Dispatch Japan

For Abe, talks with Obama came down to ‘take what you can get’

From the standpoint of his political image back home, the February 22 summit meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama was a big success for the Japanese leader. Abe was able to bolster his standing with the Japanese public and within his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as someone who can effectively manage the all-important US-Japan alliance. He projected the image of a strong leader by forcefully proclaiming that Japan “is back,” and that he has restored trust in the US-Japan relationship by reversing three years of supposed alliance disorder engendered by the Democratic Party of Japan.

The big headline in Japan was that Abe had successfully secured from Obama a statement clarifying that Tokyo would not have to make any unilateral concessions on tariff reductions as a precondition for joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

But the heavy focus on the joint statement on trade distorted the overall picture of the summit.

Indeed, walking down the TPP avenue so quickly was not Abe’s preference. It was the path he had to take if he were to demonstrate that the US-Japan alliance “is back,” since the White House made TPP its priority.

All along, Abe wanted to demonstrate alliance revival by pushing collective self-defense (his "gift" was to be a public statement of Japan's willingness to use its missile defense to try to shoot down any North Korean ballistic missile aimed at US territory), and to get a strong US statement specifically criticizing China, by name, for its East China Sea maritime provocations.

The White House would have none of it, and pushed for the public agenda to focus on North Korea, cooperation on other aspects of global security, and economic policy, especially trade.

Abe had to adjust. The word in political circles in Tokyo is that Japanese negotiators secured the final wording of the joint statement on TPP roughly ten days ago, which emboldened Abe to begin pushing in the days leading up to the summit for the LDP to accept Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations. Roughly half of the LDP’s Diet members oppose TPP, fearful of a backlash from the country’s powerful agriculture lobby.

Because Obama wanted to focus on TPP and economics so heavily, Abe had to allow TPP into the forefront if he hoped to demonstrate back home his ability to manage the alliance. Obama mentioned that the “highest priority” between the two countries is to restore healthy economic growth. The White House wants Japan, which still has the world’s third-largest economy, to join TPP, though not at the cost of watering down the low-tariff philosophy behind the prospective agreement.

Abe would have preferred to avoid tackling the complicated domestic politics of TPP until after critical Upper House elections to be held by next July. But he found he couldn’t do that and also successfully stage-manage his appearance in DC. It looks now as if Abe will announce fairly soon a decision to enter the TPP talks. It remains to see just how hard  Abe will push for genuine tariff reform, especially on agricultural products like rice, once the blowback from inside the LDP and from agricultural interests begins.

     ARM’S DISTANCE: The TPP joint statement notwithstanding, it was hard to miss that Obama kept Abe at arm's distance during the summit.

     One: There was no joint press conference. Last year, on April 30, while he was readying for an ultra-secret midnight departure for Afghanistan that night, President Obama took the time for a 30-minute joint press conference with then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Obama praised the alliance, joked easily with Noda, and promoted the "joint vision" that had been announced just days before by the "2+2" meeting between the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries.

This time, with Abe, Obama did not take the time for a press conference.

     Two: Oval Office theater. In a brief Oval Office appearance with Abe, Obama mentioned North Korea, cooperation on Afghanistan, and the high priority of promoting economic growth. He spoke not one word about the Senkakus, China, Okinawa, or even a "joint vision" of the sort announced with Noda. Abe tried his best to criticize China, very indirectly, but adhered to US desires to not rile-up Beijing. Obama took one question from a small press “pool,” which was on the looming US budget sequestration. He answered at length, but said nothing about Abe, Japan, or Asia. Obama directed the second and final question toward Abe.

     Three: Neither Obama nor Secretary of State John Kerry took the seemingly easy step of reiterating the January 18 statement by then-Secretary of State Clinton outlining American opposition to any effort at unilateral change of Japan's administrative control of the Senkakus. This was a far-cry from Abe's initial desire for a strong statement from Obama specifically mentioning China.

     Four: The White House surely gave Abe a carefully worded statement that the prime minister can use at home to push for TPP entry. But this was a case of Abe adapting to the US agenda. Abe did not want to be in a position of promoting TPP before the Upper House elections, but that's where he finds himself.

Obama embraced the US-Japan alliance, but did not embrace Abe.

 

Obama to embrace Japan, not Abe

With North Korea having recently tested a third nuclear device and China acting provocatively in the East China Sea, there will be plenty for Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama to talk about when they meet at the White House later today.

The summit will provide an opportunity for the US and Japan to reaffirm their bilateral security alliance and the need for regional peace, stability, and security.

However, below the surface, there is a great deal of unease about Prime Minister Abe in the White House, and at the State Department and the Pentagon. Concern is running high that Abe’s views on history, and his nationalist feelings toward Korea and China, could complicate relations in Northeast Asia as Japan pursues what are otherwise modest and logical expansions of security responsibilities and capabilities in the region.

Some Asia specialists from the Bush administration who know Abe, and worked with him while he was chief cabinet secretary and later briefly prime minister in 2006-2007, are fairly confident that Abe will act pragmatically, and not let his ideology cause problems for Japanese diplomacy.

But few people in the Obama administration know Abe, and top officials are somewhat skeptical that Abe (and those around him, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and education minister Hakubun Shimomura) will be able to restrain their nationalist impulses and act with a clear strategic vision for stability in the region. As Michael Cucek pointed out recently, Abe himself declared in his “new” book (a virtual reprint of an earlier tome) that his return to power is not simply a replacement of the discredited Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), but “is a fight to return the country called Japan to the hands of the citizens of Japan from out of the grip of postwar history.” Abe’s long-standing “history denier” perspective has not changed.

For this reason, the Obama administration, while squarely reaffirming the alliance, wants to avoid any statements or symbolic gestures during Abe’s brief visit that could appear provocative toward Beijing, or be seen as an endorsement of Abe’s personal political agenda.

     DIFFICULT PREPARATIONS: To begin with, the White House was never terribly enthusiastic about a visit from Abe. Tokyo pushed very hard for a January summit, but the White House said the president’s schedule would not permit that.  The White House attitude amounted to: Abe virtually invited himself, so we could hardly say ‘no.’

Part of the problem is that expectations in Washington are quite low of anything substantial emerging soon from Tokyo on hot-button issues like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks or basing arrangements for US forces on Okinawa. Many had assumed that this was a problem of the poor governance and weakness of the DPJ, but it is clear now that it is a broader political problem in Japan. Abe is not able or willing to push for progress on key issues at least until after next summer’s Upper House elections.

Abe had assumed, mistakenly, that his return to office, and that of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), would be met with cheers in Washington, that an “anything but the DPJ” attitude prevailed. While greater political stability is certainly welcomed by Obama administration officials, many in Washington were pretty happy with the foreign and security policies of the DPJ’s Yoshihiko Noda, who is clearly more moderate than Abe.

All of this made it difficult for senior officials to work out details for the summit. This became apparent two weeks ago, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Zumwalt and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey met in Washington with Takeo Akiba of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ro Manabe of the Ministry of Defense. When the talks ended, the Japanese officials were unusually brusque in declining to talk with gathered reporters, indicating the continued lack of clarity made it difficult to brief the press.

As late as last Friday, after the prime minister’s office had announced that Abe would visit Washington on February 21-23 and meet with Obama on the 22^nd, the White House would not provide quick confirmation. That afternoon, the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent a ‘heads-up’ note to the Japanese press corps saying that “if the situation allows it to happen,” Abe would visit on February 21-23. Only later did the White House issue a statement announcing the visit. Coordination was less than smooth.

     WHITE HOUSE NIXES ABE PLANS: For Abe, the visit with President Obama is important as an opportunity to demonstrate to his domestic audience that he can manage the all-important alliance with the US. However, it may turn out that the only concrete news Abe is able to bring to Washington is that the Diet will likely sign the Hague Convention provisions concerning custody arrangements of children of failed international marriages. The repeated hearing of tragic stories spurred former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to champion the cause. The DPJ had agreed to adopt legislation, and Abe has followed. But even on this issue Abe still faces hurdles, as conservatives object to “outside intervention” into family disputes, and liberals (especially the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito, have raised concerns about Japanese women victims of domestic violence.

Abe had initially hoped to trumpet his plans to lift Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and make clear publicly that Japan would use its missile defenses to assist the United States in the event North Korea launched a ballistic missile aimed at US territory.  Abe assumed the new policy would be welcomed in Washington.

That was not the case. The Pentagon, of course, would welcome the defense planning and operational flexibility that would come from Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. But US officials were concerned that a demonstration of support for such an initiative by Abe could be misinterpreted as endorsement of the prime minister’s broader domestic agenda, including revision of the Constitution, which could unnecessarily anger Beijing. Instead, US officials pressed to keep discussions during the summit to specific means to enhance deterrence and regional stability, including better US-Japan combined intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training of Japanese Self-Defense Force marine capabilities.

In the same vein, Washington was not eager to back Abe’s desire for specific criticism of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea, particularly with regard to the Senkaku islands. The Obama administration is trying to walk a very fine line between clearly warning China against efforts to unilaterally challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus, and not giving China any reason to feel threatened.

The White House is perfectly willing to reaffirm the statement made on January 18^th by then-Secretary of State Clinton in a joint appearance with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida. Without mentioning China by name, Clinton warned against “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus. But in the same sentence, she went on to say that “we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means.”

This is a warning to China, but it is also an effort to stay engaged with China, to let Beijing know that the US would not favor provocative actions by Japan, and to let Abe know that the US wants his government to stay cool and calm.

In the White House view, a specific reference to China might boost Abe’s domestic agenda, but would not be helpful for the alliance or for regional stability and security.

Within the Obama administration, the departure of Hillary Clinton and her influential assistant for Asian affairs Kurt Campbell has led to a subtle but important shift in the balance of power in managing Japan-related issues. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is a strong supporter of the strategy of “rebalancing” US force posture and diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Donilon is also extremely concerned about the strategic dilemma posed by China. How can the US simultaneously engage China and deter China from exercising undue heavy-handedness in the region? How best to persuade a rising China to participate in a rules-based regional and global architecture, and not create a self-fulfilling prophecy of China as an enemy?

It’s in this context that Donilon and other administration officials are wary of Abe’s hard line nationalist proclivities.

     TPP AND OKINAWA:  Meanwhile, the White House is frustrated that Abe will not provide an affirmative answer about Japan’s participation in the TPP trade talks, but officials there and at the State Department know that until next summer, Abe’s priority will likely be the Upper House elections. Abe does not want to anger the LDP’s rural voter base. Close to half of the LDP’s Diet delegation is opposed to TPP participation. For his part, Abe has been hinting at the possibility of making a decision on TPP prior to the elections. But the betting in Washington is that Abe is angling to garner from Obama some language hinting at flexibility in the demand that Japan put rice and other sensitive economic sectors on the negotiating table as a precondition to joining the talks. Washington is very reluctant to carve out exceptions for Japan prior to a decision by Tokyo to participate.

Many in Washington believe Abe wants Japan to eventually join TPP, if only out of the strategic recognition that TPP could be an important component of a rules-based regional security and economic architecture to which China would have to adapt. (Economic reform, which TPP could help spur, has never been in the forefront of Abe’s thinking.) But it’s unclear if and when Abe will be willing to spend the political capital required to move the issue forward.

Obama will be anxious to hear from Abe his intentions concerning TPP, but it remains unclear how the two sides will be able to meet each other’s stated political needs.

Concerning Okinawa, particularly plans to construct in the Henoko area a facility to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, expectations in Washington are very low.

The White House, State Department, and Pentagon were all quite upset that the Abe administration did not provide them with advance notice that Abe would not, prior to his Washington visit, send a request to Okinawa Governor Nakaima for permission to begin landfill work for the Henoko project.

Administration officials were not upset about Abe’s decision itself; that was expected. But the timing of his announcement, with no advance warning to Washington, upset US officials.

As for the Henoko project itself, the Obama administration increasingly recognizes the political reality that in all likelihood it will not be built, and has already begun serious consideration of possible alternatives. Indeed, this was discussed directly with the prime minister’s office and the foreign and defense ministries, prior to Prime Minister Noda leaving office. But the feeling in Washington and Tokyo is that Henoko cannot be publicly abandoned until an alternative is prepared, because Okinawans might conclude that the US will be staying at Futenma forever, and this perception would cause terrible problems. For now, both sides will continue to publicly support Henoko, even though both sides agree an alternative must be found.

 

 

 

Deming: US, Japan need ‘new imagination and energy’ on Okinawa basing issues

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fifth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Friday meeting with President Obama. Rust Deming, a veteran Japan specialist, is an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

DEMING: I don’t expect many specific results. This is really a summit to set the agenda for the two governments. First is for the two leaders to get to know each other. The prime minister has made clear that the US-Japan alliance is at the top of his list of priorities, at the center of Japanese foreign policy. The two leaders will try to put together a list of issues that need to be worked on over the next year or so.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

DEMING: Abe is not in a political position to bring very much to Washington. Nor does the Obama administration expect him to bring much. Abe wants to establish a personal relationship with the president, and wants to send a message that the US-Japan alliance is headed in a good direction now that he is back in office. He wants to demonstrate that he and the LDP have returned, and that whatever shakiness occurred over the last three years is a thing of the past.

In fact, while the first year of the DPJ in power, under Hatoyama, proved to be a difficult time for the alliance, Kan and Noda did try to bring the alliance back to the center of Japan’s foreign policy, and we made a lot of progress. If you look at the “2+2” statements from 2011 and 2012, you’ll see that the DPJ really accepted the fundamental strategic objectives of the alliance, and Japan’s roles and missions, which the LDP had agreed on earlier. There really was no gap between the two countries, which was a very good accomplishment, and very beneficial to the long-term stability of the alliance. The DPJ period was not without its benefits for the alliance.

But the LDP is back, and Abe wants to signal that he is personally putting the alliance back in the center of Japanese foreign policy.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

DEMING: The White House would like to emphasize that Japan is critical to America’s broad policy in Asia, and at the center of the “rebalancing” of US global strategy toward Asia. The administration would like to see Japan become a more active player in regional and global affairs on a wide range of issues, particularly on TPP, and more open markets.

There is also recognition that, prior to the Upper House election, Prime Minister Abe is not in a position to do very much, or even say very much, on TPP and other issues. But I expect the president to emphasize the importance the US attaches to moving forward on TPP and other issues that are important for the alliance.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

DEMING: We have been trying to get away from that in recent years, particularly in early meetings such as the upcoming visit. Abe has been in office only two months. The real opportunity provided by this summit is to set an agenda for the alliance.  Down the road, when the two leaders meet again later in the year at the G8 summit or the East Asian summit, for example, there perhaps will be more concrete results. But this is not the time to expect very much.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

DEMING: It’s clear that some people are a little uneasy with the narrative that Abe seems to share with many conservative Japanese about responsibility for and the nature of developments in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of us in Washington believe that history is a complicating factor for relations among countries in the region, and therefore not very useful to bring up. It complicates Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly the ROK and China.

But in his last tenure as prime minister, in 2006, Mr. Abe reached out to China and Korea. He did not visit Yasukuni Shrine. He is a sophisticated statesman. A lot of people hope that, whatever his personal views and impulses, Abe will operate in a way that does not complicate Japan’s relations with China and Korea, or even with the US. Remember, there are some issues related to history, such as “comfort women,” that resonate in Washington. Most people with whom I speak are fairly hopeful that Abe will behave in a way similar to his first tenure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you expect the collective self-defense issue to come up explicitly?

DEMING: That is really an issue for the Japanese to decide. Many people in Washington would like to see Japan move forward on this issue in due course. The timing of what Japan does, and how it does it, does have importance for relations in the region. But this has been a long-term issue for Japan in which the US does have great interest. You’ll recall the Yanai Commission established by Abe himself in his first term, which studied the issue. The Yanai report relates to Japan’s ability to play a more active role in the alliance and in peacekeeping operations. Many of the ideas in the report represent a natural evolution in Japan’s defense posture, and not something that signals a major departure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?DEMING: I hope so. This really is not primarily a US-Japan bilateral issue. Japan needs to take these steps to restructure its own economy, for its own good. Abe is clearly focused on the economy. He has taken some short-term steps to stimulate the economy. But long-term, there has to be a fundamental opening up of the economy. TPP is a useful device to help make that happen. I hope that, after the Upper House election, Japan will move in this direction, because it is in the interest of Japan’s long-term economic health, which is very important for the US-Japan relationship.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

DEMING: I have not been to Okinawa in about one year, but I don’t think the political dynamic there concerning Futenma and the planned replacement at Henoko has changed very much. The Henoko plan is still very problematic. We are going ahead with improvements at Futenma. The MV-22s (Osprey) have arrived there. Things seem to be operating smoothly. But I have always been extremely nervous about the possibility of an accident at Futenma, which would really, seriously complicate our overall alliance.

I hope that the new government in Tokyo might be stable and be able to make some long-term plans. And, with the Obama administration beginning its second term, there will be new people coming into office. The two sides might be in a better position to put the Futenma issue back at the top of the agenda and actually do something about the issue. I would hate to see the issue just lie fallow for another 17-18 years; we started discussing this in 1995.

I don’t have any magic solution. But I believe we need new imagination and new energy on the issue.

 

Smith: ‘Japan needs a strategic accommodation with South Korea’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fourth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Sheila Smith is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

SMITH: Given events in the region, I think this will be a crisis management summit to reaffirm the alliance. The transition in Japan makes this a good opportunity to discuss some outstanding bilateral issues, including TPP and Okinawa. But the real challenge for both sides will be to conduct the alliance reaffirmation in a way that has real meaning.

In Northeast Asia, we are facing a moment where our bilateral alliance cooperation really matters. We see Japan in a standoff with China over the Senkakus. There is no agreement on maritime boundaries. We’ve got a rising China with a trajectory of military growth.

All of the pieces are there for this to be a pretty serious heads-up for the alliance. The deterrence message is very important, and the Obama administration has done a good job in this area. But the risk-reduction message is also vital. Frameworks – bilateral, trilateral, regional – somehow have to be constructed with Beijing. I suspect there is a significant amount of interest blossoming at some level in China, because this standoff, or worse, is clearly not helpful to China’s longer-term interests.

Meanwhile, this is the beginning of the second Obama administration, and the White House is committed to a rebalancing of American force structure and overall strategic focus toward Asia. This is a moment for the Obama administration to begin defining and refining the rebalancing strategy.

Finally, the economic component of the US-Japan relationship needs enhancement. TPP is one piece of that, but there is much to be gained from a pretty frank discussion by the two leaders about growth strategies, including the yen and longer term economic goals, and how the alliance might work to support those strategies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

SMITH: There has been a lot in the media about superficial things, such as the timing of the summit, or the Kyodo report that the Obama administration gave a firm “no” to collective self defense. Some reports seem almost determined to find problems. I don’t think that this is the tone or tenor of the upcoming meeting.

But there are challenging issues, including TPP and the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.

The Diet has made progress toward ratification of the Hague convention.

The real question is: what will the alliance accomplish? They will have to talk about the longer-term forward deployment of US forces. It wouldn’t be a bad idea to create some kind of strategic consultative process, not just one confined to the Senkaku problem, but one that envisions the shape and roles of the alliance over the next decade or two.

I suspect Abe will want to talk about TPP, even if he is not ready or able to say that Japan will join the talks. The president will want to hear Abe’s views on this. We all know it poses a domestic political hurdle, but the president would like to have a clear sense of how the prime minister plans to proceed.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

SMITH: The administration is anxious to know how much “traction” the alliance can get. There is a tendency to dub recent problems as a “DPJ problem.” I don’t agree with that. Japanese politics are going through a structural transition. There will be governments, like the current Abe cabinet, that say “we have to wait until after the next election” before we can tackle this or that issue. This is not just a problem for one party. It is a structural problem that is as troubling for the conservatives as it was for the liberals, and it poses a big problem for the Japanese government.

The Obama administration wants to embrace the alliance. But there is much more realism in Washington now about how much can be accomplished, and how quickly. The realism first set in while the DPJ was in office, but it has not gone away with the LDP having come back.

There are signals, including the rising stock market and high ratings for the cabinet, that are positive, and people in Washington are aware of this, but the relatively low expectations remain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

SMITH: There are people in Washington from the Bush administration who have worked with Abe, but the Obama administration needs time to get to know him. It’s best to treat him not as a former prime minister who has come back, but rather as head of a new cabinet that just came to office. That will enable the White House to get a feel for Abe’s perspectives, on the ‘history’ issue, on collective self defense, and other issues.

There definitely are questions in Washington about exactly what Abe means by ‘collective self-defense.’ People would like to get beyond the campaign slogans of “constitutional revision” and “reinterpreting collective self-defense,” so as to get down to the actual details of what that would mean for force posture, for interoperability between US and Japanese forces, and for roles and missions.

The administration would like to know in more concrete ways what his policies are aiming at. For example, when Defense Minister Onodera said he planned to throw out the existing National Defense Program Guidelines, most of us in Washington collectively groaned: “Why? What’s wrong with the ‘dynamic deterrence’ policies outlined in the current NDPG?”

The feeling in the administration is a desire for less of the political coloring of these issues, and more of the concrete details.

Then there is the broader issue of ‘history,’ especially ‘comfort women.’ What does Mr. Abe plan to do? Does he want to issue a new statement, while not replacing the Murayama statement? There are still big questions about the prime minister’s intentions, particularly with regard to Japan’s relations with South Korea. These are not really questions of history of Japan’s wartime activities. The issue really is the viability of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the ROK.

People are watching closely Mr. Abe’s efforts to reach out to South Korea, not simply on a strategic level, but really the broader process of reconciliation and accommodation. This is where Abe’s personal views, and those of some of his cabinet members, will be very important.

We are all looking to see how Mr. Abe will treat the upcoming Takeshima Day, how Minister Shimomura will handle textbook revision, and other issues that could have an impact on Japan-ROK relations.

It is well-known that the prime minister and some of his cabinet members have very explicit personal views. But people are willing to wait and see how they proceed as a government, and make judgments once specific policies emerge.

Given the strategic environment in East Asia, particularly after the recent North Korean nuclear test, Japan and South Korea cannot afford to not move in the direction of a broad accommodation. It is very much in Japan’s strategic interests, equally important perhaps as it is to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

SMITH: The DPJ and the LDP face the same problem: what is going to happen with Japanese agriculture? How much is any Japanese prime minister willing to risk politically to mobilize for agriculture reform? How much is the prime minister willing to use TPP as a tool for promotion of economic competitiveness?

We need Japan to join because that would greatly strengthen TPP. But Japan needs to do so pretty quickly so as to fully participate. Right now, the talks are proceeding without any voice from Japan. It really boils down to whether Japan wants to be pro-active about open markets and competitiveness, or wants to stay in the old mode of incrementalism.

In reality, Abe will probably have to win a huge Upper House election victory to make this possible. And he would still have to convince an awful lot of his own LDP Diet delegation to go along. The consensus-building won’t start until after the Upper House election. No LDP member will want to go into that election campaigning on a pro-TPP platform.

Unfortunately, with the TPP talks supposed to wrap up by the end of this year, that would mean Japan would not be able to catch up and influence the final outcome.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

SMITH: This is certainly not the first government in Tokyo to lack enthusiasm about tackling Okinawa basing issues. Ryutaro Hashimoto was the most pro-active. Junichiro Koizumi was very pro-alliance, but he was not visibly pro-active about Okinawa the way Hashimoto was. Most politicians see only trouble, and no rewards, in becoming heavily involved in Okinawa base issues.

The politics are also more complicated on Okinawa since the days of Hashimoto as prime minister. People often say: wait and see what happens in the next election. In Okinawa, there is always a “next election,” often within six months – governor, prefectural assembly, Nago mayor. There is always something.

But the trend lines have shifted considerably against the Henoko project. Local LDP leaders in Okinawa are openly against the Futenma Replacement facility plan for Henoko. For example, Naha Mayor Onaga led the recent protests that went to Hibiya Park in Tokyo.

We used to think of this as a progressive-left vs. conservative-right issue, and if the conservatives would just come back all would be fine. But it is much more complicated than that.

There is a new reality in the balance among and within Japan’s political parties. You don’t have the same people representing Tokyo and Okinawa. Trust was never very deep between Tokyo and Okinawa, but now there is even less than in the past. Tokyo is going to have to work very hard to win back the conservatives recently elected to the Okinawa prefectural assembly. They openly campaigned against the Henoko project.

I have thought for quite some time that the Henoko project is the least realistic of our options. Now, that is even more the case, with both liberals and conservatives on Okinawa lined up against it.

Can Abe-san shift that? We’ll have to see. Japan hasn’t had a conservative prime minister in quite some time. In any case, it will take time.

Unlike other issues, such as abductees or revision of the Constitution, Okinawa basing is not an issue on which Mr. Abe has been outspoken. We don’t know what he really thinks. But given everything else he has to deal with before the Upper House election, I cannot imagine that this is high on his priority list.

 

Hornung: Obama to urge Abe to avoid ‘overtly antagonistic’ policies toward neighbors

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the third in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Jeffrey Hornung is an associate professor with the Hawaii-based Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

 HORNUNG: No, I don’t. They will have lots to talk about: China, Senkaku, revised defense guidelines, Futenma Replacement Facility, North Korea, and energy. Given Abe’s recent public statements on the TPP and the desire to make a decision on Japan’s participation, it is likely this will also be a focus of discussion. That said, I don’t expect any specific achievements beyond a frank conversation, a reiteration of the importance of the alliance, and a photo opportunity.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

HORNUNG: I think Abe’s goal for the summit is limited to having a face-to-face meeting with Obama and talk about the aforementioned issues. The summit is highly valuable to Abe because it provides him an opportunity to explain his thoughts on the issues, what he intends to do, and to demonstrate that he is both a good steward of the alliance and welcomed by the US. It doesn’t appear Abe will ask Obama for anything specific regarding any of the issues. 

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

 HORNUNG: Initially, I think the US agreed to the meeting because the Japanese side strongly requested it. Now that the meeting is taking place, I sense the US will use the meeting to talk about priorities for the alliance under Abe, express a strong desire for progress on Japan’s participation in the TPP and emphasize the need for Japan to have good relations with its neighbors and therefore tone down any statements or policies that may be seen as overtly antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think Abe will bring any gifts to Washington. He is not in a position to do so on issues that are relevant to the alliance. There is no consensus in Okinawa on the FRF, members of the LDP are not yet convinced about joining the TPP, and Abe just re-engaged his expert panel from his first administration to restart discussions on collective self-defense. There have been no decisions reached on any of these issues, so he is in no position to offer any new policies. If anything can be considered a “gift,” Abe may play up his decision to exempt F-35 fighter jet parts manufactured by Japanese firms from Japan’s prohibition on exporting arms. Or he may emphasize his willingness to submit legislation to enable Japan to join the Hague Convention.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

 HORNUNG: It is not a case of Washington being comfortable or not with Abe and any personal views he may hold. Instead, it is more about US strategic thinking, and officials in Washington trying to maintain calm relations throughout Asia at a time the President has expressed an interest in rebalancing to the region. If you look at Abe’s predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, he too was rather conservative when it came to security matters, very similar to Abe. And yet, under Noda, relations with the US returned to normalcy after a brief hiatus under Noda’s two predecessors.

 The difference between Noda and Abe is Noda didn’t try to overtly antagonize China or South Korea. Yes, Noda purchased three of the Senkaku Islands, but he did it only because he was trying to prevent a worse scenario. On the other hand, Abe’s speeches and comments during the LDP presidential election and general election were at times antagonistic to Japan’s neighbors, particularly China. From the US perspective, such comments are a distraction because it disrupts Japan’s relations with its neighbors, which influences US ability to effectively engage all countries in the region on more substantial issues. Likewise, although Abe said he will not revise the Kono Statement or the Murayama Statement, he will issue his own statement. If his statement flares up anti-Japanese sentiments in China or South Korea, or hurts relations with those countries with which Japan is slowly working to strengthen security relations (i.e. Southeast Asian countries, Australia, India), the energy devoted to calming the tensions is a distraction to US engagement on other issues.

 The US can work with conservative Japanese premiers, but I think the problem (if there is one) arises when those premiers pursue policies or statements that hurt Japan’s relations with its neighbors. The US wants Japan to have good relations with its neighbors, including China. I get the sense that Abe understands all this, and in order to show he is a good steward of the alliance, we can probably expect him to tone down his rhetoric on things like history.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 HORNUNG: It is difficult to say without asking Abe himself, but I can appreciate the difficult decision he faces. In Abe’s party there are members who strongly oppose Japan’s participation because they are concerned the LDP will lose votes from the agriculture sector if Abe announces his decision to join TPP talks. This matters because Upper House elections are scheduled for July, and he wants to secure a majority so as to provide him legislative power to pursue other items on his agenda. Joining the TPP talks would jeopardize this because it would upset those voters that have traditionally voted for the LDP. At the same time, he has pledged his determination to tackle Japan’s economic problems and a desire to build closer relations with the US. Joining TPP talks would assist both of these goals.  While I don’t expect any movement on this issue prior to the summit, it can be expected that they will discuss Abe’s position.

Still, there is a limited timeframe within which we can expect Abe to reach a final decision. This is because the US requires 90 days of Congressional deliberations for approval when it holds international trade negotiations. Because it is expected that TPP member countries will conclude their talks at the October APEC meeting, Abe will have to reach a decision sometime after the summit and prior to July’s elections. Given that Abe consistently reiterates his interest in joining the talks premised on the ability to gain exceptions to abolishing all tariffs, he appears interested in joining the talks, while looking for some sort of political leverage to gain his party’s acceptance. It is a political balancing act that I’m not sure he can win. It is unclear whether other TPP-interested countries are keen to allow exceptions and, if they did, whether Abe’s LDP would accept these exceptions as sufficient to justify them approving Japan’s participation.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 HORNUNG: I don’t think the plan is dead, nor is it a case of which person in Tokyo can move forward with the project. It is more a case of who in Okinawa can move the project forward. Or more correctly, who wants to move the project forward. Although Abe has announced he will not move forward with the project for now, he will focus on efforts to make a positive political environment in Okinawa, nurturing relations with local politicians in Nago and Naha in an effort to build some semblance of trust. In order for the project to proceed, not only the governor, but the Nago mayor and council have to approve. Currently, all oppose. Abe’s task is to nurture a better political environment to get some to say yes before their next election OR to help get candidates elected that support the plan. There are elections next year in Nago and Naha. Some in Tokyo believe that Gov. Nakaima may step down (due to health reasons) before the next election but, before doing so, announce his support of the plan in order to settle the contentious issue once and for all. Under this thinking, Abe’s task is to create for Nakaima an environment for a ‘hanamichi’ (path for a graceful exit) in the interlude.

  

 

Cossa: Abe and Obama to ‘get acquainted’ at meeting

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the second in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Ralph Cossa is president of Pacific Forum-CSIS, a leading think-tank focusing on Asia and the Pacific.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

COSSA: It sounds like this is turning into a “get acquainted” meeting rather than a summit with key deliverables. I’m sure the administration was hoping for more – Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF, Henoko), TPP – but it seems clear he is coming empty-handed.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

COSSA: Abe wants Obama’s blessing, and wants to enhance his image prior to Upper House elections, which seem to be the only thing really on Abe’s mind.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

COSSA: The Obama administration will likely try to impress upon Abe that deliverables are needed now on FRF and eventually on TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

COSSA: Washington is likely less comfortable or enthused about Abe than he apparently thinks Washington is or should be. I have not talked with him directly but others have told me that he believes Washington is (or at least should be) relieved with his victory, and that he has an “anything but DPJ” mentality that will not sell very well in DC. When Noda was in office, Washington was actually pretty comfortable with the DPJ. Abe’s election has raised both expectations and anxieties, given some of his election posturing, although most believe the “real Abe” is not as bad as his campaign rhetoric implies or as bad as his critics advertise.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

COSSA: Probably. If I were making US policy, I would not be pushing Japan to join now, since, with respect to market openness, it would lower the lowest denominator. If I were Japan, I would want to join now, when pressure to open up would probably be relatively low because the US is so anxious for Japan to join. So neither side’s current position makes sense to me.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

COSSA: Part of the raised expectations in Washington is on Abe delivering on FRF. Asking for more time does not cut it. If Abe can’t deliver and move the Henoko project forward after the Upper House election, it will cause some strains between the two governments. But last month, we published an essay by Kerry Gershaneck of Hawaii Pacific University on a possible alternative FRF facility, one that Kerry wrote would be “more strategically useful, politically viable, and environmentally friendly” than Henoko.

 

 

Nelson: Obama to urge ‘calm management’ of China ties in talk with Abe

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the first in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Chris Nelson is the founder and editor of The Nelson Report, one of the most influential voices in Washington on US policy toward East Asia.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

NELSON: Probably not much specific beyond important reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance, and a clear restatement of concerns about North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear explosives.

Obama will likely want to be careful in his wording on the Senkakus, insisting on no use of force to change the status quo of Japanese administrative control, while not taking sides in the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to sovereignty. A lot will depend on the ongoing debate over Japan’s intelligence evaluation that China recently aimed a “lock-on” radar system at a Japanese naval vessel. That kind of radar system is used to guide weapons in an attack. Did that really happen, and has China backed away from that provocation since then?  Pyongyang’s testing of another nuclear device has heightened regional tensions and added a degree of urgency to the meeting..

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

 NELSON: Abe would like a public demonstration from the US of solidarity and support on regional security, and he would like to avoid any public statements on politically ‘difficult’ issues that could complicate Upper House politics for the LDP.

Privately, Abe, like the rest of non-Chinese Asia, is very worried about the budget crisis (‘sequestration’) in Washington, and whether Congress and the White House will be able to keep the security commitments  that Asia, especially Japan, is relying on for regional stability.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal? 

NELSON: The White House wants to present a dual public message: solidarity with Japan, along with calm management of regional security problems.

Privately, the White House wants to reinforce concerns already expressed about alliance management, especially Japan’s relations with South Korea, which is an important US ally and very important to regional security. The White House also wants to reinforce maintaining a calm approach to China and the Senkakus problem. Finally, the White House would like some clarification on Abe’s intent concerning TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

NELSON: Beef may be the only topic on which Abe will be able to publicly bring some good news for the US. With an Upper House election to take place by next summer, Abe feels limited in what he can do. This assumes that without the political complications associated with the election, Abe would actually be in favor of TPP or the building of a new US Marine facility on Okinawa, but we really don’t know that, which is why the White House wants clarification on Abe’s actual views.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

NELSON: Many in the US foreign policy elite, including in the Obama administration, have made clear that they are uncomfortable with the ‘revisionist history’ views held by some Japanese leaders. These views complicate alliance management, especially with South Korea, and make managing relations with China much more difficult. I doubt that this will be expressed in public. It will be interesting to see if any senior US officials who give background briefings about the summit bring up these sensitive topics.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

 NELSON: ‘Eventually’ is a long time! There is no question that major business, finance, and foreign policy officials see the importance, both strategically and policy-wise. A lengthy delay by Japan runs the risk that too many chapters in a prospective TPP agreement will be set, and therefore non-negotiable, without a chance for Japan to influence the details.

Abe’s agricultural minister is seen in Washington as surprisingly progressive overall, so perhaps later this year Abe will be willing to engage in a major domestic political dispute in favor of TPP. My guess is that if the TPP talks make real progress, Tokyo will feel the external pressure to join.

Concerning US-Japan bilateral trade, negotiations concerning beef have basically ended in a positive way. Negotiators have made a lot of progress on insurance, and some other difficult topics.

Much like the case of the Korea-US free trade agreement, the auto sector could prove to be most difficult for the US and Japan to resolve.

When Abe and Obama meet, I would like to see them stress areas of agreement, such as intellectual property rights and services, and not just harp on the areas of disagreement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

 NELSON: I think the Henoko project is dead. The planned facility at Henoko will never be built.