Dispatch Japan

Obama to embrace Japan, not Abe

With North Korea having recently tested a third nuclear device and China acting provocatively in the East China Sea, there will be plenty for Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama to talk about when they meet at the White House later today.

The summit will provide an opportunity for the US and Japan to reaffirm their bilateral security alliance and the need for regional peace, stability, and security.

However, below the surface, there is a great deal of unease about Prime Minister Abe in the White House, and at the State Department and the Pentagon. Concern is running high that Abe’s views on history, and his nationalist feelings toward Korea and China, could complicate relations in Northeast Asia as Japan pursues what are otherwise modest and logical expansions of security responsibilities and capabilities in the region.

Some Asia specialists from the Bush administration who know Abe, and worked with him while he was chief cabinet secretary and later briefly prime minister in 2006-2007, are fairly confident that Abe will act pragmatically, and not let his ideology cause problems for Japanese diplomacy.

But few people in the Obama administration know Abe, and top officials are somewhat skeptical that Abe (and those around him, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and education minister Hakubun Shimomura) will be able to restrain their nationalist impulses and act with a clear strategic vision for stability in the region. As Michael Cucek pointed out recently, Abe himself declared in his “new” book (a virtual reprint of an earlier tome) that his return to power is not simply a replacement of the discredited Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), but “is a fight to return the country called Japan to the hands of the citizens of Japan from out of the grip of postwar history.” Abe’s long-standing “history denier” perspective has not changed.

For this reason, the Obama administration, while squarely reaffirming the alliance, wants to avoid any statements or symbolic gestures during Abe’s brief visit that could appear provocative toward Beijing, or be seen as an endorsement of Abe’s personal political agenda.

     DIFFICULT PREPARATIONS: To begin with, the White House was never terribly enthusiastic about a visit from Abe. Tokyo pushed very hard for a January summit, but the White House said the president’s schedule would not permit that.  The White House attitude amounted to: Abe virtually invited himself, so we could hardly say ‘no.’

Part of the problem is that expectations in Washington are quite low of anything substantial emerging soon from Tokyo on hot-button issues like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks or basing arrangements for US forces on Okinawa. Many had assumed that this was a problem of the poor governance and weakness of the DPJ, but it is clear now that it is a broader political problem in Japan. Abe is not able or willing to push for progress on key issues at least until after next summer’s Upper House elections.

Abe had assumed, mistakenly, that his return to office, and that of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), would be met with cheers in Washington, that an “anything but the DPJ” attitude prevailed. While greater political stability is certainly welcomed by Obama administration officials, many in Washington were pretty happy with the foreign and security policies of the DPJ’s Yoshihiko Noda, who is clearly more moderate than Abe.

All of this made it difficult for senior officials to work out details for the summit. This became apparent two weeks ago, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Zumwalt and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey met in Washington with Takeo Akiba of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ro Manabe of the Ministry of Defense. When the talks ended, the Japanese officials were unusually brusque in declining to talk with gathered reporters, indicating the continued lack of clarity made it difficult to brief the press.

As late as last Friday, after the prime minister’s office had announced that Abe would visit Washington on February 21-23 and meet with Obama on the 22^nd, the White House would not provide quick confirmation. That afternoon, the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent a ‘heads-up’ note to the Japanese press corps saying that “if the situation allows it to happen,” Abe would visit on February 21-23. Only later did the White House issue a statement announcing the visit. Coordination was less than smooth.

     WHITE HOUSE NIXES ABE PLANS: For Abe, the visit with President Obama is important as an opportunity to demonstrate to his domestic audience that he can manage the all-important alliance with the US. However, it may turn out that the only concrete news Abe is able to bring to Washington is that the Diet will likely sign the Hague Convention provisions concerning custody arrangements of children of failed international marriages. The repeated hearing of tragic stories spurred former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to champion the cause. The DPJ had agreed to adopt legislation, and Abe has followed. But even on this issue Abe still faces hurdles, as conservatives object to “outside intervention” into family disputes, and liberals (especially the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito, have raised concerns about Japanese women victims of domestic violence.

Abe had initially hoped to trumpet his plans to lift Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and make clear publicly that Japan would use its missile defenses to assist the United States in the event North Korea launched a ballistic missile aimed at US territory.  Abe assumed the new policy would be welcomed in Washington.

That was not the case. The Pentagon, of course, would welcome the defense planning and operational flexibility that would come from Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. But US officials were concerned that a demonstration of support for such an initiative by Abe could be misinterpreted as endorsement of the prime minister’s broader domestic agenda, including revision of the Constitution, which could unnecessarily anger Beijing. Instead, US officials pressed to keep discussions during the summit to specific means to enhance deterrence and regional stability, including better US-Japan combined intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training of Japanese Self-Defense Force marine capabilities.

In the same vein, Washington was not eager to back Abe’s desire for specific criticism of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea, particularly with regard to the Senkaku islands. The Obama administration is trying to walk a very fine line between clearly warning China against efforts to unilaterally challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus, and not giving China any reason to feel threatened.

The White House is perfectly willing to reaffirm the statement made on January 18^th by then-Secretary of State Clinton in a joint appearance with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida. Without mentioning China by name, Clinton warned against “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus. But in the same sentence, she went on to say that “we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means.”

This is a warning to China, but it is also an effort to stay engaged with China, to let Beijing know that the US would not favor provocative actions by Japan, and to let Abe know that the US wants his government to stay cool and calm.

In the White House view, a specific reference to China might boost Abe’s domestic agenda, but would not be helpful for the alliance or for regional stability and security.

Within the Obama administration, the departure of Hillary Clinton and her influential assistant for Asian affairs Kurt Campbell has led to a subtle but important shift in the balance of power in managing Japan-related issues. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is a strong supporter of the strategy of “rebalancing” US force posture and diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Donilon is also extremely concerned about the strategic dilemma posed by China. How can the US simultaneously engage China and deter China from exercising undue heavy-handedness in the region? How best to persuade a rising China to participate in a rules-based regional and global architecture, and not create a self-fulfilling prophecy of China as an enemy?

It’s in this context that Donilon and other administration officials are wary of Abe’s hard line nationalist proclivities.

     TPP AND OKINAWA:  Meanwhile, the White House is frustrated that Abe will not provide an affirmative answer about Japan’s participation in the TPP trade talks, but officials there and at the State Department know that until next summer, Abe’s priority will likely be the Upper House elections. Abe does not want to anger the LDP’s rural voter base. Close to half of the LDP’s Diet delegation is opposed to TPP participation. For his part, Abe has been hinting at the possibility of making a decision on TPP prior to the elections. But the betting in Washington is that Abe is angling to garner from Obama some language hinting at flexibility in the demand that Japan put rice and other sensitive economic sectors on the negotiating table as a precondition to joining the talks. Washington is very reluctant to carve out exceptions for Japan prior to a decision by Tokyo to participate.

Many in Washington believe Abe wants Japan to eventually join TPP, if only out of the strategic recognition that TPP could be an important component of a rules-based regional security and economic architecture to which China would have to adapt. (Economic reform, which TPP could help spur, has never been in the forefront of Abe’s thinking.) But it’s unclear if and when Abe will be willing to spend the political capital required to move the issue forward.

Obama will be anxious to hear from Abe his intentions concerning TPP, but it remains unclear how the two sides will be able to meet each other’s stated political needs.

Concerning Okinawa, particularly plans to construct in the Henoko area a facility to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, expectations in Washington are very low.

The White House, State Department, and Pentagon were all quite upset that the Abe administration did not provide them with advance notice that Abe would not, prior to his Washington visit, send a request to Okinawa Governor Nakaima for permission to begin landfill work for the Henoko project.

Administration officials were not upset about Abe’s decision itself; that was expected. But the timing of his announcement, with no advance warning to Washington, upset US officials.

As for the Henoko project itself, the Obama administration increasingly recognizes the political reality that in all likelihood it will not be built, and has already begun serious consideration of possible alternatives. Indeed, this was discussed directly with the prime minister’s office and the foreign and defense ministries, prior to Prime Minister Noda leaving office. But the feeling in Washington and Tokyo is that Henoko cannot be publicly abandoned until an alternative is prepared, because Okinawans might conclude that the US will be staying at Futenma forever, and this perception would cause terrible problems. For now, both sides will continue to publicly support Henoko, even though both sides agree an alternative must be found.

 

 

 

Deming: US, Japan need ‘new imagination and energy’ on Okinawa basing issues

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fifth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Friday meeting with President Obama. Rust Deming, a veteran Japan specialist, is an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

DEMING: I don’t expect many specific results. This is really a summit to set the agenda for the two governments. First is for the two leaders to get to know each other. The prime minister has made clear that the US-Japan alliance is at the top of his list of priorities, at the center of Japanese foreign policy. The two leaders will try to put together a list of issues that need to be worked on over the next year or so.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

DEMING: Abe is not in a political position to bring very much to Washington. Nor does the Obama administration expect him to bring much. Abe wants to establish a personal relationship with the president, and wants to send a message that the US-Japan alliance is headed in a good direction now that he is back in office. He wants to demonstrate that he and the LDP have returned, and that whatever shakiness occurred over the last three years is a thing of the past.

In fact, while the first year of the DPJ in power, under Hatoyama, proved to be a difficult time for the alliance, Kan and Noda did try to bring the alliance back to the center of Japan’s foreign policy, and we made a lot of progress. If you look at the “2+2” statements from 2011 and 2012, you’ll see that the DPJ really accepted the fundamental strategic objectives of the alliance, and Japan’s roles and missions, which the LDP had agreed on earlier. There really was no gap between the two countries, which was a very good accomplishment, and very beneficial to the long-term stability of the alliance. The DPJ period was not without its benefits for the alliance.

But the LDP is back, and Abe wants to signal that he is personally putting the alliance back in the center of Japanese foreign policy.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

DEMING: The White House would like to emphasize that Japan is critical to America’s broad policy in Asia, and at the center of the “rebalancing” of US global strategy toward Asia. The administration would like to see Japan become a more active player in regional and global affairs on a wide range of issues, particularly on TPP, and more open markets.

There is also recognition that, prior to the Upper House election, Prime Minister Abe is not in a position to do very much, or even say very much, on TPP and other issues. But I expect the president to emphasize the importance the US attaches to moving forward on TPP and other issues that are important for the alliance.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

DEMING: We have been trying to get away from that in recent years, particularly in early meetings such as the upcoming visit. Abe has been in office only two months. The real opportunity provided by this summit is to set an agenda for the alliance.  Down the road, when the two leaders meet again later in the year at the G8 summit or the East Asian summit, for example, there perhaps will be more concrete results. But this is not the time to expect very much.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

DEMING: It’s clear that some people are a little uneasy with the narrative that Abe seems to share with many conservative Japanese about responsibility for and the nature of developments in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of us in Washington believe that history is a complicating factor for relations among countries in the region, and therefore not very useful to bring up. It complicates Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly the ROK and China.

But in his last tenure as prime minister, in 2006, Mr. Abe reached out to China and Korea. He did not visit Yasukuni Shrine. He is a sophisticated statesman. A lot of people hope that, whatever his personal views and impulses, Abe will operate in a way that does not complicate Japan’s relations with China and Korea, or even with the US. Remember, there are some issues related to history, such as “comfort women,” that resonate in Washington. Most people with whom I speak are fairly hopeful that Abe will behave in a way similar to his first tenure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you expect the collective self-defense issue to come up explicitly?

DEMING: That is really an issue for the Japanese to decide. Many people in Washington would like to see Japan move forward on this issue in due course. The timing of what Japan does, and how it does it, does have importance for relations in the region. But this has been a long-term issue for Japan in which the US does have great interest. You’ll recall the Yanai Commission established by Abe himself in his first term, which studied the issue. The Yanai report relates to Japan’s ability to play a more active role in the alliance and in peacekeeping operations. Many of the ideas in the report represent a natural evolution in Japan’s defense posture, and not something that signals a major departure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?DEMING: I hope so. This really is not primarily a US-Japan bilateral issue. Japan needs to take these steps to restructure its own economy, for its own good. Abe is clearly focused on the economy. He has taken some short-term steps to stimulate the economy. But long-term, there has to be a fundamental opening up of the economy. TPP is a useful device to help make that happen. I hope that, after the Upper House election, Japan will move in this direction, because it is in the interest of Japan’s long-term economic health, which is very important for the US-Japan relationship.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

DEMING: I have not been to Okinawa in about one year, but I don’t think the political dynamic there concerning Futenma and the planned replacement at Henoko has changed very much. The Henoko plan is still very problematic. We are going ahead with improvements at Futenma. The MV-22s (Osprey) have arrived there. Things seem to be operating smoothly. But I have always been extremely nervous about the possibility of an accident at Futenma, which would really, seriously complicate our overall alliance.

I hope that the new government in Tokyo might be stable and be able to make some long-term plans. And, with the Obama administration beginning its second term, there will be new people coming into office. The two sides might be in a better position to put the Futenma issue back at the top of the agenda and actually do something about the issue. I would hate to see the issue just lie fallow for another 17-18 years; we started discussing this in 1995.

I don’t have any magic solution. But I believe we need new imagination and new energy on the issue.

 

Smith: ‘Japan needs a strategic accommodation with South Korea’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fourth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Sheila Smith is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

SMITH: Given events in the region, I think this will be a crisis management summit to reaffirm the alliance. The transition in Japan makes this a good opportunity to discuss some outstanding bilateral issues, including TPP and Okinawa. But the real challenge for both sides will be to conduct the alliance reaffirmation in a way that has real meaning.

In Northeast Asia, we are facing a moment where our bilateral alliance cooperation really matters. We see Japan in a standoff with China over the Senkakus. There is no agreement on maritime boundaries. We’ve got a rising China with a trajectory of military growth.

All of the pieces are there for this to be a pretty serious heads-up for the alliance. The deterrence message is very important, and the Obama administration has done a good job in this area. But the risk-reduction message is also vital. Frameworks – bilateral, trilateral, regional – somehow have to be constructed with Beijing. I suspect there is a significant amount of interest blossoming at some level in China, because this standoff, or worse, is clearly not helpful to China’s longer-term interests.

Meanwhile, this is the beginning of the second Obama administration, and the White House is committed to a rebalancing of American force structure and overall strategic focus toward Asia. This is a moment for the Obama administration to begin defining and refining the rebalancing strategy.

Finally, the economic component of the US-Japan relationship needs enhancement. TPP is one piece of that, but there is much to be gained from a pretty frank discussion by the two leaders about growth strategies, including the yen and longer term economic goals, and how the alliance might work to support those strategies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

SMITH: There has been a lot in the media about superficial things, such as the timing of the summit, or the Kyodo report that the Obama administration gave a firm “no” to collective self defense. Some reports seem almost determined to find problems. I don’t think that this is the tone or tenor of the upcoming meeting.

But there are challenging issues, including TPP and the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.

The Diet has made progress toward ratification of the Hague convention.

The real question is: what will the alliance accomplish? They will have to talk about the longer-term forward deployment of US forces. It wouldn’t be a bad idea to create some kind of strategic consultative process, not just one confined to the Senkaku problem, but one that envisions the shape and roles of the alliance over the next decade or two.

I suspect Abe will want to talk about TPP, even if he is not ready or able to say that Japan will join the talks. The president will want to hear Abe’s views on this. We all know it poses a domestic political hurdle, but the president would like to have a clear sense of how the prime minister plans to proceed.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

SMITH: The administration is anxious to know how much “traction” the alliance can get. There is a tendency to dub recent problems as a “DPJ problem.” I don’t agree with that. Japanese politics are going through a structural transition. There will be governments, like the current Abe cabinet, that say “we have to wait until after the next election” before we can tackle this or that issue. This is not just a problem for one party. It is a structural problem that is as troubling for the conservatives as it was for the liberals, and it poses a big problem for the Japanese government.

The Obama administration wants to embrace the alliance. But there is much more realism in Washington now about how much can be accomplished, and how quickly. The realism first set in while the DPJ was in office, but it has not gone away with the LDP having come back.

There are signals, including the rising stock market and high ratings for the cabinet, that are positive, and people in Washington are aware of this, but the relatively low expectations remain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

SMITH: There are people in Washington from the Bush administration who have worked with Abe, but the Obama administration needs time to get to know him. It’s best to treat him not as a former prime minister who has come back, but rather as head of a new cabinet that just came to office. That will enable the White House to get a feel for Abe’s perspectives, on the ‘history’ issue, on collective self defense, and other issues.

There definitely are questions in Washington about exactly what Abe means by ‘collective self-defense.’ People would like to get beyond the campaign slogans of “constitutional revision” and “reinterpreting collective self-defense,” so as to get down to the actual details of what that would mean for force posture, for interoperability between US and Japanese forces, and for roles and missions.

The administration would like to know in more concrete ways what his policies are aiming at. For example, when Defense Minister Onodera said he planned to throw out the existing National Defense Program Guidelines, most of us in Washington collectively groaned: “Why? What’s wrong with the ‘dynamic deterrence’ policies outlined in the current NDPG?”

The feeling in the administration is a desire for less of the political coloring of these issues, and more of the concrete details.

Then there is the broader issue of ‘history,’ especially ‘comfort women.’ What does Mr. Abe plan to do? Does he want to issue a new statement, while not replacing the Murayama statement? There are still big questions about the prime minister’s intentions, particularly with regard to Japan’s relations with South Korea. These are not really questions of history of Japan’s wartime activities. The issue really is the viability of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the ROK.

People are watching closely Mr. Abe’s efforts to reach out to South Korea, not simply on a strategic level, but really the broader process of reconciliation and accommodation. This is where Abe’s personal views, and those of some of his cabinet members, will be very important.

We are all looking to see how Mr. Abe will treat the upcoming Takeshima Day, how Minister Shimomura will handle textbook revision, and other issues that could have an impact on Japan-ROK relations.

It is well-known that the prime minister and some of his cabinet members have very explicit personal views. But people are willing to wait and see how they proceed as a government, and make judgments once specific policies emerge.

Given the strategic environment in East Asia, particularly after the recent North Korean nuclear test, Japan and South Korea cannot afford to not move in the direction of a broad accommodation. It is very much in Japan’s strategic interests, equally important perhaps as it is to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

SMITH: The DPJ and the LDP face the same problem: what is going to happen with Japanese agriculture? How much is any Japanese prime minister willing to risk politically to mobilize for agriculture reform? How much is the prime minister willing to use TPP as a tool for promotion of economic competitiveness?

We need Japan to join because that would greatly strengthen TPP. But Japan needs to do so pretty quickly so as to fully participate. Right now, the talks are proceeding without any voice from Japan. It really boils down to whether Japan wants to be pro-active about open markets and competitiveness, or wants to stay in the old mode of incrementalism.

In reality, Abe will probably have to win a huge Upper House election victory to make this possible. And he would still have to convince an awful lot of his own LDP Diet delegation to go along. The consensus-building won’t start until after the Upper House election. No LDP member will want to go into that election campaigning on a pro-TPP platform.

Unfortunately, with the TPP talks supposed to wrap up by the end of this year, that would mean Japan would not be able to catch up and influence the final outcome.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

SMITH: This is certainly not the first government in Tokyo to lack enthusiasm about tackling Okinawa basing issues. Ryutaro Hashimoto was the most pro-active. Junichiro Koizumi was very pro-alliance, but he was not visibly pro-active about Okinawa the way Hashimoto was. Most politicians see only trouble, and no rewards, in becoming heavily involved in Okinawa base issues.

The politics are also more complicated on Okinawa since the days of Hashimoto as prime minister. People often say: wait and see what happens in the next election. In Okinawa, there is always a “next election,” often within six months – governor, prefectural assembly, Nago mayor. There is always something.

But the trend lines have shifted considerably against the Henoko project. Local LDP leaders in Okinawa are openly against the Futenma Replacement facility plan for Henoko. For example, Naha Mayor Onaga led the recent protests that went to Hibiya Park in Tokyo.

We used to think of this as a progressive-left vs. conservative-right issue, and if the conservatives would just come back all would be fine. But it is much more complicated than that.

There is a new reality in the balance among and within Japan’s political parties. You don’t have the same people representing Tokyo and Okinawa. Trust was never very deep between Tokyo and Okinawa, but now there is even less than in the past. Tokyo is going to have to work very hard to win back the conservatives recently elected to the Okinawa prefectural assembly. They openly campaigned against the Henoko project.

I have thought for quite some time that the Henoko project is the least realistic of our options. Now, that is even more the case, with both liberals and conservatives on Okinawa lined up against it.

Can Abe-san shift that? We’ll have to see. Japan hasn’t had a conservative prime minister in quite some time. In any case, it will take time.

Unlike other issues, such as abductees or revision of the Constitution, Okinawa basing is not an issue on which Mr. Abe has been outspoken. We don’t know what he really thinks. But given everything else he has to deal with before the Upper House election, I cannot imagine that this is high on his priority list.

 

Hornung: Obama to urge Abe to avoid ‘overtly antagonistic’ policies toward neighbors

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the third in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Jeffrey Hornung is an associate professor with the Hawaii-based Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

 HORNUNG: No, I don’t. They will have lots to talk about: China, Senkaku, revised defense guidelines, Futenma Replacement Facility, North Korea, and energy. Given Abe’s recent public statements on the TPP and the desire to make a decision on Japan’s participation, it is likely this will also be a focus of discussion. That said, I don’t expect any specific achievements beyond a frank conversation, a reiteration of the importance of the alliance, and a photo opportunity.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

HORNUNG: I think Abe’s goal for the summit is limited to having a face-to-face meeting with Obama and talk about the aforementioned issues. The summit is highly valuable to Abe because it provides him an opportunity to explain his thoughts on the issues, what he intends to do, and to demonstrate that he is both a good steward of the alliance and welcomed by the US. It doesn’t appear Abe will ask Obama for anything specific regarding any of the issues. 

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

 HORNUNG: Initially, I think the US agreed to the meeting because the Japanese side strongly requested it. Now that the meeting is taking place, I sense the US will use the meeting to talk about priorities for the alliance under Abe, express a strong desire for progress on Japan’s participation in the TPP and emphasize the need for Japan to have good relations with its neighbors and therefore tone down any statements or policies that may be seen as overtly antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think Abe will bring any gifts to Washington. He is not in a position to do so on issues that are relevant to the alliance. There is no consensus in Okinawa on the FRF, members of the LDP are not yet convinced about joining the TPP, and Abe just re-engaged his expert panel from his first administration to restart discussions on collective self-defense. There have been no decisions reached on any of these issues, so he is in no position to offer any new policies. If anything can be considered a “gift,” Abe may play up his decision to exempt F-35 fighter jet parts manufactured by Japanese firms from Japan’s prohibition on exporting arms. Or he may emphasize his willingness to submit legislation to enable Japan to join the Hague Convention.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

 HORNUNG: It is not a case of Washington being comfortable or not with Abe and any personal views he may hold. Instead, it is more about US strategic thinking, and officials in Washington trying to maintain calm relations throughout Asia at a time the President has expressed an interest in rebalancing to the region. If you look at Abe’s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, he too was rather conservative when it came to security matters, very similar to Abe. And yet, under Noda, relations with the US returned to normalcy after a brief hiatus under Noda’s two predecessors.

 The difference between Noda and Abe is Noda didn’t try to overtly antagonize China or South Korea. Yes, Noda purchased three of the Senkaku Islands, but he did it only because he was trying to prevent a worse scenario. On the other hand, Abe’s speeches and comments during the LDP presidential election and general election were at times antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors, particularly China. From the US perspective, such comments are a distraction because it disrupts Japan’s relations with its neighbors, which influences US ability to effectively engage all countries in the region on more substantial issues. Likewise, although Abe said he will not revise the Kono Statement or the Murayama Statement, he will issue his own statement. If his statement flares up anti-Japanese sentiments in China or South Korea, or hurts relations with those countries with which Japan is slowly working to strengthen security relations (i.e. Southeast Asian countries, Australia, India), the energy devoted to calming the tensions is a distraction to US engagement on other issues.

 The US can work with conservative Japanese premiers, but I think the problem (if there is one) arises when those premiers pursue policies or statements that hurt Japan’s relations with its neighbors. The US wants Japan to have good relations with its neighbors, including China. I get the sense that Abe understands all this, and in order to show he is a good steward of the alliance, we can probably expect him to tone down his rhetoric on things like history.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 HORNUNG: It is difficult to say without asking Abe himself, but I can appreciate the difficult decision he faces. In Abe’s party there are members who strongly oppose Japan’s participation because they are concerned the LDP will lose votes from the agriculture sector if Abe announces his decision to join TPP talks. This matters because Upper House elections are scheduled for July, and he wants to secure a majority so as to provide him legislative power to pursue other items on his agenda. Joining the TPP talks would jeopardize this because it would upset those voters that have traditionally voted for the LDP. At the same time, he has pledged his determination to tackle Japan’s economic problems and a desire to build closer relations with the US. Joining TPP talks would assist both of these goals.  While I don’t expect any movement on this issue prior to the summit, it can be expected that they will discuss Abe’s position.

Still, there is a limited timeframe within which we can expect Abe to reach a final decision. This is because the US requires 90 days of Congressional deliberations for approval when it holds international trade negotiations. Because it is expected that TPP member countries will conclude their talks at the October APEC meeting, Abe will have to reach a decision sometime after the summit and prior to July’s elections. Given that Abe consistently reiterates his interest in joining the talks premised on the ability to gain exceptions to abolishing all tariffs, he appears interested in joining the talks, while looking for some sort of political leverage to gain his party’s acceptance. It is a political balancing act that I’m not sure he can win. It is unclear whether other TPP-interested countries are keen to allow exceptions and, if they did, whether Abe’s LDP would accept these exceptions as sufficient to justify them approving Japan’s participation.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think the plan is dead, nor is it a case of which person in Tokyo can move forward with the project. It is more a case of who in Okinawa can move the project forward. Or more correctly, who wants to move the project forward. Although Abe has announced he will not move forward with the project for now, he will focus on efforts to make a positive political environment in Okinawa, nurturing relations with local politicians in Nago and Naha in an effort to build some semblance of trust. In order for the project to proceed, not only the governor, but the Nago mayor and council have to approve. Currently, all oppose. Abe’s task is to nurture a better political environment to get some to say yes before their next election OR to help get candidates elected that support the plan. There are elections next year in Nago and Naha. Some in Tokyo believe that Gov. Nakaima may step down (due to health reasons) before the next election but, before doing so, announce his support of the plan in order to settle the contentious issue once and for all. Under this thinking, Abe’s task is to create for Nakaima an environment for a ‘hanamichi’ (path for a graceful exit) in the interlude.

  

 

Cossa: Abe and Obama to ‘get acquainted’ at meeting

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the second in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Ralph Cossa is president of Pacific Forum-CSIS, a leading think-tank focusing on Asia and the Pacific.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

COSSA: It sounds like this is turning into a “get acquainted” meeting rather than a summit with key deliverables. I’m sure the administration was hoping for more – Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF, Henoko), TPP – but it seems clear he is coming empty-handed.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

COSSA: Abe wants Obama’s blessing, and wants to enhance his image prior to Upper House elections, which seem to be the only thing really on Abe’s mind.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

COSSA: The Obama administration will likely try to impress upon Abe that deliverables are needed now on FRF and eventually on TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

COSSA: Washington is likely less comfortable or enthused about Abe than he apparently thinks Washington is or should be. I have not talked with him directly but others have told me that he believes Washington is (or at least should be) relieved with his victory, and that he has an “anything but DPJ” mentality that will not sell very well in DC. When Noda was in office, Washington was actually pretty comfortable with the DPJ. Abe’s election has raised both expectations and anxieties, given some of his election posturing, although most believe the “real Abe” is not as bad as his campaign rhetoric implies or as bad as his critics advertise.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

COSSA: Probably. If I were making US policy, I would not be pushing Japan to join now, since, with respect to market openness, it would lower the lowest denominator. If I were Japan, I would want to join now, when pressure to open up would probably be relatively low because the US is so anxious for Japan to join. So neither side’s current position makes sense to me.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

COSSA: Part of the raised expectations in Washington is on Abe delivering on FRF. Asking for more time does not cut it. If Abe can’t deliver and move the Henoko project forward after the Upper House election, it will cause some strains between the two governments. But last month, we published an essay by Kerry Gershaneck of Hawaii Pacific University on a possible alternative FRF facility, one that Kerry wrote would be “more strategically useful, politically viable, and environmentally friendly” than Henoko.

 

 

Nelson: Obama to urge ‘calm management’ of China ties in talk with Abe

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the first in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Chris Nelson is the founder and editor of The Nelson Report, one of the most influential voices in Washington on US policy toward East Asia.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

NELSON: Probably not much specific beyond important reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance, and a clear restatement of concerns about North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear explosives.

Obama will likely want to be careful in his wording on the Senkakus, insisting on no use of force to change the status quo of Japanese administrative control, while not taking sides in the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to sovereignty. A lot will depend on the ongoing debate over Japan’s intelligence evaluation that China recently aimed a “lock-on” radar system at a Japanese naval vessel. That kind of radar system is used to guide weapons in an attack. Did that really happen, and has China backed away from that provocation since then?  Pyongyang’s testing of another nuclear device has heightened regional tensions and added a degree of urgency to the meeting..

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

 NELSON: Abe would like a public demonstration from the US of solidarity and support on regional security, and he would like to avoid any public statements on politically ‘difficult’ issues that could complicate Upper House politics for the LDP.

Privately, Abe, like the rest of non-Chinese Asia, is very worried about the budget crisis (‘sequestration’) in Washington, and whether Congress and the White House will be able to keep the security commitments  that Asia, especially Japan, is relying on for regional stability.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal? 

NELSON: The White House wants to present a dual public message: solidarity with Japan, along with calm management of regional security problems.

Privately, the White House wants to reinforce concerns already expressed about alliance management, especially Japan’s relations with South Korea, which is an important US ally and very important to regional security. The White House also wants to reinforce maintaining a calm approach to China and the Senkakus problem. Finally, the White House would like some clarification on Abe’s intent concerning TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

NELSON: Beef may be the only topic on which Abe will be able to publicly bring some good news for the US. With an Upper House election to take place by next summer, Abe feels limited in what he can do. This assumes that without the political complications associated with the election, Abe would actually be in favor of TPP or the building of a new US Marine facility on Okinawa, but we really don’t know that, which is why the White House wants clarification on Abe’s actual views.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

NELSON: Many in the US foreign policy elite, including in the Obama administration, have made clear that they are uncomfortable with the ‘revisionist history’ views held by some Japanese leaders. These views complicate alliance management, especially with South Korea, and make managing relations with China much more difficult. I doubt that this will be expressed in public. It will be interesting to see if any senior US officials who give background briefings about the summit bring up these sensitive topics.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 NELSON: ‘Eventually’ is a long time! There is no question that major business, finance, and foreign policy officials see the importance, both strategically and policy-wise. A lengthy delay by Japan runs the risk that too many chapters in a prospective TPP agreement will be set, and therefore non-negotiable, without a chance for Japan to influence the details.

Abe’s agricultural minister is seen in Washington as surprisingly progressive overall, so perhaps later this year Abe will be willing to engage in a major domestic political dispute in favor of TPP. My guess is that if the TPP talks make real progress, Tokyo will feel the external pressure to join.

Concerning US-Japan bilateral trade, negotiations concerning beef have basically ended in a positive way. Negotiators have made a lot of progress on insurance, and some other difficult topics.

Much like the case of the Korea-US free trade agreement, the auto sector could prove to be most difficult for the US and Japan to resolve.

When Abe and Obama meet, I would like to see them stress areas of agreement, such as intellectual property rights and services, and not just harp on the areas of disagreement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 NELSON: I think the Henoko project is dead. The planned facility at Henoko will never be built.

Nye: Beware of ‘populist nationalism’

Japan will hold parliamentary elections on December 16 that will bring a new prime minister to office, while China remains in the midst of a critical transition in national leadership. In both countries, foreign and security policies are points of contention. Tension between Japan and China is running high, largely focused on the small Senkaku islands in Okinawa, which both countries claim as sovereign territory but which Japan has had administrative control of for many years. China’s growing assertiveness throughout the East and South China seas raises the danger of instability and miscalculation in the region.

The  Obama Administration was sufficiently concerned about these trends  that last month the State Department authorized a semi-official delegation of former top US foreign policy officials to visit Beijing and Tokyo for talks with leaders in China and Japan. The delegation included Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who was chairman of the US National Intelligence Council and a top Pentagon official in the Clinton Administration; Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state in the first George W. Bush administration; Jim Steinberg, deputy secretary of state for Barack Obama; and Stephen Hadley, national security advisor to President George. W. Bush.

The initiative seems to have come from Kurt Campbell, the influential assistant secretary of state for East Asia, who is close to both Nye and Armitage. Nye knew Campbell from Harvard, and brought him into the Pentagon in 1994 to oversee efforts to upgrade the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era. Armitage, though out of government at the time, was already well-known as a staunch advocate of stronger US-Japan security ties, and became something of a mentor to Campbell. Nye and Campbell later developed a close bipartisan working relationship centered on deepening US-Japan relations.

Nye and Armitage were logical choices to deliver a message to Japan and China. But the Obama administration wanted a slightly larger, while still bipartisan group, so Republican Hadley and Democrat Steinberg were brought in. The trip was authorized by Hillary Clinton, presumably with White House approval. The State Department picked up the expenses, except those portions already paid for by Japan’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun, which had earlier invited Nye and Armitage to participate in a symposium on regional security.

The delegation delivered a written report to Secretary of State Clinton in mid-November, and later met with her in Washington.

Comments from several members of the delegation have made it apparent that the main goal was to clarify to Chinese leaders the firm stance in Washington that the Senkakus fall within the parameters of the US-Japan Security Treaty. And, in a somewhat more nuanced fashion, the delegation emphasized to Prime Minister Yoshiko Noda and other Japanese leaders  that neither side in the Senkaku  territorial dispute should escalate, but rather manage events in a way that  precludes the question of US involvement from ever being broached.

We asked Professor Nye to further discuss the conclusions he drew from the trip. He emphasized that he would be speaking only for himself, and not other members of the delegation. The interview was originally conducted for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and appears in the magazine’s November 24 issue. (PE)

 DISPATCH JAPAN: How dangerous is the current conflict between Japan and China over the Senkakus?

NYE: I don’t think it is dangerous in the sense that someone is sitting around planning an attack. But it is a danger in the sense that events on the ground or close to the islands could escalate in a climate of populist nationalism in both countries, and may take governments beyond where they want to be. It is worth remembering that the 2010 incident seems to have occurred when a drunken Chinese trawler captain rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a broader strategy underlying China’s approach to the Senkakus, or is a Japan-China dynamic primarily at work?

NYE: Chinese regard Japan as having changed the status quo by having the central government purchase the islands from the private owner. China has not accepted Prime Minister Noda’s public explanation that he took that step to prevent Governor Ishihara from having the Tokyo municipality purchase the islands, which could have caused mischief.

The Chinese think there is a large plan by Japan to erode what they call “the outcome” of World War II. I don’t know how much of that is pure rhetoric, or represents the real thinking in China. But that is what senior Chinese say.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is your assessment? Is it rhetoric, or real thinking?

NYE: I think a lot of Chinese really believe that Japan is trying to erode the status quo. I think others are using that line in an effort to create a wedge between the US and Japan.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Some analysts argue that until the incoming Chinese leadership consolidates power, it may feel compelled to maintain a hard line toward Japan.

NYE: If your concern is a populist-nationalism, then a period of political transition is probably one of the most difficult times to exercise restraint, because nobody wants to be seen as less willing to defend the motherland than their political rivals.

If you look at China’s blogosphere, you see that there is considerable nationalism in the country. Some of it is manipulated by the top Chinese leaders. But a lot of it is indigenous, without manipulation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do Japan and China get out of this stalemate? Are there practical steps that could show progress, or is this likely to be a long-term problem?

NYE: I suspect the problem will be around for some time. Look back at 1972, when then-prime ministers Kakuei Tanaka and Zhou Enlai basically agreed to kick the can down the road. Tanaka had raised the issue, and Zhou Enlai said the two countries were not going to resolve the issue at that time, and the issue should not disrupt the process or normalizing ties.

That became the status quo, with both sides retaining their claims to sovereignty, but with Japan retaining administrative control after the United States returned the islands as part of Okinawa reversion.

That status quo basically persisted until Governor Ishihara tried to purchase the islands for Tokyo. That, in turn, led the Chinese to conclude that the long-standing status quo was gone, and could not return.

So, what can be done? The best we can hope is to get the issue off the front burner of the stove so that it does not boil over and spoil the other dishes.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You’ve mentioned possibly reviving the framework for joint development of oil and gas reserves in the area.

NYE: If you can get to a situation where the issue is treated with a low posture, where it is not playing a role in China’s political transition or in the upcoming Japanese elections, then several things might be possible. There is the idea put forward by the London Economist to take the six square kilometers of what is basically rock, and create a marine sanctuary with no human habitation but devoted to fish and birds, to the benefit of the ecology of the region.

That would not resolve the sovereignty issue. The Senkakus would still be regarded by Japan as its sovereign territory. But devoting the territory to the broader good of the region might help diffuse the issue.

In addition, it would be beneficial to revive agreements for joint exploration of some of the undersea resources, including oil and gas, in the East China Sea. There are some fields that straddle the line between Japan and China. The idea is to create an atmosphere in which the Senkaku issue could be more easily managed.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the onus on Japan to make these proposals? Where will the impetus come from?

NYE: Japan has administrative control. Japan could say that, while maintaining its sovereign rights, we are hereby dedicating these six square kilometers to marine ecology. I don’t think this would satisfy the Chinese, but it might take the issue off the front burner, and reduce the dangers of landing of troops, habitation or other actions that would serve as a red flag to the Chinese. The Chinese would protest that they still maintain their claims to sovereignty, but you wouldn’t have provocative actions of the sort that Governor Ishihara might suggest.

DISPATCH JAPAN: There are some questions in Japan about what exactly the United States would do in the event of a deeply provocative action by China with respect to the Senkakus. The US is a war-weary country. Is it realistic to expect US Marines to be involved?

NYE: I don’t think so. We can try to solve this, or at least manage this problem, well-short of that. Both Secretary of State Clinton and Defense Secretary Panetta have made clear that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty covers the Senkaku islands because they are part of the territory returned to Japan in 1972. But we have also made clear that each side should manage the problem in a way that ensures it never reaches that point.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Japan now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having territorial disputes simultaneously with Russia, China, and Korea. Does this reflect poor strategic thinking in Japan?

NYE: Japan has to think through its relations with both China and Korea. It does Japan no good to have things harken back to the 1930s. Japan today is so much different. But occasionally there are politicians in Japan who take actions that instead of looking to the future look to the past.

That is something that Japanese strategists have to grapple with.

But thinking strategically, and thinking politically in the context of an impending election, are often very different things.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Are you concerned that a populist-nationalism in Japan could disrupt the country’s diplomacy?

NYE: Japanese with whom I speak during my visits really are thinking of moderate positions. But I did not speak with Governor Ishihara or Mayor Hashimoto. The question is whether they will refrain from stirring up populist-nationalism in the context of a competition for political power. Otherwise, among the people I know and speak with, everyone from students, to businessmen, to Diet members, I do not see any signs of a dangerous nationalism at this point. But there are some people who would like to stir up dangerous nationalism.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Would it be wise for Japan to consider some kind of quick resolution of the Takeshima dispute with Korea, so as to better focus on managing relations with a rising China?

NYE: If one thinks strategically, Japan should be asking itself how to improve relations with Korea. Takeshima/Dokdo is part of that.

I am also concerned about talk of revising the Kono Statement from the 1990s regarding Korean ‘comfort women.’ Japan should not shoot itself in the foot. Japan does not need this. It makes no sense to appeal to history in an unfavorable way, when the country should be thinking about the future and improving relations with Korea.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any significant movement in Japan toward development of nuclear weapons?

NYE: No, I do not. Japan obviously could develop nuclear weapons. This came up at a recent conference on security issues in Japan organized by Nikkei, and again in front of a large audience of students at Waseda University that Rich Armitage and I addressed.

There was a polling device available at both events allowing audience members to express their views. There was not any indication of a strong desire for development in Japan of nuclear weapons. There are always some voices in favor, but it remains a very small minority view.

There is a desire to have a stronger Japan capable of participating in collective self defense. But that is not necessarily a desire for a nuclear arsenal.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why has the talk in Japan about phasing out all use of civilian nuclear energy caused so much concern in Washington?

NYE: Last summer, Rich Armitage and I expressed concern in our report that Japan would not be able to give up nuclear energy entirely and still be able to sustain the kind of economic growth we all would like to see in Japan. Our major concern was the effect that eliminating nuclear energy would have on the Japanese economy.

We also said that having Japan as a participant in the global civil nuclear energy regime puts another ‘good guy’ at the table. Japan is concerned about safety, and safeguards. And one of Japan’s most distinguished diplomats, Yukiya Amano, is head of the IAEA. So we came out in favor of Japan maintaining civilian nuclear energy, though we understand that there is considerable controversy in the wake of the Tohoku tragedy.

 

 

 

 

Sneider: ‘I don’t see strong evidence of a serious pivot toward Asia’

 Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan . Dan Sneider is associate director of research at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly headed the Tokyo and Moscow bureaus of the Christian Science Monitor, and was both national editor and foreign policy columnist at the San Jose Mercury News.

TBL: Do you accept the notion that the Obama administration will shift greater focus, attention, and overall resources to the Asia-Pacific region, as the US winds down the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

SNEIDER: I was one of many people who criticized the Bush administration repeatedly for focusing too much on the Middle East and South West Asia, while neglecting East Asia. Even from a narrow security point of view that criticism was important to make, especially for those of us watching the situation in North Korea. We argued that the North Korean nuclear program was more clear and present danger than anything Iraq posed.

But not all blame should be placed on the Bush Administration. The Clinton administration, for example, did not give East Asia the importance it deserved, at least from an economic point of view.

TBL: You don’t seem very impressed with the stated new Obama policy.

SNEIDER: Northeast Asia has always been one of the primary focuses of American security policy, along with the Middle East and Europe. The rise of China doesn’t really alter that reality. We have security alliances with Japan and South Korea for a reason, and they have been there for more than half a century. I don’t see any change in that regard.

TBL: I hear a “however” coming…

SNEIDER: Yes. The Obama Administration is certainly investing not only rhetoric, but the time and energy of senior leaders on East Asia on a scale much greater than previous administrations. The President’s extensive commitment to host the APEC summit and to attend the East Asia summit all point to this trend. The administration is genuinely working to come up with a coherent policy toward the whole region, which is a major change.

However, I continue to believe that if one could draw a pie chart measuring the collective brain of the US national security establishment, you’d see that far greater amounts of time are still devoted to the Middle East and Europe, and, relatively speaking, East Asia is still not a priority.

TBL: How would you measure that?

SNEIDER: The number of people who deal with East Asia is actually pretty small, particularly those who have real depth of knowledge and experience in the region, including language skills.

I don’t yet see strong evidence that we are really going to strategically pivot away from the Middle East to East Asia. Policy makers spend a lot more time thinking about Iran than they do about North Korea. We have a stability policy in East Asia; we want to prevent conflict by maintaining a basic balance of power. But that is different from a genuine, proactive, positive policy toward the region.

I also don’t see attempts to freshly rethink how we approach the Asia-Pacific region. We pretty much have a set of policy prescriptions that we have been following for a long time. In fairness, that may be in part because those policies worked pretty well. This has meant a series of bilateral security alliances – the well-known hu-and-spokes policy, where there is no regional security architecture; the US has been the balancing power. More recently, we’ve shown a slightly greater commitment to regional security arrangements.

Toward China, we have had a hedging-engagement policy for a long time; sometimes we hedge more, and sometimes we engage more.

TBL: So you don’t see a big change?

SNEIDER: I don’t get the sense that anyone in the Administration has sat down and said: “It is really important that we rethink this region as a whole, where it is headed, and what our role is going to be.”

TBL: How does economic policy fit in this picture?

SNEIDER: I think our approach to the region, for a long time, has tended to be weighted much too much toward security in the traditional, narrow sense, and not weighted toward economic policy. The Obama Administration has undertaken some semblance of a trade policy, and that is a good thing. But, for the most part, we have assigned ourselves the role of guarantor of military balance of power as our primary function.

TBL: You see to think that our friends in East Asia want more.

SNEIDER: Yes. The fact is that many countries in the region have much more concern about the direction of US economic policy. If we don’t recover economically, and find new sources of growth for the US economy, it is not going to matter how many Marines are sitting in Darwin, Australia, or how many aircraft carriers are moving around in the Western Pacific.

The real source of the sense in the region of American decline does not come from policy makers in the region counting US ships and planes. It’s the perception that the US is unable to deal with its own economic problems, and is drifting into stagnation.

TBL: Did the Chinese and American leaderships misread each other when Obama took office?

SNEIDER: Every US administration goes through a learning curve with China. The ‘W’ Bush Administration came into office in 2001 talking about China as a threat. People tend to forget the extent of the tough talk in place when Bush came in. We had the forced downing of the American surveillance aircraft, for example. Officials pretty quickly learn that the kind of rhetoric you bring from the campaign trail into the White House doesn’t work very well when you are trying to govern.

The Obama Administration might have shown the reverse. There was some China-bashing during the campaign. But for the most part, the Administration came into office looking to engage China in a whole range of global partnership initiatives, including climate change and currency management. The view was that China was the central relationship to manage in East Asia.

The first trip the President took to China was very upbeat, and the Administration tried to push difficult issues to the side, for which he was criticized. But the efforts ran into the normal difficulties that are there: Who the Chinese are, what they want, the inevitable, relatively speaking, limits of American power in a world in which other countries are becoming stronger, and the fact that there are issues on which we cooperate with China, and issues on which we clearly disagree.

TBL: So, we misread each other?

SNEIDER: The Obama administration settled into wariness. After the 2008 financial crisis the Chinese became overbearing and arrogant, and had a sense of triumph of their system over that of the US. But in the end, both countries understand that they somehow have to manage this relationship because there is no strategy of confrontation, or even containment that works. China is far too embedded into the world economic system, and the US is too deeply engaged with China economically as well. Rhetoric that echoes the Cold War, sliding China into the role the old Soviet Union played – should not be taken seriously. It can’t be done.

TBL: Has the Obama administration learned this lesson?

The Administration has definitely gone through a learning curve with China. But I don’t think former National Security Council director for Asia, Jeff Bader, who has dealt with China for a long time, had huge illusions that we were going to enter into an alliance relationship with China and throw off our relationship with Japan.

Did the Obama administration see China as being central? Yes, because China is central. That is not an ideological statement; it is reality. The goal is to use alliance relationships to help manage China, and pull China into structures where they are forced to adhere to existing rules. That’s what the administration seems to be is trying to do.

I see this more as a natural learning curve than a dramatic shift in US policy.

TBL: What about future US force structure in East Asia?

SNEIDER: I don’t see any evidence that someone in the government sat down and said: “OK, 20 years from now, what kind of force structure do we want to have in the Asia-Pacific region? How do we want to think about that structure from the point of view of potential adversaries, crisis situations, and other possible scenarios?” I would love to see evidence that this kind of thinking is actually going on.

TBL: What about Okinawa:

I certainly don’t see any serious rethinking about the role of the US Marines on Okinawa. Until that issue is resolved, we will continue to have unnecessary tensions with Japan, our most important ally in the region.

 

White House to tap Obama friend as Pentagon’s Asia chief

The White House will soon nominate Mark Lippert, a close friend and trusted advisor to President Barack Obama, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, according to sources close to the situation. Lippert will replace General Wallace “Chip” Gregson, who will depart April 1. Barring any unexpected glitches in the laborious background check that is now standard for high-level appointments, the Lippert nomination should be made public shortly. With his Capitol Hill experience as an aide to Senator Patrick Leahy and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, and his presidential ties, Lippert should have little trouble winning Senate confirmation.

The tapping of Lippert, who was then-Senator Barack Obama’s first foreign policy advisor starting in 2005 and became an overall friend and confidante, comes at a critical time in Obama’s effort to craft his own doctrine for America’s role in the world. It’s a clear sign of the importance the president places on US ties with East Asia.

    STRATEGIC REBALANCING: Even before taking office, Obama was influenced by a gnawing sense in much of the US foreign policy community that the US global posture was dangerously out of balance: a debilitating commitment of national power and prestige to two questionable land wars in Southwest Asia, alongside a mysterious lack of strategic investment of time, energy, and resources to an Asia-Pacific region that is anxiously witnessing the truly historic economic and military rise of China.

The first order of business was to extricate the huge US national security apparatus (planning, intelligence, troops, equipment, money, diplomacy) from Iraq and Afghanistan, which the Administration has been doggedly trying to do, but in both cases is proving easier said than done. (The White House really did not want to lose focus by getting sucked into Libya…)

Simultaneously, the Administration has been trying to reassert, and reconfigure, America’s role in East Asia. Some initial fanciful notions of a ‘strategic partnership’ with China have given way to the reality that Beijing is still somewhat clumsily seeking to define its role as an emerging regional and global power. Tensions have run high with China since the leadership in Beijing has resisted reining in its errant North Korean ally, and has haughtily asserted claims on territories controlled by Japan and some Southeast Asian nations.

Instead, the Administration is trying to foment a system of open and transparent economic and security cooperation in the region, defining the terms of engagement to which China has to respond. The economic component is the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade initiative. And the security component involves building on America’s traditional bilateral security alliances in the region to include a network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships from India, through Vietnam and Indonesia, to Australia, and up to Korea and Japan.

    THE LIPPERT ROLE: One way or another, the President wanted Mark Lippert to play a role in this emerging strategic plan to rebalance America’s global position. Several months ago the White House was looking at Lippert to go to the Pentagon as a deputy assistant secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict (SOLIC). These are the counter-terrorism operations that will become increasingly important as the US steadily withdraws ground forces from Afghanistan.

But the White House eventually settled on Lippert for the more senior post of assistant secretary for East Asia, which will require both a bold strategic vision and a deft ability to challenge some entrenched elements of the US military-security bureaucracy.

Lippert has no background in Asia. But there is no question that he will be speaking for the President.

A graduate of Stanford, with a degree in International Relations, Lippert quickly found work on the Hill with Senator Leahy, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. He joined up with Obama in 2005.

Along the way, Lippert decided to pursue his lifelong interest in the military, and utilized a little-known but important Navy program that allows skilled foreign policy specialists to commission as Naval officers and work part time in Naval Intelligence or as a staff aide to senior officers. (Interestingly, Lippert’s soon-to-be counterpart at the State Department, Assistant Secretary for East Asia Kurt Campbell, served as an aide to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the same program.)

Before the Obama presidential campaign entered full swing, Lippert served a tour in Iraq as an intelligence officer assigned to a Navy SEAL special operations unit. Upon his return, he resumed his position right next to Obama, alongside Obama’s other foreign policy alter ego, Denis McDonough, now the President’s Deputy National Security advisor. Even as the Obama campaign’s team of foreign policy advisors grew to over 300, including some establishment heavyweights, it was Lippert and McDonough who were rarely out of eye contact with Obama.

After the election, Lippert served as chief of staff for the NSC, nominally led by retired Marine General Jim Jones. The relationship was uneasy however because Lippert had much closer ties to the President. Lippert eventually left the NSC to serve another Navy tour, and returned to Washington a few months ago to once again work for Obama. General Jones has left the NSC, replaced by Tom Donilon, who shares the “rebalance toward Asia” perspective.

    THE POLICY VISION: Once he takes office, Lippert won’t have to define policy as much as implement policy. With the strong backing of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Administration’s emerging policy toward Asia has mostly been shaped by Kurt Campbell. The policy starts with the principle that the US-Japan alliance is the foundation of the US strategic position in the region. The US Kadena air force base on Okinawa, and the US naval base at Yokosuka are the keys to the ability of the US to project power and maintain stability. And, partly in response to the rise of China, Japan and other nations in the region are becoming increasingly comfortable with military-to-military cooperation. The beginnings of a broad security architecture are taking shape, not to contain China, but as a framework for the peaceful integration of China, and as a hedge in the event Beijing settles, even temporarily, on a more troubling posture in the region.

    THE FUTENMA PROBLEM: Lippert’s most difficult, and important, task may turn out to be resolving the vexing problem of the US Marine Corps presence on Okinawa. Technically, the US and Japan have an agreement for roughly half of the 17,000 Marines now stationed on Okinawa with the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to relocate to Guam by 2014. As part of the deal, the US Marine Station Futenma, on Okinawa, would close, and its key operations (mostly involving helicopters) would relocate to a new facility to be built in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa, close the Marine Camp Schwab. The key component would be a new runway built to accommodate the controversial V-22 Osprey, a tilt rotator vehicle that can land and takeoff either as a chopper or fix-wing aircraft.

Public opinion on Okinawa is firmly against the new facility. Tokyo signed the deal with Washington, but has been unable for 15 years to bring Okinawans on board. Washington insists the deal should proceed, and expects Tokyo to deliver its side of the bargain.

The issue is deadlocked. The Henoko project is essentially dead, though no official death notice has been issued.

Instead, the issue has continued to be a dangerous irritant that can easily be inflamed (as occurred recently when word emerged that then-State Department Japan desk chief Kevin Maher had made inappropriate comments about Okinawans; an otherwise unimportant incident took on outsized importance because of the backdrop of tension over Futenma.)

For a while, the Futenma issue threatened to disrupt the whole US-Japan alliance, overshadowing the critical roles of Kadena and Yokosuka, and the growing willingness of Japan to take on more regional and even global security responsibilities.

    WISHING IT AWAY: Today, Washington and Tokyo have seen the wisdom of temporarily posting a resolution, confining Futenma discussions to working level meetings. The issue is in a state of unsteady equilibrium. Tokyo continues to voice unequivocal support for the project, so as to not rile American opinion in a way that would bring the issue back to the top of the bilateral agenda. In reality, virtually no political leader in Tokyo wants to touch the issue. In the wake of the recent tragic earthquake, that will be the case even more. And Washington continues to insist the plan must go forward, but does so in a more low-key style so as to not have it return to the top of the agenda.

This approach has two problems: Futenma remains open, and just one US aircraft accident among the heavily concentrated population surrounding the base could provoke such a backlash as to threaten all US bases in Japan, including the vital Kadena and Yokosuka installations. And as long as the two sides pretend the existing Henoko plan can still move ahead, there is no possibility to discuss alternative basing arrangements.

The Marines want to stay on Okinawa. It is convenient. Japan picks up much of the bill. And it is not clear where the money would come from to fund a transfer and permanent basing somewhere else, such as Guam or Hawaii.

With the White House focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, including continued heavy deployments by US Marines in Afghanistan, the President’s advisors have fiercely resisted having the Futenma issue reach his desk. The White House does not want to have any tension with the Marines over Okinawa, and does not want to have to go to Congress for the funds to finance an alternative basing plan.

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has shared that reluctance. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, careful to maintain her successful alliance with Gates on broader issues, has gone along.

But the stalemate can’t last forever, especially because it will continue to prove disruptive to the broader strategic vision of rebalancing the US global posture toward Asia, in cooperation with Japan.

    NEW MARINE BASING ARRANGEMENT: The best solution would be for the US to scrap the 2006 “roadmap” with Japan that seemed to finalize the Marine realignment on Okinawa and Guam.

There is no compelling strategic reason for the Marines to be on Okinawa. They are a global force that can be based anywhere. They certainly are not critical to the US deterrent capability in Asia. During the tense moments with China last summer, it was the USS George Washington aircraft carrier out of Yokosuka, together with fleet air units and larger air capabilities out of Kadena that provided the US show of force in the region.

It makes no sense for the heavy Marine presence on Okinawa to cause the kinds of irritants that could ultimately threaten the vital continued US presence at Kadena and Yokosuka.

A workable solution could involve a phasing out of the III MEF from Okinawa, to be replaced by Japanese Marine units, trained by the United States, who would be responsible for the defense of Japan’s southern islands. To dispel any notions of a slip in US commitment to Japan or the region, the US could permanently base an Ohio-class submarine out of Yokosuka, and permanently base a unit of F-22 aircraft at Misawa or some other facility in Japan.

The Marines could be permanently based elsewhere, with preparations in place for the use of Japanese facilities in the event of a crisis, and visiting basing rights to be negotiated throughout the region.

A solution to the Okinawa problem becomes feasible in the context of the broader repositioning of the United States strategically in the region.

Lippert has just the kind of political clout that would be required to bring the Marines along. Nothing short of intervention by a strong defense secretary, or a person with clear White House backing, can break the current deadlock over Futenma.

Will Lippert adopt that role? If he does, he and Campbell could make a formidable team capable of reshaping the US presence in East Asia for years to come.

The danger is that he will choose to stick with the existing framework, hoping to avoid confronting the bureaucratic inertia in the military and on Capitol Hill. That would amount to presidential endorsement of the existing deadlocked plan, which would greatly inhibit the US-Japan alliance from evolving into a much more vibrant force for stability in the region anytime soon.

 

 

 

 

Okinawa: Why the Nakaima win spells trouble

Sighs of relief could be heard in Washington and Tokyo when news emerged that Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima had won reelection on November 28.

But the relief, which doesn’t run very deep, is based largely on faulty assumptions about the pliability of Okinawan politicians and the prefecture’s voters at large, which could spell major trouble for US-Japan relations in six months or so.

The stage is now seems set for the two governments to proceed with a much-needed strategic dialogue, but one with the exceedingly-tenuous premise that plans will proceed on the construction of a controversial replacement facility in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa for the Futenma US Marine Air Station, which is scheduled to close.

According to this schedule, the two governments will issue a joint security statement of some sort, including final resolution of the Futenma replacement facility issue, when Prime Minister Naoto Kan visits Washington sometime next Spring.

The problem with this scenario is that the Okinawa gubernatorial election confirmed what everyone already knew: A large majority of Okinawans vehemently opposes construction of the Futenma replacement facility anywhere in the prefecture. The Obama administration insists that a bilateral agreement for the plan proceed. The Kan administration, which saw its predecessor collapse under the pressure of the issue, is keen on avoiding a showdown with Washington, but also lacks the political inclination or power to force construction to proceed over the objections of Okinawans.

Barring any flexibility in timing or the content of the replacement facility plan, an impasse is all but certain to prevail next Spring, raising the specter of alliance turmoil at a time when tensions with China and North Korea would seem a more appropriate focus of bilateral attention.

The Nakaima reelection could prove problematic because Washington and Tokyo are likely to unwisely invest enormous, ultimately fruitless time and effort to convince him to back the Henoko project, rather than getting on with the inevitable, arduous task of crafting alternative basing arrangements for the US Marines on Okinawa.

Washington misreading the DPJ

Part of the problem is that key Obama administration officials continue to labor under the mistaken notion that today’s problems involving the Futenma replacement facility are largely the fault of former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. The argument goes that the Futenma issue had largely been put to rest by prior, LDP-led governments, with Okinawans basically having come to accept that the replacement facility would be built at Henoko Bay. However, the mistaken narrative has it, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in September 2009, Hatoyama revived “false” and “unrealistic” expectations among Okinawans that there could be an alternative site for the replacement facility, somewhere out of Okinawa, which already hosts a large proportion of US military installations in Japan. It was the unnecessary, reckless actions of Hatoyama, the story goes, that led to the Futenma problem of the last year.

Luckily, the story continues, the DPJ has “matured,” a generally younger, more pragmatic and realistic crop of leaders has come to the fore, and construction of the Henoko facility can ultimately proceed after a period of wooing and cajoling of Governor Nakaima and other Okinawan political, civic, and business leaders.

Ignoring the election

The false narrative both misreads the DPJ, and dismisses the hard-to-ignore facts on the ground in Okinawa.

Nakaima is a pro-alliance conservative who, in the past, had expressed openness to construction of the Futenma replacement facility at Henoko. But Nakaima increasingly bent to the political winds in Okinawa, which have blown harshly against the Henoko project for quite some time.

Nakaima wound up running his campaign with a firm pledge to oppose the Henoko project, all the while making clear that he continues to be a supporter of the US-Japan alliance, and is not opposed to all US bases in Okinawa, or Japan overall.

His opponent, Yoichi Iha, is much more ideologically opposed to the US military presence in Japan, and was hurt somewhat by Nakaima’s campaign criticisms that he is unrealistic about security issues, especially in the midst of rising tensions with China and North Korea.

Nevertheless, Nakaima was able to garner only 52% of the vote, to 46% for Iha.

The only major candidates both firmly opposed construction of the replacement facility at Henoko, and won 98% of the vote.

In what amounted to a stunning rebuke of the US position, not one credible candidate came forward to campaign in favor of the Henoko project.

Proponents of the project are hanging on to the tiniest sliver of hope that a package of economic aid to Okinawa, and some adjustments to other US deployments on the island, will soften Nakaima’s resistance to the Henoko plan.

Even if Nakaima could be pressed into changing his stance, the overall mood on Okinawa in opposition to the Henoko plan would seem to contradict the US insistence that the replacement facility for Futenma be both operationally feasible and “politically sustainable.”

The Kan view

For Prime Minister Naoto Kan, the Futenma controversy is one more of many accumulating political headaches. With his job approval ratings in the precarious 30% range, and his chief cabinet secretary having been censured by the Upper House, Kan does not look forward to a political showdown with Okinawa or the United States over Futenma.

There have been some suggestions that Kan might be pressed by Washington to use special legislature powers for police deployments to forcibly allow construction to begin. But people close to Kan flatly reject any chance of that occurring.

More likely is that Kan will appeal to the White House that he is doing his best to bring along opinion on Okinawa, but that he simply needs more time. And that will likely turn into appeals for yet more time.

That could result in the existing Futenma facility remaining open for an indefinite period, which is less-than-optimal given that it is located in the midst of a population center.

With the Marines scheduled to begin deploying mistake-prone V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft to Okinawa in 2012, they are just one Osprey crash away from political disaster on Okinawa.

The irony is that neither Hatoyama nor other DPJ critics of the Futenma replacement project are rigid advocates of immediate Marine withdrawal from Okinawa.

The firm US air and naval presence in Japan, combined with expansion of selected Japanese air, naval, marine ground troop, and intelligence capabilities would seem to provide a solid foundation for alliance cooperation in the region, and perhaps provide an environment in which more flexible basing arrangements for the US Marines in Japan would be feasible.

By contrast, US insistence on proceeding with the existing Futenma replacement plans seems destined to run into both adamant opposition on Okinawa, and a DPJ that has not abandoned its desire for a responsible, strategic review of the alliance force structure in Japan.