizens of Japan from out of the grip of postwar history.” Abe’s long-standing “history denier” perspective has not changed.

For this reason, the Obama administration, while squarely reaffirming the alliance, wants to avoid any statements or symbolic gestures during Abe’s brief visit that could appear provocative toward Beijing, or be seen as an endorsement of Abe’s personal political agenda.

     DIFFICULT PREPARATIONS: To begin with, the White House was never terribly enthusiastic about a visit from Abe. Tokyo pushed very hard for a January summit, but the White House said the president’s schedule would not permit that.  The White House attitude amounted to: Abe virtually invited himself, so we could hardly say ‘no.’

Part of the problem is that expectations in Washington are quite low of anything substantial emerging soon from Tokyo on hot-button issues like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks or basing arrangements for US forces on Okinawa. Many had assumed that this was a problem of the poor governance and weakness of the DPJ, but it is clear now that it is a broader political problem in Japan. Abe is not able or willing to push for progress on key issues at least until after next summer’s Upper House elections.

Abe had assumed, mistakenly, that his return to office, and that of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), would be met with cheers in Washington, that an “anything but the DPJ” attitude prevailed. While greater political stability is certainly welcomed by Obama administration officials, many in Washington were pretty happy with the foreign and security policies of the DPJ’s Yoshihiko Noda, who is clearly more moderate than Abe.

All of this made it difficult for senior officials to work out details for the summit. This became apparent two weeks ago, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Zumwalt and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey met in Washington with Takeo Akiba of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ro Manabe of the Ministry of Defense. When the talks ended, the Japanese officials were unusually brusque in declining to talk with gathered reporters, indicating the continued lack of clarity made it difficult to brief the press.

As late as last Friday, after the prime minister’s office had announced that Abe would visit Washington on February 21-23 and meet with Obama on the 22^nd, the White House would not provide quick confirmation. That afternoon, the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent a ‘heads-up’ note to the Japanese press corps saying that “if the situation allows it to happen,” Abe would visit on February 21-23. Only later did the White House issue a statement announcing the visit. Coordination was less than smooth.

     WHITE HOUSE NIXES ABE PLANS: For Abe, the visit with President Obama is important as an opportunity to demonstrate to his domestic audience that he can manage the all-important alliance with the US. However, it may turn out that the only concrete news Abe is able to bring to Washington is that the Diet will likely sign the Hague Convention provisions concerning custody arrangements of children of failed international marriages. The repeated hearing of tragic stories spurred former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to champion the cause. The DPJ had agreed to adopt legislation, and Abe has followed. But even on this issue Abe still faces hurdles, as conservatives object to “outside intervention” into family disputes, and liberals (especially the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito, have raised concerns about Japanese women victims of domestic violence.

Abe had initially hoped to trumpet his plans to lift Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and make clear publicly that Japan would use its missile defenses to assist the United States in the event North Korea launched a ballistic missile aimed at US territory.  Abe assumed the new policy would be welcomed in Washington.

That was not the case. The Pentagon, of course, would welcome the defense planning and operational flexibility that would come from Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. But US officials were concerned that a demonstration of support for such an initiative by Abe could be misinterpreted as endorsement of the prime minister’s broader domestic agenda, including revision of the Constitution, which could unnecessarily anger Beijing. Instead, US officials pressed to keep discussions during the summit to specific means to enhance deterrence and regional stability, including better US-Japan combined intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training of Japanese Self-Defense Force marine capabilities.

In the same vein, Washington was not eager to back Abe’s desire for specific criticism of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea, particularly with regard to the Senkaku islands. The Obama administration is trying to walk a very fine line between clearly warning China against efforts to unilaterally challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus, and not giving China any reason to feel threatened.

The White House is perfectly willing to reaffirm the statement made on January 18^th by then-Secretary of State Clinton in a joint appearance with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida. Without mentioning China by name, Clinton warned against “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus. But in the same sentence, she went on to say that “we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means.”

This is a warning to China, but it is also an effort to stay engaged with China, to let Beijing know that the US would not favor provocative actions by Japan, and to let Abe know that the US wants his government to stay cool and calm.

In the White House view, a specific reference to China might boost Abe’s domestic agenda, but would not be helpful for the alliance or for regional stability and security.

Within the Obama administration, the departure of Hillary Clinton and her influential assistant for Asian affairs Kurt Campbell has led to a subtle but important shift in the balance of power in managing Japan-related issues. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is a strong supporter of the strategy of “rebalancing” US force posture and diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Donilon is also extremely concerned about the strategic dilemma posed by China. How can the US simultaneously engage China and deter China from exercising undue heavy-handedness in the region? How best to persuade a rising China to participate in a rules-based regional and global architecture, and not create a self-fulfilling prophecy of China as an enemy?

It’s in this context that Donilon and other administration officials are wary of Abe’s hard line nationalist proclivities.

     TPP AND OKINAWA:  Meanwhile, the White House is frustrated that Abe will not provide an affirmative answer about Japan’s participation in the TPP trade talks, but officials there and at the State Department know that until next summer, Abe’s priority will likely be the Upper House elections. Abe does not want to anger the LDP’s rural voter base. Close to half of the LDP’s Diet delegation is opposed to TPP participation. For his part, Abe has been hinting at the possibility of making a decision on TPP prior to the elections. But the betting in Washington is that Abe is angling to garner from Obama some language hinting at flexibility in the demand that Japan put rice and other sensitive economic sectors on the negotiating table as a precondition to joining the talks. Washington is very reluctant to carve out exceptions for Japan prior to a decision by Tokyo to participate.

Many in Washington believe Abe wants Japan to eventually join TPP, if only out of the strategic recognition that TPP could be an important component of a rules-based regional security and economic architecture to which China would have to adapt. (Economic reform, which TPP could help spur, has never been in the forefront of Abe’s thinking.) But it’s unclear if and when Abe will be willing to spend the political capital required to move the issue forward.

Obama will be anxious to hear from Abe his intentions concerning TPP, but it remains unclear how the two sides will be able to meet each other’s stated political needs.

Concerning Okinawa, particularly plans to construct in the Henoko area a facility to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, expectations in Washington are very low.

The White House, State Department, and Pentagon were all quite upset that the Abe administration did not provide them with advance notice that Abe would not, prior to his Washington visit, send a request to Okinawa Governor Nakaima for permission to begin landfill work for the Henoko project.

Administration officials were not upset about Abe’s decision itself; that was expected. But the timing of his announcement, with no advance warning to Washington, upset US officials.

As for the Henoko project itself, the Obama administration increasingly recognizes the political reality that in all likelihood it will not be built, and has already begun serious consideration of possible alternatives. Indeed, this was discussed directly with the prime minister’s office and the foreign and defense ministries, prior to Prime Minister Noda leaving office. But the feeling in Washington and Tokyo is that Henoko cannot be publicly abandoned until an alternative is prepared, because Okinawans might conclude that the US will be staying at Futenma forever, and this perception would cause terrible problems. For now, both sides will continue to publicly support Henoko, even though both sides agree an alternative must be found.

 

 

 

Smith: ‘Japan needs a strategic accommodation with South Korea’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fourth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Sheila Smith is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

SMITH: Given events in the region, I think this will be a crisis management summit to reaffirm the alliance. The transition in Japan makes this a good opportunity to discuss some outstanding bilateral issues, including TPP and Okinawa. But the real challenge for both sides will be to conduct the alliance reaffirmation in a way that has real meaning.

In Northeast Asia, we are facing a moment where our bilateral alliance cooperation really matters. We see Japan in a standoff with China over the Senkakus. There is no agreement on maritime boundaries. We’ve got a rising China with a trajectory of military growth.

All of the pieces are there for this to be a pretty serious heads-up for the alliance. The deterrence message is very important, and the Obama administration has done a good job in this area. But the risk-reduction message is also vital. Frameworks – bilateral, trilateral, regional – somehow have to be constructed with Beijing. I suspect there is a significant amount of interest blossoming at some level in China, because this standoff, or worse, is clearly not helpful to China’s longer-term interests.

Meanwhile, this is the beginning of the second Obama administration, and the White House is committed to a rebalancing of American force structure and overall strategic focus toward Asia. This is a moment for the Obama administration to begin defining and refining the rebalancing strategy.

Finally, the economic component of the US-Japan relationship needs enhancement. TPP is one piece of that, but there is much to be gained from a pretty frank discussion by the two leaders about growth strategies, including the yen and longer term economic goals, and how the alliance might work to support those strategies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

SMITH: There has been a lot in the media about superficial things, such as the timing of the summit, or the Kyodo report that the Obama administration gave a firm “no” to collective self defense. Some reports seem almost determined to find problems. I don’t think that this is the tone or tenor of the upcoming meeting.

But there are challenging issues, including TPP and the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.

The Diet has made progress toward ratification of the Hague convention.

The real question is: what will the alliance accomplish? They will have to talk about the longer-term forward deployment of US forces. It wouldn’t be a bad idea to create some kind of strategic consultative process, not just one confined to the Senkaku problem, but one that envisions the shape and roles of the alliance over the next decade or two.

I suspect Abe will want to talk about TPP, even if he is not ready or able to say that Japan will join the talks. The president will want to hear Abe’s views on this. We all know it poses a domestic political hurdle, but the president would like to have a clear sense of how the prime minister plans to proceed.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

SMITH: The administration is anxious to know how much “traction” the alliance can get. There is a tendency to dub recent problems as a “DPJ problem.” I don’t agree with that. Japanese politics are going through a structural transition. There will be governments, like the current Abe cabinet, that say “we have to wait until after the next election” before we can tackle this or that issue. This is not just a problem for one party. It is a structural problem that is as troubling for the conservatives as it was for the liberals, and it poses a big problem for the Japanese government.

The Obama administration wants to embrace the alliance. But there is much more realism in Washington now about how much can be accomplished, and how quickly. The realism first set in while the DPJ was in office, but it has not gone away with the LDP having come back.

There are signals, including the rising stock market and high ratings for the cabinet, that are positive, and people in Washington are aware of this, but the relatively low expectations remain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

SMITH: There are people in Washington from the Bush administration who have worked with Abe, but the Obama administration needs time to get to know him. It’s best to treat him not as a former prime minister who has come back, but rather as head of a new cabinet that just came to office. That will enable the White House to get a feel for Abe’s perspectives, on the ‘history’ issue, on collective self defense, and other issues.

There definitely are questions in Washington about exactly what Abe means by ‘collective self-defense.’ People would like to get beyond the campaign slogans of “constitutional revision” and “reinterpreting collective self-defense,” so as to get down to the actual details of what that would mean for force posture, for interoperability between US and Japanese forces, and for roles and missions.

The administration would like to know in more concrete ways what his policies are aiming at. For example, when Defense Minister Onodera said he planned to throw out the existing National Defense Program Guidelines, most of us in Washington collectively groaned: “Why? What’s wrong with the ‘dynamic deterrence’ policies outlined in the current NDPG?”

The feeling in the administration is a desire for less of the political coloring of these issues, and more of the concrete details.

Then there is the broader issue of ‘history,’ especially ‘comfort women.’ What does Mr. Abe plan to do? Does he want to issue a new statement, while not replacing the Murayama statement? There are still big questions about the prime minister’s intentions, particularly with regard to Japan’s relations with South Korea. These are not really questions of history of Japan’s wartime activities. The issue really is the viability of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the ROK.

People are watching closely Mr. Abe’s efforts to reach out to South Korea, not simply on a strategic level, but really the broader process of reconciliation and accommodation. This is where Abe’s personal views, and those of some of his cabinet members, will be very important.

We are all looking to see how Mr. Abe will treat the upcoming Takeshima Day, how Minister Shimomura will handle textbook revision, and other issues that could have an impact on Japan-ROK relations.

It is well-known that the prime minister and some of his cabinet members have very explicit personal views. But people are willing to wait and see how they proceed as a government, and make judgments once specific policies emerge.

Given the strategic environment in East Asia, particularly after the recent North Korean nuclear test, Japan and South Korea cannot afford to not move in the direction of a broad accommodation. It is very much in Japan’s strategic interests, equally important perhaps as it is to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

SMITH: The DPJ and the LDP face the same problem: what is going to happen with Japanese agriculture? How much is any Japanese prime minister willing to risk politically to mobilize for agriculture reform? How much is the prime minister willing to use TPP as a tool for promotion of economic competitiveness?

We need Japan to join because that would greatly strengthen TPP. But Japan needs to do so pretty quickly so as to fully participate. Right now, the talks are proceeding without any voice from Japan. It really boils down to whether Japan wants to be pro-active about open markets and competitiveness, or wants to stay in the old mode of incrementalism.

In reality, Abe will probably have to win a huge Upper House election victory to make this possible. And he would still have to convince an awful lot of his own LDP Diet delegation to go along. The consensus-building won’t start until after the Upper House election. No LDP member will want to go into that election campaigning on a pro-TPP platform.

Unfortunately, with the TPP talks supposed to wrap up by the end of this year, that would mean Japan would not be able to catch up and influence the final outcome.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

SMITH: This is certainly not the first government in Tokyo to lack enthusiasm about tackling Okinawa basing issues. Ryutaro Hashimoto was the most pro-active. Junichiro Koizumi was very pro-alliance, but he was not visibly pro-active about Okinawa the way Hashimoto was. Most politicians see only trouble, and no rewards, in becoming heavily involved in Okinawa base issues.

The politics are also more complicated on Okinawa since the days of Hashimoto as prime minister. People often say: wait and see what happens in the next election. In Okinawa, there is always a “next election,” often within six months – governor, prefectural assembly, Nago mayor. There is always something.

But the trend lines have shifted considerably against the Henoko project. Local LDP leaders in Okinawa are openly against the Futenma Replacement facility plan for Henoko. For example, Naha Mayor Onaga led the recent protests that went to Hibiya Park in Tokyo.

We used to think of this as a progressive-left vs. conservative-right issue, and if the conservatives would just come back all would be fine. But it is much more complicated than that.

There is a new reality in the balance among and within Japan’s political parties. You don’t have the same people representing Tokyo and Okinawa. Trust was never very deep between Tokyo and Okinawa, but now there is even less than in the past. Tokyo is going to have to work very hard to win back the conservatives recently elected to the Okinawa prefectural assembly. They openly campaigned against the Henoko project.

I have thought for quite some time that the Henoko project is the least realistic of our options. Now, that is even more the case, with both liberals and conservatives on Okinawa lined up against it.

Can Abe-san shift that? We’ll have to see. Japan hasn’t had a conservative prime minister in quite some time. In any case, it will take time.

Unlike other issues, such as abductees or revision of the Constitution, Okinawa basing is not an issue on which Mr. Abe has been outspoken. We don’t know what he really thinks. But given everything else he has to deal with before the Upper House election, I cannot imagine that this is high on his priority list.

 

Mike Green: ‘The Asia pivot is both political, and good policy’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan. Michael Green is professor of Political Science at Georgetown University, and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. During the George W. Bush administration, Prof. Green served as senior director for the National Security Council, responsible for coordination of policy toward the Asia-Pacific.

TBL: Do you consider the ‘Asia pivot’ a new strategic initiative?

GREEN: It is a strategic recognition that Asia deserves more attention with respect to resources, and senior administration time. Secretary Clinton set that tone, very early on in the Obama administration’s first days. It makes sense because the center of international political and economic dynamism is shifting to Asia; power is diffusing, and it is shifting to Asia, especially with the rise of China and India. It makes sense for the US to play the leading role in this process. The public recognizes this. Both the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs polling over the past two years documented a sense among the US public that Asia is more important than Europe and other regions.

 TBL: How does that translate into actual policy?

GREEN: It is useful to discipline the State Department and the Pentagon to send a clear signal that Asia is going to get priority. For example: In my understanding, the Pacific Command will not be cut; no matter how the Defense Department budget cuts proceed, the cuts will come out of Europe; possibly two infantry brigades, and other force structures. But it won’t come out of Asia.

That is a very important signal for the Army to hear; It is important for the State Department to hear, because USAID will have to adjust. It imposes a certain discipline on the bureaucracy.

It also sends an important message to the Asia-Pacific region, which is always worried about American withdrawal. The message: Despite the financial crisis, this administration is not going to make cuts in our Asia policy.

And, very importantly, Republicans are not challenging this. That is the good news.

 TBL: Is it a new grand strategy?

GREEN: I am a little more doubtful. It is much more political than strategic. The focus on Asia is exactly right. The term “pivot” is where I have trouble.

Superpowers don’t pivot. Global superpowers do not, even under the kind of economic pressure we are under now, enhance security by looking like they shift radically from one region to another. It violates Teddy Roosevelt’s notion of speaking softly and carrying a big stick. It oversells the whole thing.

 TBL: Doesn’t ‘superpower’ mean you can do that?

Green: Not effectively. China is overreacting. I have been in favor of maintaining a balance of power in our China relationship, but the “pivot” label came so suddenly, and so jarringly, that it created problems with China that we did not need.

 TBL: It seemed quite a different approach from the initial Obama policy.

Green: That’s right. The Obama administration started off, in 2009-2010, emphasizing more of a concert of power with China.

That’s the problem with the “pivot.” It seems to come out of nowhere, and it comes after the 2009 statement with Hu Jintao saying that we respect each other’s core interests, and after statements about strategic reassurance. We sent signals that the US would go the extra mile to cooperate with China on climate change, strategic reassurance, due respect of core interests. All of a sudden there was a jarring new agenda which makes it implicitly all about China.

 TBL: What about Europe, and NATO?

That is an important point. Europe matters enormously. In fact, Europe is incredibly important to our China policy. We need a global approach to China, and the transatlantic relationship has been critical for that.

Finally, while it looks as if the US Pacific Command is not going to be cut in the upcoming budget battles, the commander in the Pacific does not own those forces. The air and naval assets in the Pacific, if something goes hot in Southwest Asia, are shifted.

 TBL: So we need to maintain a global, rather than Pacific policy.

GREEN: Exactly. We really can’t have a hermetically-sealed region if we  are to be a global superpower. In the context of the defense cuts that President Obama is promising -- $500 billion, and maybe more – there is a lingering danger that the US Pacific force structure could be hollowed out if events get hot in the Middle East.

And we have not solved the problems in the Middle East. It is not as if we can simply turn our attention to Asia, and look away from other critical areas.

 TBL: So you are not impressed with the “pivot”?

GREEN: I think a lot of it is political. It is cover for the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a message of robust and assertive policy toward China, which I think has a political dimension because it is allowing the administration to show that it is not ‘cutting and running’ from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Overall, I think the strategy is basically right, though it is not adequately resourced, and the speed with which it took place created some unnecessary problems. The rhetoric of the pivot probably hurt the strategy in some ways.

 

TBL: Would this have occurred if China had been cooperative on the Cheonan sinking, on climate change, and on currency matters?

GREEN: The Chinese brought this on to themselves to some extent because of their position on the Cheonan, on the South China Sea, the Senkakus. All of these incidents brought out animosity in Asia, a desire in the region for the US  to counterbalance China. The Chinese created the conditions where the administration, to its credit, really enhanced relationships, particularly in Southeast Asia, but with all of our allies.

I don’t think a lot of countries in the region necessarily appreciate the pivot label, because they don’t want to be implicated with us in putting a stick in China’s face. The foreign minister of Indonesia has questioned the pivot.

But there’s no doubt the Chinese made this possible.

 

TBL: You mentioned before that you think a lot of the pivot is political.

GREEEN: If you read Bob Woodward’s book, Obama’s Wars, you get the strong impression that the people who wanted to get out of Afghanistan were using China and this pivot logic, without knowing a whole lot about China or Asia. So the ‘pivot to Asia’ narrative was present from the beginning of the Obama administration, but a lot of it had to do with the debate over Afghanistan.

 

TBL: But it’s not all political, is it?

GRENN: No. I think Kurt Campbell and Hillary Clinton began putting the pillars of the policy in place from the very beginning.

Let’s put it this way: China’s actions helped make the policy pivot more effective; the political desire to leave Afghanistan played a role. And some of the pillars of the pivot were being put in place from the very beginning.

TBL: If we start at India, and move down to Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and then up to Japan and Korea, there seems to be a pretty interesting network, even if informal, of new security ties. And it’s not all US-led: It’s Japan-India, or Japan-Vietnam, or even Japan-Korea.

GREEN: This is not new. This was basically the Bush Administration’s Asia strategy. The pillars were the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which we negotiated; the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative, which we began; the transformation of the strategic relationship with India; and the Armitage-Nye focus on upgrading the strategic relationship with Japan.

But I give the Obama administration a lot of credit for adding energy and substance to this process, in Southeast Asia in particular.

TBL: What about ties with India?

GREEN: The Obama administration has largely dropped the ball on India. Senior Obama officials have told Indian officials that Washington does not engage in ‘balance of power’ politics the way Bush did.

And the Obama administration had no trade agenda for the first year or two.

So the building blocks of a true regional policy are finally getting into place, but it has taken the Obama administration a long time to get this done, to get back to some of the building blocks – especially with respect to India and trade – that the Bush administration had earlier put in place.

TBL: What about Southeast Asia?

GREEN: I think Secretary Clinton in particular saw a vacuum in our Southeast Asia policy. Condi Rice had skipped two of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings. Clinton filled that vacuum very quickly. and effectively, and was very welcomed, in part because of China’s much more aggressive stance in the South China Sea in 2010.

So, some of this “pivot” is new; some of it is old, but it took the Administration a while to act on existing policy.

Overall, I would say that this now amounts to a fairly solid bipartisan approach to Asia policy. This means: We should be building up our trade alliances; building up our maritime alliances.

TBL: What about China policy?

GREEN: Based on the President’s recent Asia trip, I don’t see a coherent China policy. We cannot have a policy toward China that is based only on ‘balance of power.’ We have to engage China. The agenda for cooperation was clear and robust – some people thought too robust – when Obama took office in 2009.

Now, I don’t see any engagement policy. In fact, the rhetoric toward China is a good deal more hard-line now from the Obama administration than it was under Bush, or Bill Clinton.

Chinese violations of intellectual property rights, trade restrictions, human rights violations, and cyberspace abuses are egregious, but I am not sure where the White House sees US-China relations going right now.

TBL: How will expanded maritime ties in the region affect US force structure?

GREEN: We will have more access, and be more welcomed, around the region. It is not very well-known, but we now do more naval exercises with India than we do with any other country. We do more exercises with India than India does with all other countries in the world combined.

There will be more intelligence sharing. Although India did not choose a US contender for its next jet fighter, we are actually selling India a lot of defense articles.

In India, it will not be bases; it will be deeper defense relations.

TBL: What about the rest of the region?

GREEN: In Australia, we will obviously have more access. The new facility is for all intents and purposes a base, and it will take some stress off of Okinawa. It will not replace Futenma. It will allow the Marines to send a Maritime Expeditionary Unit (MEU)), which are broadly part of the US special operations community, for very real exercises and training.

Korea, under Lee Myung-bak, is keen to maintain a hefty US presence, and he is even looking at having more regular rotations of Marines, in particular because of the Cheonan and West Sea challenges. This is not a replacement for Futenma, but there may be more rotations of Marines and naval units into Korea than before.

We will have more operations with Vietnam, and more regular visitations with the Philippines.

TBL: Are we pushing too hard, too fast?

GREEN: I wouldn’t put it that way. But we have to be careful to not overplay our hand. These relationships could change based on changes in the national leaderships of these nations. In 2004, for example, we pressed the South Korean government to give us “strategic flexibility” --  in other words, the right to use our troops based in South Korea in contingencies outside of South Korea . That was a big mistake. The South Koreans were reluctant to agree because of obvious implications for China relations. The South Koreans actually publicly said ‘no’, and the Chinese took huge comfort from that as a sign the US-ROK alliance was becoming weaker.

The lesson is that if we push too hard – if we are not sensitive to the local political conditions – we create a dynamic where we are asked to not come. We could end up with a situation in which governments are voted out of office, with new governments coming in on an explicit platform of denying or limiting US access.

TBL: Doesn’t that logic apply to Futenma?

GREEN: In a sense, yes. But the problem in Okinawa is a local government problem, not a national government problem. At the national level, Japan’s two leading parties support the US-Japan plan for Okinawa. The problem is that at the local level the opposition is becoming insurmountable.

 

Sneider: ‘I don’t see strong evidence of a serious pivot toward Asia’

 Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan . Dan Sneider is associate director of research at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly headed the Tokyo and Moscow bureaus of the Christian Science Monitor, and was both national editor and foreign policy columnist at the San Jose Mercury News.

TBL: Do you accept the notion that the Obama administration will shift greater focus, attention, and overall resources to the Asia-Pacific region, as the US winds down the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

SNEIDER: I was one of many people who criticized the Bush administration repeatedly for focusing too much on the Middle East and South West Asia, while neglecting East Asia. Even from a narrow security point of view that criticism was important to make, especially for those of us watching the situation in North Korea. We argued that the North Korean nuclear program was more clear and present danger than anything Iraq posed.

But not all blame should be placed on the Bush Administration. The Clinton administration, for example, did not give East Asia the importance it deserved, at least from an economic point of view.

TBL: You don’t seem very impressed with the stated new Obama policy.

SNEIDER: Northeast Asia has always been one of the primary focuses of American security policy, along with the Middle East and Europe. The rise of China doesn’t really alter that reality. We have security alliances with Japan and South Korea for a reason, and they have been there for more than half a century. I don’t see any change in that regard.

TBL: I hear a “however” coming…

SNEIDER: Yes. The Obama Administration is certainly investing not only rhetoric, but the time and energy of senior leaders on East Asia on a scale much greater than previous administrations. The President’s extensive commitment to host the APEC summit and to attend the East Asia summit all point to this trend. The administration is genuinely working to come up with a coherent policy toward the whole region, which is a major change.

However, I continue to believe that if one could draw a pie chart measuring the collective brain of the US national security establishment, you’d see that far greater amounts of time are still devoted to the Middle East and Europe, and, relatively speaking, East Asia is still not a priority.

TBL: How would you measure that?

SNEIDER: The number of people who deal with East Asia is actually pretty small, particularly those who have real depth of knowledge and experience in the region, including language skills.

I don’t yet see strong evidence that we are really going to strategically pivot away from the Middle East to East Asia. Policy makers spend a lot more time thinking about Iran than they do about North Korea. We have a stability policy in East Asia; we want to prevent conflict by maintaining a basic balance of power. But that is different from a genuine, proactive, positive policy toward the region.

I also don’t see attempts to freshly rethink how we approach the Asia-Pacific region. We pretty much have a set of policy prescriptions that we have been following for a long time. In fairness, that may be in part because those policies worked pretty well. This has meant a series of bilateral security alliances – the well-known hu-and-spokes policy, where there is no regional security architecture; the US has been the balancing power. More recently, we’ve shown a slightly greater commitment to regional security arrangements.

Toward China, we have had a hedging-engagement policy for a long time; sometimes we hedge more, and sometimes we engage more.

TBL: So you don’t see a big change?

SNEIDER: I don’t get the sense that anyone in the Administration has sat down and said: “It is really important that we rethink this region as a whole, where it is headed, and what our role is going to be.”

TBL: How does economic policy fit in this picture?

SNEIDER: I think our approach to the region, for a long time, has tended to be weighted much too much toward security in the traditional, narrow sense, and not weighted toward economic policy. The Obama Administration has undertaken some semblance of a trade policy, and that is a good thing. But, for the most part, we have assigned ourselves the role of guarantor of military balance of power as our primary function.

TBL: You see to think that our friends in East Asia want more.

SNEIDER: Yes. The fact is that many countries in the region have much more concern about the direction of US economic policy. If we don’t recover economically, and find new sources of growth for the US economy, it is not going to matter how many Marines are sitting in Darwin, Australia, or how many aircraft carriers are moving around in the Western Pacific.

The real source of the sense in the region of American decline does not come from policy makers in the region counting US ships and planes. It’s the perception that the US is unable to deal with its own economic problems, and is drifting into stagnation.

TBL: Did the Chinese and American leaderships misread each other when Obama took office?

SNEIDER: Every US administration goes through a learning curve with China. The ‘W’ Bush Administration came into office in 2001 talking about China as a threat. People tend to forget the extent of the tough talk in place when Bush came in. We had the forced downing of the American surveillance aircraft, for example. Officials pretty quickly learn that the kind of rhetoric you bring from the campaign trail into the White House doesn’t work very well when you are trying to govern.

The Obama Administration might have shown the reverse. There was some China-bashing during the campaign. But for the most part, the Administration came into office looking to engage China in a whole range of global partnership initiatives, including climate change and currency management. The view was that China was the central relationship to manage in East Asia.

The first trip the President took to China was very upbeat, and the Administration tried to push difficult issues to the side, for which he was criticized. But the efforts ran into the normal difficulties that are there: Who the Chinese are, what they want, the inevitable, relatively speaking, limits of American power in a world in which other countries are becoming stronger, and the fact that there are issues on which we cooperate with China, and issues on which we clearly disagree.

TBL: So, we misread each other?

SNEIDER: The Obama administration settled into wariness. After the 2008 financial crisis the Chinese became overbearing and arrogant, and had a sense of triumph of their system over that of the US. But in the end, both countries understand that they somehow have to manage this relationship because there is no strategy of confrontation, or even containment that works. China is far too embedded into the world economic system, and the US is too deeply engaged with China economically as well. Rhetoric that echoes the Cold War, sliding China into the role the old Soviet Union played – should not be taken seriously. It can’t be done.

TBL: Has the Obama administration learned this lesson?

The Administration has definitely gone through a learning curve with China. But I don’t think former National Security Council director for Asia, Jeff Bader, who has dealt with China for a long time, had huge illusions that we were going to enter into an alliance relationship with China and throw off our relationship with Japan.

Did the Obama administration see China as being central? Yes, because China is central. That is not an ideological statement; it is reality. The goal is to use alliance relationships to help manage China, and pull China into structures where they are forced to adhere to existing rules. That’s what the administration seems to be is trying to do.

I see this more as a natural learning curve than a dramatic shift in US policy.

TBL: What about future US force structure in East Asia?

SNEIDER: I don’t see any evidence that someone in the government sat down and said: “OK, 20 years from now, what kind of force structure do we want to have in the Asia-Pacific region? How do we want to think about that structure from the point of view of potential adversaries, crisis situations, and other possible scenarios?” I would love to see evidence that this kind of thinking is actually going on.

TBL: What about Okinawa:

I certainly don’t see any serious rethinking about the role of the US Marines on Okinawa. Until that issue is resolved, we will continue to have unnecessary tensions with Japan, our most important ally in the region.

 

Webb: ‘US and Japan paralyzed over Okinawa’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan. Senator Jim Webb, Democrat of Virginia, is chairman, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Webb is also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Along with Senators Levin and McCain, Webb has been highly critical of the 2006 plan to realign US forces in Japan. The three senators recently worked together to block funding for a large transfer of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam, arguing that the plan was unworkable, and not reflective of the current strategic environment in the region. While the Obama administration has done its best to be dismissive of these Congressional efforts, it is now clear that Pentagon is trying to adjust its plans to better conform with the Senators's goals.

TBL: The Obama Administration seems serious about a pivot of US foreign policy toward East Asia. But administrations over the past 30 years have talked about this, only to be diverted. Is it real this time?

WEBB: I’ve been writing about this, and working in East Asia for a long time.. When I was in the Pentagon in the 1980s, I think I was the first senior defense executive to say that the strategic future of the US needs to focus on East Asia, and not as much on NATO. At that time, we had 216,000 Army soldiers in Germany alone. I suggested back in 1984-1985 that we needed to start strategically rebalancing.

I have been pushing this issue every day since I arrived in the Senate. Frankly, I had quite a few discussions with Hillary Clinton about this before she became secretary of state, and then subsequent to her nomination and confirmation.

In my view, this is not so much a pivot, as it is a reestablishing of a vital strategic interest that we have in the region. Our national energy became deflected because of the way we went into Iraq, and the energy we put into Iraq and Afghanistan. So it is more of a return to normal with respect to our strategic interests.

When I came to the Senate, I worked very hard to become a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I decided that from my office, we would focus on five countries in East Asia: to reinvigorate our relations with Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore, and to work on renewing ties with a sixth country – Myanmar, Burma. That was our strategic perspective from the day I got here.

TBL: But the Administration is really committed, in your view?

WEBB: It is real, and I frankly think I have been a big part of the process. We are connecting with the governments and cultures of these countries, and we are articulating why our presence in this part of the world is important to regional stability. Over the past two years, we have seen the realities of the region affirm this perspective.

I have visited Japan many times. In February, 2010, while in Tokyo, I spoke to the National Press Club, and then went down to Okinawa. They like Americans; they like the relationship. The question of the security relationship was not as firm. DPJ leader Ozawa had made a trip to China with some 200 people.

But a short time later, in September 2010, we had the incident with China and the Senkaku Islands, and that, I think, led people in Japan and the region to start thinking in a different way.

I had warned about the Senkaku Islands in my Senate campaign, in the last debate with Senator Allen, when we were allowed to ask each other questions. The overall issue is the recognized need for a vibrant US role and for multilateral cooperation in the region, which are critical to issues such as sovereignty in the South China Sea for example, and resolution of environmental disputes along the lower Mekong River.

TBL: How does the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative fit in this picture?

WEBB: TPP is an emerging concept; ratifying itself as it goes along. But the notion of countries coming together with us in this kind of format does affirm that we should have a very strong presence in the region.

We have seen free trade agreements that China has negotiated with ASEAN and other countries that could potentially give China tariff benefits. I was a bit skeptical of TPP at the beginning, but with the countries now coming on board, I am more in favor.

TBL: Many top Japanese leaders remain skeptical about some of the economic details, but see TPP as creating a strategic architecture to which China has to respond.

WEBB: That is a valid point. I view over strategic interests in two stages. First, the Korean Peninsula. Korea is the only place in the world where the direct interests of Japan, China, and Russia intersect historically. Over the centuries, whenever one of these three has gotten a bit too much power, there has been a lot of volatility. I think that since World War II, people have come to see that the United States is the balancing force in the region. And if there is not stability in Northeast Asia, we won’t have stability in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, given the emergence of China, the best overall approach we can take is to develop multilateral systems, and to invite China to mature as a governing entity that is welcomed to participate.

 China may not do that right away. This is the 10^th anniversary of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and there are questions as to whether this has really been the benefit that many Americans thought it would be as a means of easing Chinese political rigidity.

But we now see a lot of nations saying the time has come for China to be more overt in helping other countries solve problems, rather than always taking stances that only favor Beijing.

In that context, TPP, and Mekong development, and the South China Sea are all issues where the US can facilitate multilateral approaches that add to stability.

TBL: How do you see the future of the US military force structure in East Asia?

WEBB: I believe it is important to our ability to respond that we have forward positioning of forces in East Asia. Okinawa and Guam are important in that regard. The reverse is also true: If we were to reposition our forces in the wrong way, it would send a negative signal with respect to strategic balance in the region. The US Marine Corps is uniquely suited for an immediate response anywhere in the region. I’ve worked on and studied this issue for many years, including as a defense planner. We don’t have the same force structure now that we did when I first began, obviously, particularly with respect to the size of our Navy, but the concept remains valid.

TBL: But we’ve reached an impasse with Japan with respect to a replacement for the Marine Air Station Futenma, on Okinawa. Political leaders in  Tokyo are reluctant to say the planned Henoko facility can’t move forward politically, but that is what most believe. So how does this impasse get resolved?

WEBB: You are spot on about this point. I mentioned this to Senator Levin two years ago, after a trip to the region. We have to resolve this. A resolution is critical to our strategic viability, and the issue has also become a key abrasion in Japan’s domestic politics. So this year, Senator Levin asked me to accompany him to the region. We visited Guam, Tinian, Okinawa, and Tokyo, and he came to share my concerns. Upon our return, we brought then-Defense Secretary Gates in to talk with us. He can speak can speak for himself, but I would say that he shared our view of the futility of the current approach. The question is: How to resolve the impasse in a fashion that is positive, rather than in a way that looks as if we are losing our critical presence in that part of the world?

This question belongs to the Pentagon. Inter-service rivalry and turf battles are driving a lot of the resistance. I think you quoted a Marine official in one of your articles saying completion of a new facility at Henoko would be the 8^th wonder of the world. I’ve heard similar sentiments.

TBL: Neither Tokyo nor Washington can say what each is thinking.

WEBB: The two national governments are paralyzed by these expressed positions. The only way to change is if there is a specific proposal to move toward. We can’t theorize anymore about this; it’s been going on for 15 years. That is the box they are in.

I suggested to Defense Secretary Panetta, before he visited the region in October, the idea of expanding the Naha runway facilities into a joint-use facility. That would help Japan commercially, but would also give us a mobilization fall-back. We’ve done this in Germany. We did in on Guam many years ago, which had a runway that was military on one side and commercial on the other.

This is just a thought. My point is that we do not have to be paralyzed between the existing Futenma facility and the Henoko option that doesn’t seem realistic.

TBL: Looking forward, how comfortable would you be with a bigger regional role for Japan’s defense forces, especially a marine force?

WEBB: When I studied this in the 1970s, I was in favor of Japan doing more with us in joint operations, particularly related to naval activities. My conclusion back then – admittedly a long time ago – was that Japan’s constitution did not preclude a bigger role in joint operations. But there continue to be historic issues that are not insignificant. Japan has to work out its own relationships in the region.

TBL: Will Mark Lippert be confirmed as the new assistant secretary of defense for Asia?

WEBB: I know that Senator McCain has sent a letter to him, raising some concerns. I had a private meeting with Mark after the confirmation hearings, and I was favorably impressed.

 

 

The White House, the Marines, and Okinawa

It looks as if President Obama, during his upcoming stop in Australia, will finally announce in Darwin a long-discussed Western Australia “training option” for the US Marine Corps, which would involve regular rotation of Marine infantry units to the area, which is both well-located and held high in Australian military lore.

 The Administration will present this as part of a broader plan for a more active US strategic presence in the whole of the Pacific.

 But there still are no signs of a US policy shift regarding the USMC deployment in Okinawa. In particular, there remain no signs that the US has altered plans to try to build a much-disputed new runway in Henoko Bay, to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been slated for closure for over decade.

 To the contrary, in a bilateral meeting with Japan’s Prime Yoshikio Noda at the APEC Summit in Hawaii on Saturday, Obama reiterated US expectations for faster results on the Henoko project.

 Obama Administration officials remain locked into their now-familiar obdurate stances on Okinawa issues, despite the overwhelming consensus among specialists who follow the area that intense local opposition will never allow the project to proceed. They even show surprisingly little concern for the inevitable domestic problems the Futema/Henoko issues will cause for the beleaguered Noda, who is already trying to manage a nuclear power crisis, a devastated earthquake/tsunami zone, and burgeoning other domestic troubles. Noda even managed to drag his divided Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) into regional TPP trade talks that Obama wanted to prominently promote at the APEC meeting for his domestic audience as a “jobs producing” initiative.

 Ironically, Noda may be the most promising young leader to come along in Japan in quite some time, so it would hardly seem wise for Washington to complicate his political life. But that’s what happening.

 

     DARWIN DETAILS: Details of Obama’s planned presentation in Darwin are few and far between; the White House is playing this card particularly close to the chest, all part of the “Asia Initiative” centered on this past weekend’s APEC meetings, the President’s subsequent stop in Australia, and then the East Asia summit in Indonesia.

 The White House for months has planned the regional visit this way, as Obama wants the US to be a “strategic leader” in the region, and to leverage that enhanced US regional presence to be a “job producer” at home.

 

     FORCE POSTURE: The restructuring of the US global force posture from Southwest Asia – Iraq and Afghanistan – toward the Pacific, has been a goal of the Obama White House for quite some time. There is little doubt that Obama believes this is a classic circumstance in which good policy is good politics.    

 

     OBAMA’S DILEMMA: Actually implementing such a huge shift is easier said than done. Okinawa is only one of many pieces to the puzzle, which makes it difficult to directly address.

 Inside the White House, the first order is winding down in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is happening, but with tough negotiations with Iraq, and debates with and within the US military brass about future force structure and strategy in both countries. Meanwhile, a hefty portion of the US national security establishment understandably remains focused on Iran, not to mention the Arab Spring.

 Then there are the looming cuts in the US budget, and the implications these will have on weapons systems, manpower levels, and basing – not to mention on inter-service rivalries.

 The Marines are themselves conducting a study of future roles and missions. Former Defense Secretary Gates acknowledged that the extraordinary requirements of the Iraq and Afghan wars turned the Marines into more of a traditional infantry unit than one with its usual expeditionary characteristics. The Marines are looking closely at where they will fit in the US global force posture of the next 20 years. The total size of the Marine Corps will surely be cut, which will logically lead to basing rearrangements.

 In this context, a key player in the process – someone extraordinarily close to President Obama -- acknowledged the other day in a lengthy exchange of views that the President himself has not yet given specific instructions as to how this emerging, energized East Asia policy could open the way to reworking the flawed aspects of the policy on Okinawa that are causing unnecessary tensions with Japan, the vital US ally in the region.

 So far as the over-worked, over-stretched, US national security apparatus is concerned, the US and Japan have a deal concerning Okinawa, and Japan should keep to it.

 This may be no way to run an alliance, but no one in the upper echelons of the Obama team wants to get stuck either in Washington or Japan -- in the political quicksand of Okinawa.

 At this point, the US Air Force and US Marines are – in public, anyway – so committed to the Henoko plan that only a direct order from Defense Secretary Panetta -- perhaps even the President himself would have to give the order – could break an extraordinary logjam that is causing such big troubles for the US-Japan alliance.

 A big part of the problem is inter-service rivalry between the Air Force and the Marines. The Air Force maintains at Kadena, on Okinawa, one of the largest air force bases in the world. The notion that there is not space on Kadena for the rather limited number of helicopters routinely operating from Futenma does not fly.

 Marine leaders, for their part, say they would relocate to Kadena. A skeptical top Marine General said privately recently that if the new Henoko project were ever built, “it would be the eighth wonder of the world.” Many Marines simply think it is not going to happen.

 That’s not to say the US Marine Corps has not negotiated hard for the Henoko project. The envisioned v-shaped runway would mostly be used by the flawed Osprey vertical lift-off and take-off vehicle that can transform into a fixed-wing vehicle for longer-faster flights. The vehicle has the ability to emergency land with a modified fixed-wing position in the event the vertical equipment fails. That’s the reason for the Henoko Project runway -- the root of the entire controversy.

 Many analysts agree that integration of the Futenma helicopter operations into Kadena could cause some political tension with Okinawans. But compared to efforts to build an unnecessary new runway at Henoko, the tensions would probably be small. And, as Senator Jim Webb has emphasized, there are ways to disperse some of the current heavy aircraft now present at Kadena.

 

     AUSTRALIA OPENS THE DOOR: On an optimistic note, opening the door to US Marine Corps overseas training with Pacific allies on a rotational basis could provide an opportunity to begin reconsidering the out-of-date Futenma-Henoko issue. In an excellent RECENT PAPER, Washington analysts Mike Mochizuki and Mike O’Hanlon argued, among other things, that more US Marines could deploy from the US on a routine, rotational basis, rather than so many being based on Okinawa as they are today. This would include training in Japan and elsewhere in a region in which the US is looking to expand ties and open new friendships in any case.

 Along these lines, Mochizuki wrote in an email, the existing Futenma facility could be closed, the US could preposition equipment and supplies overseas, and US Marine Corps helicopters and other aircraft could utilize existing US and Japan Self Defense facilities. There certainly would be no need for a new runway at Henoko.

 It’s only a matter of time – probably the middle of 2012 -- before the existing 2006 Roadmap to realign the US Marine Corp presence on Okinawa publicly falls apart politically. There is virtually no serious movement on Okinawa itself for implementation. An effort by Tokyo to use police or other means of coercion to forcibly begin construction would do incalculable damage to the US-Japan alliance. And on Guam itself, construction delays and cost overruns have already led senor members of the Senate to demand a new approach.

 Who know’s? The President’s Darwin speech may be an beginning.

Noda, Obama, and TPP: ‘We can work it out’…. Maybe

As next November’s APEC summit gets closer, it is increasingly clear that Washington and Tokyo are not quite on the same page with respect to trade policy. It is also unclear how the two governments will manage this rather uncomfortable diplomatic dilemma.

At issue: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade initiative, which President Obama would like to make a centerpiece of the APEC meeting, to be held in his home state of Hawaii. But Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, while supportive of TPP, has not yet been able to forge a consensus in Japan’s leadership circles in full-favor of the changes in the country’s agricultural policies that TPP involvement would entail.

The result is a mixed message from Tokyo, reflective of ongoing domestic policy debates:

First: Tokyo will give a tentative ‘yes’ to participate in the TPP negotiations, but with no prior commitments; as one Japanese official put it: “We want to find out more about TPP.”

Second: Japan will simultaneously proceed with separate free trade talks with China, South Korea, and the European Union, completely outside the TPP framework.

US officials are not happy, though some express sympathy with Noda’s domestic realities, while others – particularly those closer to Obama’s inner circle – are upset that Japan is proving ‘difficult’ at a time when a politically-beleaguered Obama very much wants to showcase his skills at job-producing economic diplomacy in Asia.

CONFLICTING AGENDAS: Obama and Noda have conflicting agendas, though the differences are nothing close to strategic in nature, and might not be irreconcilable. The problem is political and diplomatic: Obama is entering full-fledged reelection mode, and Noda faces huge domestic policy challenges. Diplomats on both sides will be working overtime between now and the APEC summit to make sure the signals sent from each side are consistent; allied.

After APEC comes an expected Washington visit by Noda, probably in January, fulfilling a long-overdue commitment from the two countries for their respective leaders to get together.

For the Obama administration, the APEC summit was supposed to be the unfolding of a big US strategic policy shift, away from over-commitment to Southwest Asia (Iraq, Afghanistan), in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and towards East Asia. For Obama personally, the APEC meeting was to have carried great personal significance: He is the first US president with such deep roots in East Asia; he wants to end one difficult chapter in US foreign policy, and finally bring the US into the much-hailed “Pacific Century,” which means heavily distributing US economic and military ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power toward the region facing the historic rise of China.

Today, with his political troubles at home well-known, Obama needs to show that his cherished vision for a new US role in Asia will deliver jobs at home.

Noda, meanwhile, faces his own set of difficult domestic problems: He’s young, in charge of a ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that has yet to prove it can effectively govern; the country’s national finances are in trouble, just when the nation needs to raise funds to rebuild the Tohoku region ravaged by last March’s horrendous tsunami; and the country faces a huge energy crisis, with public confidence in nuclear-generated power understandably shaken by the tsunami-induced crisis at the Fukushima electric facility.

Noda is compelled to focus on domestic issues. But he is proving to be a lot more shrewd than many analysts initially expected.

On TPP: Noda supports opening up Japan’s agricultural markets. Along with many reformists in Japan, including his predecessor, Naoto Kan, Noda believes agricultural reform is inevitable, and will bring many economic benefits. But he is hamstrung by domestic reality: It will take time to bring his own party, much less the whole of Japan’s ruling elite, into agreement.

But the commitment is not in doubt: Noda has maintained 200-plus person TPP team inside the prime minister’s office (Kantei), led by a veteran Foreign Ministry official but backed by key politicians, assigned the task of achieving a consensus. The key is to link opening up the agricultural market with a big program to modernize areas that might be significantly hurt by increased agricultural imports. This is a work in progress.

Beyond TPP as an economic policy, Noda maintains Kan’s view in three key respects:

First: TPP is a strategic policy; Japan and the US together should be setting the trade economic, and overall political-security agenda in Asia, to which China would then have to respond.

Second: Japan cannot go ahead with the existing plans for construction of a new US Marine facility in Okinawa. But to say so would risk terrible tension in US-Japan relations, which neither Noda nor Japan needs at this time.

Third: As a result, support for TPP has the potential benefit of winning US willingness to reduce pressure on Okinawa issues.

IMPLEMENTATION: With all of these moving, legitimate considerations on each side, diplomats will have to burn the midnight oil to avoid tensions from boiling over.

US officials, as they often say, are not clear who is running the show in Tokyo. For example: In the last week alone, the new minister for national strategy, Motohisa Furukawa, was in DC, meeting with top US officials (including Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke). Furukawa endorses both TPP and the plan to build the new US base on Okinawa.

By contrast, Japanese trade officials last week told their US counterparts in Washington about plans to move ahead with FTA talks with China, the ROK, and the EU. For Japan’s agriculture lobby, beef, sugar, wheat, and rice remain key, and the planned FTA talks would supposedly pose less of a domestic threat than would TPP.

Other key Japanese officials were also in DC last week, including a top national security advisor to Noda, who conveyed the “yes, but” position on TPP that seems to be Noda’s actual perspective at this point.

The US and Japan are by no means strategically out of alignment. But conflicting domestic agendas on the part of the respective national leaders may make for some tense moments over the next few weeks and months. And if serious disagreements do emerge before the expected Washington summit, they are likely to revolve more around Okinawa and the US Marine presence, than about trade issues.