Dispatch Japan

Sneider:‘North Korean behavior driven by underlying weakness’

[Editor’s note: South Korean President Park Geun-hye will be in Washington this week for talks with President Obama and members of his Cabinet. She will also deliver a speech to a joint session of Congress, a sign of continuing strong US support for its long-time ally. Much of the discussion will focus on North Korea, and US and South Korean policy toward that troubled, and troubling, nation. To discuss the situation in North Korea, and the state of diplomacy in the region, we turned to Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. Sneider, who spent time in Seoul just prior to Park’s late-February inauguration, closely watches current US foreign and national security policy in Asia and the foreign policy of Japan and Korea.

Prior to going to Stanford, Sneider was a long-time foreign correspondent. From 1990 to 1994, he was the Moscow bureau chief of the Christian Science Monitor, covering the end of Soviet Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1985 to 1990, he was Tokyo correspondent for the Monitor, covering Japan and Korea. He was also the national/foreign editor, and later foreign affairs columnist, for the San Jose Mercury News.]

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:There seems to be a bit of a lull in the recent North Korean boisterous behavior. What has been motivating Pyongyang? Have these been the tactics of a new regime trying to consolidate power? Or are these the tactics of a more shrewd leadership, engaging in yet another round of provocations designed to extract concessions?

 SNEIDER: It is not an ‘either-or’ situation. My fundamental assessment is that the driver of North Korean behavior is the internal situation. That primarily means the crisis in the North Korean economic system. The country’s rigid command economy is unable to generate capital for growth, and is unable to meet the most basic needs of the population. There have been some small attempts at modest reforms, such as experimenting with some market incentives, and some opening up of the economy to the outside. The latter has principally meant with China.

In some ways, these fledgling attempts have worsened the internal crisis. The leadership is unwilling to go down the road of reform far enough to really begin to solve the country’s systemic problems. And yet the steps they are required to take to allow some flow of consumer goods, as well as food and fuel, function to open the society to the influence of the outside.

We don’t see any visible signs of opposition to the regime. But there is plenty of evidence of social and economic change, propelled by the need to open to the outside. Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans work in China, many of them going and back and forth across the border. There are also some 90,000 North Koreans working in Russia these days, earning money and sending it back. A lot of people go to China, buy goods, and bring them back – shuttle traders. I saw this phenomenon when I was in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

This movement of people across the border brings with it information about the outside world, and very specifically about South Korea. More and more North Koreans have access to South Korean TV dramas and movies. They arrive in North Korea onDVDs, and even material downloaded onto computer flash drives. There are cell phones that enable people to stay in touch with family members who live and work in China, as some cell phones can function across the border.

It means that there is some awareness of the reality of where North Korea stands relative to South Korea, but also relative to China. They know just how poor their situation really is, and what could be theirs.

That does not mean they are disloyal to the regime. It means they are potentially a force for change.

The regime has now set out a set of twin goals: to develop the economy and to enhance their status as a nuclear weapons state.In some ways these are contradictory goals, because the country’s resources are very limited, and there is competition for resources between the military and civilian side of the economy.

But they are trying to make this fit together. On the one hand, the regime needs to use its supposed success in becoming a powerful state as a propaganda tool to try to still command the support of the population. At the same time, the regime knows it needs to deliver some tangible economic gains.

That leads directly to the kind of external behavior that we’ve been seeing recently. It serves the purpose of keeping the population in some state of mobilization, of rallying around the flag of North Korean nationalism and patriotism. It enables the regime to regiment the population, and allows the regime to use escalation and pressure tactics to extract some kind of concessions from the outside, particularly in the form of economic aid, investment, or trade.

There is coherence to the recent North Korean behavior. The underlying driver is the weakness of the North Korean state itself. The behavior is that of a weak government. That does not mean it is not dangerous. In some ways it may be more dangerous. But the behavior is certainly not that of a confident regime.

By understanding the weakness, you can begin to see the pathway out of this problem. The way out lies in the process of change within North Korea, not in some diplomatic solution via a revival of the Six Party Talks or bilateral talks. I’m not saying those talks should not take place. But we should know that these talks are very unlikely to lead to a denuclearized North Korea. That is only going to come through the process of change in North Korea.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:The rhetoric seems to have declined in recent days. How can Pyongyang just wind this down, short of some kind of skirmish, without losing “face?”

SNEIDER: A lot of people have been worried about that. What is the way off the highway of constantly escalated bellicosity? The decision to close the Kaesong Industrial Park is deeply disturbing because it makes so little sense for North Korea and it appears to be a product of their inability, in part, to back down from their initial escalation for fear of losing face. Hopefully, they can find a way to back off.The US and South Korea have ended recent joint military exercises, so perhaps Pyongyang can say that North Korea forced the ‘imperialist war-mongers’ to back down.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Kerry and, more importantly, the new South Korean president Park Geun-hye, have put on the table a readiness to talk. The North Koreans may continue to reject the overtures, but the fact is they know the offer is there. President Park will undoubtedly make that clear when she visits Washington and I would expect President Obama to support the South Korean leader. President Park will also be visiting China shortly afterwards, an important part of her emphasis on engaging the Chinese, not only regarding North Korea, but more broadly. The Chinese, for their part, appear to be sending a clear message to Pyongyang to avoid provocation and potential miscalculation, and get back to the negotiating table. Whether the North Koreans are listening to Beijing is a different question.

When the North Koreans are ready, I suspect they will pick up one of the available offers, and they will portray that as either their victory or a sign of weakness on the other side. Perhaps I am overly optimistic, but I think it is much more likely to head down that path, than it is to go down the path of escalation leading to conflict.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:How much of this North Korean behavior is linked to recent political changes in South Korea?

 SNEIDER: I believe that is a big factor. The North Koreans were hoping that the progressives would come back to power in Seoul, for very self-serving reasons. During the ten years of progressive rule in South Korea, there was a substantial flow of aid from the South to the North. Over that 10-year period, the South Koreans provided the grain equivalent of over a million tons per year in direct aid – food, fertilizer, and so on. This made up for the chronic deficit in the North Korean system. That stopped five years ago, with the coming to power of Lee Myung-bak, and that was a serious crisis for the North. China filled the gap to some extent, but not all of it. The turn of events pushed the North Koreans further into the arms of the Chinese, which Pyongyang is not happy about.

Pyongyang was very much hoping the progressives would come back to power, and that there would be a return to the previous pattern of aid flowing from the South. That did not happen.

Park Geun-hye has certainly signaled, both before the December election and after, that she is ready to open a dialogue and engage in a bit more of a positive relationship with the North. She’s talked about resuming humanitarian aid, forgingtrustpolitikbetween the North and South.

However, fundamentally there is a lot of continuity with the Lee administration. She has a lot of tough-minded folks around her and within her cabinet, and in the military.  They are very determined to respond sternly to any North Korean provocation of the kind we saw in 2010.

It was predictable that the North Koreans would test Park, to take a measure of her resolve. This has quieted down a bit, but there is still concern that Pyongyang will do something more to further test Seoul, in the form of a military provocation. It certainly worries American officials that some kind of escalatory pattern could set in.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:To what extent is Kim Jong-un actually calling the shots in Pyongyang?

SNEIDER: The North Koreans are still engaged in a struggle for legitimacy on the Peninsula. That is especially the case now that Kim Jong-un has come to power – a young guy who is untested and who must have his own doubts about the security of his regime.

I don’t believe that Kim Jong-un is individually making the decisions in Pyongyang. They likely are being made by a collective leadership. I can speculate along with others about the role being played by his uncle, and you can see evidence that decision-making goes well-beyond the young Kim. But none of us is privy to the leadership deliberations in Pyongyang. Just based on the culture and the society, it is unlikely that an untested 29 year-old with very little experience would be calling the big shots on his own.

By contrast, his father sat in waiting for over 20 years, and served in many senior positions before assuming the top spot after Kim Il-sung’s death.

The narrative of the young Kim being eager to risk war is not, in my view, an accurate portrayal of the situation in Pyongyang. The leadership in North Korea is largely stable, led by a group of people who have been running the country for a long time, under the auspices of the Kim family. They are not flighty or impulsive. They sometimes take risks, and are often aggressive and provocative. But they are not suicidal.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:Has China really changed its attitude toward a greater willingness to apply substantial pressure on Pyongyang? Are there still limits to how much pressure China will apply, or would China risk bringing down the regime?

SNEIDER: Analysts are watching a number of indicators, including the commentary in the Chinese media, to gauge the thinking in Beijing. They are carefully reading statements from Chinese leaders, watching the cross-border traffic between China and North Korea. I find that some analysts are almost desperately looking for evidence that Beijing is fed up with Pyongyang and are getting ready to dump the leadership there.

I don’t find the evidence convincing. In my talks with Chinese officials I hear exasperation, and very blunt assessments of the nature of the problem in North Korea. But the bottom line remains that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula are the priority for China, and denuclearization is secondary. China does not want to take steps that will undermine the stability of the regime in Pyongyang. That has been Chinese policy all along. North Korea is certainly a huge inconvenience for China, and it can be exasperating and irritating for Chinese leaders to have a client state like North Korea on their border.

Keep in mind that there have been time when the US and South Korea have had their problems. That is not unusual in the relationship between dominant powers and their clients. Sometimes things go awry, and the tail wags the dog.

There is a lot of that now taking place between China and North Korea. China did not want the North Koreans to test a nuclear device for a third time. They do not want the North to test a medium range missile. They want the North Koreans to avoid any kind of provocation, if for no other reason than the fact that continued North Korean provocations will lead to an expanded US military presence in the region.

China does not want that, and so the leadership in Beijing has every reason to want to want to curb the North Koreans. But the Chinese will stop short of taking steps that they fear would ultimately undermine the North Korean regime itself.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:How do you assess the Obama administration’s handling of the situation?

SNEIDER: The administration has done a pretty good job. A good indication of the administration’s thinking came recently from President Obama himself, when he said the North Korean behavior has been like that of a child trying to get its way by banging a spoon on a high-chair table.

Secretary of State Kerry went to the region recently with a pretty clear, dual message. The US is prepared to defend our allies, and to respond in a forceful way to any kind of provocation or escalation, but the US is seeking to restrain any actions that could trigger a wider conflict.

Kerry, and later the President, was very unambiguous that the US is not going to give the North Koreans what they are looking for: recognition and acceptance of their status as a nuclear state. The administration has also left open the door to serious negotiations. As I think will be evident during the upcoming visit, the Obama administration is prepared to let the South Koreans take the lead in opening a dialogue with the North.

The administration also wants some kind of practical cooperation with China. Obama administration officials may overstate China’s willingness to help in restraining North Korea, but I think it makes sense to portray the glass as half-full rather than half-empty. We want to draw the Chinese in and to increase the sense of pressure on North Korea.

As for Japan, it has a limited role to play regarding North Korea. The Japanese don’t have any more significant economic interactions with North Korea, so Tokyo lacks pressure levers.

There was some concern in Tokyo that the US might prematurely enter negotiations with the North, which might not fit well with Prime Minister Abe’s tough line toward Pyongyang. But the reality is that this decision is going be shaped by events. The US wants to coordinate closely with Japan and South Korea, but it has been evident for quite some time that Japan is not shaping the policy.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:Are you advocating that whatever engagement the US and allies conduct with North Korea be designed to accentuate the contradictions in the system?

SNEIDER: I favor the approach known as “subversive engagement,” which is a term coined by the Andrei Lankov, a very astute Russian scholar on North Korea. This means engagement that would tend to undermine the regime’s control over its own population. That would include limited economic interaction – not large-scale aid – flows of information, and other type of contact that enables the North Korea people to have a better sense of what is happening in the outside world. Academic exchanges could be an important part of this kind of engagement.

The Kaesong park is a very good example of this kind of subversive engagement. South Korean firms had been operating small-scale factories that employed upwards of 53,000 North Koreans just about 10 miles north of the demilitarized zone that divides North from South. Those workers go home and tell family members and neighbors about their experiences working in what is essentially a South Korean factory. Pyongyang has benefited from the economic gains the joint project has provided, but they revealed at times their unease over the spill-over effects on North Korean society.

For example, at one point the North Koreans demanded that the South Korean factory managers stop handing out “Choco pies,” a popular South Korean snack food, to their workers. In time, the choco pies started to find their way onto North Korean black markets all over the country. By moving to close the park, the North Koreans may have decided the impact of this kind of engagement was just too great. And there is an element of wounded pride, of being willing to tell the South Koreans: ‘You think you have leverage over us, but we don’t need you. We can shoot ourselves in the foot if we want to.’

More so than the nuclear and missile tests, and the war talk, I find this the most dangerous sign that the leadership is not in the frame of mind that could lead to some kind of sustained lowering of tensions.

 

Failure to fill key Asia policy posts hinders Obama administration

Mark Lippert, the assistant secretary of defense for Asia and one of President Barack Obama’s closest friends, was close by Chuck Hagel today when the US defense secretary met in Washington with his Japanese counterpart, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera.

In a few days, Lippert will still be at Hagel’s side, but no longer as head of the Pentagon’s Asia shop. Hagel announced 10-days ago that he had asked Lippert to be his chief of staff, a move widely-seen in Washington as beneficial to the Administration because it should ensure smooth communication between the White House and the Pentagon. The move takes effect on May 1.

Lippert is not only close to Obama, but came to know Hagel well when Obama and Hagel formed a strong bond while serving together in the US Senate.

But what of the Administration’s much-ballyhooed “rebalancing” of US strategic posture toward Asia? Who is running that show?

Lippert’s move to the Pentagon’s front office leaves two of the Administration’s top three Asia policy positions empty. Earlier this year, the influential Kurt Campbell departed after four years as assistant secretary of State for East Asia, and he has yet to be replaced.

At the National Security Council, the senior director for Asia, Danny Russel, is on loan from the State Department, and is reportedly in the running to be Campbell’s replacement. That would seemingly solve one problem but create another: a vacancy at the NSC, which is arguably the most influential of the three Asia-related posts in an administration that tends to centralize decision-making in the White House.

Some analysts argue that these vacancies are not all that important because the core of the Administration’s Asia policy – the “rebalancing” – is set in stone, and run from the very top by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and President Obama himself. Both the Pentagon and State Department have highly-competent staffs in the respective Asia shops, fully capable of managing day-to-day affairs. And,  largely because of heightened tensions with North Korea, high-ranking Administration officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey, recently have spent considerable time in region.

Others warn that the effectiveness of policy in Asia is tied to the credibility with which senior American officials named to top Asia policy posts are viewed by governments in the region. From this standpoint, the Obama administration is falling woefully short by leaving key positions unfilled.

Take the recent alarming deterioration in relations between two key US allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea. Critics, of which there are many, argue that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has unnecessarily exacerbated the tensions by encouraging visits by Japanese law-makers to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and with his accompanying nationalist rhetoric.

The State Department was sufficiently disturbed that it recently summonsed a diplomat from Japan’s Embassy in Washington to informally register the Administration’s concern.

Still, it remains unclear if Abe is fully aware of the unhappiness in Washington, which has led to a lot of discussion among Asia specialists that the Administration would be wise to use quiet but firm diplomatic means to ensure that the message gets directly to Abe and his inner circle. That, in turn, raises the question of who in the Obama Administration would have the “political juice” to effectively deliver the message.

One former government official who remains in close contact with Asia Hands in the administration says: “Strong communication through private channels is really needed, but I can’t think of who a credible interlocutor would be for Tokyo, especially since Lippert is moving up and out of the Asia business. The Administration has clearly not invested in relationships in Tokyo that put them inside the political decision-making loop.”

When relations with Tokyo are running smoothly, there is usually a senior official at the NSC, the State Department, or the Pentagon who is in daily contact with the Chief Cabinet Secretary, or a deputy chief cabinet secretary, in Tokyo, ensuring that messages at the highest level travel back-and-forth unhindered. That is not the case right now.

At the Pentagon, it’s widely believed that the acting assistant secretary for Asia, Peter Lavoy, will be nominated as Lippert’s permanent successor. Lavoy, who is a South Asia specialist, is highly-respected for his professionalism and expertise. But he is not considered a heavyweight in policy-making circles.

At State, the nomination of Russel as Campbell’s permanent replacement is now considered a foregone conclusion, though Secretary of State Kerry is reportedly resisting White House pressure, hoping instead to name his own person. Russel, who has been with the Obama NSC from the beginning, has been senior director for Asia since 2011, and is favored by President Obama’s inner circle.

A move by Russel to State would not be problem-free. While highly-respected for his expertise, especially in Japan and Korean affairs, Russel is said by numerous Foreign Service colleagues to be very political, with a knack for forming tight bonds with political appointees. His presence as chief of the East Asia bureau could create an awkward working situation with the bureau’s top career specialist, Jim Zumwalt. Also a Japan and Korea expert, Zumwalt is technically senior to Russel within the Foreign Service.

Moreover, with Caroline Kennedy reportedly in line to be the next US Ambassador to Japan, the US Embassy in Tokyo would need a strong deputy chief of mission. Reports are already circulating at State that Zumwalt could be asked, for the “benefit of the Service,” to return to Tokyo as DCM.

(After the initial publication of this report, Mr. Zumwalt forwarded the  following comment: "We have an extremely competent DCM in Tokyo: Kurt Tong.  He is doing a great job, and we have every confidence that he will help the new Ambassador to Japan get off to a strong start.  I have no plans to leave my present job in Washington.")

Meanwhile, a Russel move to the State Department would open up the top Asia spot at the NSC. National Security advisor Tom Donilon presumably would want to name a strong, trusted person to that key post. Within the tight fraternity of Asia specialists in Washington, it is anyone’s guess who that might be.

 

 

Okinawa Vice Governor Takara: ‘No go on Henoko’

 

Three weeks have passed since the United States and Japan announced with great fanfare an agreement on consolidating US military bases on Okinawa. The core of the agreement is the eventual, long-anticipated closure of the US Marine Air Station Futenma, perilously located in the crowded center of Ginowan City. The closure of Futenma, which would occur in 2022 at the earliest, is contingent on the construction of a replacement facility further north in the Henoko district of Okinawa. The decision to close Futenma was first reached in 1996, and the initial target date was 2014. Heated opposition on Okinawa has blocked the  project.

Both governments hailed the agreement as a “breakthrough” on an issue they have intensively discussed for almost 18 years, with little to show for the efforts.

Most major US media outlets, whose correspondents in Tokyo were apparently not fully aware of the ins-and-outs of the nearly two decades of negotiations, proved to be easy prey for the optimistic cloak in which American and Japanese officials draped the April 5 deal.

In the weeks leading up to the announcement, and in the weeks that have followed, Ministry of Defense officials in Tokyo, and leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, have expressed optimism that Okinawa leaders can be convinced to alter their opposition. They point out that Okinawa Prefecture Governor Hirokazu Nakaima is a member of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s LDP, and argue that he will eventually “come around.”

Nakaima has a big voice in the matter because he must give approval before landfill work that is necessary for construction of the envisioned Henoko facility can proceed. Nakaima has repeatedly expressed his view that it is simply unrealistic to think that local opposition to the Henoko plan can be overcome. He calls for a replacement facility to be built outside of Okinawa, which, despite being far smaller than Japan’s four main islands, now hosts roughly 75% of the US military presence in Japan (as measured in total Japanese land leased by the United States military for bases).

Indeed, the ink had barely dried on the April 5 agreement when, the next day, Nakaima met with Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, and afterwards told reporters that he still opposes the Henoko plan, and still expects the US and Japan to reach agreement to transfer the Marine functions conducted at Futenma to a spot outside of Okinawa. “I have no intention of changing my stance,” he said.

Optimism rose among supporters of the Henoko replacement facility plan when Kurayoshi Takara, a 65 year-old professor  who is considered Japan’s top historian on the Ryukyu Islands and Okinawa itself, took office as Vice Governor of Okinawa. Analysts sometimes pigeon-hole Takara as a “conservative,” but he is actually somewhat of an iconoclast whose views, while very respected, are hard to label. There was even talk of Nakaima retiring later this year, rather than running for reelection in late 2014, and leaving it to Takara to champion the Henoko plan.

Takara is having none of that. Eyebrows rose among those who follow Okinawa issues closely when Takara forcefully presented his opposition to the Henoko plan in an interview published by Asahi Shimbun on April 26.

The interview was accompanied by an “Interviewer’s Note,” written by Asahi correspondent Norio Yatsu.

Below are both the Yatsu note and the text of his interview with Takara.

 

* * * * *

 

Interviewer’s note:  

Kurayoshi Takara, 65, a former professor at the University of the Ryukyus, once faced fierce criticism from the Okinawan people for drafting a recommendation saying that Okinawa should make up its mind to overcome history issues and fulfill its responsibility. He became the vice governor of Okinawa this spring. He is critical of the “victim mentality” and accepts the role played by the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Is the arrival on the scene of this conservative opinion leader in the Okinawa Prefectural Government an indication of the possibility of accepting the relocation of the Futenma Air Station within Okinawa?

When the local papers in Okinawa carried on their front page the scoop that Takara was going to be named vice governor, I suspected this was a foreboding of things to come. Takara is an expert on Ryukyu history who was involved with historical research for the restoration of the Shuri Castle, as well as one of the leading conservative opinion leaders in Okinawa. I interviewed Takara in late March, just before he became vice governor. With the caveat that it’s his personal opinion, he said that Henoko relocation will not be feasible and expressed concern about the present situation in which Okinawa has no choice but to revert to its “finger-pointing” mode. He has kept quiet after assuming the vice governorship. Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga is also opposed to Henoko relocation. [Henoko is a district of the city of Nago.] If Onaga is a person who appeals to “feelings,” Takara appeals to “reason.” We mainlanders must take very seriously the fact that the two top conservative brains in Okinawa have arrived at the same conclusion.

 

ASAHI: Your recommendation “Okinawa Initiative” in 2000 was astounding. Is your assumption of the vice governorship a step toward accepting the relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Henoko?

Takara: Several people in Tokyo told me that the bureaucrats think so and are happy. They say that with my becoming vice governor, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima will give approval for landfill in Henoko, resign, and Takara will take over. I thought they have a shallow understanding of Okinawa. That’s their wishful thinking.

What I urged in that recommendation was for Okinawa to make up its mind to be a part of the nation of Japan. Modern Japan has merely treated Okinawa as a marginal prefecture and as a result, Okinawa became has adopted an unwavering victim mentality. Its ability to see the big picture has weakened. For sure, the situation in Okinawa does justify complaints about discrimination. I was saying that we should not focus only on that aspect and should improve our way of thinking. It is a big mistake to think that Takara believes that Okinawa issues can be forgotten and anything that’s good for Japan can go ahead. If I have to choose, I will definitely choose Okinawa’s interest.

 

ASAHI: Is it too optimistic to think that the governor will approve the landfill?

Takara: Personally, I think this will be very difficult. The government will probably do all it can to create an environment conducive for the approval, but I don’t think the situation will change with such methods.

As a result of the controversy stirred up by former Democratic Party of Japan Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s statement that [the Futenma base] would “at least be relocated out of Okinawa,” the hurdle for relocation within the prefecture has become higher. At the same time, Okinawans have begun to share the common perception that the hurdle is indeed higher. In both senses, there is no going back to the previous state of affairs.

The government will have various options, such as to criticize the governor’s inaction on the landfill application or take him to court, like in the case of former Governor Masahide Ota’s refusal to sign lease contracts on behalf of military land owners. Yet is it really worth going that far for Henoko relocation? This will only aggravate the Okinawan people’s antipathy toward the bases.

 

ASAHI: The governor has not completely ruled out relocation within Okinawa, and there are people who accept the relocation. The government may be thinking that Henoko relocation is still possible depending on the political situation in Okinawa.

Takara: For sure, the governor is not saying that he is opposed to relocation within Okinawa. However, he has been saying all along that Henoko relocation is near impossible. Why is Tokyo not accurate in its analysis of the reality in Okinawa? What is the government’s basis for saying there are actually many people who accept the relocation?

 

ASAHI: Perhaps it’s the notion that if forced to choose between Henoko relocation and the permanent presence of the Futenma base by the end of this year, Henoko would be accepted with reluctance.

Takara: However, it’s the Japanese government that is providing military bases, and these are operated by the U.S. forces. It will be utterly irresponsible for the authorities in charge of security to say: We tried to remove the danger posed by the Futenma base but Okinawa would not listen, so the base is staying where it is. If an accident occurs, it would be Okinawa’s fault.

 

ASAHI: What you are saying now is completely different from the Mr. Takara who served as adviser to the conservative Inamine and Nakaima administrations who asserted that “solutions are more important than interpretations.”

Takara: Okinawa plays two roles. One is to denounce, criticize, and point to the issues relating to the military bases concentrated in Okinawa. The other is to come up with concrete proposals for arriving at solutions to these issues to be included in the agenda of Japan as a whole, telling Japan: “Therefore, Okinawa would like to propose the following ideas, and it is willing to compromise to a certain extent for these proposals.”

However, Okinawa is still unable to extricate itself from the first role more than 10 years after the prefectural government changed hands from the reformists to the conservatives. The base issues are that much confined within Okinawa. The repeated crimes and accidents caused by U.S. service members and the forcible deployment of the Osprey simply serve to make the contradictions in Okinawa sink in. In reality, Okinawa has no choice but to continue to protest.

 

ASAHI: The governor advocates relocation out of Okinawa.

Takara: Governor Nakaima pledged to relocate the Futenma base out of Okinawa during the election campaign for his second term, thus plunging into the debate. His rival called for relocation out of Japan.

Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga, I, and others purposely chose to use the expression “relocation out of Okinawa” because relocation to some other place in Japan is better for thinking about Japan’s security. If we simply forget about other options in the country and go straight to relocation to Guam, the Japanese people will not appreciate the weight of the base-hosting burden on Okinawa or understand why security is important.

I slightly revised the governor’s speech to the National Governors’ Association after his reelection to read: “We are grateful for your sympathy and understanding for Okinawa, but the situation will not improve with just that. Please think of this as a problem for the Japanese people as a whole.” However, the reaction was cold.

 

ASAHI: That’s the perception gap between Okinawa and the mainland.

Takara: Forty years after Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese administration, the perception gap on the historical experience of the brutal Battle of Okinawa and long-term military occupation by the U.S. forces, which resulted in the excessive base-hosting burden, is beginning to emerge in a tangible manner. Many Okinawans are now saying that the way the Japanese government treats Okinawa amounts to discrimination.

 

ASAHI: However, you seem to disapprove of using the expression “discrimination.”

Takara: I can understand the sentiment, but once you talk like that, discussion and dialogue will stop. Those accused of discrimination will shut up and there will be an emotional gap. I have come to think that it is more important to come up with an alternative expression.

 

ASAHI: When Okinawa talks about discrimination, some mainlanders and Internet users accuse it of being a “traitor.” Don’t you think there has been little change in the paradigm of “finger- pointing Okinawa versus dejected mainland” that you abhor?

Takara: Tolerance has withered amid the social stagnation. While politicians say they take Okinawa’s voice seriously, they do not substantially translate this into policy decisions. With the generational change, it is no longer possible to talk heart-to-heart like in the olden days.

The ceremony to mark the restoration of Japan’s sovereignty on Apr. 28 is a case in point. I thought the Prime Minister really came up with a symbolic issue. Okinawa’s reversion only came after the barbaric American occupation that followed Apr. 28 ended. Unfortunately, I don’t think the Prime Minister had a strong sense that Okinawa, Amami, and Ogasawara were deserted at that time when he talked about the restoration of sovereignty.

 

ASAHI: You grew up on Minamidaito Island.

Takara: This is an island that people from Hachijo Island in Tokyo opened up in 1900. That is why Okinawa is not something that I take for granted without even thinking, which is why I am able to take a relative point of view and look at Okinawa from a certain distance.

 

ASAHI: Is a solution still difficult even after the Liberal Democratic Party returned to power?

Takara: I think so. This country is facing too many tough issues. Futenma relocation is just one of the political issues. I believe I have no choice but to do my job with this understanding.

The Japanese government is too occupied to even review the Japan-U.S. agreement and is only able to move forward on the basis of the existing policy. While in Okinawa, the hurdle is now raised for relocation within the prefecture. There is also very little leeway to mediate and narrow the gap.

 

ASAHI: Aren’t you the one who is going to close that gap?

Takara: Oh, no. It is not appropriate for the Okinawa Prefectural Government to say we have this and that idea based on the Japan-U.S. agreement or we will be able to accept this and that military base. It will be difficult for Okinawa to give up its posture of “finger-pointing” unless the government is able to come up with burden-reduction measures not premised on Henoko relocation, in addition to returning the facilities south of Kadena Air Base. However, I must not lose sight of the role I must play in proposing solutions to the problem. Otherwise, we will only be able to find solutions within the context of the contradictions plaguing us. I would like to prevent that from happening.

 

 

Manning: Pyongyang fearful of internal situation

Robert Manning is a senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as a senior counselor from 2001 to 2004 and as a member of the US Department of State Policy Planning Staff from 2004 to 2008. The interview was conducted via email for both Dispatch Japan and Weekly Toyo Keizai.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is motivating North Korea right now? Are these the tactics of a new regime trying to consolidate power? Or are these the tactics of a more shrewd leadership, engaging in yet another round of provocations designed to extract concessions?

 MANNING: The conventional wisdom to explain North Korea’s actions is that this is primarily about a new twenty-nine-year-old trying to consolidate his position by demonstrating how tough and courageous he is to the North Korean military and political elite.

That may be part of the answer. But let me offer an explanation that has been noticeably absent in the sea of commentary on North Korea in recent weeks.

It’s possible that a major reason North Korea’s new leaders decided they needed to whip up a sense of crisis — of a nation under siege and facing impending attack from outside enemies —is because they are insecure and fear a fragile internal situation that is increasingly difficult to control.

Since the end of the Cold War (and Soviet aid) North Korea’s economic system has steadily broken down. Since the great famine in 1995, there have been continual food shortages facing by some estimates up to one-third of North Korea’s twenty-three million people.

The breakdown of Pyongyang’s food-distribution system led the government to allow private markets and some private plots. There has been a bottom-up second economy taking shape. In recent years, markets have sprung up all over North Korea with a growing array of goods indulged by the regime as a coping mechanism. A fledgling merchant stratum has sprung up; it is occasionally harassed, but tolerated, and exists largely outside the government.

At the same time, despite efforts to keep the nation isolated, several factors — including economic trade and refugee flows to China, CDs and broadcasts from South Korea, and now some five million cell phones — have made its borders more porous and information flows more accessible.

This is a regime that are control freaks, and are deeply uncomfortable with things they can not control. That is a key reason they have rejected economic reforms such as those China and Vietnam have pursued.  To the degree that North Koreans get a dose of reality about the outside world, the myths of a “socialist paradise” by which the regime misgoverns start to unravel. If the twenty-three million North Koreans realize the massive lies fed to them to sustain the world’s only hereditary Stalinist dictatorship, it could gradually undo the regime.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the regime unstable?

MANNING: I am not arguing that the masses are poised to revolt. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Pyongyang still runs a terror state with some two hundred thousand in labor camps, and those caught trying to flee the country are frequently executed. But the current situation may be viewed by the regime as discomforting and fragile, with its efforts to seal off the country from reality increasingly more than fraying at the edges.

At the onset of a new leader’s tenure, how better to reassert tight control over its beleaguered citizens and whip up support for the regime than to instill fear and claim that the U.S. imperialists are on the verge of starting a nuclear war. This involved going to great lengths, including telling foreign embassies to evacuate Pyongyang and warning foreigners in South Korea to leave before the war starts. It’s great political theater, and Pyongyang seems oblivious to how ridiculous it is.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So Pyongyang is not looking for a large-scale confrontation?

MANNING: I don’t think so. Actually, I think the notion of a “crisis” – as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis – is nonsense. The world is not on the brink of an imminent nuclear confrontation. North Korean troops and artillery are not about to pour across the Demilitarized Zone. This is all nothing more than political theater. Unfortunately, a lot of media has gone along for the show, from the hysterical TV portrayals of goose-stepping North Korean troops, and breathless news reports of North Korean warnings of war, to maps depicting the range of imminent missile launches, complete with retired U.S. generals explaining the targets.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Still, the bellicosity has been pretty strident.

MANNING: This time around, it is louder and more melodramatic. But we have seen time and again North Korea throwing a political tantrum in response to annual U.S.-ROK military exercises or the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in response to Pyongyang testing a nuclear device or launching a missile.

Kim may be dangerous, but he is not crazy: North Korea is not suicidal. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests are not really “provocations.” They are part of a systematic military program that North Korea has been working on for more than forty years to obtain nuclear and missile capabilities. Diplomatic concessions in the past have affected the timing and perhaps the amount of missile and nuclear tests. But they have gone and will continue to go forward because the North Koreans want to gain such weapons. While I think deterrence still prevails, there is cause for more concern as the North Koreans develop new capabilities like the Musudan, with a 4000km range, and a mobile ICBM.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How can Pyongyang wind this down and “save face” without some kind of skirmish?

MANNING: I think they can simply claim victory, with a narrative that says US and its puppets in the South were about to attack us, but the heroic stance of Kim Jong Un forced them to back down. That may be why they held festivals and a marathon in the midst of this on April 15, Kim Il Sung's birthday. And why they did not test a missile --at least not in the midst of the pseudo-crisis as many expected.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent is Kim Jong-un actually calling the shots in Pyongyang?

MANNING: That is unclear. We know his uncle -- his father's brother-in-law, Jang Sang Taek, has been providing much adult supervision, and if you recall for about roughly a year after Kim Jong Il had a stroke in 2008, Jang was running day-to-day affairs. I suspect he is still playing a large role. But Kim is what passes for political legitimacy in North Korea.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why did the North shut down the Kaesong industrial area?

MANNING: They had suspended operations before. But given that Kaesong produces about $100 million a year in free money for the regime, it suggests domestic factors. 53,000 North Korean workers have been exposed to South Korean managers every day in Kaesong.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Has China really changed its attitude toward a greater willingness to apply substantial pressure on Pyongyang? Are there still limits to how much pressure China will apply? Would China risk bringing down the regime?

MANNING: This is a somewhat humiliating situation for Beijing, with the tail wagging the dog. Their problem is that they give stability a higher priority than denuclearization, and provide enough food, fuel and spare parts to keep N. Korea going, but have little real leverage. It is not like a rheostat that they can dial up or down a little; it is either on or off. And they are afraid of the consequences of turning it off and the possibility of a collapse where they would lose their buffer, and face a unified Korea aligned with the US.

But there is a growing debate within China among the political and intellectual elite over whether N.Korea may be a liability not an asset. China is willing to apply some pressure, endorsing sanctions. We will see how far they go in enforcing sanctions. Their ultimate problem is that like the Soviet Union, at some point N.Korea may collapse of its own weight, and China may not be able to do much about. In the meantime, rather than coordinating with the US, ROK on Japan, they have been reluctant to discuss "what if" – regime collapse -- questions.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:The US seems prepared to impose a price on North Korea for any conflict, while working carefully to avoid unnecessary escalation. Is that your assessment of the Administration’s approach, and do you agree with it?

MANNING: I think Obama has handled it about right. They show of force, the B-2s, was a clear statement that we are serious, and if they launch any aggression, it will be the end of N.Korea.

Yet the US cancelled an ICBM test to avoid appearing to escalate things, and have made it clear the US is willing to negotiate. The door is open -- anytime, so long as Pyongyang is willing to put its Weapons of Mass Destruction on the table, based on the 2005 agreement that the North walked away from, as they did with the Feb.29 2011 agreement.

In the past, North Korean actions have been designed to create tensions in order to extract concessions. But the Obama administration and that of the new ROK President Park Geun-hye have made it clear that they have both seen that movie before and are not buying it.

The administration has handled this tempest in a teapot well, with its military show of force sending a clear signal to the twenty-nine-year-old Kim that this is not a video game, and that Pyongyang should think twice before confronting the United States and its allies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To what extent is the strenuous US reaction designed to reassure the region of US reliability, vs. the obvious desire to deter North Korea?

MANNING: I think for the US, credible deterrence and reassurance to our allies are inseparable. The US offshore balancer role in the Asia-Pacific remains an essential pillar of stability, and the US does not want to risk diminishing the credibility of that role. I think it is important to make clear to Pyongyang that they will not be accepted as a nuclear state. They would probably like an India-type agreement with the US, but Washington and Seoul are not going to give it to them.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there any chance for a diplomatic solution, and what would that look like?

MANNING: So long as the North Korean regime wants to possess nuclear weapons, there is little room for problem-solving diplomacy. There are deep levels of distrust on both sides and the North Korea regime is anachronistic, trapped in its own myths. That leaves little to seriously talk about.  Pyongyang should recall that the Soviet Union had thirty thousand nuclear warheads, yet that didn’t save it from collapsing from its own contradictions.

Americans tend to think all problems have solutions, but sometimes they can only be managed. We can plan for post-Kim regime scenarios, but we have to live with the present.

 

 

 

 

 

Mochizuki: ‘US-Japan agreement on Okinawa is not a breakthrough’

Professor Mike Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. He co-directs the "Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific" research and policy project of the Sigur Center. Previously, he was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was also Co-Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at RAND and has taught at the University of Southern California and Yale University. This interview was conducted jointly for Toyo Keizai On-Line and Dispatch Japan.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the significance of the recently-announced agreement between Washington and Tokyo concerning the return of some territory in Okinawa?

MOCHIZUKI: This is a last-ditch effort by the US and Japanese governments to alter base politics in Okinawa so that the Futenma Replacement Facility can be constructed at Henoko Bay.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this a genuine breakthrough on the issue?

MOCHIZUKI: If by “genuine breakthrough,” you mean that the agreement will succeed in fundamentally altering current political dynamics in Okinawa, I would say it is not a breakthrough. Moreover, the agreement does not entail a significant acceleration in the timetable for returning U.S. facilities south of Kadena Air Force Base, which has been sought by Okinawans.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: It seems that Tokyo is trying to “buy off” Okinawa. Can that tactic work anymore?

MOCHIZUKI: Okinawa of course welcomes the financial aid from the central government in order to promote development. But this aid does not necessarily translate into local willingness to accept a new Marine Air Station within the prefecture.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So much of the new agreement depends on construction of replacement facilities, which has been one reason for the impasse of many years. So where is the “breakthrough?”

MOCHIZUKI: There is no substantive breakthrough. But I think that by recommitting themselves to the return of Futenma as well as the return of facilities south of Kadena, the U.S. and Japanese governments hope to turn around public opinion in Okinawa. After the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama, the political executives of every city, town, and village of Okinawa –whether conservative or progressive-- have declared their opposition to the Henoko FRF plan. So what the Abe government would like to do is at least win the support of conservatives in Okinawa for the current Futenma relocation plan. But when Okinawans read the fine print of the agreement and consider the conditions and the probable schedule for the return of U.S. military facilities, there is not much to cheer about.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any change in the attitude of Governor Nakaima? There are top-level MOD officials who believe that since the governor is an LDP member, he will eventually alter his opposition to the Henoko plan.

MOCHIZUKI: I think Governor Nakaima wants to maintain a good rapport with the Abe government, and he is wisely refraining from rejecting central government initiatives out of hand. But I don’t think this means that he is now prepared to accept the Henoko plan. He is being cautious, and he has stated that he needs to find out how local communities that will be affected by the latest agreement feel.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: The MOD and the Kantei seem to think they can out-maneuver Mayor Inamine by somehow winning the support of a majority of assembly members. Do you see that as feasible?

MOCHIZUKI: Winning over the majority of the Nago City Assembly is an ambitious goal for the MOD and Kantei. But what is key is whether or not Mayor Inamine, who has vehemently opposed the Henoko plan, wins re-election in 2014.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a different attitude toward the Henoko project between the local Henoko residents vs. the other sections of the prefecture? The OPG staff seems to think that the Henoko community favors the project, but all other sections of Okinawa remain opposed.

MOCHIZUKI: Because there has been so much money flowing into the communities closest to Henoko Bay, it is not surprising that these communities tend to favor the FRF project. But those sections of Nago City away from Henoko Bay tend to be opposed. And public opposition to the Henoko plan remains pretty robust in the rest of Okinawa Prefecture.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How would you characterize the Abe government’s approach toward Okinawa? Tokyo seems intent on using the period of review of the landfill application to win over a significant portion of Okinawa sentiment that, up to now, has been opposed.

MOCHIZUKI: Through both financial aid and the promise of future closures of U.S. military facilities in attractive areas for development, the Abe government hopes to win over the hearts and minds of conservative Okinawans who are pro-development and more supportive of the security alliance with the United States. Unfortunately, the latest agreement tends to take a piecemeal approach so the effect on these Okinawans is unlikely to be dramatic.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Has the tension with North Korea had any significant impact on how the long-standing stalemate for FRF? (Putting pressure on Okinawa to agree to Henoko…)

MOCHIZUKI: Tensions with North Korea as well as tensions with China over the Senkakus may have increased support for the US-Japan alliance among some Okinawans. But this does not necessarily mean that they will now embrace the Henoko plan. Rather many Okinawans are probably asking that if US military forces are so important for Japanese security, why don’t other prefectures offer to host those forces?

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: According to the new agreement, Futenma would remain open for at least another 9 years (2022). Is it wise to keep such a controversial facility open for such a long time?

MOCHIZUKI: The target date of 2022 is probably frustrating and depressing for Okinawans. Remember that under the original 1996 agreement, the goal was to have Futenma returned between 2001 and 2003. 2022 would be at least 19 years after the target date. That’s a whole generation. Moreover, the April 2013 agreement does not declare Futenma will be returned in 2022 at the latest. The document instead states “2022 or later.” So there is a strong possibility that the 2022 target year will not be met.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: The plan to relocate a large number of US Marines to Guam seems to be in question, as construction of new facilities on Guam is caught up in cost-overruns, underestimation of costs, questions in Congress, and now the sequestration. How can the overall base realignment move forward if the US can’t deliver on the Guam side of the deal?

MOCHIZUKI: That’s a good question. Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings and I, however, have an answer to that. We propose relocating these Marines back to bases on the continental United States. If we pre-positioned equipment in Japan and elsewhere in the region, we can easily and rapidly fly Marines back into the region during a contingency. Moreover, Marines can maintain a regular regional presence through rotational deployments.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the US Marine presence on Okinawa really of strategic importance, or is the real motivation more mundane bureaucratic considerations?

MOCHIZUKI: If Okinawa were willing to host 20,000 Marines permanently, I would acknowledge that there may be strategic benefits of such a presence. But that is not the case. Therefore, we have to recognize the political strain that such a Marine presence poses on the alliance. Moreover, having Futenma Marine Air Station located in a crowded urban area increases the probability of a tragic accident.If such a tragedy were to occur, this would have a devastating effect on the alliance. It is strategically important to maintain support in Okinawa for hosting more vital facilities like Kadena Air Force base. I am not arguing that all the Marines should leave Okinawa. But I believe that we can dramatically reduce the Marine presence on Okinawa without undermining the US security role in the Asia-Pacific.

US-Japan agreement on Okinawa: Far less than advertised

US and Japanese officials are promoting the April 5th agreement on returning some land in Okinawa now used by the US military as a breakthrough in long-stalled plans for an overall restructuring of the US presence in Japan’s southern-most prefecture.  Amy Searight, the Pentagon’s principal director for East Asia policy, told reporters that the agreement “is a milestone in our progress towards realigning our forces in Okinawa.”

But even a cursory look shows that there is far less in this agreement than meets the eye. Indeed, in some ways it represents backtracking from an agreement announced in April 2012.

Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s office, while striving to not appear obstinate, pointed out that much of the agreement rests on the assumption that the controversial Marine Corps Air Station Futenma will be relocated to a new facility in the Henoko Bay area of the prefecture – a facility that Nakaima “has consistently believed and repeatedly warned is politically unfeasible.” The Okinawa Times, among other criticisms, echoed Nakaima by pointing out that “it has been nearly 17 years since agreement was reached to return the Futenma Air Station. The plan has made little progress because it was premised on the base’s relocation to the Henoko district.”

Consider these features of the agreement:

 

• The area to be returned totals about 2,590 acres, which is a mere 4.5 percent of the total amount of land now utilized by American forces based on Okinawa;

• Of these 2,540 acres to be returned, only 6.2 percent would be returned relatively soon, without significant conditions. That is a mere 161 acres. Moreover, numerous Okinawan commentators have pointed out that many of those 161 acres are of little use economically;

• On other hand, 80.2 percent of the planned land returns (2,076 acres) are contingent on construction of replacement facilities in Okinawa. This includes the Futenma Replacement Facility envisioned for Henoko – the one that Governor Nakaima continues to call politically unfeasible. The anticipated completion dates for these replacement facilities are all quite vague, specifically 2022-28 “or later.” The Okinawa Times referred to this “or later” caveat as “a love letter in the sand.”

• Finally, 13.6 percent of the planned land returns (353 acres) will coincide with the redeployment of 9,000 Marines out of Okinawa, including a to-be-determined number to Guam. However, construction on Guam of the necessary new facilities to support the inflow of Marines is bogged down by cost under-estimates, doubts about the plan in Congress, and now the US budget sequestration.

The argument from many Okinawans that the April 5^th agreement is a significant step backward is compelling. In April 2012, the two countries agreed to delink the return of 5 key facilities south of the huge Kadena Air Base from the Futenma-Henoko issue, which represented significant progress from a 2006 bilateral statement that had reaffirmed that link. The idea was to accelerate the return of the five facilities, which include Camp Zukeran, the Makiminato Service Area, and the Army port at Naha. The April 5^th agreement in essence abrogates the 2012 statement, and returns the entire issue to the status of 2006, making virtually all returns into a package, with the core element being the completion of the Futunma Replacement Facility in Henoko.

The Abe administration is hoping that identifying specific dates for the return of each facility will weaken opposition in Okinawa to the Henoko plan. But it remains very unclear whether local officials in Okinawa will accept that argument from Washington and Tokyo that the moveable and flexible timelines for the return of key facilities actually represents a concrete schedule.

High-level Ministry of Defense officials are optimistic that Governor Nakaima, a member of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, will eventually show flexibility and lower his opposition to the Henoko plan.

The Governor’s office is now reviewing an application from Tokyo to engage in landfill operations in Henoko Bay that are necessary for construction of the new facility. That review will take somewhere between 8-10 months, coming close to a scheduled January 2014 race for mayor of Nago, of which Henoko is a district. The current mayor, Susumu Inamine, is opposed to the Henoko project.

The MOD and the prime minister’s office (Kantei) seem to think they can out-maneuver Mayor Inamine by somehow winning the support of a majority of Nago assembly members.

Senior staff members in the Office of Prefectural Governor (Nakaima’s staff) argue that the MOD and Kantei are wildly optimistic, but say it will take about a month to gauge the overall reaction to the April 5^th agreement and other efforts  by Tokyo (including economic aid packages) to sway opinion among local officials throughout the prefecture.

All of this obscures the worrisome fact that, under the most optimistic scenario, the dangerous Futenma facility (located smack in the middle of Ginowan City) will remain open for another nine years, even though there are clear alternatives available. The alternatives, which US and Japanese officials have informally discussed, include a new facility on Shimojishima island (part of Okinawa prefecture), consolidation of the Futenma operations onto the huge Kadena air base, or construction of a new heliport inside Camp Schwab or Camp Hansen, combined with US access to a new runway to be built in Naha. The last option would include the US hosting of a regiment of Ground Self Defense Forces at Hansen or Schwab, which the GSDF is  anxious to do.

Discussion of these alternative options has never officially been acknowledged by either Washington or Tokyo, for fear of killing the Henoko plan without an alternative firmly in place.

As things stand now, the two sides are committed to the Henoko plan, but continued opposition on Okinawa in the face of the April 5^th agreement could finally force Washington and Tokyo to seriously pursue one of the alternative options.

 

 

For Abe, talks with Obama came down to ‘take what you can get’

From the standpoint of his political image back home, the February 22 summit meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama was a big success for the Japanese leader. Abe was able to bolster his standing with the Japanese public and within his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as someone who can effectively manage the all-important US-Japan alliance. He projected the image of a strong leader by forcefully proclaiming that Japan “is back,” and that he has restored trust in the US-Japan relationship by reversing three years of supposed alliance disorder engendered by the Democratic Party of Japan.

The big headline in Japan was that Abe had successfully secured from Obama a statement clarifying that Tokyo would not have to make any unilateral concessions on tariff reductions as a precondition for joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

But the heavy focus on the joint statement on trade distorted the overall picture of the summit.

Indeed, walking down the TPP avenue so quickly was not Abe’s preference. It was the path he had to take if he were to demonstrate that the US-Japan alliance “is back,” since the White House made TPP its priority.

All along, Abe wanted to demonstrate alliance revival by pushing collective self-defense (his "gift" was to be a public statement of Japan's willingness to use its missile defense to try to shoot down any North Korean ballistic missile aimed at US territory), and to get a strong US statement specifically criticizing China, by name, for its East China Sea maritime provocations.

The White House would have none of it, and pushed for the public agenda to focus on North Korea, cooperation on other aspects of global security, and economic policy, especially trade.

Abe had to adjust. The word in political circles in Tokyo is that Japanese negotiators secured the final wording of the joint statement on TPP roughly ten days ago, which emboldened Abe to begin pushing in the days leading up to the summit for the LDP to accept Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations. Roughly half of the LDP’s Diet members oppose TPP, fearful of a backlash from the country’s powerful agriculture lobby.

Because Obama wanted to focus on TPP and economics so heavily, Abe had to allow TPP into the forefront if he hoped to demonstrate back home his ability to manage the alliance. Obama mentioned that the “highest priority” between the two countries is to restore healthy economic growth. The White House wants Japan, which still has the world’s third-largest economy, to join TPP, though not at the cost of watering down the low-tariff philosophy behind the prospective agreement.

Abe would have preferred to avoid tackling the complicated domestic politics of TPP until after critical Upper House elections to be held by next July. But he found he couldn’t do that and also successfully stage-manage his appearance in DC. It looks now as if Abe will announce fairly soon a decision to enter the TPP talks. It remains to see just how hard  Abe will push for genuine tariff reform, especially on agricultural products like rice, once the blowback from inside the LDP and from agricultural interests begins.

     ARM’S DISTANCE: The TPP joint statement notwithstanding, it was hard to miss that Obama kept Abe at arm's distance during the summit.

     One: There was no joint press conference. Last year, on April 30, while he was readying for an ultra-secret midnight departure for Afghanistan that night, President Obama took the time for a 30-minute joint press conference with then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Obama praised the alliance, joked easily with Noda, and promoted the "joint vision" that had been announced just days before by the "2+2" meeting between the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries.

This time, with Abe, Obama did not take the time for a press conference.

     Two: Oval Office theater. In a brief Oval Office appearance with Abe, Obama mentioned North Korea, cooperation on Afghanistan, and the high priority of promoting economic growth. He spoke not one word about the Senkakus, China, Okinawa, or even a "joint vision" of the sort announced with Noda. Abe tried his best to criticize China, very indirectly, but adhered to US desires to not rile-up Beijing. Obama took one question from a small press “pool,” which was on the looming US budget sequestration. He answered at length, but said nothing about Abe, Japan, or Asia. Obama directed the second and final question toward Abe.

     Three: Neither Obama nor Secretary of State John Kerry took the seemingly easy step of reiterating the January 18 statement by then-Secretary of State Clinton outlining American opposition to any effort at unilateral change of Japan's administrative control of the Senkakus. This was a far-cry from Abe's initial desire for a strong statement from Obama specifically mentioning China.

     Four: The White House surely gave Abe a carefully worded statement that the prime minister can use at home to push for TPP entry. But this was a case of Abe adapting to the US agenda. Abe did not want to be in a position of promoting TPP before the Upper House elections, but that's where he finds himself.

Obama embraced the US-Japan alliance, but did not embrace Abe.

 

Obama to embrace Japan, not Abe

With North Korea having recently tested a third nuclear device and China acting provocatively in the East China Sea, there will be plenty for Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama to talk about when they meet at the White House later today.

The summit will provide an opportunity for the US and Japan to reaffirm their bilateral security alliance and the need for regional peace, stability, and security.

However, below the surface, there is a great deal of unease about Prime Minister Abe in the White House, and at the State Department and the Pentagon. Concern is running high that Abe’s views on history, and his nationalist feelings toward Korea and China, could complicate relations in Northeast Asia as Japan pursues what are otherwise modest and logical expansions of security responsibilities and capabilities in the region.

Some Asia specialists from the Bush administration who know Abe, and worked with him while he was chief cabinet secretary and later briefly prime minister in 2006-2007, are fairly confident that Abe will act pragmatically, and not let his ideology cause problems for Japanese diplomacy.

But few people in the Obama administration know Abe, and top officials are somewhat skeptical that Abe (and those around him, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and education minister Hakubun Shimomura) will be able to restrain their nationalist impulses and act with a clear strategic vision for stability in the region. As Michael Cucek pointed out recently, Abe himself declared in his “new” book (a virtual reprint of an earlier tome) that his return to power is not simply a replacement of the discredited Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), but “is a fight to return the country called Japan to the hands of the citizens of Japan from out of the grip of postwar history.” Abe’s long-standing “history denier” perspective has not changed.

For this reason, the Obama administration, while squarely reaffirming the alliance, wants to avoid any statements or symbolic gestures during Abe’s brief visit that could appear provocative toward Beijing, or be seen as an endorsement of Abe’s personal political agenda.

     DIFFICULT PREPARATIONS: To begin with, the White House was never terribly enthusiastic about a visit from Abe. Tokyo pushed very hard for a January summit, but the White House said the president’s schedule would not permit that.  The White House attitude amounted to: Abe virtually invited himself, so we could hardly say ‘no.’

Part of the problem is that expectations in Washington are quite low of anything substantial emerging soon from Tokyo on hot-button issues like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks or basing arrangements for US forces on Okinawa. Many had assumed that this was a problem of the poor governance and weakness of the DPJ, but it is clear now that it is a broader political problem in Japan. Abe is not able or willing to push for progress on key issues at least until after next summer’s Upper House elections.

Abe had assumed, mistakenly, that his return to office, and that of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), would be met with cheers in Washington, that an “anything but the DPJ” attitude prevailed. While greater political stability is certainly welcomed by Obama administration officials, many in Washington were pretty happy with the foreign and security policies of the DPJ’s Yoshihiko Noda, who is clearly more moderate than Abe.

All of this made it difficult for senior officials to work out details for the summit. This became apparent two weeks ago, when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Zumwalt and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey met in Washington with Takeo Akiba of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ro Manabe of the Ministry of Defense. When the talks ended, the Japanese officials were unusually brusque in declining to talk with gathered reporters, indicating the continued lack of clarity made it difficult to brief the press.

As late as last Friday, after the prime minister’s office had announced that Abe would visit Washington on February 21-23 and meet with Obama on the 22^nd, the White House would not provide quick confirmation. That afternoon, the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent a ‘heads-up’ note to the Japanese press corps saying that “if the situation allows it to happen,” Abe would visit on February 21-23. Only later did the White House issue a statement announcing the visit. Coordination was less than smooth.

     WHITE HOUSE NIXES ABE PLANS: For Abe, the visit with President Obama is important as an opportunity to demonstrate to his domestic audience that he can manage the all-important alliance with the US. However, it may turn out that the only concrete news Abe is able to bring to Washington is that the Diet will likely sign the Hague Convention provisions concerning custody arrangements of children of failed international marriages. The repeated hearing of tragic stories spurred former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to champion the cause. The DPJ had agreed to adopt legislation, and Abe has followed. But even on this issue Abe still faces hurdles, as conservatives object to “outside intervention” into family disputes, and liberals (especially the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito, have raised concerns about Japanese women victims of domestic violence.

Abe had initially hoped to trumpet his plans to lift Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and make clear publicly that Japan would use its missile defenses to assist the United States in the event North Korea launched a ballistic missile aimed at US territory.  Abe assumed the new policy would be welcomed in Washington.

That was not the case. The Pentagon, of course, would welcome the defense planning and operational flexibility that would come from Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. But US officials were concerned that a demonstration of support for such an initiative by Abe could be misinterpreted as endorsement of the prime minister’s broader domestic agenda, including revision of the Constitution, which could unnecessarily anger Beijing. Instead, US officials pressed to keep discussions during the summit to specific means to enhance deterrence and regional stability, including better US-Japan combined intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and training of Japanese Self-Defense Force marine capabilities.

In the same vein, Washington was not eager to back Abe’s desire for specific criticism of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea, particularly with regard to the Senkaku islands. The Obama administration is trying to walk a very fine line between clearly warning China against efforts to unilaterally challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus, and not giving China any reason to feel threatened.

The White House is perfectly willing to reaffirm the statement made on January 18^th by then-Secretary of State Clinton in a joint appearance with Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida. Without mentioning China by name, Clinton warned against “any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus. But in the same sentence, she went on to say that “we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means.”

This is a warning to China, but it is also an effort to stay engaged with China, to let Beijing know that the US would not favor provocative actions by Japan, and to let Abe know that the US wants his government to stay cool and calm.

In the White House view, a specific reference to China might boost Abe’s domestic agenda, but would not be helpful for the alliance or for regional stability and security.

Within the Obama administration, the departure of Hillary Clinton and her influential assistant for Asian affairs Kurt Campbell has led to a subtle but important shift in the balance of power in managing Japan-related issues. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is a strong supporter of the strategy of “rebalancing” US force posture and diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Donilon is also extremely concerned about the strategic dilemma posed by China. How can the US simultaneously engage China and deter China from exercising undue heavy-handedness in the region? How best to persuade a rising China to participate in a rules-based regional and global architecture, and not create a self-fulfilling prophecy of China as an enemy?

It’s in this context that Donilon and other administration officials are wary of Abe’s hard line nationalist proclivities.

     TPP AND OKINAWA:  Meanwhile, the White House is frustrated that Abe will not provide an affirmative answer about Japan’s participation in the TPP trade talks, but officials there and at the State Department know that until next summer, Abe’s priority will likely be the Upper House elections. Abe does not want to anger the LDP’s rural voter base. Close to half of the LDP’s Diet delegation is opposed to TPP participation. For his part, Abe has been hinting at the possibility of making a decision on TPP prior to the elections. But the betting in Washington is that Abe is angling to garner from Obama some language hinting at flexibility in the demand that Japan put rice and other sensitive economic sectors on the negotiating table as a precondition to joining the talks. Washington is very reluctant to carve out exceptions for Japan prior to a decision by Tokyo to participate.

Many in Washington believe Abe wants Japan to eventually join TPP, if only out of the strategic recognition that TPP could be an important component of a rules-based regional security and economic architecture to which China would have to adapt. (Economic reform, which TPP could help spur, has never been in the forefront of Abe’s thinking.) But it’s unclear if and when Abe will be willing to spend the political capital required to move the issue forward.

Obama will be anxious to hear from Abe his intentions concerning TPP, but it remains unclear how the two sides will be able to meet each other’s stated political needs.

Concerning Okinawa, particularly plans to construct in the Henoko area a facility to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, expectations in Washington are very low.

The White House, State Department, and Pentagon were all quite upset that the Abe administration did not provide them with advance notice that Abe would not, prior to his Washington visit, send a request to Okinawa Governor Nakaima for permission to begin landfill work for the Henoko project.

Administration officials were not upset about Abe’s decision itself; that was expected. But the timing of his announcement, with no advance warning to Washington, upset US officials.

As for the Henoko project itself, the Obama administration increasingly recognizes the political reality that in all likelihood it will not be built, and has already begun serious consideration of possible alternatives. Indeed, this was discussed directly with the prime minister’s office and the foreign and defense ministries, prior to Prime Minister Noda leaving office. But the feeling in Washington and Tokyo is that Henoko cannot be publicly abandoned until an alternative is prepared, because Okinawans might conclude that the US will be staying at Futenma forever, and this perception would cause terrible problems. For now, both sides will continue to publicly support Henoko, even though both sides agree an alternative must be found.

 

 

 

Deming: US, Japan need ‘new imagination and energy’ on Okinawa basing issues

 

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fifth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Friday meeting with President Obama. Rust Deming, a veteran Japan specialist, is an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

DEMING: I don’t expect many specific results. This is really a summit to set the agenda for the two governments. First is for the two leaders to get to know each other. The prime minister has made clear that the US-Japan alliance is at the top of his list of priorities, at the center of Japanese foreign policy. The two leaders will try to put together a list of issues that need to be worked on over the next year or so.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

DEMING: Abe is not in a political position to bring very much to Washington. Nor does the Obama administration expect him to bring much. Abe wants to establish a personal relationship with the president, and wants to send a message that the US-Japan alliance is headed in a good direction now that he is back in office. He wants to demonstrate that he and the LDP have returned, and that whatever shakiness occurred over the last three years is a thing of the past.

In fact, while the first year of the DPJ in power, under Hatoyama, proved to be a difficult time for the alliance, Kan and Noda did try to bring the alliance back to the center of Japan’s foreign policy, and we made a lot of progress. If you look at the “2+2” statements from 2011 and 2012, you’ll see that the DPJ really accepted the fundamental strategic objectives of the alliance, and Japan’s roles and missions, which the LDP had agreed on earlier. There really was no gap between the two countries, which was a very good accomplishment, and very beneficial to the long-term stability of the alliance. The DPJ period was not without its benefits for the alliance.

But the LDP is back, and Abe wants to signal that he is personally putting the alliance back in the center of Japanese foreign policy.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

DEMING: The White House would like to emphasize that Japan is critical to America’s broad policy in Asia, and at the center of the “rebalancing” of US global strategy toward Asia. The administration would like to see Japan become a more active player in regional and global affairs on a wide range of issues, particularly on TPP, and more open markets.

There is also recognition that, prior to the Upper House election, Prime Minister Abe is not in a position to do very much, or even say very much, on TPP and other issues. But I expect the president to emphasize the importance the US attaches to moving forward on TPP and other issues that are important for the alliance.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Will Abe be able to bring any “gift” to Washington, or will domestic political considerations make that unfeasible?

DEMING: We have been trying to get away from that in recent years, particularly in early meetings such as the upcoming visit. Abe has been in office only two months. The real opportunity provided by this summit is to set an agenda for the alliance.  Down the road, when the two leaders meet again later in the year at the G8 summit or the East Asian summit, for example, there perhaps will be more concrete results. But this is not the time to expect very much.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

DEMING: It’s clear that some people are a little uneasy with the narrative that Abe seems to share with many conservative Japanese about responsibility for and the nature of developments in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of us in Washington believe that history is a complicating factor for relations among countries in the region, and therefore not very useful to bring up. It complicates Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly the ROK and China.

But in his last tenure as prime minister, in 2006, Mr. Abe reached out to China and Korea. He did not visit Yasukuni Shrine. He is a sophisticated statesman. A lot of people hope that, whatever his personal views and impulses, Abe will operate in a way that does not complicate Japan’s relations with China and Korea, or even with the US. Remember, there are some issues related to history, such as “comfort women,” that resonate in Washington. Most people with whom I speak are fairly hopeful that Abe will behave in a way similar to his first tenure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you expect the collective self-defense issue to come up explicitly?

DEMING: That is really an issue for the Japanese to decide. Many people in Washington would like to see Japan move forward on this issue in due course. The timing of what Japan does, and how it does it, does have importance for relations in the region. But this has been a long-term issue for Japan in which the US does have great interest. You’ll recall the Yanai Commission established by Abe himself in his first term, which studied the issue. The Yanai report relates to Japan’s ability to play a more active role in the alliance and in peacekeeping operations. Many of the ideas in the report represent a natural evolution in Japan’s defense posture, and not something that signals a major departure.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?DEMING: I hope so. This really is not primarily a US-Japan bilateral issue. Japan needs to take these steps to restructure its own economy, for its own good. Abe is clearly focused on the economy. He has taken some short-term steps to stimulate the economy. But long-term, there has to be a fundamental opening up of the economy. TPP is a useful device to help make that happen. I hope that, after the Upper House election, Japan will move in this direction, because it is in the interest of Japan’s long-term economic health, which is very important for the US-Japan relationship.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

DEMING: I have not been to Okinawa in about one year, but I don’t think the political dynamic there concerning Futenma and the planned replacement at Henoko has changed very much. The Henoko plan is still very problematic. We are going ahead with improvements at Futenma. The MV-22s (Osprey) have arrived there. Things seem to be operating smoothly. But I have always been extremely nervous about the possibility of an accident at Futenma, which would really, seriously complicate our overall alliance.

I hope that the new government in Tokyo might be stable and be able to make some long-term plans. And, with the Obama administration beginning its second term, there will be new people coming into office. The two sides might be in a better position to put the Futenma issue back at the top of the agenda and actually do something about the issue. I would hate to see the issue just lie fallow for another 17-18 years; we started discussing this in 1995.

I don’t have any magic solution. But I believe we need new imagination and new energy on the issue.

 

Smith: ‘Japan needs a strategic accommodation with South Korea’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai and Dispatch Japan. It is the fourth in a series of interviews and commentary about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington. Sheila Smith is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Given the troubles with North Korea and China, there will be plenty for Abe and Obama to talk about. But do you expect any specific achievements from the summit?

SMITH: Given events in the region, I think this will be a crisis management summit to reaffirm the alliance. The transition in Japan makes this a good opportunity to discuss some outstanding bilateral issues, including TPP and Okinawa. But the real challenge for both sides will be to conduct the alliance reaffirmation in a way that has real meaning.

In Northeast Asia, we are facing a moment where our bilateral alliance cooperation really matters. We see Japan in a standoff with China over the Senkakus. There is no agreement on maritime boundaries. We’ve got a rising China with a trajectory of military growth.

All of the pieces are there for this to be a pretty serious heads-up for the alliance. The deterrence message is very important, and the Obama administration has done a good job in this area. But the risk-reduction message is also vital. Frameworks – bilateral, trilateral, regional – somehow have to be constructed with Beijing. I suspect there is a significant amount of interest blossoming at some level in China, because this standoff, or worse, is clearly not helpful to China’s longer-term interests.

Meanwhile, this is the beginning of the second Obama administration, and the White House is committed to a rebalancing of American force structure and overall strategic focus toward Asia. This is a moment for the Obama administration to begin defining and refining the rebalancing strategy.

Finally, the economic component of the US-Japan relationship needs enhancement. TPP is one piece of that, but there is much to be gained from a pretty frank discussion by the two leaders about growth strategies, including the yen and longer term economic goals, and how the alliance might work to support those strategies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you see as Abe’s main goal?

SMITH: There has been a lot in the media about superficial things, such as the timing of the summit, or the Kyodo report that the Obama administration gave a firm “no” to collective self defense. Some reports seem almost determined to find problems. I don’t think that this is the tone or tenor of the upcoming meeting.

But there are challenging issues, including TPP and the Henoko project to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.

The Diet has made progress toward ratification of the Hague convention.

The real question is: what will the alliance accomplish? They will have to talk about the longer-term forward deployment of US forces. It wouldn’t be a bad idea to create some kind of strategic consultative process, not just one confined to the Senkaku problem, but one that envisions the shape and roles of the alliance over the next decade or two.

I suspect Abe will want to talk about TPP, even if he is not ready or able to say that Japan will join the talks. The president will want to hear Abe’s views on this. We all know it poses a domestic political hurdle, but the president would like to have a clear sense of how the prime minister plans to proceed.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the Obama administration’s main goal?

SMITH: The administration is anxious to know how much “traction” the alliance can get. There is a tendency to dub recent problems as a “DPJ problem.” I don’t agree with that. Japanese politics are going through a structural transition. There will be governments, like the current Abe cabinet, that say “we have to wait until after the next election” before we can tackle this or that issue. This is not just a problem for one party. It is a structural problem that is as troubling for the conservatives as it was for the liberals, and it poses a big problem for the Japanese government.

The Obama administration wants to embrace the alliance. But there is much more realism in Washington now about how much can be accomplished, and how quickly. The realism first set in while the DPJ was in office, but it has not gone away with the LDP having come back.

There are signals, including the rising stock market and high ratings for the cabinet, that are positive, and people in Washington are aware of this, but the relatively low expectations remain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Washington seems reluctant to appear too close to Abe with respect to collective self-defense or open criticism of China. Is Washington comfortable with Abe, or do his views on history and hawkish tendencies make people leery?

SMITH: There are people in Washington from the Bush administration who have worked with Abe, but the Obama administration needs time to get to know him. It’s best to treat him not as a former prime minister who has come back, but rather as head of a new cabinet that just came to office. That will enable the White House to get a feel for Abe’s perspectives, on the ‘history’ issue, on collective self defense, and other issues.

There definitely are questions in Washington about exactly what Abe means by ‘collective self-defense.’ People would like to get beyond the campaign slogans of “constitutional revision” and “reinterpreting collective self-defense,” so as to get down to the actual details of what that would mean for force posture, for interoperability between US and Japanese forces, and for roles and missions.

The administration would like to know in more concrete ways what his policies are aiming at. For example, when Defense Minister Onodera said he planned to throw out the existing National Defense Program Guidelines, most of us in Washington collectively groaned: “Why? What’s wrong with the ‘dynamic deterrence’ policies outlined in the current NDPG?”

The feeling in the administration is a desire for less of the political coloring of these issues, and more of the concrete details.

Then there is the broader issue of ‘history,’ especially ‘comfort women.’ What does Mr. Abe plan to do? Does he want to issue a new statement, while not replacing the Murayama statement? There are still big questions about the prime minister’s intentions, particularly with regard to Japan’s relations with South Korea. These are not really questions of history of Japan’s wartime activities. The issue really is the viability of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the ROK.

People are watching closely Mr. Abe’s efforts to reach out to South Korea, not simply on a strategic level, but really the broader process of reconciliation and accommodation. This is where Abe’s personal views, and those of some of his cabinet members, will be very important.

We are all looking to see how Mr. Abe will treat the upcoming Takeshima Day, how Minister Shimomura will handle textbook revision, and other issues that could have an impact on Japan-ROK relations.

It is well-known that the prime minister and some of his cabinet members have very explicit personal views. But people are willing to wait and see how they proceed as a government, and make judgments once specific policies emerge.

Given the strategic environment in East Asia, particularly after the recent North Korean nuclear test, Japan and South Korea cannot afford to not move in the direction of a broad accommodation. It is very much in Japan’s strategic interests, equally important perhaps as it is to strengthen the US-Japan alliance.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe has ruled out entry into the TPP talks for now. Will Japan eventually join the talks?

SMITH: The DPJ and the LDP face the same problem: what is going to happen with Japanese agriculture? How much is any Japanese prime minister willing to risk politically to mobilize for agriculture reform? How much is the prime minister willing to use TPP as a tool for promotion of economic competitiveness?

We need Japan to join because that would greatly strengthen TPP. But Japan needs to do so pretty quickly so as to fully participate. Right now, the talks are proceeding without any voice from Japan. It really boils down to whether Japan wants to be pro-active about open markets and competitiveness, or wants to stay in the old mode of incrementalism.

In reality, Abe will probably have to win a huge Upper House election victory to make this possible. And he would still have to convince an awful lot of his own LDP Diet delegation to go along. The consensus-building won’t start until after the Upper House election. No LDP member will want to go into that election campaigning on a pro-TPP platform.

Unfortunately, with the TPP talks supposed to wrap up by the end of this year, that would mean Japan would not be able to catch up and influence the final outcome.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe announced he will not move forward for now with the next step for the Henoko project to replace Futenma (the landfill request to Okinawa). If Abe can’t get the Henoko project moving, who can? Or is it effectively dead?

SMITH: This is certainly not the first government in Tokyo to lack enthusiasm about tackling Okinawa basing issues. Ryutaro Hashimoto was the most pro-active. Junichiro Koizumi was very pro-alliance, but he was not visibly pro-active about Okinawa the way Hashimoto was. Most politicians see only trouble, and no rewards, in becoming heavily involved in Okinawa base issues.

The politics are also more complicated on Okinawa since the days of Hashimoto as prime minister. People often say: wait and see what happens in the next election. In Okinawa, there is always a “next election,” often within six months – governor, prefectural assembly, Nago mayor. There is always something.

But the trend lines have shifted considerably against the Henoko project. Local LDP leaders in Okinawa are openly against the Futenma Replacement facility plan for Henoko. For example, Naha Mayor Onaga led the recent protests that went to Hibiya Park in Tokyo.

We used to think of this as a progressive-left vs. conservative-right issue, and if the conservatives would just come back all would be fine. But it is much more complicated than that.

There is a new reality in the balance among and within Japan’s political parties. You don’t have the same people representing Tokyo and Okinawa. Trust was never very deep between Tokyo and Okinawa, but now there is even less than in the past. Tokyo is going to have to work very hard to win back the conservatives recently elected to the Okinawa prefectural assembly. They openly campaigned against the Henoko project.

I have thought for quite some time that the Henoko project is the least realistic of our options. Now, that is even more the case, with both liberals and conservatives on Okinawa lined up against it.

Can Abe-san shift that? We’ll have to see. Japan hasn’t had a conservative prime minister in quite some time. In any case, it will take time.

Unlike other issues, such as abductees or revision of the Constitution, Okinawa basing is not an issue on which Mr. Abe has been outspoken. We don’t know what he really thinks. But given everything else he has to deal with before the Upper House election, I cannot imagine that this is high on his priority list.