Dispatch Japan

The White House, the Marines, and Okinawa

It looks as if President Obama, during his upcoming stop in Australia, will finally announce in Darwin a long-discussed Western Australia “training option” for the US Marine Corps, which would involve regular rotation of Marine infantry units to the area, which is both well-located and held high in Australian military lore.

 The Administration will present this as part of a broader plan for a more active US strategic presence in the whole of the Pacific.

 But there still are no signs of a US policy shift regarding the USMC deployment in Okinawa. In particular, there remain no signs that the US has altered plans to try to build a much-disputed new runway in Henoko Bay, to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been slated for closure for over decade.

 To the contrary, in a bilateral meeting with Japan’s Prime Yoshikio Noda at the APEC Summit in Hawaii on Saturday, Obama reiterated US expectations for faster results on the Henoko project.

 Obama Administration officials remain locked into their now-familiar obdurate stances on Okinawa issues, despite the overwhelming consensus among specialists who follow the area that intense local opposition will never allow the project to proceed. They even show surprisingly little concern for the inevitable domestic problems the Futema/Henoko issues will cause for the beleaguered Noda, who is already trying to manage a nuclear power crisis, a devastated earthquake/tsunami zone, and burgeoning other domestic troubles. Noda even managed to drag his divided Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) into regional TPP trade talks that Obama wanted to prominently promote at the APEC meeting for his domestic audience as a “jobs producing” initiative.

 Ironically, Noda may be the most promising young leader to come along in Japan in quite some time, so it would hardly seem wise for Washington to complicate his political life. But that’s what happening.

 

     DARWIN DETAILS: Details of Obama’s planned presentation in Darwin are few and far between; the White House is playing this card particularly close to the chest, all part of the “Asia Initiative” centered on this past weekend’s APEC meetings, the President’s subsequent stop in Australia, and then the East Asia summit in Indonesia.

 The White House for months has planned the regional visit this way, as Obama wants the US to be a “strategic leader” in the region, and to leverage that enhanced US regional presence to be a “job producer” at home.

 

     FORCE POSTURE: The restructuring of the US global force posture from Southwest Asia – Iraq and Afghanistan – toward the Pacific, has been a goal of the Obama White House for quite some time. There is little doubt that Obama believes this is a classic circumstance in which good policy is good politics.    

 

     OBAMA’S DILEMMA: Actually implementing such a huge shift is easier said than done. Okinawa is only one of many pieces to the puzzle, which makes it difficult to directly address.

 Inside the White House, the first order is winding down in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is happening, but with tough negotiations with Iraq, and debates with and within the US military brass about future force structure and strategy in both countries. Meanwhile, a hefty portion of the US national security establishment understandably remains focused on Iran, not to mention the Arab Spring.

 Then there are the looming cuts in the US budget, and the implications these will have on weapons systems, manpower levels, and basing – not to mention on inter-service rivalries.

 The Marines are themselves conducting a study of future roles and missions. Former Defense Secretary Gates acknowledged that the extraordinary requirements of the Iraq and Afghan wars turned the Marines into more of a traditional infantry unit than one with its usual expeditionary characteristics. The Marines are looking closely at where they will fit in the US global force posture of the next 20 years. The total size of the Marine Corps will surely be cut, which will logically lead to basing rearrangements.

 In this context, a key player in the process – someone extraordinarily close to President Obama -- acknowledged the other day in a lengthy exchange of views that the President himself has not yet given specific instructions as to how this emerging, energized East Asia policy could open the way to reworking the flawed aspects of the policy on Okinawa that are causing unnecessary tensions with Japan, the vital US ally in the region.

 So far as the over-worked, over-stretched, US national security apparatus is concerned, the US and Japan have a deal concerning Okinawa, and Japan should keep to it.

 This may be no way to run an alliance, but no one in the upper echelons of the Obama team wants to get stuck either in Washington or Japan -- in the political quicksand of Okinawa.

 At this point, the US Air Force and US Marines are – in public, anyway – so committed to the Henoko plan that only a direct order from Defense Secretary Panetta -- perhaps even the President himself would have to give the order – could break an extraordinary logjam that is causing such big troubles for the US-Japan alliance.

 A big part of the problem is inter-service rivalry between the Air Force and the Marines. The Air Force maintains at Kadena, on Okinawa, one of the largest air force bases in the world. The notion that there is not space on Kadena for the rather limited number of helicopters routinely operating from Futenma does not fly.

 Marine leaders, for their part, say they would relocate to Kadena. A skeptical top Marine General said privately recently that if the new Henoko project were ever built, “it would be the eighth wonder of the world.” Many Marines simply think it is not going to happen.

 That’s not to say the US Marine Corps has not negotiated hard for the Henoko project. The envisioned v-shaped runway would mostly be used by the flawed Osprey vertical lift-off and take-off vehicle that can transform into a fixed-wing vehicle for longer-faster flights. The vehicle has the ability to emergency land with a modified fixed-wing position in the event the vertical equipment fails. That’s the reason for the Henoko Project runway -- the root of the entire controversy.

 Many analysts agree that integration of the Futenma helicopter operations into Kadena could cause some political tension with Okinawans. But compared to efforts to build an unnecessary new runway at Henoko, the tensions would probably be small. And, as Senator Jim Webb has emphasized, there are ways to disperse some of the current heavy aircraft now present at Kadena.

 

     AUSTRALIA OPENS THE DOOR: On an optimistic note, opening the door to US Marine Corps overseas training with Pacific allies on a rotational basis could provide an opportunity to begin reconsidering the out-of-date Futenma-Henoko issue. In an excellent RECENT PAPER, Washington analysts Mike Mochizuki and Mike O’Hanlon argued, among other things, that more US Marines could deploy from the US on a routine, rotational basis, rather than so many being based on Okinawa as they are today. This would include training in Japan and elsewhere in a region in which the US is looking to expand ties and open new friendships in any case.

 Along these lines, Mochizuki wrote in an email, the existing Futenma facility could be closed, the US could preposition equipment and supplies overseas, and US Marine Corps helicopters and other aircraft could utilize existing US and Japan Self Defense facilities. There certainly would be no need for a new runway at Henoko.

 It’s only a matter of time – probably the middle of 2012 -- before the existing 2006 Roadmap to realign the US Marine Corp presence on Okinawa publicly falls apart politically. There is virtually no serious movement on Okinawa itself for implementation. An effort by Tokyo to use police or other means of coercion to forcibly begin construction would do incalculable damage to the US-Japan alliance. And on Guam itself, construction delays and cost overruns have already led senor members of the Senate to demand a new approach.

 Who know’s? The President’s Darwin speech may be an beginning.

Noda, Obama, and TPP: ‘We can work it out’…. Maybe

As next November’s APEC summit gets closer, it is increasingly clear that Washington and Tokyo are not quite on the same page with respect to trade policy. It is also unclear how the two governments will manage this rather uncomfortable diplomatic dilemma.

At issue: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade initiative, which President Obama would like to make a centerpiece of the APEC meeting, to be held in his home state of Hawaii. But Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, while supportive of TPP, has not yet been able to forge a consensus in Japan’s leadership circles in full-favor of the changes in the country’s agricultural policies that TPP involvement would entail.

The result is a mixed message from Tokyo, reflective of ongoing domestic policy debates:

First: Tokyo will give a tentative ‘yes’ to participate in the TPP negotiations, but with no prior commitments; as one Japanese official put it: “We want to find out more about TPP.”

Second: Japan will simultaneously proceed with separate free trade talks with China, South Korea, and the European Union, completely outside the TPP framework.

US officials are not happy, though some express sympathy with Noda’s domestic realities, while others – particularly those closer to Obama’s inner circle – are upset that Japan is proving ‘difficult’ at a time when a politically-beleaguered Obama very much wants to showcase his skills at job-producing economic diplomacy in Asia.

CONFLICTING AGENDAS: Obama and Noda have conflicting agendas, though the differences are nothing close to strategic in nature, and might not be irreconcilable. The problem is political and diplomatic: Obama is entering full-fledged reelection mode, and Noda faces huge domestic policy challenges. Diplomats on both sides will be working overtime between now and the APEC summit to make sure the signals sent from each side are consistent; allied.

After APEC comes an expected Washington visit by Noda, probably in January, fulfilling a long-overdue commitment from the two countries for their respective leaders to get together.

For the Obama administration, the APEC summit was supposed to be the unfolding of a big US strategic policy shift, away from over-commitment to Southwest Asia (Iraq, Afghanistan), in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and towards East Asia. For Obama personally, the APEC meeting was to have carried great personal significance: He is the first US president with such deep roots in East Asia; he wants to end one difficult chapter in US foreign policy, and finally bring the US into the much-hailed “Pacific Century,” which means heavily distributing US economic and military ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power toward the region facing the historic rise of China.

Today, with his political troubles at home well-known, Obama needs to show that his cherished vision for a new US role in Asia will deliver jobs at home.

Noda, meanwhile, faces his own set of difficult domestic problems: He’s young, in charge of a ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that has yet to prove it can effectively govern; the country’s national finances are in trouble, just when the nation needs to raise funds to rebuild the Tohoku region ravaged by last March’s horrendous tsunami; and the country faces a huge energy crisis, with public confidence in nuclear-generated power understandably shaken by the tsunami-induced crisis at the Fukushima electric facility.

Noda is compelled to focus on domestic issues. But he is proving to be a lot more shrewd than many analysts initially expected.

On TPP: Noda supports opening up Japan’s agricultural markets. Along with many reformists in Japan, including his predecessor, Naoto Kan, Noda believes agricultural reform is inevitable, and will bring many economic benefits. But he is hamstrung by domestic reality: It will take time to bring his own party, much less the whole of Japan’s ruling elite, into agreement.

But the commitment is not in doubt: Noda has maintained 200-plus person TPP team inside the prime minister’s office (Kantei), led by a veteran Foreign Ministry official but backed by key politicians, assigned the task of achieving a consensus. The key is to link opening up the agricultural market with a big program to modernize areas that might be significantly hurt by increased agricultural imports. This is a work in progress.

Beyond TPP as an economic policy, Noda maintains Kan’s view in three key respects:

First: TPP is a strategic policy; Japan and the US together should be setting the trade economic, and overall political-security agenda in Asia, to which China would then have to respond.

Second: Japan cannot go ahead with the existing plans for construction of a new US Marine facility in Okinawa. But to say so would risk terrible tension in US-Japan relations, which neither Noda nor Japan needs at this time.

Third: As a result, support for TPP has the potential benefit of winning US willingness to reduce pressure on Okinawa issues.

IMPLEMENTATION: With all of these moving, legitimate considerations on each side, diplomats will have to burn the midnight oil to avoid tensions from boiling over.

US officials, as they often say, are not clear who is running the show in Tokyo. For example: In the last week alone, the new minister for national strategy, Motohisa Furukawa, was in DC, meeting with top US officials (including Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke). Furukawa endorses both TPP and the plan to build the new US base on Okinawa.

By contrast, Japanese trade officials last week told their US counterparts in Washington about plans to move ahead with FTA talks with China, the ROK, and the EU. For Japan’s agriculture lobby, beef, sugar, wheat, and rice remain key, and the planned FTA talks would supposedly pose less of a domestic threat than would TPP.

Other key Japanese officials were also in DC last week, including a top national security advisor to Noda, who conveyed the “yes, but” position on TPP that seems to be Noda’s actual perspective at this point.

The US and Japan are by no means strategically out of alignment. But conflicting domestic agendas on the part of the respective national leaders may make for some tense moments over the next few weeks and months. And if serious disagreements do emerge before the expected Washington summit, they are likely to revolve more around Okinawa and the US Marine presence, than about trade issues.

Futenma: Push-back from Tokyo?

It may be too soon to raise any diplomatic red flags, but there are troubling signs of potentially serious tension emerging between Washington and Tokyo over stalled plans to construct a new US Marine facility in Okinawa.

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda held a briefing for reporters earlier today (Friday), and denied reports that President Barack Obama had pressed for “results” on the new facility, set to be built in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa as a replacement for the existing US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been targeted for closure for well over a decade. Obama and Noda met on Wednesday, while both were in New York for the UN General Assembly.

During the briefing, Noda was asked directly whether Obama had spoken of expected “results.” He responded first with a gesture, tilting his head to indicate disagreement with the question, and then said: “We explained our position. We made clear our plan to move forward on the agreement reached by the two governments, and I explained that we will reduce the burden on Okinawa, and that we have to work hard to not fix the status quo of Futenma’s continuing operation, and that we will talk to Okinawa with a sincere heart. Then we received an answer: ‘We are looking forward to progress.’”

Noda was pressed by another reporter, who quoted a US official – Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell – as having said Obama “made very clear” that “we need to see results.” Again, Noda denied this, saying: “I think the answer was: ‘We are looking forward to progress.’”

Here’s the problem: The reporter quoted Campbell accurately. In a press briefing held Wednesday following the Noda-Obama meeting, Campbell had this to say about the exchanges concerning Futenma: “We all acknowledged the challenges associated with Futenma replacement. But I think both sides understand that we’re approaching a period where we need to see results, and that was made very clear by the President.”

At the press briefing, Campbell was joined by Danny Russel, the top White House aide for Asia, who added: “On the issue of Futenma, Prime Minister Noda brought the President up to date on the Noda government position and strategy for moving forward on Futenma’s replacement facility, and both leaders shared the view that this is a priority and that there’s a great deal of important work that needs to be done. So the emphasis is on common ground and on a common effort to achieve our common goals.”

Complicating the situation is that a top Japanese official who briefed reporters after the Noda-Obama meeting indicated that Obama said that “results” are needed and that he hopes to see “progress.”

This may seem a bit of tedious, if not petty, diplomatic nuance. But it was less  than two years ago that a  disagreement over the content of an exchange between President Obama and then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama over the very same Futenma issue sparked one of the more tense incidents between the two countries in the postwar period. At the time, Hatoyama urged Obama to “trust me,” that Tokyo would try to find a resolution to the Futenma embroilment as soon as possible. But when Hatoyama later indicated that this was not necessarily a commitment to implement the existing bilateral accord to construct the replacement facility at Henoko, Hillary Clinton took the highly-unusual step of summoning Japan’s ambassador, Ichiro Fujisaki, for a dressing-down at the State Department – in the midst of a blizzard that had otherwise crippled Washington.

At the time, the incident severely frayed trust between the White House and the Kantei, and the subsequent chilly treatment accorded Hatoyama by Washington contributed to the demise of his cabinet a few months later.

     THE VIEW FROM TOKYO: What’s on Noda’s mind? Japanese officials interpreted Obama’s demeanor in the New York meeting as unusually business-like. One official who was inside the meeting reports that Obama began with a systematic listing of those bilateral issues that need a quick resolution. That was followed by the Campbell-Russel press conference, the tone of which also took Japanese officials by surprise. Correctly or not, they say they detected a hardening of Campbell’s stance, in sharp contrast to what they saw as deliberate State Department efforts to play down the Futenma issue since Hatoyama’s 2010 resignation.

Noda’s comments came on the heels of a statement by Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa that conveyed no small hint of irritation at the perceived hectoring tone of Campbell’s remarks. “When it comes to the Okinawa issue,” Ichikawa told reporters in Tokyo on Thursday, “both sides carry responsibility. It would be awkward if the two sides were to not show an attitude of working together in a harmonious manner.” Ichikawa is already on record saying that the Noda government, while committed to the Henoko plan, has no intention of imposing a deadline on talks with Okinawa aimed at winning acquiescence.

Noda and Ichikawa each have personal motivations that could help explain their respective comments following the talks with Obama. Every prime minister of Japan wants to demonstrate the ability to skillfully manage the critical US-Japan alliance, so the last perception Noda wants to take hold is that he is being pushed around by Washington. And Ichikawa, who is close to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) power broker Ichiro Ozawa, sympathizes with the view that Japan should be more forthright in expressing disagreements with Washington.

But beyond Noda and Ichikawa, a much broader array of Japanese foreign policy and political leaders are aware that the Pentagon and the White House are encountering serious obstacles to implanting the US side of the bilateral deal for Marine base realignment on Okinawa and Guam. Key members of the US Senate – Democrats Carl Levin and Jim Webb, and Republican John McCain -- have raised both budgetary and strategic concerns about the realignment plan, which could cost upwards of $20 billion. The Senate’s Appropriations Defense Subcommittee has already moved to strip the 2012 Defense budget of $155 million for construction programs on Guam designed to help pave the way for the transfer of some 8,000 Marines and family members from Okinawa.

Since Hatoyama’s resignation, the DPJ overall has been determined to allow no light between the US and Japanese sides on the Futenma issue, lest the party’s leader suffer a fate similar to that of the ex-prime minister.

Awareness of troubles on the American side has apparently allowed to seep out some of the repressed frustration in Tokyo with US demands to move ahead with the Futenma replacement project despite seemingly insurmountable opposition on Okinawa.

The Pentagon and White House have, until recently, pretended to ignore Congressional opposition to the Okinawa base realignment plan. The entire plan was initially scheduled for completion by 2014, but the two sides earlier this year acknowledged the obvious by stating the deadline would not be met. The US has placed blame for implementation delays squarely on Tokyo’s inability to overcome opposition on Okinawa, even though rising costs and construction delays on Guam have been equally responsible.

During his recent confirmation hearings to be the new deputy defense secretary, Ashton Carter received extensive briefings from Senator Levin, who chairs the powerful Armed Services Committee, and Senator Webb, who chairs the Asia subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. Webb in particular explained to Carter that overtures to alter the Okinawa base realignment plan will have to come from Washington, since Tokyo will be reluctant to risk antagonizing the US by indicating a weakening of support for the existing bilateral agreement.

     WASHINGTON MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY: It’s unclear how much of the briefing material received by Carter has made it up to President Obama. In any case, part of the apparent White House impatience stems from a desire for Japan to be fully in tune with a strategic vision for East Asia that President Obama hopes to highlight during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hawaii in November. Part of that involves the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks, which Campbell emphasized during his New York press briefing are intended more as a strategic rather than a mere trade policy. Noda has indicated personal support for TPP, but there is no consensus yet in Japan about whether to fully participate. And part of the vision involves the US and Japan standing shoulder-to-should on alliance and regional security issues, something that is made more difficult the longer the Futenma controversy persists.

Ironically, impending major reductions in US defense spending, including likely cutbacks in overseas basing as well as personnel reductions, will almost surely impact the US force structure and basing arrangements in East Asia, including Okinawa. That could provide a face-saving chance for the US to propose a rethinking of the current plan for base realignment on Okinawa.

Unless that happens, the tension in the alliance over Okinawa that seems to be reemerging will only grow.

 

Noda and Futenma

Some unofficial diplomacy in Washington over the next two weeks should provide clues as to how the Noda and Obama administrations will approach deadlocked plans to realign the US Marine presence on Okinawa.

The best bet: A new Marine air station envisioned for the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa will not be built, and the existing Futenma air station will remain open until enough time has elapsed for the two sides to take a fresh look at the whole issue.

The diplomacy kicks off today (September 7) with a seminar on the US-Japan alliance since 3-11, co-sponsored by the Stimson Center and the Sasegawa Peace Foundation. The keynote speakers will be Seiji Maehara, recently named by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda to be policy chief for the ruling Democratic Party (DPJ), and Senator Jim Webb, a former US Navy secretary and a decorated Marine officer who has rankled the Pentagon with his strong opposition to the Henoko plan.

Two weeks later, on September 19, Prof. Mike Mochizuki of George Washington University will host a conference on Okinawa that will feature a presentation by Hirokazu Nakaima, governor of Okinawa prefecture. Nakaima continues to voice strong opposition to the Henoko plan.

     DEADLOCK IN TOKYO: In Tokyo, Noda’s new administration shows no inclination to invest the enormous political and financial capital that would be required for even a hope of winning Okinawan acquiescence. The new prime minister has huge tasks on his agenda, including reconstruction of the devastated Tohoku region, resolving the Fukushima nuclear emergency, tackling the nation’s burgeoning debt problem, and taming the rising yen. Breaking the Futenma-Henoko log jam is not a priority.

But US-Japan relations are a priority, so top Japanese officials will continue to voice support for the Henoko plan, so as to forestall the issue once again provoking anger in Washington and causing instability in the bilateral alliance. All the while they will continue to “explain” to Washington the need for more time to bring along Okinawan public opinion.

It’s a scene that has played out repeatedly over the 18 months, ever since former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was treated as a virtual pariah by the Obama administration and other US officials for having urged that the two countries consider alternatives to the Henoko plan. Painfully aware of the treatment accorded Hatoyama, no DPJ leader (with the possible exception of a weakened Ichiro Ozawa) is willing to risk a direct confrontation with Washington over the Henoko-Futenma issue. By default, if nothing else, the DPJ policy has been to keep the issue on policy life-support at the working level, allowing no light between the official US and Japanese positions, while actually taking no real steps toward implementation.

The Noda cabinet has no one steeped in Okinawa issues, and no one with the heavyweight political gravitas to forge a new understanding between Okinawa and Tokyo.

     MISREADING THE DPJ: Maehara, the DPJ’s policy chief and a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance, is often misunderstood in Washington as someone the US could count on to push hard for the Henoko plan. Little known is that Maehara took the opposite position while Hatoyama was in power. At the time, Maehara, in addition to being transportation minister, was also state minister for Okinawa issues. While then-Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and then-Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada fairly quickly abandoned Hatoyama’s (and the DPJ’s) goal of an alternative to the Henoko plan, Maehara continued to work tirelessly long thereafter in favor of the original DPJ stance. Indeed, Kitazawa and Okada took to freezing Maehara out of their discussions on the Henoko-Futenma issue in the winter and spring of 2010.

Meanwhile, Noda has named Akihisa Nagashima to be his special advisor on foreign and security matters, which will almost surely involve him in Okinawa issues. Nagashima, also a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance and advocate of a bigger regional and global security role for Japan, was initially sympathetic to the DPJ idea that the US and Japan, as allies, could together find an acceptable alternative to the Henoko plan. But during an October 2009 visit to Washington, in his capacity as a senior vice minister of defense, Nagashima was on the receiving end of a stern, sobering lecture by then-US national security advisor General Jim Jones about the vital importance of the planned Henoko facility. Nagashima later relayed the substance of the exchange to some reporters in Washington.

Ironically, Jones has since shifted his stance, and argues that the US operations now run from Futenma could largely be integrated into the huge US Air Force base at Kadena, also on Okinawa. Jones’s revised view parallels that of Senator Webb.

The new foreign minister, Koichiro Gemba, is a rising star within the DPJ, but he is relatively new to foreign affairs, and lacks the political power base in Tokyo both in the Diet and within the bureaucracy that would be required to negotiate a new arrangement with Okinawa.

The new defense minister, Yasuo Ichikawa, is already in hot water politically over his failed effort at self-deprecatory humility; a defense minister should probably not declare himself an amateur on matters of national security. It is unlikely that Ichikawa, should he survive calls for his resignation, will be taking the lead on Okinawa issues.

At the bureaucratic level, the central government is going through some of the motions required for implementation of the Henoko plan. A senior Defense Ministry official recently informed Governor Nakaima of plans to submit by the end of this year an environmental impact statement regarding the Henoko facility. The government would then apply to the governor’s office for permission to begin reclaiming land in Henoko Bay waters. The project requires the Governor’s prior approval.

All of this will enable Noda to give an upbeat report about his efforts when he meets President Obama in New York later this month.

In reality, Governor Nakaima shows no signs of altering his opposition to the Henoko plan, though he remains a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance. (It will be difficult for anyone to peg him as harboring anti-American sentiments.)

Nakaima will make his views widely known when he visits Washington later this month.

     OPPOSITION ON THE HILL: The situation in Washington concerning Henoko-Futenma, and the overall restructuring of the US Marine presence, is only slightly less-unsettled. Leon Panetta is still putting his team in place. Mark Lippert, a White House favorite, has survived a grueling vetting process and should soon be nominated to be the Pentagon’s new policy chief for East Asia. It remains unclear how Panetta and Lippert will approach the Okinawa issue.

The Marines, meanwhile, are in the midst of an internal study, ordered by then-Defense Secretary Bob Gates, about future roles and missions. The Marine Corps will shrink in size considerably in the coming years, as the US further winds down the taxing deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Marines resume their more traditional role as an expeditionary, amphibious force.

With China rising, East Asia’s strategic significance will only continue to grow. But a debt-weary Congress is under great pressure to reduce US defense spending. Finding the proper US strategic posture and force structure in East Asia will be a compelling task for Panetta’s new team.

For all of the pressure on Tokyo to proceed with the Henoko project, the US is woefully far behind on implementation of its side of the realignment of US forces in Japan. Construction delays, cost overruns, and fears of insufficient infrastructure have all raised doubts about the feasibility any time soon of relocating 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members from Okinawa to Guam, as called for in the 2006 “roadmap” agreed to by the two countries.

Three senior US senators – Jim Webb, along with Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Levin and the Committee’s ranking Republican John McCain – have joined forces in opposition to the planned Marine restructuring on Okinawa and Guam. Congress has slowed funding.

Given the troubles on the US side, it is little wonder that a top DPJ official said recently that the Noda government will likely wait for the Obama administration to take the next step.

Some influential American policy makers, including former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, argue that while the Henoko project is dead, it is up to Japan to come forward with an alternative basing arrangement that is both operationally feasible and politically sustainable.

That is unlikely to occur however, as Japanese political leaders do not want to suffer the consequences experienced by Hatoyama. From the Japanese perspective, the ball is really in the American court.

It will take some time before the political leadership in both Washington and Tokyo will see the way to set aside the 2006 roadmap, and jointly devise an alliance force structure and posture in East Asia that fits the region’s vital strategic importance.

 

Noda administration: ‘Mainstream’ holds sway in ‘unified’ DPJ

Prime Minister-designate Yoshihiko Noda hit the ground running, moving quickly to name the four top executives of the ruling Democratic Party (DPJ), while also working to put together a cabinet.

On the surface, the party appointments seem in line with Noda’s commitment to unify a DPJ deeply divided between pro-Ozawa forces, anti-Ozawa ‘mainstream’ forces, and centrists not allied with either of those camps.

A close look, however, shows that while Noda is cleverly involving in his administration some people associated with DPJ strongman Ichiro Ozawa, he otherwise is carefully proceeding on both the policy and political fronts in a direction that might not sit well with the Ozawa camp.

As secretary-general of the DPJ, for example, Noda has tapped Azuma Koshiishi, a long-time Ozawa associate who heads the DPJ caucus in the Upper House. But at 75, it is doubtful Koshiishi will have the energy and power to steer party financial resources or personnel appointments in Ozawa’s direction. The public ‘face’ of the DPJ is more likely to be new Acting DPJ President Shinji Tarutoko, who has deliberately distanced himself from Ozawa for over a year.

Also likely to eclipse Koshiishi will be Seiji Maehara, whom Noda has appointed chief of the DPJ’s Policy Research Committee (PRC). Maehara, who placed a disappointing third in Monday’s race for the DPJ presidency, is one of the pillars of opposition to Ozawa within the DPJ. Noda has promised that as PRC chief, Maehara will have considerable influence over legislation promoted by the government, and also a huge role in DPJ coordination efforts with opposition parties.

Noda says he is committed to a three-party agreement accepted by the DPJ several weeks ago -- over Ozawa’s protests -- to alter aspects of the party’s 2009 manifesto. Maehara supports that stance. And as chief of the DPJ’s Upper House caucus, where efforts to coordinate with the opposition LDP and Komeito will be particularly important, Koshiishi will have a hard time siding with Ozawa against Noda’s instructions to seek better communication with the opposition.

     FORMING A CABINET: Having filled the DPJ’s top executive positions, Noda is now working to form his cabinet. His most critical choice will be for chief cabinet secretary. Does he go ‘big,’ with a political and policy heavyweight like current Secretary General Katsuya Okada? Or does he go ‘small,’ with someone with less gravitas, such as former DPJ Secretary General Tatsuo Kawabata, DPJ Deputy Secretary General Osamu Fujimura, or Koriki Jojima, currently deputy of the DPJ’s PRC. Okada would bring experience to the job and could quickly help stabilize the new administration. But he might overshadow Noda, and raise questions in the public mind about who would actually be running the government. Noda wants and needs Okada, who was critical to Noda’s victory and could wind up instead as finance minister.

On the other hand, none of the ‘small’ candidates would overshadow Noda, and would each bring particular skills. Kawabata served as DPJ secretary general before the party came to power, and informally leads the DPJ Diet members who hail from the old Democratic Socialist Party. He has carefully placed himself within the DPJ between Ozawa and mainstream figures like Okada. Fujimura is a very close Noda associate and played a key role in lining up support for Noda’s election as DPJ president. Jojima played an important role in forging the 3-party agreement to review some DPJ policies, so he is in synch with Noda on that front.

Other key figures to watch:

Michihiko Kano, the current agriculture minister, who lost in the first round of the DPJ presidential race but then steered his supporters to vote for Noda. Kano has been in agreement with Ozawa in opposing a rapid opening of Japan’s agricultural markets through participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP) trade talks. But he was outraged at tactics Ozawa used in the election to try to gather votes for his candidate, Banri Kaieda. Noda will probably reward Kano with continued membership in the Cabinet.

Yukio Edano, currently chief cabinet secretary, won much praise for his calming demeanor during the Fukushima nuclear emergency. But he could wind up sitting on the sidelines for a while, preparing for a future run for prime minister. Edano is very close to the DPJ’s other heavyweight, Acting President Yoshito Sengoku, whose stature has suffered in recent days due to missteps taken in coordinating Seiji Maehara’s campaign to replace the outgoing Naoto Kan.

Akihisa Nagashima, former parliamentary vice minister of defense, is being widely-talked about to run either the foreign or defense ministry.

'Severe confrontation' rocks DPJ

(Editor's note: Due to loss of electrical power stemming from Hurricane Irene, this report must be quite short. We apologize for any inconvenience.)

Voting to replace Naoto Kan as president of the Democratic Party of Japan, and prime minister, will begin in about one hour, in what is shaping up to be the most serious conflict inside the DPJ in recent memory. The top vote getter will likely be Trade Minister Banri Kaieda, but he will fall short of the 50% majority required to claim victory. That will force a runoff between the second-place finisher: either former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara or Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

Stripped to its essentials, the battle pits legendary political heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa against 'mainstream' forces in the DPJ who oppose Ozawa's machine-style approach to electoral politics. It's a battle neither side can afford to lose.

Ozawa's backing will likely enable Kaieda to win the first round, but Kaieda's perceived willingness to do Ozawa's bidding could hurt him severely in the second round. In two debates over the weekend, Kaieda made no effort to disguise his decision to align with Ozawa.

On Sunday night, DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada and former Secretary General Yoshito Sengoku met and agreed that the Noda and Maehara forces should unite in the second round, regardless of which one winds up taking on Kaieda. Okada backs Noda, while Sengoku backs Maehara.

Normally that would likely be sufficient for the 'mainstream' candidate to win. But Ozawa, whose power inside the DPJ has considerably slipped, is pulling out all stops to push Kaieda over the top, and avoid a humiliating personal loss.

Both sides are fighting as if there is no tomorrow -- which there very well might not be for the DPJ in its current form, regardless of who emerges on top in today's voting.

 

 

 

 

PM election: too close to call

The three top contenders to replace the departing Naoto Kan as president of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and prime minister will face off in a nationally televised debate in Tokyo about 3 hours from now, from 2-4 pm local time. The debate could help provide some clarity to a race that is now too close to call, as many of the 398 Diet members who will cast votes on Monday have yet to make a decision, and will be paying close attention. A second debate is scheduled for Sunday.

The top contenders – Trade Minister Banri Kaieda, Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara – will be joined in the debate by Agriculture Minister Michihiko Kano and former Transport Minister Sumio Mabuchi, but the latter two stand little chance of winning.

With backing from legendary party boss Ichiro Ozawa and former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Kaieda seems likely to emerge Monday as the top vote-getter. But he is unlikely to win a 50% majority, triggering a runoff with the contender who finishes second.

Eyes are thus on Maehara and Noda, who will slug it out for the second spot. Once the second runoff spot is determined, will either Noda or Maehara back the other, against Kaieda? There is a great deal of mistrust between the two camps, with Noda harboring misgivings about Maehara’s main backer, DPJ power broker Yoshito Sengoku.

With so much maneuvering taking place among the various DPJ power centers in search of a winning coalition, the possibility remains that last minute deals could alter any expected outcome.

Maehara has two distinct advantages: he is a superior debater, and the latest poll from Asahi, published Saturday morning, showed him favored by 40% of voters, to only 10% for Kaieda. Even though there is not likely to be a Lower House election any time soon, making the “face” of the party less of a pressing a factor in the decision-making of each Diet member, the public’s preference cannot simply be ignored.

Maehara's weakness:  While popular with the public, Maehara is actually a controversial figure inside the DPJ, as he has staked out one of the strongest anti-Ozawa positions within the DPJ. A meeting with Ozawa earlier this week lasted only 10 minutes, and Maehara made pretty clear that he remains opposed to Ozawa regaining the influence he has lost inside the  DPJ.  It would be hard for Maehara to unify the party.

But Kaieda and Noda have weaknesses as well.

Kaieda will be seen as Ozawa's choice, and Ozawa remains one of Japan’s most unpopular political leaders, despite his entrenched (though diminished) position within the DPJ. Moreover, Kaieda  was severely criticized by his own group leader, Hatoyama, for his performance as trade and industry minister during the Fukushima nuclear emergency. Kaieda’s strength to be the national leader also came in for questioning earlier in the year when he broke down in tears during a Diet session involving Fukushima.

Noda’s weakness: He has pushed for a “grand coalition” involving the opposition LDP and Komeito, and he has advocated a quick rise in the national consumption tax. Both positions make many Diet members wary. But many members of the departing Kan’s sizeable DPJ group are leaning toward Noda.

The situation might be clearer after the first debate.

 

 

 

With Cabinet changes, Kan again signals intent to stay

For all the talk about Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s supposedly looming resignation, analysts and politicians alike keep forgetting two things: Kan remains determined to stay in office for at least several more months, and legally Kan’s opponents have no means to dislodge him.

Never was this more clear than on Monday, when Kan made small but highly-significant changes to his Cabinet lineup. Lame duck prime ministers don’t usually undertake Cabinet reshuffles, however slight.

Kan coupled the shakeup with disclosure, for the first time, of clear criteria he will use to time his departure: passage of a second supplemental budget, adoption of legislation authorizing the issuance of bonds to finance some 40 percent of the current budget, and adoption of legislation requiring electric power company usage of renewable energy sources.

Kan’s critics, especially leaders of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), argue that nothing can get done in the Diet until Kan leaves office. Kan, by contrast, argues that he will only leave office once the LDP and others cooperate to pass critical legislation relating to post-earthquake/tsunami reconstruction efforts. Kan in many ways has the upper hand, since failure to cooperate will expose the LDP to the wrath of a public that has had its fill of pointless political maneuverings.

     MIKI SIMILARITIES: In some ways Kan’s situation is similar to that faced by Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976, when LDP leaders launched a “Down with Miki” (Miki oroshi) campaign after Miki refused to prevent the arrest of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for his involvement in the Lockheed bribery scandal. At the time, Miki rebuffed efforts to oust him, arguing that the LDP could replace him as party president at any time, but not as prime minister until his term expired. Miki was not forced out until a Lower House election in late 1976 resulted in big losses for the LDP. At the time, the four-year term of Lower House members expired, requiring a new election for prime minister. It was only the expiration of his term, not political maneuvering, that dislodged Miki from office.

     KAN’S TERMS: Kan, of course, will not last until the end of his term, which expires in 2013. But a no-confidence motion against him failed earlier this month, after some deft political maneuvering by the prime minister himself. By tradition, only one no-confidence motion can be filed per Diet session, leaving his critics with little legal leverage.

Kan does not want to go down as a failed prime minister. He has personal and good-government motivations. The personal are straight-forward; no one wants to be known as an unsuccessful leader. The good-government factor is less-obvious, but real. Kan believes he is bringing important, substantial changes to Japan, both though his struggle to rearrange the power balance between the bureaucracy and the political world, and through promotion of a two-party system, which implies a viable Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

Kan is determined to not be unceremoniously dumped. His critics have assumed Kan would simply fold under pressure, much as his four predecessors did; all lasted less than one year in office. But that has consistently shown to be wrong. He wants to leave on terms he considers both personally and politically acceptable.

Working in Kan’s favor is the lack of a compelling reason for his ouster. The public is  not enamored of Kan. Polls go back and forth as to how long the public thinks Kan should stay in office. But the public is even more suspicious of the motives of those, especially within the LDP, who want to oust him. The public has also long desired stability in the prime minister’s office – a halt to the revolving door that has plagued the government’s top post for years.

By insisting he remain in office, Kan has actually strengthened the DPJ, quieting at least for now talk of a ‘grand coalition’ with the unpopular LDP. The DPJ, while still unsteady at times, is more stable than many analysts expected would be the case, and the eventual transition to Kan’s successor is likely to be orderly.

     EYE ON ENERGY: At a Monday night press conference following the Cabinet adjustments, Kan did not give a timeframe for expected passage of his three legislative priorities. Most attention is focused on the two budget-related bills. But Kan seems to harbor particular interest in the renewable energy issue.

As a former civic activist, Kan would like to see a weakening of what many see as a nest of unscrupulous political influence bound up in the electric power industry. The LDP has particularly strong ties with the industry, which Kan views as a weakness for the country and a political weapon for the DPJ. Kan has not said what he would do if the LDP were to block his proposed renewable energy legislation, but it is not inconceivable he  would threaten a dissolution of the Diet and a general election. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power catastrophe, accusations of corrupt ties between the LDP and the electric power industry could be a powerful campaign weapon for the DPJ.

Kan is not likely to take that step, as it would risk the DPJ’s substantial Lower House majority and control of central government’s ministries. But the fact that Kan could wield the threat shows the leverage he still has, despite his beleaguered status.

     COURSE OF EVENTS: Top DPJ leaders, who have been meeting without Kan, envision a new Cabinet taking office in late August or early September, arguing that the “torch” of leadership should pass to the next generation of party leaders late in the current 70-day extended Diet session. The executives also say that this new government should formulate the next reconstruction budget.

It remains to be seen if Kan will abide by this schedule. If the recent past is any guide, he won’t.

Meanwhile, Kan is showing up for work every day, utilizing the unusual circumstances in Japan today to stay in power. Kan knows that his critics do not want to be seen as undermining government efforts to address rebuilding in the country’s Tohoku region that was devastated on March 11.

In fact, the government’s headquarters for Tohoku reconstruction, which came into force by legislation passed last week, will begin meetings this week, led by Ryu Matsumoto, whom Kan named to a new ministerial post for reconstruction. Kan will also be aided by rising star Goshi Hosono, who was named to the newly-created state ministerial post for dealing with the Fukushima nuclear crisis.

As long as Kan is promoting reconstruction in the national interest, his critics will have to tread lightly. He may be embattled, but Kan could very well continue to defy expectations of an early departure.

 

 

 

US-Japan base roadmap: ‘dead plan walking’

The lengthy joint security statement set to be issued by the US and Japan today marks the demise of the 2006 bilateral “roadmap” for restructuring US forces in Japan, particularly the plan to construct a facility in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa to replace to US Marine Air Station Futenma.

No one will say this officially, of course. The two governments will continue to say that they have only postponed the 2014 deadline for completion of the new facility, and the related redeployment of 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

But the plan is dead.

Key members of Congress have moved to block it, insisting that more viable, cost-effective, and innovative ways be found to base and deploy US forces in the strategically critical Asia-Pacific region. In Japan, neither the money nor the political will is present to move forward with construction of a new facility that Okinawans – who generally are supportive of the US-Japan alliance – deeply resent. And on Guam, the building of infrastructure and related facilities needed to host a larger number of servicemen and military equipment is far behind schedule and plagued by cost overruns, which has further angered an increasingly debt-weary Congress.

For now, the most likely outcome of the roadmap’s death is a tacit acceptance of the status quo: 17,000 Marines from the division-size III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – the only MEF based abroad – will remain based on Okinawa, and the 1,200-acre Futenma base, which is dangerously located in the center of Ginowan City (pop. 91,000), will remain open.

Few Japanese political leaders are prepared at this point to raise the idea of alternative basing options, for fear of provoking the wrath of a Washington that has been surprisingly inflexible on the issue for over a decade. There is virtually no chance that the initiative to start talks on alternative arrangements will come from Tokyo.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is in the midst of a transition from the historic tenure of retiring Defense Secretary Robert Gates – truly a momentous era for the Defense Department – to the incoming team of Leon Panetta, who is moving over from the CIA.

Today’s “2+2” meeting of the defense and foreign ministers of Japan and the US takes place with Gates still in office, making it unrealistic to have expected any change in the official US stance on base realignment in Japan to be apparent in the joint statement. Even if Panetta ultimately chooses to initiate a policy change, it will take time for him to put in place his own team to bring that about, not to mention have the opportunity to give the issue the attention it deserves. Not surprisingly, Panetta is extraordinarily focused Afghanistan and Pakistan, as his trip to Pakistan just 10 days ago for talks with top Army and intelligence officials made clear.

But it is also reasonable to assume that Panetta, as part of his deliberations with Congress about overall defense spending, will want to engage the three influential senators – Carl Levin, Jim Webb, and John McCain – who have taken the lead in insisting on changes in US basing plans for the Asia-Pacific region, including the realignment roadmap for US forces in Japan.

As US forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and cutbacks in defense spending proceed, another US global force posture review is likely, in which context the US and Japan could engage in discussions about alliance roles, missions, and force structure, and update a 2006 realignment roadmap that has already been overtaken by events.

     ALLIANCE POSITIVES: Problems surrounding Okinawa and US basing notwithstanding, today’s bilateral Security Consultative Committee talks (as the ‘2+2’ is formally known) will highlight the enduring, enormous value of the US-Japan alliance – a genuine coming together based on friendship and shared interests that was on display for the world to see in the wake of the ‘triple disaster’ that hit Japan on March 11. The joint statement to be issued today speaks at length about common security challenges in North Korea, Afghanistan, Iran, and other areas, and shared interests in disaster relief, nuclear safety, energy security, climate change, and regional and global economic prosperity.

     UNSTABLE STATUS QUO: Still, the collapse of the 2006 roadmap for base realignment can’t simply be papered over by political leaders and government officials from Washington and Tokyo. Almost 16 years after the horrendous assault and rape of a young Okinawan girl by three US servicemen sparked intense protests and led to base realignment plans, the US and Japan have virtually nothing to show for a decade-and-a-half of intense negotiations. Clearly this is no way to run an alliance, especially one of such immense regional and global importance.

The stalemate reveals deep-seated, uncomfortable realities about the structure and management of the bilateral US-Japan alliance, including discrimination by main-island Japanese (and, implicitly the US) against Okinawa, which bears a hugely-disproportionate share of the burden of US military installations in Japan; a continuing (though much-lessened) tendency of Japanese leaders and citizens alike to bear less-than-full responsibility for security matters; and, a lingering, occasional tendency on the part of American military and civilian leaders to adopt the haughty tone of superiority typical of managers dealing with a client-state.

The original purpose of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), formed by the two countries in November 1995 in the wake of the schoolgirl rape, was to reduce the heavy “footprint” of US military installations on Okinawa. The centerpiece of the SACO agreement, reached in December 1996, was the promised return to Okinawa of the US Marine Air Station Futenma. Virtually everyone agrees Futenma is a disaster just waiting to happen, given its location in a heavily populated area. One helicopter crash in downtown Ginowan City could throw this vital security alliance into crisis.

     INTERIM OPTIONS: Futenma is home to Marine tanker aircraft, and Marine helicopters. Original plans called for moving the tanker aircraft to bases in Kyushu; those plans remain intact. The initial plans envisioned movement of the Marine helicopters to some other existing facility on Okinawa. The first option was the giant US Air Force Kadena base, north of Futenma. But intense rivalries between the US Air Force and the US Marines bureaucratically rendered that “unworkable,” with both services making the dubious argument that it would be dangerous having fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operating in close proximity. A second option was to construct a relatively small heliport inside the Camp Schwab Marine base.

Over time, however, the Kadena and Schwab options gave way to the vision of a brand new runway – either offshore, or with landfill – being built in the Henoko Bay area.

Once the runway vision emerged, the search for a replacement for Futenma was no longer about helicopters; it morphed into the new need for a dedicated Marine runway for fixed-wing aircraft.

And over time, US negotiators began to firmly link the closure of Futenma with the construction of the new runway.

The purpose of this runway? The Marines have never provided a consistent, credible explanation. Ministry of Defense officials in Tokyo who have worked  intensively on the  Futenma replacement issue say they have never been informed about the Marine intentions for the envisioned runway (actually, runways, as plans envision a V-shaped structure). There had been talk by Marine officials of possible use by jet fighters, but Japanese officials counseled against voicing any such intentions for fear of inciting opposition on Okinawa. Since then, US officials have spoken about Gulfstream-style executive jets. Some officials have also mentioned the need for runways in the event that  MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft need to conduct emergency landings in fixed-wing (instead of helicopter) mode. The Marines are scheduled to deploy 24 Osprey to Okinawa starting in October 2012, which has infuriated many on Okinawa, including moderate Governor Hirokazu Nakaima.

Once the need for a runway is either eliminated or put aside, the Futenma air station closure could proceed even if the overall base realignment plan is postponed. The Marine tankers at Futenma could move to  Kyushu, as planned, and the helicopters (even MV-22 Osprey) could be moved to either Kadena (as envisioned by Senators Levin and Webb), or to a heliport inside of Camp Schwab, which engineers say could be constructed quickly.

Closing Futenma, as both the US and Japanese governments have promised would be done, would go a long way toward easing tensions on Okinawa about the heavy presence of US bases. It would also deeply impress Okinawans if the US were to finally deliver on promises to reduce the noise associated with continuous flights in and out of the huge Kadena air base. Up to now, the US has agreed to modify some flight schedules, only to rotate in other aircraft, with the result of no net noise decrease.

On the other hand, tensions will linger as long as Futenma remains open, especially because the US unilaterally decided to link the Futenma closure to the broader realignment, which the SACO agreement of 15 years ago never envisioned. If Futenma remains open, the 24 Osprey set for deployment to Okinawa next year will likely wind up there.

Okinawans are also worried about political retaliation from Tokyo, in the form of reduced economic aid. An existing large development assistance program is scheduled to expire next year, and renewal talks have barely begun.

     FROM INTERIM TO LONG-TERM BASING: There would be relatively few political or technical obstacles to closing the Futenma air station as an interim measure, while postponing the final decisions about overall US basing in Japan and the region until a later date. To the contrary, closing Futenma, and integrating its current assets and operations into existing facilities, would create the kind of political goodwill that would facilitate broader US-Japan strategic dialogue.

Alas, both interim and long-term solutions to the Futenma problem will have to wait until Leon Panetta and his team are up and running inside the Pentagon. And even then it will likely take time for the issue to make it to Panetta’s desk.

Until then, the unstable status quo – Futenma’s continued operation – will likely remain, causing the US-Japan alliance to work with less-than-optimal efficiency and friendly willingness.

 

 

 

Kan again confounds opponents, analysts

Once again, Naoto Kan’s political opponents, and a broad spectrum of political analysts in Japan, have underestimated the Japanese prime minister’s determination to stay in power.

With a deft, last minute political maneuver – an announced willingness to step aside at some unspecified date – Kan managed to divide opponents within his own Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and easily beat back on Thursday a no-confidence motion submitted by a deeply-frustrated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

The big losers: The LDP, which submitted the motion despite the likelihood of defeat, and DPJ leader-turned-dissident Ichiro Ozawa, who once again finds himself in Japan’s political wilderness, but this time while under indictment for alleged misuse of political funds, and weighed down by an extraordinarily low level of popularity among voters.

Kan is by no means strong, of course, and even the medium-term outlook for his DPJ is very uncertain.

Speculation will grow as to who will replace Kan, what will become of the struggling LDP, who will follow Ozawa in the likely creation of a new political party, and whether some kind of coalition government will form to stabilize the government.

It will take time for some clarity to emerge.

But with this latest episode of political soap opera out of the way, Kan will likely be able in the short-term to shame his opponents into at least pretending to focus on the pressing national needs of post-earthquake reconstruction and longer-term economic reforms.

Working in his favor is the widespread revulsion among voters that narrow political maneuvering took precedence over actual governing in the midst of a serious national crisis. Kan is not a particularly sympathetic figure; his approval rating is below 30 percent. But close to 50 percent of voters in recent polls said he should be allowed to remain in office until reconstruction efforts have had time to set in.

Ozawa and the LDP just ignored those voter sentiments, and will likely suffer as a result.

Actually, even before the March 11 earthquake, Kan was using the public’s desire for political stability as his main political card to justify remaining in office. Opponents and analysts alike predicted a March or April “crisis” for Kan, but he seemed to revel in ignoring them.

Kan now seems likely to push for an extension of the current Diet session, now scheduled to end June 22, so as to pass a second supplementary budget for reconstruction. After that, a special Diet session seems likely for late August or early September, for adoption of legislation to allow issuance of bonds to finance a big portion of the national budget that started April 1.

It’s anyone’s guess how long Kan will stay in office. He did not specify any date to leave. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who withdrew his support for the no-confidence motion after Kan offered to step aside, indicated his view that Kan’s departure should come early this summer. But Kan has consistently shown an unusual determination to resist pressure he regards as unreasonable or overly-political, and it is by no means certain that with the no-confidence vote out of the way, Hatoyama or other remaining dissidents will have the power to oust Kan as early as they may now desire. That could cause further party turmoil, though the desire for another bruising political battle any time soon is very limited, which will work to Kan’s benefit.

Kan will want to be able to say that the reconstruction efforts are genuinely on solid footing. Sometime next Autumn would seem to make sense. In any case, Hatoyama’s early-departure musings notwithstanding, Kan has likely achieved his main goal: to not be unceremoniously forced from office, and to have his departure take place in a relatively orderly fashion via internal DPJ deliberations.

Kan may also have prevented a breakup of the DPJ. The party remains an unruly group, with competing centers of power. But the desire to remain in control of the government could be enough to keep the disparate elements together, at least for a while longer.

It remains very unclear what remains of the on-again, off-again political relationship between Hatoyama and Ozawa.

Kan will have considerably more room to try to govern, something he is actually interested in, despite the somewhat unfair accusations that he has mismanaged events since March 11. With Ozawa and his supporters likely to depart, remaining dissidents somewhat disarmed, and younger aspirants to party leadership mollified by the prospect of his near-term departure, Kan will try to reassert the reform program he dubs the “Third Opening” of Japan.

It also seems likely Kan will be in office for a long-delayed summit meeting with President Obama, now tentatively set for sometime in September, though postponement once again until Kan’s successor is in place is a possibility. The two governments may have more to say about that when their respective defense and foreign ministers meet in a “2+2” meeting later this month.