Dispatch Japan

The Iraq War’s damage to US-Japan relations

The official end of US combat operations in Iraq has prompted a surge in commentaries on the impact of the war, none more important than Anne Applebaum’s in the Washington Post on August 30. (Leave aside for a moment that 50,000 US troops remain on the ground in Iraq, in arguably a more dangerous position than before.)

 

Abblebaum tries to assess the impact that seven years of war in Iraq has had on American society, and American foreign policy. The price, she rightly says, has been “much higher than we usually admit.”

 

In the realm of foreign policy, Applebaum argues that the war severely damaged “America’s reputation for effectiveness,” and undermined “America’s ability to organize a coalition.”

 

Specific examples cited: Participation in the Iraq war cost Tony Blair his reputation, lost an election for the Spanish government, and proved unpopular even in countries where the US is popular, such as Italy and Poland.

 

As is usual in Washington these days, there was no mention – probably no consideration – of Japan. But a strong case can be made that the Iraq war hurt America’s reputation in Japan as much, if not more, than in any other allied country.

 

The consequences are evident today in the increasingly bitter dispute over a replacement for the US Marine Air Station Futenma, on Okinawa, which is scheduled to be closed. They are reflected in the broader calls in Japan these days for a “more equal” alliance relationship with the United States.

 

The Okinawa dispute predates the Iraq War, and the calls for more equality in the alliance were inevitable. But deep concerns and disappointment about American ‘unilateralism’ and haughty, heavy-handed diplomacy, prompted by the Iraq War, have made those sentiments more salient and intense.

 

It didn’t start out that way. After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the government led by Junichiro Koizumi moved quickly to support US and allied forces in combat operations to overthrow the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan. Public opinion supported Koizumi’s stance.

 

Just as occurred in Europe, however, public opinion in Japan did not support America’s shift in focus from Afghanistan to Iraq. Many political leaders and officials in the defense and foreign ministries also harbored deep doubts about the wisdom of the Iraq invasion.

 

Nonetheless, Koizumi supported the Bush administration, in expectation of close US-Japan coordination on policy toward China and North Korea. Japan dispatched a small unit of ground forces to Iraq for rebuilding operations, and Japanese air force units provided an important transport link between Kuwait and Iraq.

 

Many officials in Tokyo subsequently complained bitterly that Japan gained nothing from the support provided for the Iraq war, as the Bush administration ran a zig-zag, inconsistent policy toward North Korea and froze Japan out of the deliberations.

 

Moreover, support for Japan’s refueling of US and allied ships in the Indian Ocean declined in Japan, as those operations came to be seen as a part of the US combat operations in Iraq, rather than the initial intent of combating terrorism in Afghanistan.

 

Koizumi’s support for the Bush administration’s Iraq policy was an important, though often understated, factor in the rise to power of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ argued that Koizumi’s LDP had no other policy than to blindly follow Washington’s Iraq misadventure.

 

When the DPJ opposed renewal of Japan’s Indian Ocean refueling operations, many in Tokyo were stunned that some US Democrats who opposed the Iraq War nevertheless heavy-handedly pressured Japan to maintain its support for the “alliance.”

 

It was okay for Barack Obama to oppose the Iraq war, but not Japan.

 

The Iraq War, and Koizumi’s support, had a profound impact on the subsequent evolution of debate in Japan over security policy. Before the war, support was gradually growing in Japan for an easing of the country’s ban on “collective self-defense.” But for many, an easing of the ban became conflated with unquestioning support for American military operations. A commission appointed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to study the issue developed very credible, workable suggestions, but its report has done nothing but gather dust. Abe’s successor, Yasuo Fukuda (who was deeply opposed to the Iraq war, and told US officials so in the spring of 2007, prior to unexpectedly taking over from Abe) simply tabled the commission’s report, knowing it was politically dead at that moment.

 

On the other side, interest grew in the view espoused by DPJ strongman Ichiro Ozawa: Japan could engage in collective self-defense operations, including combat, as long as the missions were sanctioned by the UN Security Council. The requirement of UN authorization, in Ozawa’s view, would provide Japan with a clear legal framework to guide its actions, would help convince neighboring countries that Japanese actions were not aggressive, and would provide a buffer between Japanese decision makers and American pressure.

 

There is a broad consensus in Japan today that the country should be more engaged in international security operations, as evidenced by the presence of Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces in Pakistan today, and by the presence of Maritime Self-Defense Forces in the Arabian Sea engaged in anti-piracy missions. The DPJ governments have chosen to not label these as “collective self-defense” missions, but they are just that, in fact.

 

Today in Tokyo, many see the unrelenting US pressure for construction of a Futenma replacement facility on Okinawa, and the rude treatment accorded Japanese political leaders who dare to voice a different view, as a continuation of the pressure tactics demonstrated during the Indian Ocean refueling operations in 2007. It’s Iraq War-style unilateralism in a different form.

 

Thus the continuing calls in Japan for greater “equality” in the alliance – a legacy, at least in part, of US policy in Iraq.

 

 

Aki Nagashima and SDF operations in the Indian Ocean

Akihisa Nagashima, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense, contacted me recently to ask that I correct the way I presented his stance on Japan’s past maritime refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.

 

In a June 18 post, I reported and commented on Nagashima’s remarks to a Washington conference on US-Japan security ties sponsored by the Center for a New American Security. (Nagashima’s remarks are available on the blog Armchair Asia.)

 

Nagashima, a security expert well-known and liked in Washington, presented an “ambitious agenda” for US-Japan security cooperation. After the prolonged tension between the US and the Hatoyama cabinet during the previous 8 months, the Kan cabinet was anxious to reassure Japanese voters and American officials of its ability to effectively manage the US-Japan alliance. Nagashima’s conference presentation was very helpful in that regard.

 

Nagashima included in his remarks a call for Japan to “re-energize” its maritime operations in the Indian Ocean. I saw this as more of a personal appeal than a policy of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Indeed, the DPJ-led Hatoyama Cabinet, over Nagashima’s objections, last year blocked reauthorization of Japan’s Indian Ocean operations.

 

I then commented: “Conveniently forgotten in Washington is that Nagashima played a critical role in ultimately ending Japan’s refueling of allied naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. In late 2007, when the DPJ was still in the opposition, Nagashima used Diet questioning periods to reveal sloppy accounting of the end-use of oil delivered to American vessels, and demonstrated that some oil was probably used by Americans ships that backed US combat operations in Iraq. The DPJ was very critical of former LDP Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s support for the US invasion of Iraq.”

 

This was a slipshod summary of what was a much more complex and important debate in Japan at the time. I hastily boiled down the discussion in a way that failed to point out the critical differences Nagashima had, and still has, with many of his DPJ colleagues. 

He wrote to me:  

“I appreciate your mentioning my speech. 

“However, I have to correct some important facts, which is about what role I played to end Japan's refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. I was so upset when I read the section, because what you wrote is completely opposite to what I did in late 2007 and have done to date.

“I did oppose DPJ policy to end the refueling operations at that time and have repeatedly tried to restore the operations in every single occasion since then.  It was my short-sighted colleagues who were looking after and trying to reveal in the Diet session the end-use of oil delivered to US vessels.  Never ever was myself.

“As for my attempts to restore the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, most recent one came just after the power transition of September 16, 2009, when I proposed in my October 7 public speech as vice minister to dispatch the refueling ships to the Indian Ocean again.  But again DPJ-Socialist coalition rejected my proposal, though. I am still seeking to dispatch MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean, therefore I said in my speech at the CNAS conference that Japan should seek to re-energize the activities of maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.”

The hunch that Nagashima’s Indian Ocean idea was personal proved correct. Just one day after the Washington speech, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada dismissed the idea during a press conference in Japan.

But Nagashima is right in saying that he has consistently supported Japan’s refueling and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) in the Indian Ocean, a stance that put him at odds with many of his DPJ colleagues. The situation gets complicated because some of the arguments made by Nagashima to support his stance were used by DPJ refueling opponents to support their stance. The LDP government at the time was on the receiving end of criticisms from both Nagashima and DPJ refueling opponents.

Understanding the events of 2007 is critical to evaluating the debate inside the DPJ today.

 

 

AT THE BEGINNING: After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Japan moved quickly to assist US and allied efforts in Afghanistan, mostly by agreeing to provide fuel and other logistical support to American and allied vessels in the Indian Ocean. In November 2001, the Cabinet approved a “Basic Plan” that stated explicitly that Japan would assist US and allied “combat” operations in Afghanistan. The wording of the subsequent legislation adopted by the Diet was deliberately vague. Defense and Foreign ministry officials, and then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s office, wanted it that way, anticipating that additional action beyond the refueling operations might be needed, and that these would even further broach Japan’s traditional prohibition against “collective self defense.”

Most of the fuel provided by Japan came in the 16 months from December 2001 through March 2003, and went to US naval vessels involved in, among other things, missile attacks on Afghanistan or in launching jet fighters.

 

Over time, Japan’s Afghan refueling operations slowly changed to support more general allied naval operations, involving seven countries working together in Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) to prevent the free flow of terrorists and supplies between Iraq and Afghanistan. Japan’s MIO role was largely limited to supplying oil to the one Pakistani frigate participating in the project. The overall MIO mission was largely symbolic, and the results modest, with only small numbers of smugglers captured and small cargos of guns and drugs seized.

 

For many in Japan, the symbolism turned decidedly negative with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The public in Japan, and much of the country’s political establishment, was opposed to the Iraq invasion. Suspicions grew that some Japanese oil transferred in refueling operations wound up on US ships involved in combat operations in Iraq.

 

The public generally supported the Koizumi administration’s initial backing for the US and allied invasion of Afghanistan. The public was not supportive, however, of Koizumi’s decision to back the Bush administration in Iraq, and questioned the dispatching to Iraq of ground and air units from the Self Defense Forces.

 

For many, the Indian Ocean refueling operations became blackened by the brush of the Iraq invasion.

 

DPJ WINS THE UPPER HOUSE: The refueling issue became particularly controversial the Fall of 2007, after the DPJ won control of the Upper House. The then-DPJ leader, Ichiro Ozawa, quickly announced the party’s opposition to renewing authorization of the refueling, which was set to expire on November 1, 2007. Ozawa argued that the maritime operations were illegal because they were not authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Ozawa also proposed, however, that Japan participate in operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan, which was run by NATO but had UN authorization.

 

Ozawa’s proposal caught many of his DPJ colleagues by surprise, but also put LDP-led government, then headed by Yasuo Fukuda, on the defense. Fukuda’s defense minister, Shigeru Ishiba, reverted to a traditional post-war stance, saying Japanese support for ISAF would be unconstitutional because it might involve the use of force.

 

At the time, Nagashima was not happy with the DPJ’s opposition to refueling, in the belief that Japan had a right, and responsibility, to participate in international security operations such as those in the Indian Ocean.

 

But Nagashima was particularly angry with the Fukuda government for what he said was a dishonest unwillingness to acknowledge that Japan had indeed participated in operations that went beyond those related to Afghanistan envisioned in the original authorizing legislation. He posted on his personal blog on September 11, 2007 a blistering critique of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this point. He even mentioned that he had personally checked the web site of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, responsible for the Middle East, and that by the nature of its operations it was evident that fuel provided by Japan had aided operations beyond Afghanistan.

 

Nagashima was not opposed to that support. He wanted the government to acknowledge it, and to defend the operations as legitimate.

 

Others in the DPJ, and many media accounts, used Nagashima’s Fifth Fleet web site investigation to criticize the LDP-led governments for backing the US in Iraq.

 

RETREAT ON “COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE”: In the end, the anti-terrorism legislation that authorized the Indian Ocean refueling operations did expire on November 1, 2007, and Japan’s naval vessels temporarily returned home. The government drafted new legislation, ultimately passed over DPJ protest, that removed any reference to Afghanistan, and specifically barred refueling for anything other than MIOs. Any and all connections between Japan’s refueling operations and Afghanistan were cut.

 

At the time, Japanese officials acknowledged great disappointment with the wording of the replacement legislation, as it marked a major step backward from the decade-long effort to bring about Japanese acceptance of the right of collective self-defense.

 

Surprising as it may sound, Prime Minister Fukuda was not unhappy with this turn of events. On the one hand, as chief cabinet secretary after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Fukuda played an important role in facilitating Japan’s support for allied combat operations in Afghanistan.

 

But some people very close to Fukuda told me at the time that the prime minister was very much opposed the Iraq War, and believed his predecessors Koizumi and Abe had gone too far in backing the Bush administration. He also believed Abe had self-destructed politically, lasting only a year in office, in part because he neglected pressing domestic economic issues in favor of more controversial (though important) security issues, including championing Japan’s right to engage in collective self-defense with other nations.

 

Fukuda was not enthusiastic about reauthorizing Indian Ocean operations, but felt he had to so as to maintain harmony with Washington. His solution was wording that made clear Japan’s participation would be limited to MIOs, with no involvement whatsoever in Afghanistan (or Iraq) operations.

 

Ironically, the bill tabled by the DPJ at the time would have done far more to actually help improve circumstances in Afghanistan. It was a far-cry from the bold proposal of Ozawa to back ISAF operations (which Ozawa later modified to involve only civilian assistance to ISAF). But it did propose to dispatch Japanese civilians, and members of the Self Defense Forces in civilian capacity, to assist in various police, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction efforts.

 

When I visited Nagashima in his Diet office in early October 2007, he was busy helping draft that bill, studying how to work with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams already up and running in Afghanistan. DPJ opposition to the Indian Ocean refueling operations, or Nagashima’s desire to see them renewed, barely came up in our talk.

 

Nagashima did not give up on the Indian Ocean operations. As he correctly pointed out in his recent note to me, he suggested reauthorization in a speech last October, but was overruled, and the operations ended last November. The Hatoyama cabinet left it to Nagashima to travel to Washington to deliver the news that the operations would end.

 

Nagashima was similarly overruled by Foreign Minister Okada last week. And this time, the pacifist Socialists, banished from the ruling coalition, played no role in the decision. The mainstream of the DPJ decided.

 

The DPJ does support, however, the current anti-piracy operations conducted in the vicinity of Somalia by ships from the Maritime Self Defense Forces. The ships are authorized to escort Japanese and non-Japanese vessels alike, and to fire on suspected pirates who refuse to heed warnings. The government is considering revising the authorizing legislation to allow Japan to refuel vessels from allied countries involved in the anti-piracy mission. These operations have been very effective, with Japanese vessels having escorted hundreds of ships through pirate-infested waters in recent months. The operations are deemed to be “police” rather than “military” in nature, and the DPJ-led government claims they do not amount of “collective self-defense.” Nagashima prefers that the government acknowledge that they are, in fact, “collective self-defense” operations.

 

The Iraq War, and the fear that Japan could be pulled into future misguided American operations, have left both the conservative LDP (what remains of it) and the center-left DPJ hesitant to support the exercise by Japan of its right to engage in collective self-defense.

 

There is plenty of room for growth in DPJ perspectives, and Nagashima continues to play an important role in party deliberations on security policy. But as the recent public difference with Foreign Minister Okada shows, Nagashima’s views on missions and rules of engagement for Japanese forces deployed overseas are often in the minority within the DPJ.

 

A later posting will discuss in more detail the state of discussion in Japan about the right of “collective self defense.”